

CHAPTER 2

THE PROBLEMATIC OF “DIDASKEIN”

It is logical and realistic to accept that the didactical problematic is related to a manifold of factors of the times. In the previous chapter it is indicated that some didacticians maintain that didactic activity largely is determined by the times and everything related to it. Although this standpoint is not acceptable as a ground for didactical theory, because the event has appeared and still appears everywhere and always between persons, it really is a timeless universal on the horizon of human life. Still it is difficult to refute the fact that didactic emphases, demands and expectations that must be met change as eras come and go in human history.

The emphases of didactic tasks of a rural-agrarian milieu (Middle Ages) necessarily are different from those of an industrialized large city (Industrial Revolution). How and where these two apparent extremes of “didaskhein” ultimately broach each other is treated later. The fact is the exposition of a general-didactical problematic, in particular, is correlated with time, while its original, fundamental structure can theoretically be shown to be a universal matter not bound to time.

The consequence is simple: the ways the origins are made visible in a particular period* do not mean that the original structure has changed but that the practical pattern, by an apparently modified emphasis, acquires a different relief that inclines one to think that we have to do with a change in structure, while it really is a question of manifestations in modified or new situations, new tasks that must be implemented, new problems that must be managed.

Now a worldwide deficit is that teachers force a matter that appears to be a modified didactical structure by hastily implementing undeveloped modes of teaching in an attempt to bridge this deficit or to make its effect less tangible. Programmed instruction, the implementation of television and calculators to try to guarantee, to some extent, the course of the teaching situation are not

* Visibility is influenced by life circumstances, religious beliefs, economic practices, state and civic organizations, prosperity, social norms and habits, etc.

fundamental interventions, i.e., they are not structural changes of “*didaskhein*”. The same holds for a variety of other aspects among which are training, teaching as a social auxiliary service, bringing about new types of schools, etc. that really represent branches at the end of the didactic line but are not fundamental regarding the original intervention.

Taking into account the kaleidoscopic nature of the practical situation, to try to acquire a grasp of this problematic, the theoretical didactician is forced to proceed to order and select, insert and delete in order to verbalize this matter and to converse with others about it. What follows are some essential aspects of the didactical problematic that I hope will lead back to *fundamentalia* in an attempt in this way (i.e., from the particular to the general, from practice to the theoretical) to provide an answer about the origin of “*didaskhein*” that everyone must understand wherever and whenever they venture into the practical situation of the teaching event.

A. THE TIME-CONCRETE IMPERATIVE

In each era there is a definite relationship between a valid idea or expectation of teaching and a time-concrete imperative that is bound together with the state of educating in a particular community. The idea of teaching stems from the naïve and spontaneous involvements that persons continually create between themselves and surrounding matters and persons and that eventually are crystallized into certain expectations and even claims that are transferred from the practice of educating to the teaching situation.

This teaching situation is constituted in a variety of generally recognized practices. The school certainly is the most important of these but it is supplemented by matters such as employment training for future trades, conscription in the military sphere, categorical teaching with respect to church and youth organization work. It also is clear that the idea and expectation of teaching strive for completeness in form and contents and that the spontaneous continued participation of the youth in the totality of life obligations is sought.

The parents, as natural educators, seldom give a formal, deliberate account of their intentions in this regard because the knowledge at their disposal is constituted as well as delimited by their own experiencing. However, they do have an identifiable notion that the eventual adulthood of their children has a definite connection with teaching, broadly speaking, and there definitely is a demand to take account of both the parental home and instances of teaching. This accounting manifests itself in the time-concrete imperative of life circumstances and demands that are most clearly expressed in the greater society outside of the home. Irrespective of who the child is and whatever family he comes from, society (including occupation, state, church, association and club life, social conventions) makes particular demands that are not allowed to be rejected. The harmony that usually is created in teaching with respect to the expectations fostered in the home and the demands made by the general society represents the state of educating of a particular community. Thus, the harmony proclaims educating (within which teaching is included) as valid, adequate and balanced. The more complex the societal situation the more demands are placed on education in the home and the greater the expectations fostered in the home (parents) by community teaching institutions. Therefore, it is not surprising that teaching as it manifests itself in various aspects in a variety of institutions really is the fulcrum where society will or will not attain a balance between potential and prognosis. If one would test such an explanation in the practical situation itself, perhaps the extension of formal teaching offers a good example, especially as is shown in past decades. The initial ideal of general formative teaching was limited to the primary school. It was the ideal of each Western nation that every child receive at least 8 years of general formative teaching by which the time-concrete imperatives of the so-called Second Industrial Revolution could to some degree be brought into balance. For many years this first general expectation was viewed as satisfied and in accord with maintaining the development of the structure of society. With increasing industrialization and the related rise of the large city, a balanced state of educating was brought about. This was more or less the situation until and during World War II. After the Second World War changes came. Increasing specialization, automatization, new control over reality, changes in lifestyle, first the individual, later the community and still later the whole nation,

necessitated in this period an adjustment of the balance in the state of educating. A consequence is that general formative teaching was extended. Where previously the primary school was the public school, in the middle of the 1950's and definitely in the 1960's the secondary school laid claim to the same title. The entire primary school population was to spend at least 3 more years in the secondary schools in accordance with the expectations regarding teaching held by the home as well as society in the new situation.

However, it seemed relatively quickly that this addition to general formative teaching was inadequate. In contemporary times in all developed countries there is thorough talk of at least a twelve year teaching structure that follows the principle of differentiation and that will be compulsory for all pupils because the balance of the state of educating according to present day expectations and demands cannot be attained without it. Also, it is attempted to transfer the greatest number of youth from the secondary school for continued instruction in universities and other institutions of higher education for the simple reason that the secondary school no longer can hold in balance the overflowing tempo and related societal demands.

