

CHAPTER I

THE “DISCOVERY” THAT A CHILD IMPEDED IN BECOMING IS IN A PROBLEMATIC EDUCATIVE EVENT

1. INTRODUCTORY ORIENTATION

1.1 Introduction

As a way of access to the facts of reality about being human, pedagogics attempts to understand and interpret educating in terms of truisms, as well as various perspective, or ways of access, as particular standpoints from which there is an attempt to understand educative facts. Each of these perspectives has its own categories, which have reality status because essentially each is involved in a perspective on human life reality, according to Landman and Gous.¹

As part-areas of knowledge of pedagogics, one can distinguish among fundamental pedagogics, psychopedagogics, didactic pedagogics, physical pedagogics, and sociopedagogics, to mention a few.

Ever since pedagogics has been practiced as an autonomous science with its own area of focus and categories (which are illuminative means of thinking),² and especially since the 1950's, orthopedagogics, as a very recent sub-part of pedagogics arose and educationists began to distance themselves from a haphazard intervention with children in educative distress.

Educative problems are as old as educating itself, and research into “educative problems” has a long history. However, until relatively recently, this research was completely unconnected and, even today, there is a conspicuous lack of a common point of departure for such research, or an accountable orthopedagogic perspective involving studying a *child in a problematic situation of educating who is impeded in his/her becoming*.

Because providing help to a child in a problematic educative situation (in particular, a child with one or another specific handicap) was initiated by scientific disciplines other than pedagogics, next there is a brief historical exploration of such interventions.

1.2 A historical exploration of intervening with the handicapped child

Since earliest times, the child with specific handicaps has made him/herself conspicuous. In particular, the specific symptoms connected with various handicaps compelled “special” intervention, and there were attempts to help such children.

In this connection, the first such institution was the *Abbe de l'Epee*, which was established in Paris in 1770 with the aim of helping deaf children.³ After Valentin Haüy witnessed how sighted bystanders ridiculed several blind children who gave a musical performance,⁴ he had pity for them, and his campaign for them contributed to the establishment of an institute for the blind in 1784.⁵

An institute and school for severely mentally handicapped was established in 1928 in Switzerland under the leadership of Guggenbuhl,⁶ and in 1840, a similar institute was started by Seguin in Paris.⁷

During 1848, similar institutions were established in England and the U.S.A.⁸ Since then, physically handicapped, and mentally deficient children have also enjoyed attention,⁹ and “specialized” help for such handicapped children was gradually expanded and differentiated, and was also carried into the ordinary school context, especially toward the end of the 20th century. Gradually, in connection with helping blind, deaf, epileptic, and other handicapped children, interest in the affectively disturbed child also increased.

From the 1920's, especially in the Netherlands, attention was given to scientific educative help to the handicapped child and, since the 1930's attention was directed on a large scale to schools for

providing exceptional teaching/educating to children with learning and educative difficulties.¹⁰

In the U.S.A., intervention with the handicapped child gained momentum beginning with the establishment of several child guidance clinics at the beginning of the 20th century, and much attention was given to remedial teaching.¹¹

In South Africa, “specialized” help for the handicapped child followed approximately the same pattern as in Europe. Teaching the blind, and deaf came first, and since the 1930’s, the intellectually handicapped received more attention. Teaching children with cerebral palsy, and those with learning difficulties have been strongly in the foreground since the 1950’s.¹²

A very recent development is the attention given to the *learning-impaired* child as such, and especially in the Transvaal, orthodidactic help was given to children with specific learning difficulties.

1.3 An evaluation of the pedagogical accountability of the intervention with the handicapped child

With a closer penetration of the “specialized” help for the handicapped child in the institutes, and schools for the deaf, blind, debilitated, epileptic, and others, it is immediately obvious that this is done without first reflecting on the essence of these children, or on their world.

Persons involved in providing such help were prepared in sciences other than pedagogics, and had little or no knowledge of the child’s educative situatedness. Usually, these children were “treated” in institutions by physicians, psychiatrists, and psychologists who, moreover, were assisted by clergymen, social workers, and less scientifically oriented functionaries.¹³

This help was especially practical in nature, and often moralizing. Two viewpoints served as points of departure, i.e., those children who showed one or another sensory, or intellectual defect, and those who had manifested character defects.¹⁴

The conspicuousness of the symptoms had allowed for a search for means and methods for helping the child in his/her “development”. There was special concentration on the “state” of the child, and the “treatment” of the symptom, and attempts were made to help a handicapped child with one or another defect which he/she should “endure”. This also explains why the names of physicians such as Itard, Seguin, Montessori, Decroly, Strumpell, Lutz, Asperger, Zuithoff, and Valk¹⁵ appeared so prominently in the list of the first providers of help to the handicapped child.

The priority of the medical intervention with the “deviant” child, and the overlapping with other scientific disciplines, such as psychology, psychiatry, sociology, and social work had the consequence that there was no unitary approach, and with the different sciences, as its basis of origin, there was no authentic orthopedagogics. Each science had studied the handicapped child from its own approach.¹⁶ This is, indeed, characterized by an eclectic character, since it availed itself of a series of theories, methods, and techniques developed by the different sciences, irrespective of their underlying [philosophical] anthropology, usefulness, and origin.

In addition, a unitary approach was hindered by the multi-sidedness of help for such a divergent number of symptoms. Instead of noticing the child’s educative distress, it is concealed to such an extent that, in practice, the provision of help shows little recognizable sign of *orthopedagogics*.

Also, the *learning difficulties* of the deviant child received attention, but for an explanation of the “problem”, and of learning difficulties, a connection was sought with the contemporary teaching practice which, in its turn, also had no accountable foundation, since it was not grounded in the pedagogical.

This ignoring of the handicapped child’s educative situation, and the acceptance of sciences other than pedagogics, as basic for providing help, largely kept in check the establishment of an accountable helping practice.

Seeing a child's pedagogical situatedness and the "discovery" of *educative distress*, led to the establishment of the orthopedagogic, which includes within it a study of the *problematic* event of educating, and a child's under actualization of his/her potentialities.

