

THE FUNCTIONS OF FUNDAMENTAL PEDAGOGICS

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1. FIRST FUNCTION: Bringing fundamental preconditions to light

1.1.1 Introduction

There is no doubt that EDUCATING, i.e., an adult giving support to a not-yet-adult with the aim of the latter's proper adulthood, **really** exists. Regarding this reality, one can reflect on various persons who investigate its (the event of educating, the pedagogic) meaning in a variety of ways.

- (i) In the first place there are those who, on the basis of their natural involvement in educating (e.g., parents), engage themselves in and think about the educative activities they have, will, or are carrying out. They are **educators** who are involved with children in **educational situations** and who reflect on this being together. In other words, they have their particular perspective on the event of educating that, as an educator's, is called an **educational perspective**.
- (ii) Another group of "educators" are experts because of their preparation in/study of Pedagogics. They are called **pedagogues** and are involved with children in **pedagogic situations** and, in expert ways, they reflect on the educative activities they engage in with children. In other words, they have an expert perspective on the educative event that is called a **pedagogic perspective**, i.e., a pedagogue's perspective.
- (iii) A third group distinguishable are those who, in scientifically accountable ways, investigate educational

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and pedagogic situations in order to disclose their real essences, their sense and coherences, especially with the aim of their being noted by pedagogues studying them and by giving guidance to educators on their basis. They are **pedagogicians** who carry out scientific studies in **pedagogical situations** regarding the phenomenon of educating that is manifested in educational and pedagogic situations. In other words, they have a scientific perspective on the educative event that is called a **pedagogical perspective**, i.e., the perspective of a pedagogician.

Thus there is:

- (i) an educational perspective (non-expert);
- (ii) a pedagogic perspective (expert); and
- (iii) a pedagogical perspective (scientific).

There are a variety of pedagogical (scientific) perspectives (part-perspectives) and a particularly relevant question is with which of the above perspectives are they involved?

- (i) Certainly not with an **educational perspective** because the practitioners and authorities of these perspectives just mentioned possess expert knowledge of the event of educating;
- (ii) also not with a **pedagogic perspective** because they are not merely involved in applying their expertise in the child's interest;
- (iii) but indeed with a **pedagogical perspective** because each part-perspective has the task of the **ontological** understanding of the event of educating from its own perspective. Thus each has to overcome essence blindness and disclose real pedagogical essences in terms of their sense (content) and coherences (structures).

This view implies that there are various part-perspectives of Pedagogics that involve themselves with the **pedagogical perspective** on educative activities. Consequently, there is mention of a sociopedagogician using the pedagogical perspective in

· These three terms are placed in parentheses because here one really is involved with tautologies.

sociopedagogical ways and then there is mention of a **sociopedagogical perspective**. For the same reason there is a **psychopedagogical perspective**, a **didactic pedagogical perspective**, etc.

Is there also mention of a sociopedagogic, a psychopedagogic, a didactic pedagogic, etc. perspective? Yes, to the extent that a **pedagogue** evaluates, plans, etc. his educative activities with a child in the light of his expert knowledge of the sociopedagogical, the psychopedagogical, etc. Here, however, a science as such is not involved **but** rather there is use of sociopedagogical, etc. findings in practice⁽¹⁾.

Various persons **involve** themselves in various ways with the reality of educating, thus with the EDUCATIVE REALITY. They investigate this reality with a greater or lesser degree of intensity and radicalness (essence-awareness). Persons who use the **pedagogical perspective** view the educative reality as an area for radical (radix = root), i.e., scientific investigation, thus as their **area of study**. The area of study of the pedagogical perspective is the reality of educating. This means that the area of study of the various pedagogical perspectives that can be distinguished (the psycho-, didactic-, fundamental-, etc.) also is the reality of educating. The fact that there are different perspectives indicates that each involves itself in different ways with the **total** reality of educating. For example:

- (a) The **Psychopedagogical** investigates the **total** reality of educating in order to disclose how a child's **psychic life** is executed and actualized in that reality. In other words, the psychopedagogical is involved with the psychic life of a child-in-the-reality-of-educating (child with educator, child-in-education).
- (b) The **Didactic Pedagogical** approaches (brings closer) the **total** reality of educating with the aim of showing how a child's **didactic life** (meaningful didactic ways of living) is actualized in that reality. In other words, the didactic pedagogical is involved with the **didactic ways of living** of a child-in-the-reality-of-educating (child-in-education).
- (c) The **Fundamental Pedagogical** reflects on and considers the **total** reality of educating with the aim of disclosing **fundamental** ways of living of a child-

in-the-reality-of-educating (child with educator). Via fundamental (penetrating)⁽²⁾ thinking, the fundamental pedagogical searches for:

- (i) **preconditions** for being an educator (also a pedagogue), i.e., for fundamental-pedagogical structures that, among others, carry the educator (pedagogue) as an accompanier (guider) of the actualization of the child's psychic and didactic life in the reality of educating;
- (ii) **preconditions** for being a child-in-education, i.e., for fundamental pedagogical structures in which a child-in-education is intertwined in his actualization of his psychic and didactic life (which he occupies) in his being on the way to proper adulthood.

Stated differently, because the Psychopedagogical, the Didactic Pedagogical, the Fundamental Pedagogical, etc. all are Pedagogical (perspectives) their area of study is the reality of educating **but** each has a different aim. This means that each pedagogical perspective has a different FUNCTION as far as its area of study of the Pedagogical is concerned. Each perspective has its own way of contributing to disclosing the **sense** of the total reality of educating, i.e., each makes a contribution to understanding the meaning of the educative reality for a human way of living.⁽³⁾ The psychopedagogical perspective discloses those meaningful ways of living⁽⁴⁾ in the reality of educating that are or can be relevant to the **psychic life** of a child-in-education and that are or can be actualized in practice. By using the pedagogical perspective in its own ways the Didactic Pedagogical discloses the **ways of living with significance for teaching**. The function of the Fundamental Pedagogical perspective is to disclose **fundamental** ways of educative living that are preconditions for actualizing all other ways of educative living. With this a **first function** of the Fundamental Pedagogical (perspective) is revealed: disclose the **preconditions** of all meaningful ways of educative living in the form of psychic, didactic, social, vocational orientation, physical ways of living and living-with-deficiencies of a child-in-educative-distress.

1.1.2 Fundamental preconditions

The fundamental preconditions⁽⁵⁾ mentioned here are:

- (a) the pedagogic **relationship structure** that is made up of the following structures
 - (i) understanding
 - (ii) trust
 - (iii) authority
- (b) the pedagogic **sequence structure** that exists according to the following structures
 - (i) association
 - (ii) encounter
 - (iii) engagement
 - (iv) intervention
 - a. interference
 - b. approval
 - (v) return to association
 - (vi) periodic breaking away
- (c) the pedagogic **activity structure** formed by the following structures
 - (i) giving meaning
 - (ii) exerting
 - (iii) exemplifying norms
 - (iv) venturing
 - (v) thankfulness (gratitude)
 - (vi) accountability
 - (vii) hope
 - (viii) design
 - (ix) realization
 - (x) human dignity
 - (xi) self-knowledge
 - (xii) freedom
- (d) the pedagogic **aim structure** in which the following structures appear
 - (i) meaningful existence
 - (ii) self-judgment and self-understanding
 - (iii) worthiness of being human
 - (iv) morally independent choosing and acting
 - (v) norm-identification
 - (vi) philosophy of life

(These fundamental **structural preconditions**, also called ESSENCES or fundamental ways of living, are described briefly in the second column of the table in Chapter Two, section 2.4.2).

1.2 SECOND FUNCTION: Describing and explaining the fundamental ways of thinking

1.2.1 Introduction

A second function of Fundamental Pedagogics, in its scientific approach to the reality of educating as a particular given reality (as it really is⁽⁶⁾), as a fact that cannot be thought away, as it is⁽⁷⁾ in its full meaning⁽⁸⁾ as pedagogic life,⁽⁹⁾ is to indicate the WAYS OF THINKING (ways of disclosing, discovering, manifesting, bringing-to-light) by which pedagogical essences (meaningful pedagogic ways of living) can appear with their sense and coherences. Fundamental Pedagogics **demonstrates** ways of thinking by showing how fundamental ways of pedagogic living can be unconcealed. To do this is **fundamental** work. It is fundamental work because the FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION is a question of a really experientiable and experienced reality (e.g., educating). It is a question of the **ways of being** of an aspect of reality⁽¹⁰⁾ (e.g., educating) as a question of its real essences.

By indicating the ways of thinking, the **fundamental question** is answered. The ways of thinking exist in a number of **steps of thinking**, as particular **thought-questions**:

1.2.2 First question: WHERE does the reality of educating appear so that it can be investigated scientifically?

The **places**⁽¹¹⁾ where the reality of educating appear for study are:

- (i) the everyday reality of educating;⁽¹²⁾
- (ii) literature;⁽¹³⁾
- (iii) the social sciences;⁽¹⁴⁾
- (iv) philosophical anthropology;⁽¹⁵⁾
- (v) life philosophy sources [for a Christian]
 - (a) The Bible, together with concordances and other forms of exegeses,
 - (b) The Christian-Protestant Marriage Formulary,

- (c) The Christian-Protestant Baptism Formulary,
- (d) The Heidelberg Catechism,
- (e) The Netherland Creed,
- (f) The Dordrecht Cannons.⁽¹⁶⁾

These places also are called **sources of knowledge**.