Lots of implicated didactical problems flow from this that contemporarily are so actual that they claim the whole of theoretical Didactics. This is to some degree understandable: the need brings a pragmatic focus with it and the pragmatic primarily is not interested in fundamental theoretical questions. Therefore, theoretically, simple slices are made according to the actuality of a particular problem by which the origins remain hidden and the criterion of success is a linear cancer to a didactical utopia that will be comparable with what is created by a large industry. Therefore didacticians waste away their birthright for a pot of lentil soup that perhaps temporarily will keep the wolf from the door but then the eventuality of the practice they are involved with is not brought within their field of vision. Programmed instruction, perhaps, is one of the best examples in this particular respect.

Therefore, it does not surprise anyone that the general-didactical problematic shows itself in inquiries about talent, optimal realization of potential, a re-delimiting of learning areas, an increase

in testing expectations and standards, research into cybernetics in order to construct learning models that in mechanistic and determined ways will be realizable, the implementing of techniques, refining and bending technological principles by which “didaskhein” is absorbed in a comparable way into the methods of a large industry all are possible without his being conscious of this.

Thus, it seems meaningful in the search for the problematic of “didaskhein” to go back to the coordinated pedagogical disciplines in order to briefly, and without the claim of completeness, look at what effect they can have for disclosing the didactical problematic. This is especially meaningful because the didactician must not unravel problems that in their foundation are pedagogical in isolation from his particular perspective and that, therefore, are not one-sidedly elucidated didactically and that can be successfully taken up in a practical performance. As a science the pedagogical is not reducible to didactics and although a large number of authors have broached this theme in various important respects, in an explication such as this it cannot be avoided.

B. THE OTHER PEDAGOGICAL PERSPECTIVES AND “DIDASKEIN”

Considerations regarding the significance of the other pedagogical disciplines for didactical pedagogics especially include two important tasks in so far as they co-constitute the didactical problematic.

For the student of modern pedagogics it must be clear that there are a variety of perspectives on the educative phenomenon that all, although not in the same relationships, still can contribute to help complete a didactical pedagogical perspective. This does not mean that the didactical problematic is constituted by the totality of problems that are raised by the other pedagogical disciplines. As does each of the disciplines, didactical pedagogics has its own autonomy which implies that it has a problematic of its own. As a matter of the pedagogical, the relief of the didactical problematic can assume an impossible form if or as long as the didactician refuses to see the implicit logic that each other perspective, being

pedagogical in nature, co-illuminates and, therefore, also co-defines the description of his problematic.

Under this brief motivation one can delimit somewhat the two matters mentioned above to which the didactical pedagogue must give attention:

In the first place there must be an explication about the relevance of another discipline for the development of didactical thinking, therefore, for designing a didactical theory. Consequently, the didactician must acquire structural clarity about what contributions such a discipline makes to illuminating the didactic event and, thus, to sorting out didactic problems.

In the second place the didactician must be in a position to proceed in scientific ways to interpret didactically these insights from other perspectives with respect to his own problematic and in a regressive as well as progressive respect to indicate the pedagogical line in his theoretical designs. It is understandable that this line eventually must be able to result in a teaching practice that, by consistent argument, holds the implication that the explications of other pedagogical disciplines have ontological as well as logical relevance for designing and establishing a didactic practice.

1. *Fundamental pedagogics:* Certainly the charge of fundamental pedagogics is to disclose and describe scientifically the structure of the educating phenomenon as it shows itself in the reality of educating and in a philosophy of life. If it is taken into consideration that in a historical respect pedagogics still is practiced as a part-discipline of Philosophy, it is understandable that with respect to the scientific character of the matter, this aspect is at least as old as Philosophy itself. The history of Philosophy shows very clearly that since Plato and Aristotle there regularly are in philosophical pronouncements fundamental commentary given on the structure of educating. Because this commentary is about an actual practice, a piece of life experience that everywhere and always can be observed with persons, they necessarily have implications for that practice with which the pronouncements deal.

Therefore, one should make a comprehensive and in depth study of these general philosophical explications of educative practice and on that basis do relatively accurate research (in a historical sense) regarding the relevance such explications have for teaching practice. After all, it is the case that educating continually realizes itself in teaching and that the meaning of teaching is rooted in educating, as such. But this matter is precisely the task of fundamental pedagogics that, without working eclectically, continually is involved in interpreting pedagogically general philosophical explications of an anthropological, axiological, ethical, ontological and logical nature and evaluating their relevance in accordance with reality and a philosophy of life.

It is obvious that the didactician must evaluate each of the mentioned aspects, historically, contemporarily or prospectively, from fundamental pedagogics and interpret them for a particular practice (teaching). It also is not the aim of the didactician to take the tasks of the fundamental pedagogue out of his hands and interpret them in an original pedagogical sense.

But this is not what usually happens. The usual course of matters is that didacticians entirely ignore these really fundamental pronouncements about the pedagogical phenomenon as expounded in fundamental pedagogics and believe these pronouncements illuminate a theory that has little or no relevance for teaching practice and, therefore, do not deserve attention didactically. For the development of the science and the contributions that the didactician must make to that development, such an attitude only can have one consequence: an attenuation of the perspective corresponding to the appraisal of the other pedagogical disciplines. What in this respect is really valid for fundamental pedagogics also is valid for every other discipline with respect to what a didactician can deliberately isolate in developing his theory.

The comprehensiveness of taking into account such an exposition makes it relatively meaningless to try in a brief introductory discussion such as this to try to discuss the total relevance of the other part-disciplines for designing a didactical theory. Here justice cannot be done to the scope and depth of the issue. This, however, is a future area of study for the didactician and therefore one

perhaps should at most acquire an indication of a few matters via examples that also can serve as a motivation for the mentioned postulates and standpoints.