1.4 The "discovery" of educative distress

The first scientific approach to child problems was taken in 1890 by Ludwig Strumpell who, in his "Die Paedagogische Pathologie" reflected on "deviant behavior" by "problem children" and their psychiatric "treatment".¹⁷

With the rise of psychoanalysis, and especially after Freud, in 1907, had "treated" a child for anxiety,¹⁸ the phenomenon of deviancy in children also had become a matter which was approached from this perspective. However, at first, this was little more than an application of child psychopathology.

With the appearance of his "Einführung in die Heilpaedagogik" in 1924,¹⁹ Hanselmann was the first to actually present a comprehensive work on children with deviancies. This work was very influential, and contributed to the fact that, after 1930, various forms of psychological, and psychiatric approaches came into the foreground, but also the psychological-psychiatric viewpoints on child problems became dominant.

Hanselmann's work was followed by the more pedagogical works of Moor,²⁰ Bopp,²¹ Asperger,²² and Cruickshank and Johnson,²³ in which the educative situatedness of the deviant child no longer was entirely ignored.

The absence of a founded orthopedagogic theory, and the applied approach, which was generally in vogue, and according to which different sciences also found application in intervening with these children, the development was hindered from then on, and this had the consequence that pedagogics was very late to intervene with the handicapped child, as *a child-in-educative-distress*.

The first pedagogical intervention came from the "didactic pedagogic" side by "scientists of teaching" who were asked to

contribute to the “treatment” of handicapped children in institutions,²⁴ in the form of *special* or *exceptional teaching*.

Since the 1950’s, orthopedagogic practice, even here in South Africa, gradually began to lose its haphazard character.²⁵ On the one hand, the educative distress of the child who came into the orthopedagogic field of vision, gradually was noticed more, and on the other hand, the provision of help became strongly directed by the current pedagogical thinking.

Especially the works of Langeveld, Vliegenthart, Van Gelder, Lubbers, Dumont, Ter Horst, and others in the Netherlands, and Nel, Sonnekus, Stander, Gouws, and others in South Africa, contributed to the development of a general orthopedagogic theory, and an accountable practice. The Faculty of Education at the University of Pretoria played a leading role in constructing orthopedagogic practice, in which connection, especially Nel had done pioneering work. The book “Psigiese beelde van kinders met leermoeilikhede”²⁶[{Psychic images of children with learning difficulties}], which he co-authored with Sonnekus, appeared in 1959, and must be seen as an important milestone.²⁷

Vliegenthart²⁸ indicates the place of orthopedagogics, as a fixed structure of pedagogics, as the “mother science”, and Ter Horst emphasizes that the problematic situation of educating²⁹ is the object of study of orthopedagogics.

Providing help to a “deviant” child had a very long and tortuous course before the educative distress of such a child was accepted as its point of departure. Although there still are several “specialists” who involve themselves in helping children with “problems”, and who still ignore the child’s educative situatedness, each provider of help whose work rests on scientifically founded grounds takes his/her point of departure in the problematic educative situation of a particular child.

Where help is given to another person, it is obvious that such a person must first be *known*, and this also leads to showing the way one can arrive at such *knowledge*.

By means of a historical exploration of the development of acquiring knowledge of *a person*, it is immediately clear that there were many stumbling blocks in this development, and the initial stranglehold of naturalism on the human sciences is seen as one of the most central, a matter considered next.

2. VIEWING BEING HUMAN FROM A NATURAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE AND THE CONCEALMENT OF ITS ESSENCES

Mainly because of the success of the methods of the natural sciences, during the previous two-and-a-half centuries, the human sciences also made use of these methods, and the rationale for doing so compellingly entered the foreground that it did not leave them unscathed.

There was an attempt to arrive at knowledge of a human being in the same way as learning to know about things in nature. By studying a human being as an *object*, there was a search for correspondences between human and non-human forms.

From this approach, a view of being human, and a psychology gradually developed which could be qualified as “naturalistic”. With respect to the human being as a *person*, a psychic *life-as-totality-in-function*, the emphasis fell on the physical, and psychic, and it was attempted to isolate the psychic, and then to understand and explain the isolated psychic functions causal-mechanistically in terms of cause and effect, according to which particular and general causes would have constant, repeatable effects.

This naturalistic-oriented anthropology availed itself of concepts or categories which *characterize* the human being as another natural phenomenon, e.g., as a psychophysical organism, or a higher animal.

Also, in psychology the analysis-synthesis method was preferred. A human being was isolated from his/her world, and he/she also was viewed as a compilation of abilities, aptitudes, functions, capacities, temperaments, urges, desires, and behavioral patterns which could be isolated and measured as such.

Human “behavior” is equated with animal behavior and viewed as resulting from various psychic processes which automatically play themselves out in a human being, such as, e.g., processes of perceiving, learning, and thinking. When these processes do not proceed adequately, this implies that the human being, as an organism, does not successfully *adapt* him/herself to his/her environment. He/she is the product of heredity and environment, and the malfunctioning of the many processes, also is the product of a weak reaction to stimuli, or also the consequence of precisely defined laws regarding human urges, and desires who, as does an animal, should live in a closed world. Faulty processes should be able to be corrected by sufficient *motivation*. Because of *maturation* and *growth*, a human being also should automatically develop to adulthood, if the right conditions for growth are provided.

Since human “reactions” are the result of the activity of a limited number of simple functions, there is an attempt to isolate them as elements,³⁰ for which reason this psychology can also be referred to as an “element-psychology”, as a continuation of the “psychology of consciousness”, of which Descartes is the founder.

With the establishment of Wundt’s psychological laboratory in Leipzig in 1875, several psychologists accepted that, finally a method was found by which it should be possible to measure, by tests, the complexities of the human psychic life, and explain them according to particular laws of behavior.

The findings of general psychology had provided the necessary theories for what had come to be known as psychotechnics, a term introduced in 1903 by Stern,³² which includes the application of psychology to practice. According to Munsterberg,³³ psychotechnics is the science of the practical application of psychology in the service of cultural tasks.

In his differential psychology,³⁴ Stern analyzed the extent to which general human differences are realized within individuals, and which can be shown by a psychogram. [In this way], the specific individuality of each unique person is entirely misunderstood.³⁵

By measuring stimuli and reactions which are paired with changes in consciousness, there is an attempt to discover fundamental factors. For example, “extravagance” should be explainable in terms of the strength of relationship among a variety of character tendencies, and three temperamental basic factors—i.e., a strong emotionality, a weak activity, and a weak secondary function. Knowledge of the individual is acquired by measuring the elementary factors. It is accepted that individuals differ from each other only in the extent to which the strength of the relationship among these factors differ. Thus, if one only has a profile of the elementary functions, one can read from it all there is to know of the individual in terms of a psychogram.