1.2.3 Second question: What DISPOSITION (ATTUNEMENT) is necessary to allow the investigation (search for essences) to succeed?

An **attentive** disposition is required and this means the following have to occur:

- (i) a lively cognizance of the knowledge provided by the sources of knowledge;
- (ii) a vigilant listening to (reading of) what the sources of knowledge provide;
- (iii) an intense examination of the reality of educating itself;
- (iv) a serious lingering with the sources of knowledge as a thorough and careful study of them;
- (v) an enthusiastic essence-awareness as a **wanting** (willing) to notice pedagogical essences;
- (vi) a diligent **wanting** to abolish everything that might promote essence blindness;⁽¹⁷⁾
- (vii) an attentive openness and directedness to the sources of knowledge; and
- (viii) a sharpened search for what continually appears in the sources of knowledge as pedagogic, i.e., as promoting a child's becoming an adult.

1.2.4 Third question: What means are necessary to be able to bring to light the essences of the reality of educating that appear in the sources of knowledge?

Illuminating means of thinking are necessary. Thinking in terms of “an adult accompanying a child to adulthood” illuminates the appearing reality of educating. Thus, this is the **category** in light of which the sources of knowledge are investigated with the aim of unveiling the essential characteristics (essences) of this category. The meanings of accompanying a child (pedagogical essences) have to be brought to light and this only is effectively possible if the

sources of knowledge are studied (approached) **in terms of** “accompanying a child” (the pedagogical).

"Accompanying a child" is used as a light (category) for thinking. To more deeply (i.e., more radically) penetrate the appearing reality of educating it is necessary that the light for thinking, "accompanying a child", be made clearer. This is possible because the essences that "accompanying a child" has manifested now are used as categories. Thus, continually more categories (illuminating means of thinking) are placed at the disposal of the pedagogician.⁽¹⁸⁾

At this time it is possible that one or more essences (meaningful pedagogic ways of living) are brought to light: when possible essences have appeared the further question that has to be posed is aimed at determining if the possible essences have **real essence-status**.

1.2.5 Fourth question: With what step of verification can the phenomenological investigation begin?

THINKING AWAY⁽¹⁹⁾

In thinking, a pedagogician directs himself to the reality of educating itself (in its various places of appearance) because the real pedagogical essences with their coherences that he seeks are found there. Now he has to begin to test (verify) the essentiality (essence-status) of the essence(s) that he thinks he has noticed. He has to show that these essences are so characteristic of educating that if they are negated or eliminated, educating in its fullness is not possible. He has to show that the essences he has noticed cannot be thought away from an authentic educative situation. Thus, he works as follows: He tries to think away these essences from the educative situations he knows. If a situation is still an authentic situation of educating after the (presumed) essences of concern are thought away from it, his alleged essences do not have essence-status. In other words, if in his reflecting on the educative situations that he knows and can recall, he varies (modifies) them so that the essences he wants to test are absent and educating in its fullness still is possible, he has not noticed real pedagogical essences.

Subsequently, he has to investigate, in thought, different variations of ordinary situations of educating. He has to investigate whether his presumed essences also cannot be thought away from vocational orientation situations, pedotherapeutic situations, didactic-pedagogic situations, etc. If the essences cannot be thought away from all such variations of educating then they are given essence-status. In order to execute what has just been described, the pedagogician has to **converse** with the practitioners of the various areas of the science of pedagogics and also he has to undertake a study of the literature.

1.2.6 Fifth question: How can the investigation into the practice of educating as such continue?

ACTING AWAY⁽²⁰⁾

Now the pedagogician further determines if what he has shown cannot be thought away also cannot really be acted away. It is possible that he committed errors in thinking during his thinking away activities and now, in order to attain greater certainty, he tries to act away the essences he was not able to think away in real educative situations. However, immediately, this is very difficult for him because by attempting to act away, by putting particular obstacles in the way of a child-in-education, it is clear to him that "he shall offend one of these little ones which believe in me, it were better for him that a millstone were hanged about his neck, and *that* he were drowned in the depth of the sea" (Math. 18:6). Acting away any educative essence decidedly has to be seen as an obstacle because this impedes a child in his being on the way to proper adulthood. "Acting away experiments", therefore, are not permissible by a Christian-Protestant's philosophy of life but also they are anti-pedagogic.

The question that now arises is how a pedagogician can carry out this step of acting away? Before trying to answer this question first it is advisable to determine the scientific methodological necessity for such a step. Is that which is not permissible by a philosophy of life and that is anti-pedagogic justifiable on scientific grounds?

Acting away appears to be scientifically (methodologically) necessary because it can be a meaningful way of verification. If one can act as if a particular educative essence does not exist and educating in its fullness still is possible then one is not dealing with

a real educative essence. It also is clear that a real acting away is a stronger verification than thinking away in which human errors of thinking can be committed if the thinker's recall of educative situations he has experienced fail him. But acting away is not permissible both in terms of a life philosophy and pedagogically. How then must the necessary acting away be carried out such that both the philosophy of life and the pedagogic objections can be avoided? The following answer is possible: the pedagogician has to study educative situations in which particular educative essences are acted away. How can such a study be done? The most meaningful way is to study the data of a Child Guidance Institute and determine where the acting away of particular educative essences has led. A Fundamental Pedagogician and an Orthopedagogician, e.g., jointly can carry out such a study.

1.2.7 Sixth question: How can there be assurance that the essences (pedagogically meaningful ways of living) that so far have withstood two verifications appear more clearly such that their further actualization is promoted?

SEPARATING⁽²¹⁾

The scientific necessity of acting away was noted and an acceptable method for investigating acting away was indicated. At this stage the pedagogician knows that his presumed essentials cannot be thought or acted away. Now he proceeds to additional verification steps in order to increase the certainty of the essence-status of the presumed essences he has disclosed. However, before proceeding to such further steps of thinking he carries out another activity. He wants the essences that cannot be thought and acted away to appear very clearly so that the additional steps of thinking can be carried out as effectively as possible. Thus, he separates the essences from the non-essences (what can be thought and acted away) that also are found in the pedagogic situation (e.g., the accepting actions of the educators in contrast to their physical statistics, etc.). The scientific necessity of this separation lies in the demand for the clearer appearance of the essences in order that the additional steps of thinking can be carried out as effectively as possible and also to note clearly what is valid and necessary for **all** educative situations.

1.2.8 Seventh question: How can it be determined if the essences that now appear clearly, perhaps, are not valid but that their opposites are?

CONTRADICTIONS⁽²²⁾

The separation of the essentials from the non-essentials is now accomplished. The non-essentials are not thought about further and thinking is unimpeded by them and the effort is to verify further the essence-status of what is seen as essential. To such verification, as a further reinforcement of certainty, one's philosophy of life also is roused. A Christian philosophy of life demands that only the very best be done for the Covenant child and that there is a strong assurance that what cannot be thought and acted away, i.e., the essentiality of educating, is promoted in doing things for and with a child. It also is noted, from a philosophy of life perspective, that because of their separation from the non-essentials the essentials already appear more clearly but still have to be dealt with further.

One meaningful way of dealing with them is to pose for each essence its contradiction as a possibility. There is the possibility that the contradiction (opposite, converse) of each essence is present in a pedagogic situation. Thus, such contradictions have reality-status, but the question is whether they have a right to exist in an authentic pedagogic situation. If these contradictions should have the right to exist, this means that the essence-status of the essences, on further verification, do not have a right to exist and thus they cannot be educative essences. Then, the essences and their contradictions are in conflict with each other. The conflict can paralyze educative actions if a contradiction of an educative essence cannot be eliminated. If elimination is not possible, because the contradiction indeed has a right to exist in an educative situation, the essence of which it is a contradiction is not a real essence. That which can be shown to have the right to exist with a degree of certainty and at the exclusion of the other, probably is a real essence of educating. Not having the right to exist of the one confirms the right of the other to exist. This has to do with two contrasting forces that are active. The positive is opposed to the negative and the actualization of the latter can lead to tragedy. Thus, the educator has to be able to identify himself with the positive. Such identification is more easily done if the essence-status of the positive is noted clearly. Among other ways, showing the indubitability of the negativity of the contradiction can do this.

In the contradiction, an educative essence is placed against its negation. If such an essence can be replaced arbitrarily by its contradiction, it cannot have ontological status. The ontological principle of contradiction is stated as follows by Hessen: a being cannot simultaneously be and not be, or the being and non-being of the same being exclude each other. In this light, it has to be shown that educative essences have to be pedagogically meaningful and that their contradictions are pedagogically meaningless. The pedagogical meaninglessness of a contradiction lies not only in the fact that the pedagogic is more obscured, altered and concealed by this contradiction but that it even is nullified by it. Therefore, the pedagogician looks for essences, for the non-contradictory, for the generally valid, and what cannot be thought away.

1.2.9 Eighth question: In what way can the meanings (and coherences) of these essences that have endured verification so far be determined?

THE HERMENEUTIC QUESTION⁽²³⁾

The essences of educating of which their right and also necessity to exist now have increasingly been confirmed by thinking and acting away, by separating essentials from non-essentials and by "contradictory" thinking, now appear in the clearest way possible.