From the fundamental pronouncements of South African thinkers such as Oberholzer, Landman, Van Zyl, Kilian, Roos, Gunter and Liebenberg it seems very clear that ontologically a categorical structure of educating as a phenomenon is possible because these categories bring to the fore the essences of the experiencing as it arises in the lifeworld. These categories, then, are illuminative means of thinking by which the phenomenon of educating appears as what it really and essentially is. Each ontological grounding claims to agree with reality, in this case the reality of educating. The extent to which fundamental pedagogics makes grounded pronouncements is shown to be beyond any doubt by Landman and Liebenberg, among others.

Here perhaps it serves as sufficient motivation to indicate that one cannot educate with respect to nothing; that the “something” mentioned in educating assumes contents; therefore, educating also actualizes itself in teaching with the consequence that fundamental pronouncements about educating necessarily have relevance for the teaching event. It is factually impossible for the didactician to deny this particular relationship, i.e., that these fundamental – pedagogical pronouncements have didactical significance and ought to be interpreted didactically in designing a didactical theory because they have relevance for practice (teaching).

But also in the following respect, Landman in his fundamental exposition has already written pronouncements that perhaps one day when a historical perspective on such things arises really can be of great value. He indicates, e.g., that in the unfolding of the educative event there is very clear mention of an aim, relationship and sequence structure.

This pronouncement strikes like the blow of a hammer in designing a didactical theory. Perhaps this can best be explained in terms of two accepted didactical categories, i.e., “relationality” and “constituting”. The teaching event, even as such, cannot be imagined without a definite aim, relationship and sequence. For

example, where a particular relationship is lacking between teacher and pupil, teaching simply will not occur because authority will be absent. Where authority is lacking in teaching knowledge (that indeed is a matter of authority) will not be put in relief. With this the trust between teacher and pupil and the learning aim will remain out of reach. Thus, the pedagogical guarantee of the sequence [course] of the situation deteriorates. Then, teaching has not been actualized.

Landman's characterization of the relationship structure in a fundamental-pedagogical respect as a relationship of authority, understanding and trust cannot be thought away from the event that we know as "didaskhein". If one should proceed to think this away at the same time he also thinks away teaching in its essence. Now the didactician takes into consideration the theoretical unfolding of a matter such as the lesson structure, and the same holds precisely for the fundamental-pedagogical sequence structure.

In the sequence structure of the event of educating Landman as well as Kilian show the following moments: pedagogical association, pedagogical encounter, taking responsibility for relationships, engagement and pedagogical intervention.

Without leaving the significance of the other out of account, I specifically refer to engagement and its didactical significance with the expectation that the motivation mentioned above will come clearly to the fore. Directly from the French language the word "engagement" literally means in English "to assume your obligation".

At this stage it must be clear that unlocking reality and stepping up to reality, as two basic didactical matters, cannot be gone into fully without the idea of engagement. Where children are involved in a lesson situation, pedagogical engagement does not speak alone in the course of the educative event but it also greatly determines the sequence [course] of the situation itself. The sense of the lesson structure and everything accompanying it largely are made visible through the quality of the engagement; for example, the readiness of the teacher to assume his obligation as a teacher in a true sense.

The same holds for the child himself giving meaning in the learning activity, i.e., in his stepping up to reality. Through the interconnected sequence offered by engagement with respect to unlocking reality and stepping up to reality one notices the constituting as a matter of judging and a learning effect in the sequence of the didactic situation. The theoretical consequence for Didactics is obvious: This averts all haphazard, non-aim directed, not responsible participation in a teaching practice, in particular concerning the adult. The didactic-pedagogical appeal is a matter of engagement and brings the didactic event into motion. It offers a didactic course [sequence].

To deny the relevance of fundamental pedagogics for designing a didactical theory and for illuminating the didactical problematic really means to try to think away the reality of teaching, in particular its educative connotations.

2. ***Psychopedagogics***: The exposition regarding the significance of fundamental pedagogics for unfolding and understanding the didactical problematic is offered by way of examples introducing a few categories and criteria. In the same way one should disclose the significance of psychopedagogics for unfolding and understanding the didactical problematic in terms of, among others, the category “stepping up to reality” (learning) and the criterion “perspectivity”.

In an eventually comprehensive exposition of the relevance of a psychopedagogical perspective for didactical theory construction such an approach should be indispensable. After all, the connection of “learning” and “letting learn” with the consequent expected change (as acquiring perspective) really is obvious and a denial of such a connection is difficult, however categorical this postulation might sound.

When at this stage I do not choose such an approach for the explication, it is not because it is less important or not of as much relevance as another approach. I have already indicated that a meaningful possibility for settling these relations lies in an exemplary approach that, as a matter of fact, to some extent is an indication of the fundamentals and that *ipso facto*, ought to have an

equal relevance as an approach in the case of the psychopedagogical.

In order to broaden the perspective, I choose another way in order to be able to show somewhat the extent of the relationship in this particular regard and possible accusations of ambiguity regarding intercepting and putting aside categories and criteria. I thus proceed from the lesson structure in an attempt to show from another angle how meaningful psychopedagogical research and pronouncements manifest themselves in the search for the “didactic” of didactical pedagogics.

In more than one respect, the lesson structure is the result, eventuality of a didactical theory. The use of the concept “structure” with respect to a lesson indicates, especially in this particular connection, that the didactician must be able to make a real, accountable pronouncement about what a lesson is on the basis of his findings because, the lesson structurally is largely the totality of the perspective of his theory that not only must make it observable but also realized. To the extent that didactical theory is a reflection about a practice with the aim of assuming a practice, the responsibility contained in the concept “lesson structure” must literally arise in the course of activity of the teaching situation.

Thus viewed, the question of a lesson structure is not really a matter of expectation but indeed one of actualization. However, in order to understand the significance of psychopedagogics for unfolding a lesson structure, there are a few matters that are essentially entwined with constructing a didactical theory that must be briefly touched upon in order that the perspective of the didactical pedagogue is allowed to collaborate unhindered, as far as possible, in his search for *fundamentalia*.