It was especially American psychologists who tried to perfect the methods of measurement. However, because the course of contents of consciousness are not measured directly, the emphasis is allowed to fall on measuring the intensity of the incoming stimuli, while the outgoing motor reactions and accompanying bodily phenomena are noted.

Many of these psychologists were really nothing more than physiologists. Cattell, who had introduced the concept “test” in 1890, also then mentions physiological and psychological measurement in the same breath.³⁶

Statistical prediction, and the control of behavioral achievements had become the main aim and the emphasis was placed on objectively recordable behavior. For example, Van Strien³⁷ notes, in this regard, “What lays behind the behavior, no longer interested the psychologist, it was the behavior itself.”*

Especially with behaviorism, the main aim became to develop methods for measuring behavior, and although the attempt was to implicate different “aspects of personality” in these measures, there was a one-sided concentration on external stimuli.

This emphasis on the measurement of characteristics had led to *psychometrics* strongly entering the foreground, and where, at first,

*[Wat achter het gedrag lag interesseerde de psycholoog niet langer, het ging hem om het gedrag zelf]

it pointed to the measured aspects of psychological experiments, increasingly it became a collective noun referring to the statistical analysis of test results.

The natural science-oriented psychologist turned him/herself, particularly, to statistics, which had become an important tool of psychology, especially the technique of calculating correlations.

There was an industrious attempt to improve the reliability of measurements, and to demonstrate statistically, the validity of the results.

Van Strien³⁸ indicates that the task of the psychological investigator really implies that of “the ‘research-man’”. On the one hand, he must have the resourcefulness to design tests and, on the other hand, have the mathematical ability for their validation.... Once a good test battery is compiled, judgment follows ... from the obtained scores with mathematical certainty”.*

Under the influence of behaviorism, the view of a human being as merely a higher form of being an animal during evolutionary development not only became more strongly oriented naturalistically but, more specifically, psychology became an animal psychology and, especially as a psychology of rats, was placed on an equal footing with child psychology.³⁹

Up to and including the First World War, the entirety of psycho-diagnostics was based on the idea of human “behavior” as the product of a combination of several elementary functions. Starting with the assumption that the activation of specific psychic functions contributed to corresponding external achievements,⁴⁰ resulted in moving psycho-diagnostics to a naturalistic-psychological level,⁴¹ and this is described as “The attempt to assess personal characteristics through the observation of external features, as in *physiognomy, craniology, graphology*, study of voice, gait, etc.”⁴²

* [Hij moet enerzijds beschikken over vindingrijkheid in het ontwerpen van tests, anderzijds over een wiskundige knobbel bij het valideren ervan ... Wanneer eenmaal een geode testbatterij is opgesteld, volgt het oordeel ... met wiskundige zekerheid uit de behaalde scores]

Psycho-diagnosis was little more than a mere medical, or medical-psychiatric diagnosis.⁴³ The person is viewed as a *patient*, or a *case*. The emphasis is on the *symptom*, which should be the result of a “neuroticizing process”, which must be “diagnosed” with the aim of “treating” the patient to bring about a “healing process”.

Frequency tables, compiled from previous experiences also were often leaned on, e.g., “types” of misdeeds, etc., while the *why* of their connection to the subsequent judgment is mostly not considered.⁴⁴

With the rise of depth psychology, inaugurated by Freud, and where there was emphasis on the *unconscious*, attention was diverted somewhat from externally perceivable stimuli, and the origin of some behaviors was sought in the *past*. Freud tried to trace traumas to the past and, thus, to find the origins of present disturbances, or neuroses. *Making* these traumas *conscious* should make possible a release from, and cure of them.⁴⁵ Since the Ego can no longer effectively hold the Id in check, it collapses, and this results in a neurosis. Now there is a conflict between what a person *wants* to do, and what he/dhe *may* do in terms of what the environment allows. Thus, there is a search for the *repressed desires*, or causes of the collapse of the Ego. Such a psycho-diagnosis goes hand in hand with “psychotherapy”, as “psychoanalysis”. In practice, this amounts to the verbalization of repressed material, mainly by means of the technique of *free association*.

A “Clinical history” of the “patient” is obtained by asking him/her to describe his/her own past and problems, to answer direct questions about them, and by means of free association without censure,⁴⁶ dream analysis, or hypno-analysis.

In free association, e.g., a person is asked to say the first word which comes to mind after a “stimulus word” is provided. Usually, use is made of the “train of thought” method, where the person must elaborate on the subsequent thoughts which arise in connection with the word [first] given. Jung⁴⁷ had specifically made use of the word-list type of association, where a series of stimulus words is presented to the person, and he/she then must say the first word this calls forth.

After completing the free association test, a discussion is carried on with the “testee” to find out how the “associations” had occurred, with the aim of discovering repressed contents in the unconscious.⁴⁸

Dream analysis is directed to a person’s dream content, based on latent, in contrast to manifest contents, since the dream also is seen as representing the fulfillment of unfulfilled desires.

With hypno-analysis, there is an attempt, via “hypno-regression”, to let the person once again experience the disturbing traumatic situation.

Thus, contemporary “behavior” is explained in terms of the forgotten, or repressed contents. Making the repressed material conscious is very important because, by doing so, the anxiety it causes is eliminated.

With a child, there is an attempt to snatch from the unconscious what has resulted in a fixation in the so-called oral, anal, genital, or oedipal phase,⁴⁹ because Freud believes that all neuroses are the consequence of traumas during the periods of infantile sexuality.⁵⁰ Van den Berg⁵¹ points out that, in fact, the unconscious is an *anti-I*, and Freud’s striving to make the unconscious conscious implies that the unconscious, as a second person, must be disclosed. The loving “first” person (the ‘patient’ in the present), e.g., must become conscious of the “hating” person (the person in the past), and the two clashing “persons” must reconcile with each other.

Consequently, a human being is still viewed as a being “reacting” to “stimuli” (from the unconscious), and the emphasis is placed strongly on the past, which conditions the present behavior.⁵²

Although after World War I there was renovation in various directions noticed, and especially “individual personality diagnostics” strongly entered the foreground since the 1930’s and 1940’s,⁵³ the *personal* role of the *person* in establishing his/her relationships was still entirely neglected.