The pedagogician now is prepared to continue with his verification. No essence of educating is actualized for the sake of itself but with the aim of actualizing another essence indissolubly connected with it. (Thus, by moving from one essence to another there is movement yet nearer to adulthood). Hence, the verification of essence-status includes the determination of coherences. Is there a coherence between one essence of educating and another? An affirmative answer is a confirmation of its essence-status. Thus, if an essence of educating has a connection with additional essences of educating that cannot be thought and acted away, its essence-status becomes clearer. The following question is posed: Does the significance of one essence lie in the fact that it makes the actualization of another essence possible? An essence of educating only has meaning if it is a precondition for actualizing another essence of educating. For example, the significance of the pedagogic relationship structure is that it makes possible the actualization of the pedagogic sequence structure. In other words, there is a meaningful connection between the pedagogic relationship and

sequence structures. The relationship between them cannot be thought or acted away. This is an ontic connection.


Now, the question is how can a coherence be shown? The answer is by asking the hermeneutic question. The hermeneutic question is "What is the function of this particular essence?" Since it can be shown that a particular essence of educating serves to actualize another, this confirms its essence-status still further. Such an essence of educating has pedagogic significance, i.e., it is pedagogically meaningful.

1.2.10 Ninth question: How can it be ascertained if a pedagogic way of living (essence) that thus far has maintained its essence-status will be meaningfully implemented in the way it is actualized?

To be pedagogically meaningful an essence has to be actualized in pedagogic situations. It has to fit meaningfully into a way of actualizing that is **triadic** in nature.⁽²⁴⁾

The sense of a particular essence, among others, is that it makes possible the actualization of another essence. Thus, there is a coherence between the two essences. For example, the meaning of pedagogic (educative) association with its **being-by** each other of child and adult is that it is a precondition for their **being-with** each other in pedagogic encounter: persons first must be **by** each other before they can deepen their relationship to the intimacy of a **being-with** each other. Thus, the significance of a pedagogic encounter is that it makes possible the emergence of educative matters (an adult notices a reason why he has to intervene with a child) on the basis of which the educating adult assumes responsibility to intervene pedagogically (interfere or approve) followed by the intervention itself.

What was just described is represented as follows:



This representation means the following:

- (i) Pedagogic association is a precondition for actualizing a pedagogic encounter;
- (ii) pedagogic association, as such, is inadequate to lead to an authentic engagement. This inadequacy is overcome by the intensifying force of the pedagogic encounter;
- (iii) both pedagogic association and encounter are preserved and maintained in the engagement. If, for example, the simultaneity of the association (child and adult are by each other at the same time) and the spatiality of the association (child and adult are aware of each other's presence at the same place) should disappear the adult cannot intervene with the child because then the child is absent. If the pedagogic encounter is not preserved and maintained in the engagement, pedagogic nearness, turning to-in-trust, experiencing belongingness, etc. disappear, all of which are preconditions for intensifying the vague indications for intervention to a clearer emergence of educative matters. Then the educator will not know why he should intervene with the child and his assuming responsibility for intervening is not possible;
- (iv) there is mention of a movement from association to encounter followed by a joint movement to engagement;
- (v) the three essences and the movement mentioned in (iv) have the right and necessity to exist in a pedagogic situation since the pedagogic (accompanying a child in the direction of proper adulthood) is not possible without them. Thus, there is a movement from a first possibility (association) to a second possibility (encounter) and then jointly to a third possibility or synthesis (engagement). Such a [dialectic] movement is known as a triadic one;
- (vi) here there is mention of actualizing three ways of being a person that follow each other--thus there is the idea of a course (movement in a specific direction);
- (vii) it is clear that if the educator tries to eliminate the second possibility (encounter) he will act pedagogically improperly. This is because he then is trying to bring about engagement in an inadequate way. Thus, this triadic movement is loaded with normative matters (demands of propriety);
- (viii) there are an indeterminate number of triadic movements in a pedagogic situation of which the example given is only one. On this basis a pedagogic situation is a triadic one in which the being a person (human being) of both educator and child flourish by means of a first possibility (way of being), an additional possibility and a synthesis.

1.2.11 Tenth question: How can it be determined if the essences that have survived the verifications so far are really lights appearing in the reality of educating?

CATEGORICAL AND CRITERIAL STATUS⁽²⁵⁾

The essence-status of the essences of educating now appear unable to be thought away, to be beyond dispute and to be unquestionable. Even so, the pedagogician is not absolutely satisfied that he has noticed real essences of educating. The following step in thinking (that for the first time now becomes a meaningful possibility) must be carried out: the categorical status of the essences has to be investigated. Can these essences be elevated to categories? In other words: Do these essences possess the possibility of being implemented as illuminating means of thinking? If it seems that such essences cannot be employed in pedagogical thinking in order to illuminate other essences of educating so that more of its essences come to light by such an illumination, the essence-status of such educative essences becomes doubtful. The categorical test is viewed as a particularly powerful and deep-reaching way of verification.

If pedagogical essences with categorical status are formulated as questions they can be implemented as yardsticks for judging pedagogic situations, thus as criteria. In this way it can be determined if the essences possess categorical status.

1.2.12 Eleventh question: How can it be determined if there are OTHER METHODS that can be meaningfully implemented along with the phenomenological method in a pedagogical investigation?

Above it was indicated how the contradictory (question 7), the hermeneutic (question 8) and the dialectic (question 9) can be used as **steps of the phenomenological method**. The test of whether or not another method (experimental, statistical, etc.) can be meaningfully employed is if it can make a meaningful contribution to revealing essences. Thus it has to be determined if the method can be employed meaningfully as a particular step in the phenomenological method (See **Appendix A** at the end of this chapter).

1.2.13 Twelfth question: After an essence still possesses the necessity to exist after all of the verification steps, how can I determine that it will be meaningful for me?

ACCEPTABILITY AND AWAKENING-TO-LIFE (ENLIVENMENT)⁽²⁶⁾

The question is “May the educative essence(s) that I have noticed be actualized by me as a Christian-Protestant educator in real educative situations?” It is necessary that I view a particular educative essence(s) from the perspective of my particular philosophy of life only to be certain if I can attribute to the essence(s) the status of “essence(s)-for-me”.

The essences that have passed the test of philosophy of life acceptability now can be dealt with further. Indeed, philosophy of life acceptability spurs me on to the following step and makes it possible to give meaning to these essences. Acceptability leaves no doubt about permissibility. The Christian-Protestant pedagogician, who accepts the educative essences as essences-for-him, feels himself called to actualize these essences in his educative work. However, there is a precondition that must be met before there can be mention of actualizing. Something particular must be accepted, namely, the awakening-to-life (enlivenment) of the essences of educating that are characterized by their lifelessness but still have life acceptability. (Because of it, lifelessness can be transformed into liveliness). Lifeless educative essences, because of their life acceptability, can be awakened to a particular life, to educative life. How is educative life awakened? Answer: Educative life is awakened in educative essences by the essences of a philosophy of life that are illuminated by studying philosophy of life sources as particular sources of educative knowledge.

The philosophy of life essences serve as life-giving content of the educative essences. (For examples see Landman, W. A., *Leesboek vir die Christen-Opvoeder*. NG Kerkboekhandel, Pretoria). However, the question that must be answered here is if such awakening to life by the Christian-Protestant pedagogician and educator is permissible. May he use his philosophy of life to awaken educative life? It is immediately clear to him that he cannot create life because it is only God who can be the Creator of life. (Ps. 104: 30a “Thou sendest forth thy spirit, they are created.” Acts. 17:25 “Neither is worshipped with men’s hands, as though he needed anything, seeing he giveth to all life, and breath, and all things.”) May the

Christian educator use the life that God created to awaken life in educative essences? The following is meaningful in this regard:

- (i) Educative life through obedience

Ezekiel 20:11: “And I gave them my statutes, and showed them my judgments, which *if* a man do, he shall even live in them.” (Actualizing educative essences in light of God’s Word makes educative life possible).

- (ii) The Word of God is the source of life (thus also of educative life)

“... but by every *word* that proceedeth out of the mouth of the Lord doth man live.” (Also a Christian’s educative life in light of God’s Word.)

- (iii) One finds life with God

Proverbs 8:35. “For whoso findeth me findeth life, and shall obtain favour of the Lord.” (With the life that the Christian educator finds, he can awaken educative essences.)

1.2.14 Thirteenth question: How can it be determined if the phenomenological method is not already obsolete?

(See Appendix B at the end of this chapter.)

1.2.15 Fourteenth question: How can it be determined if the phenomenological method is an effective method for illuminating pedagogic life in meaningful ways?

This can be done by studying the publications of phenomenologists and then deciding if they make a meaningful contribution to understanding the pedagogic or not.


1.3 THIRD FUNCTION: Describing and explaining the fundamental grounding of the pedagogic

The word "fundamental" leads one to think of the Latin "fundamentum" that means ground or basis. The Latin "fundare" means to provide a ground or basis.⁽²⁷⁾ In this section "fundamental grounding" means the search for the ontological, anthropological grounds of the pedagogic.

GROUNDEDNESS⁽²⁸⁾

Groundedness means that the ground, origin, source of an essence can be indicated. If this can be done, its essence-status is confirmed. In connection with an essence, this means the following true to life questions have to be answered: For example, on what basis is the pedagogic encounter possible? Answer: on the basis that a human being is a being-with. On what basis is being-with possible? Answer: on the basis of a human being as being-in-the-world.