In the development of didactical thinking one can with a relative degree of confidence assert that constructing a lesson structure only on the basis of the lesson contents is not well-founded didactically. Any pronouncement about learning contents in its didactic connotation will show that the contents do not constitute an unchangeable aspect of didactic practice. History shows that as a person as well as time proceeds, the beacons shift. The fact of

contents, without any doubt, refers to an essential matter of the experiential totality that we know as “teaching”.

The question about **what** contents does not show the unchangeable that serves as a precondition for a theoretical design. The form, on the other hand, manifests itself as a constant in so far as the experience of “teaching” occurs at all times among and between persons. Without intensively discussing this at this stage, I simply refer to the question of the fundamental forms that always and in all cultures and with respect to each and any view of life undeniably are present in the experiential whole and therefore can be described as structural regarding it.

A conversation about contents is absolutely essential in so far as it has to do with the form of “*didaskein*”. Therefore, it is a structural matter of teaching and, as such, also refers to the ultimate, very individual lesson situation. The implication of this is that lesson contents vary according to cultural-, temporal- and world-view while the form is shown to be exactly constant in the history of Didactics. From this one possibly should easily infer that the lesson contents cannot be of fundamental significance for an exposition of the lesson structure and that there only is mention of “structure” in so far as the lesson form makes this structure identifiable and describable.

Such a statement is partly true. But: in the unfolding of a lesson structure the form, as such, is cold and dead, i.e., didactically immobile and barren until particular contents arise in terms of which the form comes into motion and becomes a dynamic construction that ultimately can be described pedagogically as a teaching effect. “*Didaskein*” is a matter of an orderly, systematic, accountable way of acting. There is clear mention of form in which the contents must be offered.

The harmony between form and contents is the only didactic guarantee that the change aimed for will occur. In this equilibrium of form and contents in the lesson structure psychopedagogics speaks so strongly that the candid didactical pedagogue sometimes is very surprised.

In the real lesson structure there is mention of a lesson aim. This lesson aim is a core matter in the lesson structure in two respects: in the first place it delimits the activity character of the lesson in the sense that it marks off a balance between form and contents. In the second place, it directs the activities of the participants in their teaching and learning aspects. It follows that the question of “teaching” and “learning” in form as well as contents must be understood as implicit in the concept “lesson aim”.

Considering that teaching is attuned to learning and that learning, as such, is motivated by teaching, among other things, it is obvious that the lesson aim necessarily includes the learning aim. If one now takes into account that the human activity we know as “learning” presumes a way of being, the taking up of and planning for the ways of learning in the lesson structure really are a logical consequence of the above statement. Also, this represents a breakthrough in perspective that psychopedagogics has brought about for didactical pedagogics that is of unusual scope.

This pronouncement not only is a matter of fundamental insight but also and especially of functional realization in the dynamic that the concept “lesson structure” presumes in order for it to be. The modes of learning indeed presume taking the above into account, the actualization of the learning activity with respect to particular learning contents in particular, i.e., planned, initiated, didactic courses. This planning that constitutes the warp and woof of “didaskhein” also implies the planning of modes of learning. I mention a few aspects in the course of a lesson where, in its planning and actualization, the question of modes of learning undeniably and essentially constitute part of the didactic activity.

To plan for the modes of learning in a didactic respect means to give structure to the course of a lesson in accordance with the nature of the learning contents in which particular modes of learning can be actualized in order to attain the greatest possible teaching effect. This pronouncement has at least two important consequences for studying the didactical problematic: in the first place it proclaims the psychopedagogue as a conversational partner in the construction of the lesson structure because (in the second

place) the didactician in designing his lesson structure must not leave the course of learning to chance.

Here it must clearly be stated that the concepts “course of a lesson” and “course of learning” are not used in a complementary way but in a coordinated meaningful connection that carries the actualization of “*didaskhein*” in the lesson situation.

To return to the remarks regarding categories made at the beginning of this section: the unlocking of reality and stepping up to reality (teaching and learning) manifest themselves in that the teacher, in accordance with the unique nature of the learning contents, so expresses his presentation that the modes of learning that he also must take into account in the achieving course of consciousness, **as such**, are proclaimed in the lesson situation.

A precise unraveling of the lesson structure shows, among other things, the following firm points of this pronouncement. In each lesson structure there is mention of a reduction of the learning contents to their essentials in terms of which formulating a lesson problem is possible. Understandably, this reduction of learning contents and the related formulation of the lesson problem are matters of an insight into the learning activity that must be brought into the foreground for the effective forming of concepts as a new, greater mobility of the pupils. This is accomplished in the actualization of the pupil’s foreknowledge and the integration of the new contents into it by which the eventual exercise of the insight itself as well as its possible didactic application are carried out. Without taking the modes of learning (e.g, experiencing, lived experiencing, observing, abstracting) into account, the actualization of the course of the lesson simply is not possible didactically. Understandably, the learning activity is left to chance if the didactician does not take this up purposefully in his anticipations of the course of the lesson.

Now if one further takes into consideration that the ways the contents are ordered and the form is chosen (including the methods that are going to be followed) ought to be in direct correspondence with the mode or modes of learning planned for, one didactically can with the greatest confidence pronounce that the actualization of

the learning event in the lesson situation without the co-consideration of the modes of learning not only is meaningless but also appears to be impossible.

Obviously, here it is not the case that psychopedagogics makes particular prescriptions for didactical pedagogics to which it then must conform or that it must apply. On the contrary, the didactical pedagogue questions psychopedagogics in order to keep in view the general pedagogical course of matters in its embracing, comprehensive, overarching whole. Also, this questioning of psychopedagogics is done in order to in some way try to guarantee that the child's way through the world, to the extent that teaching is involved in it, not only will be meaningful but in a concrete sense also will lead to greater adulthood.