In the U. S. A., psychoanalytic thought had undergone change, and there was a shift in emphasis from the earlier “developmental phases” to the contemporary “environment”, and it was accepted that neurosis can be just as much a consequence of conflicts and tensions in the present, e.g., poor housing accommodations, employment circumstances, etc. as from an unassimilated oedipal problem, and psychoanalysis had become a mere “method of treatment”, where the present problems implicate “counseling” without reaching much of an *understanding* of the person’s actions as such.

The psychoanalytic approach with children did not differ at all from that with adults and, although gradually, situational adjustments were made with toys, the play room, drawings and other media being substituted for the sofa, free association, hypno- and dream-analysis, essentially there was not much change, especially when an objectivistic approach was maintained.⁵⁴

A “diagnostician” continued to be viewed as the person who, with the help of available *techniques* (e.g., toys and other media), deciphers and treats the “mechanisms” by which the “patient” is *controlled*, and “reconditions his/her thoughts”.

The conscious and unconscious were seen as two *separated* areas and, moreover, the psychic was viewed in a *physical* and *physiological* light. The *significance* of the person *him/herself* in his/her relatedness was ignored, and his/her *own* role in this was neglected, while the emphasis was placed on the causal connections among the psychic phenomena.

Also, a child was seen as a plaything of his/her urges, and all child neuroses were explained in terms of handy hypotheses, such as the Oedipus hypothesis. The child him/herself had no role, since his/her psychic life is determined in a drive-causal-mechanistic way. For example, Ruttin⁵⁵ says: “The occurrence of neurotic ways of behaving and experiencing by anyone, as intuitively conceived by psychoanalysis in its classical form, also is a mechanistic doctrine. Also, Freud said the origin of all human behavior is in the individual’s past. In his view, a person reacts because of drives

unknown to him and is the prisoner of his 'psychic mechanisms', not only in his dreams.”*

From these few thoughts, it is evident that there cannot be a penetration to an understanding of a person from a naturalistic viewpoint, and even less so, regarding an understanding of another *person*, and that another method than that of the natural sciences must be implemented to disclose a *person* in his/her *essence* and learn to *know* a unique person in his/her *essentials*.

3. THE HUMAN BEING IS DISCLOSED AS A PERSON

Because of the lack of an accountable point of departure, underlying concepts, and an accountable view of being human, which made it impossible to *understand a human being, as well as a person*, gradually, there was an objection to the exaggerated confidence which was placed in the natural scientific methods for studying the human being. It was realized that one who wants to *understand* another person must allow him/herself to be guided by an entirely different fundamental experience than that from a psychometric starting point.

With respect to an answer to the question of *who* and *what* a human being is, *phenomenology* has shown, from grounded results, that he/she is a *person*.

Since the phenomenological method, emanating from the thought of Brentano, Husserl, Heidegger, Jaspers, Binswanger, Sartre, and others, aims to disclose a phenomenon in its primordial relatedness to reality, it goes to the lifeworld, there where the primordial experience of being human appears.

The human being is disclosed as *Dasein* (Heidegger), and by verbalizing the essences of this *being-in-the-world*, being human is

*[De naar aanleiding van neurotische gedragswijzen en belevenissen van iedereen, intuïtief geconcepieerde psychoanalyse is in haar klassieke vorm eveneens een mechanistische leer. Ook Freud zag de oorzaak van alle menselijk gedrag in het individueel verleden. De mens reageert in zijn ogen op grond van aan homzelf onbekende drijfveren en is de gevangene van zijn 'psychisch apparaat', niet alleen in zijn dromen].

described by an accountable [philosophical] anthropology in terms of justifiable *categories* from the human order of being.

In this way, it is shown that being human is *openness*, or a *being open-for*. As *intentionality*, he/she is continually open-for, but also directed-to the world as a *meaning-giving* being-directed-to [something]. He/she need not be “reaction stimulated”. He/she is *never isolated* from the world, but is in continual *dialogue* with it. Van den Berg⁵⁶ says, e.g., that a human being is not a thing but “he is a dialogue”. He/she continually, *actively* goes out to [the world] because he/she *will give sense and meaning* to it. He/she *answers* the *appeal* which the contents of reality direct to him/her, by dialoging [with them] and, indeed, in terms of the *relationships* he/she *establishes* with things, fellow persons, and [for a believer] with God. Consequently, he/she is always *involved-in-relating* and, particularly, relating to the world within which he/she *finds* him/herself because, in addition to *consciousness*, as *consciousness of something* (Brentano). or *of meaning* (Husserl), he/she also is *self-conscious*. As an *existential* being, a human being dwells [via his/her intentionality] in the world by *intentionalizing*, and *orienting* via various *ways of being*, or *existentialia*. As *subject*, as *initiative of relationships*,⁵⁷ a *person* continually signifies the world, or *dwells* in it, and in his/her dwelling, he/she *transforms* it into an intentionalized world in terms of what has meaning for him/her. Because the meaning-giving of no two persons is precisely the same, no two humans are in precisely the same *lifeworld*. The entirety of a person’s *experienced* meanings constitute his/her lifeworld, as the *always growing, expanding, further shifting horizon of meanings, as the possessed experience of the contents of reality for a unique person*.

Hence, a person always finds him/herself in a *situation*, as the *whole of momentary relations with respect to which he/she must act*. According to Van den Berg,⁵⁸ a situation is the “totality of the personal world, perspectively structured by a specific intentional structure.”*. He⁵⁹ says the situation “... [is] when I am ‘with’ the things of this world in a thinking, feeling, imagining, or willing way

* [totaliteit van de personale wereld, perspectivisch gestructureerd door een specifieke intentionele structuur]

....”*. According to Ruarus et al,⁶⁰ a situation is “a perceivable *location* before us that is precisely researchable and in which we find ourselves at *any time*, but at the same time, is our experiencing of our being here-and-now (i.e., being-present), and the attribution of meaning that the here-and-now provides.”** Consequently, in each situation, a person is present in his/her full communicative totality, and this implies the entirety of his/her personal world, according to Gouws.⁶¹

By intentionalizing, the situations in which he/she finds him/herself, he/she is continually involved in shifting the horizon of his/her own lifeworld by also integrating [it into] his/her possessed experience. Thus, he/she is someone who continually becomes *different*, and who *him/herself* also collaborates in this becoming by *self-actualizing* his/her *psychic life*, for which reason he/she is *unpredictable*.