The grounding demonstrated by this example is that the pedagogic is



The essence-status is confirmed for each pedagogic essence (thus including the essences of a lesson structure) whose ground, thus source of origin, can be shown in this way.

Being-in-the-world (ontological category) gives rise to human ways of life that, in their turn, are the origin of particular human activities such as, e.g., the pedagogic. Consequently, e.g., being-in-the-world is the origin of, thus the ground of the possibility of being-with that, in its turn, is the origin of (precondition for) pedagogic encounter, etc. That a pedagogic encounter has its origin (ground, foundation) in the lifeworld is an indication of its essence-status.

It is clear that here there is mention of grounds and of grounding and not of deducing. Ways of being-in-the-world are not deduced from being-in-the-world but are grounded in it. On what basis is the

pedagogic possible? Answer: It is possible because the anthropological exists. The pedagogic is one of a number of possible human activities and the pedagogic is only understandable and possible as a particular anthropological (anthropic--Viljoen) event.

If the anthropological ground of, e.g., the essences of a lesson structure can be shown, this can indicate the nearness-to-life of these essences: particular ways of human living become embodied as lesson structure essences.

1.4 FOURTH FUNCTION: Describing and explicating fundamental criteria for being scientific⁽²⁹⁾

Fundamental Pedagogics emphasizes what is fundamental and leads to an authentic becoming aware of what carries and controls illuminative pedagogical thinking, thus the scientific observation of real pedagogical essences, namely the wonder (Plato, Aristotle) and the admiration (Marcel) that there are pedagogical essences (essences of child accompaniment with their sense and coherences) and that these essences are as they are and not otherwise. As a form of SCIENCE Pedagogics is a knowing of real pedagogical essences. It is a knowing that satisfies the following preconditions:

1. It is critically accountable, i.e.,
 - (a) free of errors and mistakes;
 - (b) verifiable: its authenticity must be determinable in the reality of educating itself and it must be logical;
 - (c) free from prejudgments;
 - (d) with an elucidation of presuppositions, e.g., that real essences exists and that they can be disclosed. A presupposition that can be shown to be unquestionably true is called a fundamental axiom;
 - (e) free of contradictions (contraries);
 - (f) free of categories from non-human orders of being such as the animal and plant kingdoms and the order of the physical and the chemical;
 - (g) satisfies criteria for being scientific such as:

(i) Universality. Science is knowledge of the generally valid (e.g., which is true for all educative situations) and the necessary (that which is necessary for all educative situations), i.e., knowledge of real pedagogical essences.

(ii) Groundedness in the universal lifeworld itself, thus not at all an anthropological conception (particular personal opinion).

2. It is methodically acquired knowledge, i.e., as far as Fundamental Pedagogics is concerned, it is phenomenological in the clarity (light, unconcealedness, openness) of presently established knowledge of **real** pedagogical essences. This has to do with a phenomenology that necessarily satisfies the following preconditions:

- (a) Ontology only is possible as phenomenology (Heidegger): Only by a phenomenological approach can real essences be adequately disclosed).
- (b) Phenomenology only is meaningful as ontology: Only that scientist (here: pedagogician) is a phenomenologist who can decidedly elucidate, interpret and give reasons why Pedagogics is Essence-pedagogics; thus pedagogical thinking is what is understood ontologically (understanding of real pedagogical essences, their sense and coherences, against the universal lifeworld, within which the educative event is embedded as a background for this thinking).
- (c) Phenomenological thinking is categorical thinking; i.e., that pedagogician only is a phenomenologist who can be accountable for the categories that he attentively uses as explicatory means of thinking, thus illuminating, access-creating and expressing means.

(d) Phenomenological steps of thinking are accountable steps of thinking; i.e., carrying out the steps of thinking that are necessary for disclosing the reality of accompanying a child (educative reality) must satisfy two preconditions, namely:

(i) Scientific necessity: it must make an unmistakable and indispensable contribution to bringing to light real essences, their sense and coherences;

(ii) Philosophy of life permissibility: this may not clash with the pedagogician's philosophy of life. Thus, it must satisfy the demands of his philosophy of life.

1.5 FIFTH FUNCTION: Describing and explaining the structural status of a philosophy of life

That a philosophy of life is fundamental in pedagogic situations must be shown by Fundamental Pedagogics.

When it is noticed that:

- (i) educating really is philosophy of life actualizing, and
- (ii) neutral educating is not possible

it is meaningful to see the following structural characteristics⁽³⁰⁾ of a philosophy of life:

In the first place, if it has structural status, a philosophy of life can be seen as a **general rule**. Then, for example, to ask "Which general rules must be satisfied before a situation can be viewed as an educative situation?" is the same as asking "Which philosophy of life demands make it possible for a situation to appear as a **pedagogic** situation?" Fundamental Pedagogics reflectively searches for these demands.

Second, a structure is a **constitutive unity**. This means that a philosophy of life is a reality without which another reality (e.g., the reality of educating) can neither be thought nor exist. A philosophy of life thus is characterized by its necessity and inevitability. To ask what philosophy of life demand is necessary for a pedagogic situation to arise is to ask about a particular fundamental structure of that situation. The question also can be stated as follows: “What is constitutive of the pedagogic situation?” or “What constitutes the educative situation?” That is to say, what realities belong exclusively to the educative situation and is a philosophy of life such a reality? Fundamental Pedagogics wants to answer these questions.

In the third place a philosophy of life, as a fundamental structure, is a **precondition**, i.e., something that is required for something. In other words, it is something that must be present for something else (e.g., the educative situation) to exist. Educating cannot be understood in its real essence if there is no reference to the realities that are preconditions for it and this also holds for a philosophy of life as a particular reality. Thus, the preconditions are the foundation that makes possible what comes into being (e.g., educating). In other words, preconditions refer to the possible requirements, and, indeed, requirements that set demands in order to be actualized (realized, figured forth) otherwise what is built up (namely, educating) is not possible.

Fourth, as a fundamental structure, a philosophy of life is a reality that is a particular **carrier of meaning**, where “particular” indicates that if the philosophy of life is thought away or treated as if it doesn’t exist, what is built up (e.g., education) does not at all mean what it must really mean. When philosophy of life demands are described as carriers of meaning, this means that without them the pedagogic will not have meaning and will not be understandable, thus will be meaningless. Hence, to understand educating requires an understanding of what these carriers of meaning are and what their real essentials are. Fundamental Pedagogics reflectively searches for carriers of meaning, also for the philosophy of life, as a particular carrier of meaning.

In the fifth place, as a fundamental structure, a philosophy of life is a **real essence**. That is, it is something that is (exists) and that belongs essentially to that of which it is an essence. The question “What are the real essences of the educative situation?” is a question

of the reality that is necessary for the situation to exist, of what is not accidental (thus, genuine) and non-changeable but is consistent (invariant) for all educative situations. One of these realities is a philosophy of life.

Sixth, as a fundamental structure, a philosophy of life is **evident**, i.e., a reality that shows itself as obvious, (seemingly self-evident), undisputable, and irrefutable. Something evident also is that which is obviously valid, i.e., against which no objection can be made even if it possibly can't be something one is certain of. Evident is what can be recognized and referred to as unquestionable. The evidences of an educative situation, also a philosophy of life as something evident, must be found and disclosed by reflective penetration, thus by radically thinking it through. That which pedagogics is and that can be nothing else, that which is experienced as necessary in an educative situation must be disclosed, otherwise the event of educating cannot be understood. Fundamental Pedagogics reflectively searches for evidences and also finds a philosophy of life to be something evident.

In the seventh place, as a structure, a philosophy of life is something **experientable**, i.e., a reality that, through the scientific, is experienced as undeniably and unquestionably embedded in the totality of life and in which life also is present. A philosophy of life, as fundamental structure, then, is what brings to light particular norms in thinking through the scientific as a condition of life. A philosophy of life as a pedagogic structure, then will be the normative that in being reflectively fathomed is experienced as life-giving to the educative event, as that without which educative activities will not be viable and without which this event, as a particular facet of human life, will not be understood. Fundamental Pedagogics reflectively searches for those realities that make the pedagogic situation viable and sees a philosophy of life as such a reality.

OBSERVATION

In the above there is frequent mention of a philosophy of life as a fundamental structure, i.e., as generally valid. Now, when there must be a choice of **which** philosophy of life will be adopted as **that** philosophy, there is a move to the terrain of the particular because then a choice must be made that demands a personal

decision. The true Afrikaner unconditionally has chosen the Christian National idea.

1.6 On the statement “Everything Pedagogical is Fundamental Pedagogical”

For the critical reader of the above five functions of Fundamental Pedagogics it is easy to describe this statement as extremely naïve. This also is so because only Fundamental Pedagogics is able to perform fundamental work by means of a functional analysis.

The statement: all pedagogics is **fundamental in nature**, however, is valid, but only for those pedagogical perspectives that do the following:

- (i) describe and interpret the coherences that the ways of pedagogic life with which they are concerned have with the fundamental pedagogic ways of living;
- (ii) in their own investigation of the reality of educating follow the fundamental way of thinking by applying its own categories;
- (iii) they are sensitive to ontological-anthropological grounding;
- (iv) they satisfy fundamental criteria for being scientific; and
- (v) they uphold the structural status of a philosophy of life.