Now if one brings together for consideration the above pronouncements about the pedagogical aim, relationship and sequence structures with the modes of learning, it seems clear that these three disciplines of pedagogics (fundamental, didactical and psychopedagogical) figure equally in the lesson situation and jointly carry educating in accordance with the reality to which it ought to be faithful. This faithfulness to reality as well as nearness to life are reasonable demands that can be imposed on educating. This especially is a demand that from a sociopedagogical perspective fosters particular expectations of didactics. Therefore, it should be meaningful to focus on the matter of possible integration from a sociopedagogical perspective as well as the relevance of sociopedagogics for an investigation of the didactic problematic.

3. *Sociopedagogics*: One can describe the reality-involvement of teaching that indeed is an activity among and between persons, i.e., an activity that also is socially determined, in especially two historical-social respects. Both views are popular in the history of didactical thinking and both have and still do exercise an influence on formulating didactical theorems in particular. Both views, in the course of time, and especially on the basis of their generally accepted popularity appear didactically as demands.

Although no one denies the sound principle that is enclosed in them, they thereby are elevated to the rank of norms in so far as

they concern didactic practice. If this ought to be so at the moment is not directly to the point.

The question that we now will attend to and discuss is whether these two principles, as well as didactic norms, indeed do not form a connection between didactic-pedagogical theorems and a sociopedagogical perspective by which the relevance of sociopedagogics is particularly significant for unraveling as well as constituting a didactic practice.

The two matters referred to are the following: In the first place it is continually stated as a principle and/or demand that teaching must be near to life, be anchored in the soil of life, as such, and ought to be interpreted with respect to the life style and cultural climate and in doing so it can take up a life-authentic course of educating and futurity that can qualify as “near to life”.

I mean that the “Heimatprinzip” (principle of local lore) that is so popular in Central Europe offers a good frame of reference for this particular matter.

The second aspect continually referred to and that equally often functions as a demand for didactical theorems is that teaching ought to be near to educating, i.e., that in its formalization it must not be foreign to the practice of educating and decidedly show a continuity between home and school. The often existing distance or even gap between home educating and school teaching is the central target focused on in expositions of this nature and in all of their variations. Also, here we have a sociopedagogical calling that undeniably lets itself be heard in didactical theory and that cannot merely be ignored in the search for essential didactical problems. In familiar publications, Spranger as well as Peters and Hahn are important exponents of such a view and also in modern pedagogics this way of being stands on its own so that it inescapably is compelled to be a pronouncement of didactical theory.

Here we have to do with two important concepts: nearness to living and nearness to educating. Superficially, this seems to be a complementary, even a tautological formulation. Really the one cannot be thought of without the other.

By careful analysis one must indicate that a near to life teaching, although it does not ignore form, still in the now existing pronouncements of Weniger, among others, and the recent past of Klafki is qualified as content defining. The second, although it does not ignore content, is all the same really a matter that in its pronouncements and claims again focuses on form in its argument so that the concept “supplementary” has more relevance in light of the problem than “complementary” and a tautological interpretation in its totally really falls away.

According to the ideal consequence one should be able to assert that regarding these two matters, in its formal styling in an educative connection, the school must be pedagogically acceptable (accountable)—and that in light of this pedagogical acceptability it must concentrate on near to life contents by which the spirit of the age and the state of the culture, the situatedness of the youth and the moral-religious ordering of society must be taken into account—to only mention a few of forms of manifestation of such demands.

If one now takes into account the above, he should assume that teaching, also in its educative connection, does not progress in a vacuum but in a particular social, inter-human situation and therefore it is a social matter, the question of the relevance of sociopedagogics for the didactical pedagogical acquires particular significance. The consequence is easy to formulate: It was always and will remain so that life form or lifestyle and educative form (thus also teaching form) always fundamentally are dependent on each other because the educative structure even determines the scope of society generationally.

However, it must be equally clear that the concepts “near to life” and “true to educating” cannot be of a constant nature regarding content because the societal situation is flowing, changing and thus is metastable in nature. This metastability of content contributes understandably to bringing about a changing emphasis on form so that the uninitiated easily contends that the form changes in accordance with the contents.

The didactician should take such an assertion as meaning that the changing societal situation will and can *essentially* influence the didactic form. The fact is that the theoretical didactician understandably refers to the didactic form in its experiential state as it is observed in the reality between and among persons, as a universally valid matter, but he cannot deny the changing emphasis and also cannot deny that even today particular aspects of form are hypostatized such that it dominates the total practice and conceals in such a way that the whole in its scope dwindles under the grotesque emphasis of a part.

This skewed image that was repeatedly run across in didactic practice in the past and still is today cannot be charged to the social purview and the resulting sociopedagogical pronouncements. After all, the reality with which sociopedagogics is involved is one of change, even very fast change. War and peace, prosperity and poverty, industry and agriculture necessarily influence aspects such as the scope of teaching, the length of the school year, the facilities that can be made available, the contents that are concentrated on, etc.

For didactical theory, however, contradistinctions arise here that bring about contrasts some of which can be very difficult to take into account didactically and that really never are justified via thinking, e.g., a stand for near to life (content) in contrast to the universal, true to reality in contrast to the ideal-historical, etc. The oscillating effect for disclosing a didactical theory is one of identifiable confusion in thinking in favor of a so-called situational and zeitgeist “applied” practice. The present destructive pragmatism and formula didactics are good examples of the effect that sociopedagogical views arising from particular societal tendencies can have on didactic constructions.