As a *person*, a human being is continually a *subject*, and differs fundamentally from all objects in nature. Hence, to really be able to *know* a *person*, he/she must be *understood* from the inside out; this is different from dead nature, which only can be known from the outside, because it is causally determined, and is unlike the *living* person who is *goal-striving*.

Because a human being, as a *person*, is unique, he/she withdraws him/herself from being measured, in the sense that the rest of reality is amenable to measurement research,⁶² and in the following is a brief reflection on the possibility of *understanding another person*.

4. ACQUIRING ESSENTIAL KNOWLEDGE OF A PERSON

One who wants to push through to a true understanding of another person quickly discovers that external behavior is just a symptom

* [‘houdt ik mij op’, wanneer ik denkend, voelend, imaginerend of willend ‘bij’ de dingen van deze wereld ben, of, zoals de taal het overvalst vertolk, ‘er in op ga’]

** [een voor ons waarneembare *plaatsbepaling*, die exact onderzoekbaar is, en waarin wij ons *enige tijd* bevinden, maar ze is tevens onze beleving van onshier-en-nu-zijn (d.i. aanwezig-zijn) en de zingeving, die we aan de hier-en-nu verlenen]

which conceals the interiority behind it and that, indeed, it is this interiority which is really the focus of knowledge.

Already in 1894, Windelband⁶³ shows the contrast between natural scientific and human science methods, and in 1912, Dilthey⁶⁴ indicates that “we explain Nature and we understand the Inner life”*, and he distinguishes *understanding* of the naturally given, and its causal-mechanistic determination, and *comprehending*, as a way of *interpretation*.⁶⁵

For Spranger,⁶⁶ who had built on this concept, *understanding* means to *meaningfully* understand mental/spiritual coherences or relations. *Meaningful* means an ordering, or coherence within what forms a *valued whole*. The sense or meaning of someone’s behavior is only to be gauged in relation to a greater valued whole, and not to see it in the “form of behavior” itself.

Various streams in psychological thinking were directly, or indirectly influenced by these *ideas about understanding*, and various persons had directed attention to the human being as a *totality*, although this idea was still very divergently explained. As psychology had become more anthropologically oriented,⁶⁷ greater clarity was attained with respect to a person, as a *totality*, and *understanding him/her*.

In 1938 Allport,⁶⁸ and also Murray,⁶⁹ in the U.S.A., argue for a totality approach to an individual, and then a new stream of understanding diagnostics arose. Allport,⁷⁰ however, thinks that each “human life has its own lawfulness”, and that one cannot explain or understand someone’s “behavior” from one’s knowledge of human beings in general. He says there is a fatal short-circuiting (non-sequitur)⁷¹ in understanding another person if he/she is explained in terms of general rules. One must first know the full *pattern* of his/her life. In this context, Van Strien⁷² cites Allport⁷³ and says, “Human ability to know, therefore, does not proceed via an implicit statistical generalization of coded experience, but it has

* [De Natur erklären wir, das Seelenleben verstehen wir]

an ability to perceive relations and anticipate changes that a computer would miss.”**

As far as understanding another person is concerned, it must be pointed out that much of the knowledge acquired in everyday association remains *implicit*, and gradually we take it for *what* it is. In everyday associations we learn [to have] a “first acquaintance”, “I know him/her”, and a “good knowledge” of him/her. The knowledge which is built up while associating with another, actually exists in the assumption that actions and behaviors observable under some circumstances will be repeated under changed circumstances. We gradually become familiar with another from his/her actions in everyday life situations. When now, a pronouncement must be made about this person, the judger exhausts his/her *knowledge based on impressions* which rest on the verbalization of the habitual actions of that person by qualifying them in terms of personal traits and, e.g., he/she is “known” as friendly, hardworking, contradictory, interfering, hot-tempered, moody, conceited, proud, stubborn, intelligent, stingy, extravagant, honest, old-fashioned, relieved, narrow-minded, willful, impatient, timid, flexible, submissive, effeminate, etc.

In 1933, Vernon⁷⁴ shows that these personal traits attributed to another person depend on the situation in which he/she finds him/herself, and the role relationship he/she is in. Even so, there is agreement with Van Strien⁷⁵ when he emphasizes that “Characteristics are not objective quantities that lie hidden in a person, in the way chemicals have their properties. They are the result of the appeal that goes out to this special person who is in this relation to the judger.”* The better we learn to know someone, the more we also discover the numerous exceptions to general qualifications, and the more nuances we discover about his/her personal traits, and we know that the other can never be known by

** [Het menselijke kenvermogen werkt daarom niet langs de weg van een the impliciete statistische generalisatie van gecodeerde ervaringen, maar bezit een vermogen tot het waarnemen van veranderingen, dat de Hollerith-machine mist]

*[Eigenschappen zijn geen objectieve grootheden, die als chemicalien hun eigenschappen hebben. Ze vormen de neerslag van het appel dat er in deze situatie uigaan op deze speciale persoon, die in deze relatie tot de beoordeelde staat]

merely searching for externally perceivable personal traits or characteristics, or even by giving too much value to his/her habitual conduct.

The emotional impression another's conduct can make on us can be very successful by means of characterizing [someone] via our "understanding". However, where this involves delivering an "objective" judgment, and making, this "characterization" of another, or about this person's expected comportment, then these characteristics can be very precarious, according to Van Strien.⁷⁶

So-called "pure" objectivity is not possible in the human sciences because reality always remains a subject-signified reality. Meaningful wholes within a value-system can only be *understood*, and not *measured*.

Sartre⁷⁷ indicates that the natural scientific approach of reducing the concrete to the abstract is a "mental chemistry" which brings a person not closer to, but farther from the real underlying motives. Therefore, use must be made of a different method to penetrate to an understanding of another.