1.7 Fundamental pedagogics, educative learning and subject matter teaching

Since Fundamental Pedagogics also has the task of expressing itself about its own becoming a practice it is interested in the possibilities of becoming a practice. One matter that has a particular practice-making effect on fundamental pedagogical essences is LEARNING. In the next chapter educative learning and the modes of learning as they are illuminated by Psychopedagogics are viewed fundamental-pedagogically. Because learning is actualized during the **course of a lesson** there also is reference to these particular modes of didactic life. For this purpose, the essences of the course of a lesson are described as follows:

BRIEF DESCRIPTIONS OF SOME ESSENTIALS OF THE LESSON STRUCTURE

1. TEACHING AIM: The parts played by teaching and learning in the child's becoming a proper adult.

- (i) **Lesson aim:** The role of the teacher in a specific lesson (e.g., his form of presentation) in order to achieve a particular aim (unlocking an aspect of reality).
- (ii) **Learning aim:** The role of the child in accomplishing a particular effect (i.e., what he, as a learning child, must achieve) from the lesson.

2. SIX PHASES OF A LESSON

(i) **Actualizing foreknowledge:** Existing meaningful and relevant experiences are brought forth.

- (a) **Becoming-aware-of-foreknowledge:** The child is made aware that he has relevant, meaningful experiences at his disposal.
- (b) **Eliciting-foreknowledge:** Bringing to light primary essentials from the child's experiential world (as meaningful points of linking up on which there can be further building).
- (c) **Enlivening-foreknowledge:** Teacher appreciates the child's already existing meaningful knowledge (experiences).

(ii) **Stating the problem:** Posing a meaningful question to the child that directs an appeal to his inquiring consciousness.

- (a) **Guiding-to-problem-formulation:** The child is helped to state the learning aim (as defined by the teacher) in the form of a question.
- (b) **Experiencing-the-lesson-problem:** The question posed must be experienced by the learning child as meaningful-for-me.
- (c) **Experiencing-the-inadequacy-of-knowledge:** A feeling and knowing awareness arises that the existing knowledge is incomplete for solving or breaking through the problem that is becoming visible.
- (d) **Accepting-responsibility-for-solving-the-problem:** Deciding that as great and active a part as possible will be taken to actualize everything that subsequently must occur.

(iii) **Exposing the new content:** Unlocking new knowledge.

- (a) **Reducing-to-essentials:** Searching for and disclosing the most important additional essences (core facts) of the learning content that have value for solving the problem.
 - (b) **Seeing-relations:** Meaningful connections among the core facts are sought.
 - (c) **Gaining-insight-into-concepts:** Exemplifying by teacher and child acting together regarding essences with the aim of concept forming.
- (iv) **Actualizing (controlling) lesson content:**
Controlling the insights of the learning child with regard to the reduced essences.
- (a) **Principle of activity:** Actualizing of: the appeal to do something, present content, work together, the appeal to learn, decide on self-activity and encourage independent activity.
 - (b) **Principle of individualization:**
Actualizing of: Being open to the teacher, respect for the child's being different and uniqueness, encouraging the child to achieve and be someone himself, acquiring one's own style of learning activities and participation in the modes of learning.
 - (c) **Principle of socialization:**
Actualizing of establishing relationships, intervening with the child's achievement, experiencing a stable classroom context and initiating working together
 - (d) **Principle of tempo differentiation:**
Take part in actualizing the essentials of the lesson structure and the content with an optimal individual work-tempo.
- (v) **Functionalizing:** Transferring acquired insights to new situations in which it is used (brought into function).
- (a) **Practicing-insights:** Insights that have been made one's own are practiced and cultivated in meaningful ways.
 - (b) **Integrating-the-new-knowledge:**
Foreknowledge and newly acquired knowledge are synthesized (via remembering) in order to form a useable unity.

- (c) **Applying to the lifeworld:** Determining the meaning the newly acquired knowledge and insights have for his own way of living.
 - (vi) **Evaluating:** Judging the extent to which the learning child has come to insight and its application.
 - (a) **Testing-as-orientation:** Obtain clarification of the current status of insights with the aim of planning what can be done subsequently.
 - (b) **Differentiating-assignments:** Determine the role if the individual learner's interests, experiences, etc. in carrying out assignments.
 - (c) **Carrying-out-assignments:** Encourage the child to carry out meaningful assignments in the most effective ways.
-

Fundamental pedagogic interpretations of educative learning, the modes of learning and essences of the course of a lesson find their results in subject teaching. A particular fundamental pedagogic structure, namely, a **philosophy of life** is considered in the chapter by Dr. S. G. Roos where he deals with philosophy of life accountable subject teaching.

The actualization of fundamental-pedagogic essences, in general, and also as their actualization in subject teaching is emphasized differently with boys and girls, deserve the attention of Fundamental Pedagogics. Prof. N. J. Mentz gives attention to the latter.

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- (3) Van Peursen, C. A.: **Stategie van de Kultuur**. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1970, 72-73, 74.
- (4) Landman, W. A., op. cit., 6-7.
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- (6) See (a) Heidegger, M.: **Sein und Zeit**. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 10th Edition, 1963, 354. (b) Hengstenberg, H-E.: **Philosophische Anthropologie**. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1957, 84-85, 369.
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- (10) Heidegger, M.: **Sein und Zeit**, op. cit. 8-9, 13-17, 19-20.
- (11) Landman, W. A. op. cit., 11-16.
- (12) Ibid, 16-18.
- (13) Ibid, 18-29.
- (14) Ibid, 20-21.
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- (18) See Landman, W. A., S. G. Roos, R. P. van Rooyen, op. cit., 7-17.
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- (20) Ibid, 109-111.
- (21) Ibid, 111-112.
- (22) Ibid, 113-115.
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- (24) Landman, W. A., S.G. Roos, R. P. van Rooyen, op. cit., 162-163.
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- (29) Landman, W. A., S. G. Roos, R. P. van Rooyen, op. cit., 22-24.
- (30) Compare Landman, W. A., C. J. G. Kilian, S. G. Roos, T. A. Viljoen, op. cit., 10-13.

APPENDIX A

From: van den Berg, J. H.: **Kroniek der Psychologie**.
'S-Gravenhage: Boekencentrum, 1954, 35-36 in order to
demonstrate the connection between phenomenology and
experimenting.

“Lastly, I want to stress once again that the psychological experiment is of great importance. One continually hears the opinion that modern psychology, and in particular so-called phenomenological or existential psychology, should be ‘against’ the experiment. This is not the case. Indeed, the phenomenological psychologist is convinced that a ‘blind’ experiment is not possible: he believes that the psychological experiment takes on meaning when one, through keen analysis beforehand, has determined what one wants to investigate experimentally. For example, if one wishes to design an experiment on depth perception, it first is necessary to describe in a thorough analysis what ‘depth’ really means. Consequently, we can never learn from an experiment what ‘depth’ means. We learn about that exclusively from a thinking-analyzing entry into the relationship of the ‘visually near and far’, of ‘foreground and background’; that is to say, in a description of these relationships as they appear before our reflective observing. Thus, a phenomenological analysis serves as a propaedeutic [preparation] for each experiment. The phenomenological psychologist most certainly can be an experimenter—he even must be—however, he wants to know what he is doing. He has reservations. It is this reserve that gives the impression of a rejection of the experiment.

“In addition, the phenomenological psychologist is convinced that the experiment is unusable in many areas. Whoever sits oneself on the sickbed as an experimenter certainly sees, from the beginning to the end of the investigation, the sick person not as sick but as a behaving laboratory animal. The psychology of the sickbed is an area inaccessible to the experimenter. In saying this, it is not to claim that it is meaningless to experimentally investigate what this situation means, not by looking at the walls of the room but by looking toward the ceiling and what it includes. A visitor who remains standing at the sickbed during a conversation does not allow the sick person to see his face in the usual ways but he appears to him as behind his eyeballs, under his chin and in his nostrils. The psychology of the sickbed is incomplete when one does not also try to address these and similar issues by an

experimental investigation. However, the question itself is opened by a phenomenological analysis of the sickbed as to whether everything is accessible to experimental investigation but perhaps becomes denatured by it. The stamp of the phenomenological psychologist is that this approach allows the areas of research to be nearer the state in which it appears. The phenomenologist is afraid the topic of investigation will be disturbed by the research; he wants the topic to first appear as it immediately presents itself. Phenomenology is the description of the phenomenon as it appears. The phenomenologist is an empiricist, but an extremely careful one. He knows that each empiricism, in large measure, is dependent on one's empirical method.

“There is a delicate empiricism that identifies most deeply with its objects and in this way it becomes an authentic Theology” (Goethe, *Naturwissenschaften*). This “delicate empiricism” characterizes the phenomenological method. Phenomenological psychology does not put the experiment in its way, but by a careful empiricism it can open fields of empirical research. An antithesis between phenomenology and experimental psychology does not and never did exist; the antithesis of phenomenology and empiricism is even less likely. What exists is the antithesis of a psychology that conceives of a person as an isolated subject (or object) and a psychology that views a person, in the first place, as an easily disturbed relationship (as a relationship and communication”).