In a situation such as this, if Sociopedagogics is silent or worse allows its voice to be heard wrongly (judging from the reality structure of educating), the effect (however small) must show itself as a garbling of didactical theory forming. For example, in its last entrenchment it can have the effect of bring forth the destructive complaint that where educative and teaching intervention are life alienating, in its essence it is meaningless and thus does not

contribute to life realization at all. Is this not the complaint that today repeatedly is made about theoretical discussions of pedagogical questions?

In other words, the *fundamentalialia* that are brought to expression in designing a didactical theory have no relevance because the societal framework denies the essence of “*didaskein*”, i.e., its original structure, and unashamedly postulates a time-bound situation (content over its generally valid form) as a priority. The collapse in insight about what really is essential for practice is obvious, irrespective of the content that is relevant.

Societal censorship or its lack therewith separate form and content by wrongly neglecting to emphasize the harmony that necessarily must exist between them. In this respect, neither political science nor cultural philosophy or even different variants of pragmatic thinking can take the place of sociopedagogics.

The concepts “person” and “world” proclaim the right of sociopedagogics to exist. But also they proclaim its relevance for fundamental thinking about “*didaskein*”. “Person” and “world” presume a dynamic, cumulative relationship that is brought about structurally by teaching-directed intervention and interference.

How and where should a person then still claim that sociopedagogics builds up its structure separately and apart from didactical pedagogics and that this structure has no particular significance for a science of teaching except for a few aspects of social relations that often are indicated as the connection between the two?

No one denies this connection, but if this implies that it is the only or last pronouncement that sociopedagogics offers didactical pedagogics, then there is an impoverishment in both of these part-disciplines that, from a didactical point of view, this really is seen as welcome.

4. *Historical Pedagogics*: As with any other science, pedagogics also has its history. On its surface, this looks like a relatively simple, obvious statement with little consequence for unraveling the

pedagogical, and, in this case, the didactical problematic. Nevertheless, with this a course of progression has been raised that not only reveals a wealth of facts, in an encyclopedic sense, but also that brings pedagogical essences to the surface.

Judged differently, historical pedagogics is no pedagogics. By implication this means that pedagogics, as does any science, also has its history that includes the fact that this historical perspective brings forth pedagogical essences and thus engages in essence-thinking from a particular point of view, i.e., forces the historical view on us. After all, historical pedagogics, in its pedagogical tendency, cannot really involve itself with any reality other than the reality of educating as it has been revealed over the centuries. If, in its own literature, historical pedagogics sometimes creates the impression that it constitutes a chronological compilation, and if over the course of time, this compilation points to gaps in the settled pronouncements of historical pedagogics, it would be difficult to account for such a gap and view it as a matter of historical pedagogics.

For each distinguished pedagogue, indeed it is clear that there are many noticeable ways to practice historical pedagogics. And in this country, certainly it especially is Potgieter who imported a new way of practicing this pedagogical discipline by which a fresh, thematic approach largely replaced a precise chronological one. If an historical pedagogue should decide to work by chronologically-compiling, in either case, he is not forced to do this at all. Whatever the method might be, his pronouncements (if pedagogically couched) can have nothing else than the phenomenon of educating as a central theme. If so, the historical pedagogical view must be considered to have value for didactical pedagogics.

It certainly is an understandable claim in the contemporary practice of Didactics that this is original. The word “origin” (verb “arise”), which is the root word of “original”, etymologically is interesting. Viewed etymologically, “origin” refers to beginning, starting, arising—stated in a general: what has proceeded from something. Original thinking, insights, pronouncements, etc.; i.e., this would imply thinking, insights, pronouncements, i.e., a first, beginning coming forth and seeing of a particular practice, isolated by

thinking and verbalized in a pronouncement. Thus, original thinking implies origins, i.e., what always was so.

But now it obviously is clear that the practice that Didactics is concerned with is not that of today or yesterday. This practice is as old as being human itself so that the history of didactics also implies (to some degree) the history of being human and the converse.

Thus, one also could say the essences of the pedagogical that now are present were already there. Hence, original pedagogical thinking is not possible without also taking into account the origins of the pedagogical as explicated by historical pedagogics. Therefore, it also would be possible to unravel each facet of the didactical problematic in its historical sense and the progression of its course of development as one now knows it after its historical sense, i.e., its origins are researched and interpreted for contemporary times. Stated still further: a contemporary interpretation by which *all* pedagogical perspectives concerning the didactic would be ignored simply is not possible.

The didactician would not have had anything to do with “origin” in a comparative sense. After all, the concept “reality” also includes historical reality—and especially in the sense that what *is* actually *has become*. The contemporary has meaning on the basis of the past; the past has become the present; the immediate problem has a past. Giving meaning outside of the past is unthinkable. Now precisely it is this moment of giving meaning by teaching that I have chosen here as an example for interpretation in a didactic-pedagogical respect in order to indicate the value of historical pedagogics for forming a didactical theory to any degree.

As far as a study of teaching is concerned, one could interpret the question of giving meaning in both a general or particular respect. In a general respect, there would be mention of the meaning of the form of the didactical by which the *fundamentals* are brought to the fore, while there is a particular meaning of the contents by which the idea of the *elementals* calls for a didactical interpretation.

Thus we have two concepts that make a cardinal contribution to a contemporary theoretical structure while also disclosing the

meaning of historical pedagogics for the study of didactics. In an historical didactical respect, without interpreting Pestalozzi, Herbart, Schleiermacher, Willmann and many others, a contemporary formulation of the fundamentals and the elementals in Didactics would not be possible. Without going into detail, the modern formulation of these two concepts especially amounts to making fundamental the ground-experiencing and ground-lived experiencing of a learning child with respect to representing and verbalizing reality.

Obviously, the matter of the fundamental, thus, is the didactic plan to prepare for particular ways of learning that must realize these basic experiences and lived experiences in a situation that is established most artificially.

On the other hand, it is the task of a didactician, by presenting learning contents, to insure that the elemental, i.e., the simplest, most basic essentials of the learning contents through which the matter and coherence of the concerned problem or theme can arise so they can be reduced and ordered such that they really can be made accessible to the learning person.