Luijpen⁷⁸ says, "The unconcealedness of the other, as other, is the open door through which the phenomenologist eventually will once again enter."* Strasser⁷⁹ sees in phenomenology primarily a method for entering natural experiencing, with the bracketing of all subjectivity and scientific foreknowledge, and penetrating to the essence of the phenomenon. According to Snijders,⁸⁰ the task of phenomenology for psychology is to disclose primordial human experiencing, and for Binswanger,⁸¹ psychology is "Dasein playing with itself."** Snijders⁸¹ also emphasizes that psychology does not remain with describing, but subsequently strives to penetrate to the level of explaining, and reflecting on the evidence of the natural lifeworld is an important task.

To understand and explain another, then, it is primarily necessary to "enter" his/her lifeworld, i.e., in its past and present structure.⁸³

* [De onverborgenheid van die ander als de ander is de open deur waardoor de fenomenoloog eindelijk weer eens binnen gaat]

** [Spiel des Dasein mit sich selben]

One must put oneself in the place of another, and see the world with his/her own eyes.

Buytendijk⁸⁴ talks of “stepping into another mode of existence.”^{***} Each *knowing* is a form of *being*, and each being is a *being-in-opposition*, and Van Strien⁸⁵ also says that when a person really wants to learn to know another, he/she must try to penetrate into his/her experiential world, into his/her “interiority”, one must listen to the other, not only to his/her words, but also to his/her silences, his/her frames of mind, his/her body.

“Empathizing”, thus, involves making the other’s structuring of his/her lifeworld visible, and this subjective empathizing, as understanding a fellow person *in his/her world*, amounts to placing yourself in the lifeworld of the other, and determining what meanings the world has from his/her standpoint. Communication with the other is important, but the other does not impart him/herself, but the way in which he/she signifies the world because, as a person, he/she continually is the center of giving meaning.

This “empathizing” is also possible because I encounter the other as the center of his/her own world with personal meanings. Van Strien⁸⁶ says, “I empathize with the other when I try to see reality with his eyes, thus, the meanings that things and events have for him. I do not enter an inner room of his consciousness, but I transport myself into his world. To make myself part of this world, the shared things must be [interpreted] as ‘mine’, and ‘ours’. In order to be able to understand the other a re-structuring of the meanings that I give to ‘myself’, and my world is necessary. The *totality of reality* receives this [meaning] from the other, as center, as a new meaning giver.”*

*** [in een andere modus van bestaan treden]

* [Ik leef mij in de ander in, wanneer ik tracht de werkelijkheid met zijn ogen te bekijken, in de betekenissen dus die dingen en gebeurtenissen voor hem hebben. Ik treed niet binnen in de binnekamer van zijn bewustzijn, maar ik verplaats me in zijn wereld. Voor een deel maak ik ook zelf deel uit van deze wereld, evenals ‘mijn’ en ‘onze’ gemeenschappelijke dingen. Om de ander te kunnen verstaan is er een herstructurering nodig van de betekenissen die ik aan ‘mijzelf’ en aan mijn wereld verleen. De *totale werkelijkheid* krijgt zo, vanuit de ander als centrum, een nieuwe zingeving]

Consequently, there is mention that the other is *encountered* and, within this encounter, he/she shows him/herself as a “conscious-being-in-the-world”⁸⁷. Strasser⁸⁸ qualifies the encounter as “the communication of persons in a situation that is meaningful for them.”** Buytendijk⁸⁹ says that this encountering, as a personally interested participation in each other, is the foundation for participating in the real essences of existence as such. It is the “knowledge of the love” which the other shows for us in his/her concrete being human, which is the only way to the full interiority of a fellow person, according to Buytendijk.⁹⁰ There is no talk of one person “examining” the other, but of one person who encounters another in a human situation.⁹¹

As far as this encountering knowledge is concerned, it is “connecting inner coherences in terms of purposive moments of sense in opposition to external coherences, with the help of causality and external regularity”*, according to Van Strien.⁹² Thus, there is mention of meaningful connections. In contrast to these meaningful coherences, there are the “blind” connections of nature, which do not allow one to grasp their real “why”. Therefore, use must be made of *concepts* which adequately verbalize this inner coherence, and *terms of characteristics*, which only have relevance for the practical usability of the person, and reject those relevant to reactions to stimuli from the environment.⁹³ Thomae⁹⁴ emphasizes that, for a “dynamic interpretation”, only those terms are important which have something to say about the way in which an individual existence unfolds itself from inside to outside. To grasp the meanings of another person, the thing-like, fixed language of a reductionist psychology is not appropriate. In this regard, Van Strien⁹⁵ says, “language has provided thousands of terms of characteristics for talking about all the nuanced ways in which persons appear to us, which are like the arrows in a Middle Ages battle; they don’t travel far and don’t penetrate the external armor. There is another way of viewing needed to penetrate behind the observable surface.”**

** [het communiceren van personen in een situatie die voor hen zinvol is]

* [leggen van innerlijke samenhangen, aan de hand van doelen zin-momenten, gesteld tegenover het leggen van uitwendige samenhangen met behulp van causaliteit en uitwendige regelmaat]

** [duizenden eigenschapstermen die de taal voor alle nuances waarin personen aan ons verschijnen praat heft, zijn alsde pijlen in een middleeuws gevecht; ze reiken niet ver en

Buytendijk⁹⁶ points out, e.g., that when one looks at the terminology of depth psychology of "... repression, controlling, ... , having conflicts and making peace,"*** this remains a mythological representation of moments which, in fixated introspection, are disclosed in the interior, while only *turning into oneself*, and in an *understanding relationship* with the other, is one able to grasp that person in his/her living existence.

Instead of the above, there is the more compassionate, more intimate language of an encounter.⁹⁷ Some concepts essential for understanding another are encounter, openness, concern, well-being, trust, going-out-to-another, responsibility, morality, independence, free choice, interiority, tenderness. In terms of such language, Strasser⁹⁸ is allowed to see how the rational and non-rational streams flow together in an image of "the unique personality"* in the objectivity of the lovingly viewed fellow person. Buytendijk⁹⁹ points to the liberating power of the word which lifts the viewed depth above the haphazardness of the situation.

It must also be emphasized that the encounter not only gives rise to purely intuitive knowledge of the existence project¹⁰⁰ and, in no sense, is there a subjectivistic judgment about the other, since the investigator also again withdraws him/herself from the interpersonal situation. A sufficient distance must be arrived at, and the relation is viewed from a distance. Van Strien¹⁰¹ says the more this distanced viewing is brought about, the more understanding insight is acquired, as a subject of study. The relation then becomes a professional relation, and there is objectivity, because it is an objectivity which rests on objectivity-in-subjectivity, the only way one can arrive at true objectivity about another person.