APPENDIX B

THE PEDAGOGIC DISCUSSION OF PHENOMENOLOGY TODAY

W. A. Landman

In: Tydskrif vir Geesteswetenskappe. South African Society of Science and Arts. Pretoria. April 1978.

1. SOME CONTEMPORARY PRONOUNCEMENTS ABOUT THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD

1.1 Heidegger, M.

Martin Heidegger himself has described the phenomenological method as a perennial possibility for thinking that can undergo change from time to time (Zur Sache des Denkens. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1969, 90). In other words, because the phenomenological method can change from time to time it is a perennial possibility for thinking. This does not have to do with change for the sake of change but change with the aim of continually more effective essence disclosing. Related to this, the following position by Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka is meaningful:

“At this basic level of consideration I challenge the contention that phenomenology has to come to the end of its essential development. I will try, on the contrary, to establish that precisely now, when the two great lines of phenomenological inquiry outlined by Husserl, the eidetic and the transcendental, have been fully developed by himself and his followers, we enter into a new, **self-reflective and self-critical** phase of research. Comparable to that of the progress in science, which points out further perspectives into ever deeper dimensions of man’s transaction with the universe, this new phase establishes phenomenology as an open field of continuous philosophical scholarship.” (The Later Husserl and the idea of Phenomenology. Tymieniecka, A-T (Ed.) Dordrecht: Reidel, 1972).

The phenomenologist (pedagogue) continually must critically rethink his ways of implementing the phenomenological method. This means he must reflect on the **preconditions** that this method must satisfy in order to be acceptable to him as a person with a particular scientific attunement and with a particular philosophy of life. Thus, the scientist who views the awareness of essences as a particular criterion for being scientific and for whom being

Protestant is highly valued poses other demands than someone who will talk more generally and who subscribes to an atheistic philosophy of life. Common to essence-awareness and being a Protestant is a particular regard for reality. Essence awareness that is expressed in a way that does not conflict with being a Protestant can lead to an intensified disclosure of essences.

In order to show that the phenomenological method is a perennial possibility for thinking (Heidegger) and an “open field of continuous philosophical scholarship” (Tymieniecka), some contemporary pronouncements about the method will be looked at briefly.

1.2 Estes, C. R.: “Concepts as criteria derived from an Existential-phenomenological perspective” In: Educational Theory, Vol. 20, 1970, 150-156.

“Existential phenomenology is a **current** style of philosophizing.”

And it is possible:

“to identify, explicate, and order existential-phenomenological concepts as criteria by which one may initiate a philosophic critique of **educational** theory and practice (p. 150). ... These concepts are intentionality, intersubjectivity and openness.” (p. 155).

Contemporary (existential) phenomenology has relevance for Pedagogics especially in the sense that the anthropological categories of intentionality, intersubjectivity (being-with) and openness (being-in-the-world), seen from a pedagogical perspective, contribute to understanding the pedagogic. The following statement by Estes is instructive:

“ ... that all existentialists are not phenomenologists and, conversely, all phenomenologists are not existentialists”. (p. 150).

The phenomenologist who is not an existentialist but is an existential thinker necessarily asks about the meaning of that with which his existence is most concerned, namely, his own philosophy of life. As a phenomenological existential thinker he questions himself about the philosophy of life permissibility of the steps of thinking he will use to effectively disclose essences.

1.3 Natanson, M.: “Phenomenology and Typification: A study in the philosophy of Alfred Schutz.” In: Social Research, Vol. 37, 1970, 1-22.

In the following quotation the thinker is faced with a clear choice:

“At this moment in the career of Western Man, history itself is threatened and reflection upon it cast into a defensive and apologetic role. ... I believe that phenomenology is committed to the fulfillment of Reason and unembarrassed to capitalize that embattled noun” (p. 1). ... Reflective life, the life of reason, is very much in doubt today, if not in dispute. The duality of thought and action festers in the minds of those who see in the theoretical attitude a masked quietism. ... Whether the alternative to philosophy be absurdity or praxis, the fundamental possibility of self-reflection, analysis, argumentation, and ultimately the transformation of the person rests upon Reason coming to fulfillment in the life of Man. Existential act, and the choice you make defines who you are.” (pp. 21-22).

A contemporary Pedagogician chooses for reflection (without making Reason absolute) and, indeed, for reflection as essence disclosing thinking. He chooses steps of thinking that are scientifically necessary and philosophy of life permissible. What is scientifically necessary, in the last instance, must be verified life philosophically. He also knows that in circles in which the phenomenological method is or has come into disfavor, timidity of thinking triumphs and little (or no) value is given to reflection.

1.4 Owens, T. J.: Phenomenology and Intersubjectivity. The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1970.

pp. 1-2 Phenomenology is contemporary and has a future:

“Dialogue and communication have today become central concepts in contemporary man’s effort to analyze and comprehend the major roots of conflict that threaten our twentieth-century world. Underlying all attempts at dialogue, however, is the presupposition that it is ontologically possible for men to reach one another and to communicate meaningfully. It is this most basic question—of the possibility and the limits of interpersonal relationships—that various phenomenologies of intersubjectivity direct themselves.”

The idea of verification of the philosophy of life permissibility of the steps of thinking is of particular importance for meaningful communication (pedagogical discussion) between fellow-believers. Philosophy of life selected steps of thinking bring reflecting fellow-believers closer to each other and a **joint** disclosure of essences becomes possible. In this way the pedagogical discussion can proceed to the most effective methodology and not to religious convictions and religious steadfastness that are doubted. This does not mean that a pedagogical discussion with fellow non-believers has become impossible.

**1.5 Smith, F. J.: Phenomenology in perspective.
The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1970.**

(p. i): Various ways of using the phenomenological method are possible but require a willing readiness for arduous thinking:

“Phenomenology, as one of many ways of philosophizing, can be seen from many perspectives. And, as a body of thought, it can be placed in perspective. The essays in this book clearly show that there is no one way of “doing phenomenology”, any more than there is any one way to philosophize. Phenomenology reveals itself as many-faceted, and there is work in this field for many talents. The fact that there are such varied aspects to the study of phenomenology is what puts it in perspective as a rich source of philosophical thought.”

One of the many perspectives on phenomenology is that of the philosophy of life permissibility of its steps of thinking. Accentuating the facet of philosophy of life permissibility is possible and for the thinker who knows that he and his philosophy of life form an unbreakable and even necessary unity. Philosophy of life acceptable steps of thinking lead to enthusiastic pedagogical practice.

**1.6 Schneider, K.: Das Problem der Beschreibung in der
Erziehungswissenschaft. Heidelberg: Quelle & Meyer,
1971.**

(p. 25): Schneider indicates that many misunderstandings can be removed if the question of method is distinguished from the remaining questions of phenomenological philosophy. For Martin

Heidegger phenomenology also primarily is a concept of method, a way of acting. In no sense is it a “standpoint” or “direction” because phenomenology can be neither, as long as it is understood correctly (Sein und Zeit, 27, 38 etc.). It is not difficult to indicate the fruitfulness of the phenomenological method for contemporary Pedagogics.

Contemporary pedagogical thinking in the Faculty of Education at the University of Pretoria primarily involves the phenomenological method. It is a concept of method that directs and makes possible the research. As a method, it is constituted by several steps of thinking. It is these steps of thinking, as particular ways of disclosing essences that must be judged in terms of a philosophy of life. The “standpoint” is that phenomenology is valuable and that philosophy of life selected steps of thinking are meaningful.

1.7 Vandenberg, D.: Being and Education: An essay in Existential Phenomenology. Engelwood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1971, p. 22.

“The analysis of the educational problem into its root questions indicated that the proper resources for the formulation of educational problematics and educational theory are those of existential phenomenology. For moral education to be successful, it is necessary for moral rules (if and when they are the content of moral education) to acquire some status in the pupil’s being, that is, to acquire **ontological status**. To assist in developing methods of moral education, there ought to be inquiry into the matter of the ontological status of moral rules, into how they acquire it and whether they require it to control, direct, guide, or suggest conduct. Methods of promoting the “internalization” of moral rules, or, better, of promoting the externalization of conduct into the space specifiable by moral rules, have to be compared with methods of moral instruction utilizing “intelligence”, “reflection”, “insight”, and so on, if moral education is to be grounded. Such inquiry is ontological inquiry no matter who does it, unless one remains content with free-floating theoretical constructs. But then moral education is not grounded.

On the other hand, such inquiry can be pursued with the phenomenological method, which would have several merits. First, it is thoroughly modern in that its use as a method of philosophizing dominates the philosophical scene on the European

continent, for it constitutes one of the aforementioned revolutions in philosophy in this century.

Secondly, it is a method that is “publicly verifiable” in intent, on principle, and in practice and could conceivably bid fair for a **consensus** (at least to the extent that any verification principle can, among those who use the specified method properly).

Third, phenomenological method attempts to get underneath ‘perceived phenomena’, that is, **beneath** “phenomena” as they are seen through highly structured perception (that is, through concepts and constructs that are more or less forced upon the phenomenon from outside), in order to confront the phenomenon in question directly, and in this sense it is purely descriptive and nonemotional.”

Phenomenology is a radical search for that which has ontological status, that is, for what is really essential to being a child and that contrasts sharply with general chit-chat. It offers the possibility for intersubjective verification and the attainment of consensus that is conducive to pedagogical discussion.