Meaningful learning and meaningful teaching thus encounter each other in the concepts “fundamental” and “elemental” because the coherence of form and content are expressed essentially by these two concepts.

In the historical analysis and evaluation of the above-mentioned educationists to which Klafki, in particular, has come, it seems very clear that the didactical structure, in general, but the lesson structure, in particular, without [acquiring] basic insights into these two matters is not really correct. On the basis of the incorrect interpretation of Herbart’s views, so strictly followed by his pupils and followers, that develop into a very definitive lesson phase-structure, and that progresses in a mechanistic, determined way, cannot give an account of the fundamentals such that the elementals necessarily acquire a skewed appearance. Fundamental experiencing and lived experiencing, as constituted in the simplest, most representative content, imply that the sense of a particular aspect of reality must be made visible in the relationship and

coherence of a matter. When this does not happen it simply means that essentially a child does not enter reality in the sense that he does not discover the essence of that reality. And it is from this coherence or interaction of the fundamentals and the elementals in a lesson structure such that any phraseology didactics is unacceptable and therefore with good reason can be placed under question marks with correct theory forming.

Until [didactic] criteria are designed in this particular context, historical pedagogics provides Didactic study with a source of rich, varied and comparable data. In fact, the establishment of criteria related to the accumulation of didactical theories through the ages would not only be impossible but also senseless without a study of historical pedagogics.

The transcendent always offers the didactic a play image of the practice that is, that is rejected and that changes, and that in a positive or negative aspect of the concepts speaks to modern times. The structuring of a didactically accountable theory and thus it is impossible in any way to construct a didactical pedagogical theory without choosing to study historical pedagogics.

The origins (fundamentalia/essences) of “didaskhein” have been discussed and their possibilities for beginning or approaching the construction of a didactical science as well as their significance for a new discipline have been considered and have raised the inevitable matter of the didactic problematic. It has been shown that a point of view does not necessarily force to the surface essences that actually are the experiential totality of teaching as such; i.e., a bringing to light a phenomenon that is among and between persons. On close examination, it also is the case that teaching reveals itself in many situations that usually are part of a person’s forms of living and thus primarily has nothing to do with schooling.

These pronouncements force a didactician to distinguish between didactical pedagogics and didactics. In the first case there is a conspicuous educative course that is actualized in and by teaching. On the other hand, there is teaching that need not have anything to do with educating because the meaning of teaching in such a broad spectrum does not have a pupil’s becoming adult as an aim and thus

need not be considered further in a pedagogical connection by one who teaches.

Above it is indicated that in so far as a child is dependent on educating in order to be adult, teaching cannot be thought away from this course of educating. Briefly, the argument comes down to the following: Educating is an aim-directed, profound activity that an adult carries out in his being with a child with the aim that, as time goes by, he will move from a state of non-adulthood to a state of being adult. This adulthood is a matter of responsibility and therefore also a matter of life choices and an unfolding involvement in life. Life contents in all of their variations thus always are themes of educating. After all, an educator does not educate in terms of nothing. He always educates with respect to “something”.

This “something” that then is proclaimed as contents, simultaneously assumes that there is teaching. This means that the contents introduced to a child as human matters are unlocked and constantly he is called to deal responsibly with them and, as life contents, to appropriate them for himself in order to acquire independence which is synonymous with adulthood.

One also could say that educating always is accomplished by teaching and in so far as teaching is concerned with educating, the meaning of this teaching is found in educating and in its aim. In so far as there is mention of a course of teaching in a child’s becoming adult, and which is an inevitable part of the entire event, this makes teaching a part of educating. After all, if teaching is studied in this particular context, then this study is a discipline of a greater pedagogical investigation and there is mention of the discipline “didactical pedagogics”.

But as already indicated, all matters of teaching are not limited to an educative situation. It also occurs daily among adults in a myriad of variations by which teaching acquires a life of its own that cannot be reduced to educating but where “*didaskhein*” will suffice. In these situations teaching also is studied by those who are interested in it. This type of study simply should be called didactics without any reference to educating.

Indeed, both of these facets of the study of teaching have a common basis. That experience that we know as teaching belongs to the most original experiencing of human beings. Whatever the nature and scope of later training, independent scientific study, detailed research, etc., one fact cannot be ignored: no educating is actualized without teaching and thus all intense, real, scientific, practical, skills-based teaching and training a person already was preceded by a primary educative teaching and in the most direct, most obvious sense of the word is a continuation of it.

The autonomous structure of “didactics” undoubtedly has its origin in an educative situation when a pupil or student or worker is not seen primarily as such but as a not-yet-adult on the way to adulthood. To gain fundamental insight into the course of the didactic without taking this fact into account is to deny the first beginning of the course of thinking, i.e., to think of reality as being different from how it actually is. The search for the origins or fundamentalia of “*didaskhein*” implies taking different origins in approaching it if one wishes to arrive at its real essences.

So far, the issue of essences has been discussed repeatedly and dealt with in various ways. Also, various points of view of the origins and their coherences for accountably building a theory of teaching have been indicated. If one would see that any theory construction after all is a search for the possibility of knowing a particular aspect of reality, certainly at this stage it is meaningful to be able to formulate and, in light of known epistemological statements, to arrive at a more extensive formulation. In didactical theory forming, such statements are not epistemological but rather an interpretation of such views as far as they have relevance for a researcher in constructing didactical theory. The following aspects certainly are of particular importance:

1. If a didactician in any way tries to progressively acquire a definite course in constructing his theory, he cannot but choose experience as the point of departure for his exposition. Experiencing is reality, i.e., it *is* and it is given with being human. In its entirety it covers the whole of human involvement in reality. Thus, a person’s involvement in the reality of teaching lies within the spectrum of his experiences,

and beyond any doubt, his constructions imply a matter of perceiving in a rationally penetrative way to the essences of such reality. As a thinker, he cannot avoid working through his analyses of categories as illuminative ways of thinking that must describe the essences of experiencing (everyday practice) to disclose the essentials of teaching.