To disclose a human being, as a *person*, in his/her *being-situated*, is also to discover that he/she continually becomes *different*, and he/she *him/herself* has a role in this. It also is discovered that the

dringen niet door een uitwendig pantser. Er is een andere wijze van beschouwen noodig om door te dringen de zichtbare oppervlakte]

*** [zich annemen, verdringen, beheersen, zich nestelen, conflicten hebben en vrede sluiten, van controleurs en douanebeambten, portiers en chercheurs]

* [die eenmalige Persoonlijkheid]

being-situated of a child, as a person, always includes a *being-situated-pedagogically* and, thus, it is necessary to investigate him/her in this pedagogical situation, if one wants to arrive at an understanding of this unique child. In addition, it is also discovered that a child's becoming different in a pedagogical situation includes *becoming an adult*, an event in which the child *him/herself* also has a role. In the following section, attention is given to a child's becoming different, in his/her being situated pedagogically.

5. A CHILD IS COMMITTED TO EDUCATION

From personological anthropology, a more accountable study of a child came to the pedagogical,¹⁰² especially since the 1930's.¹⁰³ In a search for who a child (as a human being) is, Heidegger,¹⁰⁴ Langeveld,¹⁰⁵ Oberholzer,¹⁰⁶ and others also brought to light a "new" child anthropology. Langeveld arrived at the now well-known statement that *a child is someone who him/herself wants to be someone*, and *a child is someone committed to education*. He says, "Without human educating [upbringing], a human child cannot become a person. That a human being is a being who brings up (educates), who is brought up (educated), and who is committed to upbringing (being educated) is one of the most fundamental characteristics of the human image."^{107*} Thus, one arrives at the ontological-anthropological pronouncement that educating is a category of human *Dasein* which a child cannot be without.¹⁰⁸

As such, educating is "help with becoming". A child has the world of the adult as his/her destination, and it is precisely the tension between his/her not-yet adulthood, and his/her adulthood which makes educating possible.¹⁰⁹ The pedagogical is there where responsibility is expressed in the form of a protective bondedness, says Faure.¹¹⁰

Ter Horst¹¹¹ says, "Educating is a continual 'conversation' with the child; the 'words' and the topics change, and the more the child

* [Zonder menselijke opvoeding wordt het mensenjong geen mens. Dat de men seen weze is dat opvoed, opgevoed wordt en op opvoeding is aangewezen, is zelf een van de fundamenteelste kenmerken van her mensbeeld]

learns to ‘speak’, the greater his contribution.”** According to Viljoen,¹¹² a child’s becoming human shows itself in a pedagogical perspective “as embodying dialogue as changing dialogue”. At first, he/she carries on a dialogue *with* the educator, but gradually also, by means of the educator, with things and the other, and eventually *independently* of the educator.¹¹³

Thus, there is an elevation in level,¹¹⁴ as an *elevation in dialogue*, and a child will continually give meaning to life contents, will realize values, and make choices on a higher level. Dialogue elevation, as the acquisition of (specific) meanings, is a matter involving parents and children together, what Lubbers¹¹⁶ qualifies as “symmorphosis”, and which is realized in the daily event of educating.

For Landman,¹¹⁶ educating is helping a child with meanings. This helping a child with meanings, with conscience forming,¹¹⁷ with this giving form together [symmorphosis],¹¹⁸ moral activation,¹¹⁹ his/her being-addressed as a person,¹²⁰ help to moral self-determination,¹²¹ to acceptance of independence,¹²² to conquering freedom,¹²³ and acquiring responsibility occur in a pedagogical situation in which an encounter occurs between a morally independent, responsible *adult* and a child, who is becoming responsible and independent, with an eye to a child’s becoming adult, such that he/she him/herself will make responsible choices and decisions in freedom, and on his/her own account.

The fruitful tension between a child’s need for help and independence,¹²⁵ between what he/she is (not-yet adult) and what he/she ought to be (adult), leads to his/her dialogue with the world continually changing. His/her dialogue progressively, though very gradually, becomes more like that of an adult. Consequently, Landman¹²⁶ also says, “thus becoming is dialogue elevation.”

Much has already been brought to light about *adulthood* as such but, as far as the *event* which leads to it is concerned, there is still much room for research.

** [Opvoeden is een voortdurend ‘gesprek’ met het kind; de ‘woorden’ en de onderwerpen veranderen en naarmate het kind beter leert ‘spreken’ wordt zijn inbreng groter]

According to Landman,¹²⁷ adulthood is reached in terms of an event of accompanied dependence entwined with accompanied independence, with the aim of self-accompanied independence; thus, on his/her way to adulthood, a child is *accompanied* by an adult. However, this accompaniment includes supporting a child to *him/herself* realize his/her becoming adult, as a continually progressive breaking through the momentary situation with the aim of expanding and shifting the horizon of his/her own lifeworld.

As a *person*, as being educatively situated, lifeworld-establishing-in-the-world, who because of the primordial fact of child-being, i.e., that he/she him/herself gladly wants to be someone, and to become, he/she is continually involved in cultivating and transforming the world into a world-for-him/her.

This establishing and expanding a lifeworld, entails that there continually be a progressive acceptance of responsibility, which the child him/herself progressively makes morally independent decisions, and subsequently acts on them, that he/she increasingly identifies with norms, etc.¹²⁸

A child *him/herself* gradually *elevates* the level on which he/she carries on a dialogue, on which he/she accepts responsibility, on which he/she makes choices, and on which he/she realizes values.

It is precisely the fact that a child is *becoming-adult-in-the-world* that distinguishes him/her as a *child*. Only when this “person becoming adult” changes into an “adult person becoming”, does he/she stop being a child, and he/she also takes leave of the event of educating.

As far as this self-becoming is concerned, in addition, it involves the continually breaking-through of insight;¹²⁹ a firm bonding;¹³⁰ an acceptance of life, as a saying yes to values;¹³¹ and taking an adequate position¹³² with respect to these matters. And now, the question is *how* this is realized. For an answer to this question, psychopedagogics must be consulted.