There is meaningful consensual agreement among fellow-believers about which steps of thinking are philosophy of life permissible.

1.8 Wolf, A.: Brennpunkte moderner Erziehungswissenschaft. Donauworth: Auer, 1972.

(p. 51): Wolf says the selection of a method depends on the researcher’s question. Thus a science that uses the phenomenological method does so because it asks about the main characteristics that are illuminated by this precise description. This means that if an investigator will have the main characteristics illuminated, he will apply the phenomenological method. If he has a different purpose, he will apply other methods, e.g., empirical methods if he is looking for precisely measurable lawfulness, etc. (p. 52).

The choice of method is a further indication of the investigator’s interests. For example, if his interest is in understanding the pedagogic, he will apply the phenomenological method, etc.

The selection of the steps of thinking that constitute such a method also can depend on their philosophy of life permissibility. The investigator who knows that his ways of interrogating are philosophy of life permissible will ask his questions with conviction, enthusiasm and accountability, thus ask meaningful questions and, therefore, practice science (Pedagogics) on the highest level possible.

Contemporary Pedagogics is a task for the phenomenological method.

1.9 Hans-Hermann Groothoff (Cologne): “Phaenologie Und Paedagogiek” In: Phaenologie heute. Edited By Walter Biemeel. The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1972.

“In almost all recent introductions to the science of education, in its problems, its methods, its subdivisions, its theory-praxis relation, one at least finds a sign of the possibility and task of a phenomenological pedagogy—occasionally also called descriptive pedagogics— increasingly constituted by such parts, or the phenomenological method in pedagogics or a phenomenology of educating contributing to pedagogics as a discipline.”

Phenomenology is a possibility of contemporary pedagogical thinking. It can be enthusiastically accepted as a particular task by the pedagogician if its steps of thinking are shown to be philosophy of life permissible. Acceptance of tasks that are enriched by a philosophy of life occur on a high level because the character of their appeal now speaks more clearly. Being called to expert knowledge of educating acquires such particular forms.

1.10 Edited by David Carr & Edward S. Casey: Explorations In Phenomenology. No. 4: Selected Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973.

The aim of this collection of essays is to show that phenomenology, in both letter and spirit, is alive in the **contemporary** philosophical world. (p. 9).

A few of the pronouncements by these authors that are of particular significance for contemporary Pedagogical thinking are the following:

1. The hermeneutic method is applicable to the human sciences because human action constitutes a “text” that must be interpreted (P. Ricoeur). The “text” of the pedagogician is the reality of educating itself that must be disclosed and interpreted.
2. Structure analysis leads to a movement from naïve interpretation to critical interpretation and from superficial interpretation to depth interpretation (P. Ricoeur). Depth interpretation, in reality, is bringing to light essences and their mutual coherences.
3. The empirical approach is inadequate for the social sciences, while the hermeneutic method is necessary (C. Taylor).
4. Today it is possible to distinguish a third phase (first phase: Husserl, second phase: Heidegger): a phase in which dialectic thinking and hermeneutics are in the foreground (F. R. Dallmayr). Describing **triads** that can be noticed in the reality of educating have become themes for contemporary pedagogical discussions (See Landman, W. A.: *Fundamentele Pedagogiek en Onderwyspraktyk*. Chapter 4. Durban: Butterworths, 1977).
5. Phenomenology is essence disclosing. Essence disclosing is the keystone to the entire phenomenological approach (D. M. Levin). Pedagogics must be essence-pedagogics to be able to claim being scientific.
6. The phenomenological method must be supplemented by the method of contradictions (investigate whether essences are rational constructions or not), conversation and hermeneutics (D. M. Levin).
7. In the last instance, the aim of phenomenology is a clear, critical grounding of human activities (R. M. Zaner). This provides an authentic answer to the question: “On what ground is educating possible?” Pedagogical essences ground all educating.
8. If it can be shown that essences are possible preconditions, this shows their necessity (J. N. Mohanty). Pedagogical essences, as what serve as possible preconditions for a child becoming a proper adult, necessarily must be actualize for and with him.

9. Essence disclosing is a methodological concept essential to phenomenology (J. N. Mohanty). Phenomenology is meaningful as ontology, thus, meaningful as essence revealing.

10. The true locus of uncovering (disclosing) [essences] is ontological in nature (T. Kisiel). Ontological understanding of the pedagogic is a meaningful aim of each pedagogical discussion.

11. A person's existence is hermeneutic through and through and the task of hermeneutics is to bring concealed meanings to light (T. Kisiel). What is pedagogically meaningful, i.e., pedagogical essences, must be disclosed.

12. Existentialia (as anthropological categories) are possibilities of living that the thinker has to relate to that which must be thought about (C. E. Scott). In this way, superficialities in the form of **naturalism**, **evolutionism** and **neo-Marxism** are nullified.

13. Categories serve as horizons within which events appear for their disclosure. Categories, as illuminative means of thinking, make the disclosure of essences possible.

14. Categories (existentialia) serve as a focus that allows events to occur so that they can be grasped conceptually.

The scientist who proposes research with the knowledge that the steps of thinking constituting his investigation are for him philosophy of life permissible can proceed to an intensified, critical interpretation, conquering empiricism, to essence disclosure, pedagogical discussion, etc.

1.11 Dennis, R.: "Phenomenology: Philosophy, Psychology and Educator" In Educational Theory. Vol. 24, No. 2, p. 154, 1974.

"It appears that phenomenology, in both its philosophical and psychological forms, has much to offer education. As a philosophy, it offers a paradigm of knowing that places the greatest emphasis upon the conscious acts of the knower which are governed by discoverable necessary and a priori laws. As a psychology, it offers a new approach to educational research: the method of "disciplined naiveté" which has as its cardinal feature the suspension of all bias before conducting research. Thus, phenomenology offers a fertile

field of exploration for students of education. However, the surface of this field has been barely scratched.”

As far as pedagogical thinking in pedagogical discussions is concerned, the fact that thus far only the “surface has been scratched” points to meaningful future possibilities for a phenomenological method. This future work can, among others, exist in the further construction and prospering of what in this citation appears as benefits of a phenomenological approach, namely:

- (i) disclosing additional pedagogical essences as necessary *a priori* laws that guide the actualization of the pedagogic;
- (ii) eliminating naïve prejudgments (not presuppositions!) in the pedagogical investigation.

As far as this author is concerned, a still more radical investigation of the place and function of a philosophy of life can be added by judging the permissibility of the phenomenological steps of thinking.

1.12 Hengstenberg, H. E.: “The Phenomenology of Meaning as an Approach to Ethics.” In *International Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 14, March 1974, pp. 3-24.

“In **our day** the study of meaning is carried out in two main directions. The first one investigates the meaning of statements in the widest sense of the term (Analytic Philosophy, Modern Information Theory. W. A. L.); the second examines practical meanings, as they are concretized in man’s real life (Phenomenology. W. A. L.). ... And as soon as we pass from the abstract ideal meaning of statements to the concrete statements as used by people, we penetrate into the domain of this second direction of meaning. ... This second dimension of meaning is also very important **today**. ... It remains ... indispensable to uncover the **condition** under which meaning may be present in man’s life and action.”

Phenomenological thinking is a particular search for possible preconditions, also for the possible preconditions for uncovering contemporary ways of giving meaning—including giving meaning in

pedagogical situations and pedagogical discussions. A particular precondition for effective thinking is the philosophy of life permissibility of its steps of thinking so that the reflecting can be done with the greatest possible conviction, enthusiasm and accountability.

1.13 Imelman, J. D.: “Plaats en inhoud van een personale Pedagogiek. Groningen: V. R. B. Offsetdrukkerij, 1974, pp. 4-5.

[In Dutch] “A first relationship that arises is between such a similarly posed pedagogics and pronouncements that try to say something about the essence of educating. Substantive guidelines on the ‘how’ and ‘what’ of educating will have to find their foundation (their justification of the ‘why’) in what is experienced as the essence of educating. An **ontological-phenomenological approach to this essence** will be given in this study by which there is an attempt to give a hermeneutic interpretation regarding the onticity or empirical reality of educating and of the phenomena that constitute it. The ‘knowledge interest’ that prevails is to understand the reality of educating and to interpret its sense and structure with a view of providing a ground for educating. For example, in this study the mutual relationship between ontology and educating is one of substantive dependence.”

“If this approach were to continue, there would be mention of unattractive limits that give the impression of being too noncommittal, at least theoretically. Practically, one might leave things only to an ontology or a doctrine; the significance of this for practice is provided more fully at the end of this study. Theoretically, however, this would ignore completely what long has been of concern to thinking about educating, i.e., the problem regarding the diverse ways in which knowledge is obtained. One finds a methodological struggle between scientists and philosophers who believe that knowledge of the activity of educating only should be acquired by more empirical-positivistic approaches and thinkers with more humanistic approaches (phenomenological, understanding, hermeneutical, speculative, dialectic-critical, etc.). To develop an ontology of educating and learning in this study, pronouncements of theoretical findings form a whole, and obviously this is a confrontation with other kinds of theoretical statements about educating and the reality of educating.... In summary, the course of (the present) research can be seen as follows: the aim is to

arrive at content for a personal pedagogics. This content is acquired from a phenomenological ontology of the reality of educating. In addition there is an inherent relationship between ontological and dependent statements of (educational) doctrine.