These categories are verbalizations of essences of experience, i.e., of practice as they manifest themselves to the thinker. It is well understood that in verbalizing these essences, thinkers can and do differ.

However, these verbalizations of experience do not change it. No one who describes an experience can avoid its essences in the descriptions such that the categories, whether or not they are considered as such, must be visible in each. The visibility of categories also is a matter of the coherence of parts or aspects that must display a whole (the experience).

In light of the diversity of experience it is unimaginable that it will show itself only in one category, i.e., that it will be simple (uni-faceted). After all, life is multi-faceted. Hence the coherence of the categories provides a structure, a scheme, a conceivable, understandable exposition of a slice of reality as it really is.

At all costs a seeker of fundamental theory must avoid letting his pursuit of categories allow experience itself from excluding reality or be deceived by aspects that are not essential constituents or by matters that are not essential constituents of the experience. The way he reduces an experience to its essences, or strips away everything that is superfluous for insight and that does not contribute to a viewing of the essences of such an experience is of fundamental importance for the quality of a theory to which he is involved in giving structure.

2. There is no doubt that there only is a reality for a person to the extent that he is aware of it. Therefore, a thought construction necessarily is bound in some way to experience,

i.e., it stems from the fact that a person participates in reality and thus is aware of it. That such thought constructions can be seen as wrong, unbalanced, incoherent, idealized, etc., does not strip them of any connection with reality.

Therefore, it is difficult to see that a theoretical construction in didactical pedagogics has no connection with reality and has nothing to do with it. The problem with such theoretical development usually is that a particular aspect of experience is posited as a category and everything else simply is diverted in a dialectical and/or hermeneutic way.

3. The origin of a particular slice of experience is knowable in its essences only in terms of itself. Thus, experiencing is no thought construction but it provides the possibility or soil for thinking in the same way that the ground offers possibility for a tiller.

The danger to which a fundamental investigator must pay particular attention is that experience, as it appears, often remains covered by already known preconditions for the possibility that a particular slice of it will be actualized in a person's life. Thus, the didactician, in constructing his theory, searches for the meaning and ground of the experience as it appears in the human lifeworld.

Therefore, the connection with other thought constructions must comply with the important criterion that a theorist, in his expositions of reality itself, must disclose it as it really *is* via methods that can penetrate the unique nature of that experience in order to bring to light its essences. Undoubtedly, it is possible for a thinker to cover over the experience in his explications instead of disclosing it.

4. As such, experience is unformulated. It is not verbalized. Also, experience does not speak for itself. In a scientific sense, this experience must be verbalized in terms of the scope and quality of the investigator's penetration of it and his ability to interpret and formulate it scientifically. A description in terms of categories without interpretation

logically is not possible. Although this subjective aspect in theory building hopefully is not the accompanying factor for thinking, without it, thinking is not possible. Continually, it is *someone* who thinks about *something*.

Phenomena as such are there to be thought about but do not themselves think. Absolute objectivity in constructing a didactical theory is not possible. The phenomenon of educating (teaching) thus is nothing other than the structure of Dasein itself in light of which each concept taken up in the theory as a construction must show a coherence of existing and being^{???}.

5. The fact that a person is in the world, participates in it, anticipates the reality in which he is involved and designs it according to his expectations all make possible a discipline such as didactical pedagogics. On closer examination, teaching certainly is one of the purest examples of human intentionality that is actualized in his involvement in reality.

For a builder of didactical theory, this matter is of fundamental importance and it certainly deserves a brief explication in order to give some indication of its significance for a theoretical design. The actualization of intentionalities is a meaningful aspect of theory forming in didactical pedagogics that perhaps can best be illuminated if one realizes that in actualizing intentionalities it is not so much that a person turns to reality but necessarily he proceeds to establish a *relationship* with it.

Strictly speaking, this means you turn yourself to reality, you turn your face to reality. This matter of turning yourself to reality implies that this is a matter of preparatory or ongoing action that is not necessarily is a constitutive relationship aspect that the concept “intention” carries. The fact that a person is placed in a particular situation, that he must deal

^{???} Questionable translation of: Die verskynsel van die opvoeding (onderrig) is derhalwe niks anders nie as die struktuur van Dasein self in die lig waarvan elke begrip wat in die teorie opgeneem word, ‘n samehang moet toon van syn en synde as konstruksie.

with the appeal emanating from it, so that also he must act by teaching makes the relationship (actualizing intentionalities) a fundamentally meaningful matter for constructing a didactical theory.

Being in the world means actualizing intentionalities and actualizing intentionalities that have an effect, i.e., which means having to teach. It is this actualization of intentionalities by teaching that the meaning of reality, the meaning of a person's being involved with and participation in a common human experience-structure that has important theoretical-didactical consequences.

The reason lies in the fact that what constitutes reality, in a sense-giving way, is indicated as an immanent meaning, and indeed makes the act of teaching meaningful within the course of educating. Teaching implies the actualization of intentionalities within the totality of his experiences such that it is a fulfillment of intentionality by a person in the world.

One certainly would be able to compile a wide range of conclusions of this nature as fundamental insights in constructing a didactical theory. For the purpose of this chapter, however, I think it suffices, not because these five conclusions are comprehensive and complete, but possibly to offer a student who immerses himself in didactical theory an opportunity to himself search, to think, to formulate and to test his conclusions on arguments that follow in the remaining chapters.

An important issue that is absent in the above five conclusions is the coherence of form and content as matters of didactical theory building but since this is a theme in the next chapter, it is omitted here.