6. PSYCHOPEDAGOGICS AS A PEDAGOGICAL DISCIPLINE

Becoming amounts to the continually progressive breakthrough of the horizon of one's own lifeworld¹³³ by which a child also continually becomes different. This becoming different, then essentially refers to the unfolding of a gestalt which initially is present in a pedagogical event, as possibility, according to Viljoen.¹³⁴

A child-as-person is continually called into existence when he/she *actualizes his/her personal potentialities*. These personal potentialities are always available as the *psychic-life-as-potentiality*, which then manifest themselves in its actualization, as an event of becoming and learning, in terms of the forms of actualizing the psychic life by means of various modes.

Actualizing means that personal *potentialities* are converted into personal *actualities*, and that a learning and becoming child continually changes psychic life potentialities into actualities.

From the above, if the event of becoming adult of a unique child is to be understood, it is necessary that his/her actualization of his/her psychic life in his/her educative situation be grasped. Psychopedagogics, whose object of study is the actualization of a child's psychic life in educating, is the pedagogical discipline which addresses this matter.¹³⁵

For example, psychopedagogics has shown that, from the beginning, a child carries on a psychic life actualizing dialogue with the world. As a totality-in-function, he/she communicates with reality and continually becomes different. Hence, Beets¹³⁸ also says, "Human development presupposes existential communication."^{*} This communication, as an event of becoming, continually progresses as a meaningfully coherent total event in terms of exploring, emancipating, distancing, differentiating, and objectifying¹³⁷ by way of experiencing,¹³⁸ willing, lived experiencing, knowing, and behaving, in terms of sensing, attending,¹³⁹ perceiving, imagining and fantasizing, thinking, actualizing intelligence, remembering¹⁴⁰ and observing.¹⁴¹

* [Menselijke ontwikkeling veronderstelt existentiële communicatie]

Psychic life actualizing by a child, as person in his/her situation of educating, changes the contents of his/her educative reality to a reality-for-him/her, and broadens his/her lifeworld, as he/she continually becomes different. In this actualizing, he/she is involved in carrying on a dialogue under educative accompaniment.

In chapter four, there is further consideration of the event of becoming adult as such, in terms of a child actualizing his/her psychic life, and these few words suffice for now.

7. EDUCATING DOES NOT NECESSARILY SUCCEED

From the foregoing, a child's actualization of his/her psychic life in terms of becoming adult, simultaneously implies personal becoming. Adequate personal becoming, then, implies that a child continually actualizes his/her psychic life adequately, in which case there also is a correspondence between the level of adulthood already attained, and that level which now ought to have been reached.

Also, this personal becoming of a child, as becoming adult, requires from a child an *active going out* to the appealing reality of educating, as well as *active accompaniment* of him/her by an adult. These activities of adult and child are called into existence in terms of realizing the pedagogical structures, a matter which includes a task for both. The task character of the event of educating, and a child's becoming adult testify to the fact that this is not an automatic occurrence, and confirms the fact that personal thriving is not merely a "predetermined, and fixed course of maturation".¹⁴²

A good course of educating a child, and his/her optimal becoming adult cannot be guaranteed because the adult, the child, or both might participate inadequately in the educative space in which they find themselves. An ideal educative climate also does not exist because of the bald fact that we live in an imperfect world inhabited by imperfect beings, says Van der Zeyde.¹⁴³

Langeveld¹⁴⁴ also says that many rights and wrongs are passed on to the becoming child, "much that is good pedagogically happens, much that is wrong has happened. But insofar as the educand is really *influenced*, everything is not enumerated in a mechanistic

and fixed way, as a command is, but it is assimilated. This assimilation can proceed unfavorably so the result is superficial, bad, wrong; it can also progress favorably and still result in superficiality, or failure if, e.g., the pedagogically undesired does not appear to be noticed, or explanations are treated as a trivial game.”* Thus, the absence of normative moments in the educative situation can work to promote or restrain educating. Thus, there must be an adequate ordering so that a child will not become entangled in the chaos of conflicting meanings.¹⁴⁵

The dialogic character of educating speaks clearly in the previous thoughts, and Ter Horst says that the “conversation” is sometimes a dispute with shouting and indignation, but that it always remains a dialogue, and the child and educator ask questions, express opinions, call to account, accuse, ask for help. In addition, he¹⁴⁷ says the educative dialogue offers a perspective, to the extent that, with input from a total person, one carries on a total dialogue with full reality, and dialogue impeding factors in an educative situation are education impeding factors. Vermeer¹⁴⁸ says one can conceive of the educative dialogue as a point of intersection of the subjective interpretations of parents and child where short-circuits can arise. At this point of intersection, progression can become regression, e.g., when norms which are held to be “obvious” are passed over in silence.

As soon as there is disturbed communication, there also is inadequate realization of the event of educating and, thus, also of a child’s psychic life; such a situation must be qualified as a *problematic situation of educating* because the level of becoming adult of the child does not correspond to the level achievable. Thus, accompanying him/her to actualize his/her psychic life occurs inadequately, and this quickly leads to him/her finding him/herself in difficulty, and *restrained* in his/her personal becoming, and his/her becoming adult. Then, his/her personal meanings, as coherent with possessed experience, progressively differ to such a

* [veel dat een goed paedagogische uitwerking, veel dat gehad zou hebben. Maar voor zover het de opvoeding werkelijk *raakt*, wordt alles niet mechanistisch opgegenomen en vastgelegd zo-als hetgeboden word, maar ver-werkt. De verwerking kan ongunstig verlopen, en ze kan ook in gunstig zin oppeervlakkig of averechts uitvallen, als nl. Het paedagogisch ongewenste blijkt niet opgemerkt, goed uitgelegd of en bagatelle behandeld te zijn].

degree from generally accepted meanings that they must qualify as *disturbed* meanings. Lubbers, Van der Zeyde, Klinkhamer, as well as Ter Horst refer to something which restrains a child¹⁴⁹ as [something] “that impedes him on his way to adulthood.”^{150*}

Where there is a *problematic event of educating*, there also is a child in that situation who is *restrained in becoming*; the inadequate realization of the pedagogical event leads to the inadequate actualization of a child’s psychic life, by which he/she becomes impeded in his/her becoming adult. In the following chapter, this matter will be dealt with more closely.

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*[dat hem tot hinderpaal is op weg naar volwassenheid]

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