To know and explicate the essences of educating requires an ontological understanding along a phenomenological way. The significance of an ontology of education for **practice** also must be explicated. Ontological and doctrinal pronouncements built on this form a coherence.

If by “doctrine” one can mean, among other things, “philosophy of life”, this constitutes a matter for enlivening the pedagogical essences.

1.14 Troutner, L.: “Toward a phenomenology of Education: an exercise in the foundations.” In: Philosophy of Education Proceedings. Vol. 30, 1974, pp. 148-164.

Troutner gives four reasons why existential thinking (which is phenomenological in nature) is unpopular with some educational philosophers:

“In some unpublished research conducted a few years ago in which a concerted effort was made to find out why, despite repeated attempts by many educational philosophers, ... existentialism has had so little influence upon education, I came up with four reasons: (1) inadequate philosophical preparation and understanding, on the part of many of the educational philosophers concerned, of what **existential thought** is all about, (2) the tendency to choose Jean Paul Sartre’s philosophy (which is probably the worst possible choice one can make if one is interested in connecting existentialism and education) as representative of existential thought generally, (3) the jarring incongruity that is to be found between many of the major existential themes, such as anxiety, alienation, being-unto-death, etc., and the education of children, and (4) the near complete neglect of phenomenology. Events of the last two or three years suggest that others have also noted the neglect, and that the time may now be ripe for a sustained collaborative effort that will open up the whole area of phenomenology and education.”

In addition, Troutner emphasizes the following:

“We are going to make our first point by purposely asking the wrong question, to wit: “How would the phenomenologist analyze education?” The phenomenologist would not analyze education, or anything else for that matter, because there is **no one prototype** called the phenomenologist or the phenomenological approach. The history of the development of this method, from Husserl’s early “pure” phenomenology and later “transcendental turn” to the existential phenomenologists and more recently the dialogal phenomenologist, is filled with many tortuous twists and turns that almost defy intelligibility. Moreover, this history is still in the process of being written. The question, “What is phenomenology?” is both irritating and exasperating because it defies any precise definition or explicitation. Under these circumstances anyone making a phenomenological analysis should always **begin his inquiry by stating his frame of reference**, i.e., to the extent that it is possible. This will not only add to the understanding of the exposition, but it will also give the reader a clue as to the direction that the inquiry will be taking. For the particular kind of phenomenological context out of which and through which one makes one’s analysis will greatly influence the outcome of the inquiry. Most of the analysis in this essay, to the extent that I am aware of it, grows out of an existential phenomenological perspective, particularly that of Martin Heidegger.”

The equating of Sartrean existentialism and phenomenology was (and is) a particular contributing factor to the discord between phenomenologists and non-phenomenologists in South Africa. The resulting confusion between existentialism and existential thinking also has contributed to misunderstanding.

The fact that there is not “the” phenomenology but only “a” phenomenology justifies divergence from Husserl’s and Heideggerian standpoints that sometimes must be respected. For example, here one thinks of a rejection of Husserl’s absolutizing of reason (already done by Heidegger with his concepts of attunement and existentiality). Also in this connection there can be reference to the necessity for a philosophy of life choice of steps of thinking.

The phenomenologist (pedagogician) must, for the sake of meaningful pedagogical discussion, always indicate his presuppositions (as his referential framework). For example, this is the case when it is clearly stated that the reflecting is going to occur

in terms of scientifically necessary steps of thinking that are shown to be philosophy of life permissible.

1.15 Pivcevic, E.: “Phenomenology and Philosophical Understanding.” London: Cambridge University Press 1975, p. 271.

“It is clear that the manner in which phenomenologists approach philosophical issues differs considerably from the style of approach more usual in the analytical philosophical tradition; the isolated experiments with the so-called ‘linguistic phenomenology’ hardly amounting to as serious attempt to bridge the differences between the two methods. I attempt to highlight some of the limitations of both analytical analysis and the phenomenological approach through a consideration of their respective treatment of concepts. I argue that at least in the case of some concepts a new structural analysis is needed which incorporates features of both these types of approach while going far beyond either.”

It will pay thinkers (also those involved in pedagogical discussions) to search for phenomenological principles and the foundations of analytic philosophy between which a meaningful synthesis is possible. In this way possibly a yet sharper, more radical thinking, thus an ontological understanding of the reality of educating, can be actualized. This field lies fallow for future investigation.

1.16 Flitner, W.: “Ruckschau auf die Paedagogik in futurischer Absicht.” In: Zeitschrift fur Paedagogik, Vol. 22, No. 1, 1976, pp. 1-8.

p. 8. Flitner states that for the strategy of Pedagogics today, in addition to the “appeal to the facts”, it is important to note that there must be a reflective penetration to the core, to the hub. To be able to do this, a method that is true to matters is necessary.

Essence disclosing as core disclosing, then, is meaningful pedagogical work and occurs by implementing the true-to-reality phenomenological method.

In addition, Flitner indicates the following:

The relation of Pedagogics (theory) to practice is dialectic in nature; a theory arises from a practice and the practice again is clarified additionally by the theoretical reflection of Pedagogics (p. 3).

The phenomenological method is characterized by the fact that it takes the reality of educating (also in the form of a practice) as its point of departure for reflection and also follows the phenomenological credo “return to the things themselves”, i.e., interpreted as a return (with deeper understanding, refinement, etc.) to the practice from which it has arisen. Also this way of returning must set in motion the pedagogical discussion. (See Landman, W. A.: *Fundamentele Pedagogiek en Onderwyspraktyk*. Durban: Butterworths, 1977).

1.17 Imelman, J. D.: *Inleiding in de Pedagogiek*. Groningen: Wolters-Noordhoff, 1977.

It is instructive to note that Imelman ends his work with the following words (p. 261):

“Hopefully, as was abundantly noted in this book, among other things, the intention was to lay the foundation for the dialogical phenomenology proposed and its included epistemology.”

2. A PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH: SOME VIEWS APPLICABLE TO THE FACULTY OF EDUCATION, UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA

The following are views regarding the contemporary applicability of the phenomenological method appearing in Appendix B:

- 2.1 Phenomenology can be viewed from a variety of perspectives and there is more than one way to practice phenomenology (Smith). This means that a Christian, as a person who wants to practice science in the light of particular Christian norms, also can judge phenomenology from his perspective regarding the permissibility of the steps of thinking and procedures that constitute this method. As just stated, the implication of this is that it is entirely possible that certain facets of the phenomenological method might be unacceptable to a Christian. However, this also holds for every scientific method. Thus, for example, a Christian user of the experimental method might set certain limits for himself that

might not have relevance for an atheist (e.g., that in no way can experimenting take a course such as the unaccountable experimenting with non-medical drugs, etc.). In addition, a Christian might have an aversion for methods by which the results of animal experiments are applied to humans and by which being human is reduced to numbers by statistical methods, etc.

- 2.2 The scientist must make a choice between reflection and absurdity and the choice he makes will determine who he is (Natanson). Fundamental Pedagogics chooses **for** reflection as essence disclosing that constitutes the sense of the entire phenomenological procedure (Levin) and **against** the absurdity of essence-blindness. In addition, it chooses a phenomenological method that at least satisfies two preconditions.

2.2.1 Scientific necessity

A step of thinking is scientifically necessary if its implementation leads to disclosing and verifying essences.

2.2.2 Philosophy of life permissibility

The pedagogician will not follow philosophy of life incorrect ways and, thereby, be untrue to himself. This means that before a particular step in thinking is exercised by him he first must make certain that it is not in conflict with his philosophy of life. If he can be reassured that the scientifically necessary steps of thinking also are philosophy of life permissible for him, this will lead to him carrying out the steps with greater emotional assurance, conviction and also accountability. Thus, the pedagogician who asks the question of philosophy of life permissibility can account for what he is involved in with greater intensity, with a clearer idea about the correctness of his actions, and with a firm feeling that essence disclosing is allowable. From this it seems that by answering the philosophy of life question affirmatively, the philosophy of life is placed in the service of a sharpened scientific practice.

- 2.3 Reflection on how there **even** is phenomenological practice and a critical evaluation of the **unique** ways of being a phenomenologist are characteristic of contemporary phenomenological research (Tymieniecka). The Fundamental

Pedagogician is attuned to a selection of those fundamental steps of thinking and procedures that disclose real essences and that agree with his own philosophy of life. He states the following:

Phenomenological steps of thinking are accountable steps, i.e., the exercise of the steps of thinking that are necessary for disclosing the educative reality must satisfy two particular requirements, namely:

- 2.3.1 Scientific necessity: it must make an unmistakable and indispensable contribution to bringing real essences, their sense and coherences to light;
 - 2.3.2 Philosophy of life permissibility: this may not clash with the pedagogician's philosophy of life. Thus, it must satisfy the demands of his philosophy of life.
- 2.4 Since the phenomenological method can change from time to time it is a perennial possibility for thinking (Heidegger). "Change" here can refer to the fact that certain phenomenological procedures, in the course of time, can be eliminated and even that certain accents will be modified. This also can mean that new criteria can be designed for the acceptability of these procedures, or that certain "old" criteria can be re-emphasized. Here, once again, there is thought of the two mentioned criteria of which the second (philosophy of life permissibility) decidedly is viewed as new in various phenomenological circles (and also by adversaries of the phenomenological movement).