CHAPTER 1
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM, AIM AND METHOD

A. INTRODUCTION

Many studies have been published on the retarded child and what is striking about most of them is that they focus on **symptoms**. Characteristics are postulated as if they capture the essence of the child. Burt [1], e.g., lists the following qualities: low intelligence, physical, sensory, and motor defects, left-handedness, speech defects, and deficiencies of character, and temperament.

Typical of current views is the definition of the American Association on Mental Deficiency, [2] which states that intelligence is the ability to "effectively adapt oneself" to one's environment, and that the retarded child does not have this ability.

An additional matter is the **stereotyped list of causes** compiled with respect to these intellectually less endowed children. For example, Burt [3] lists as causal conditions: inheritance, school (including irregular attendance, and ineffective teaching), home and neighborhood, and a variety of physical conditions.

One of the most important issues is the **measurement** and **classification** of children. This is closely related to the **conceptual confusion** prevailing about the child who is poorly endowed intellectually. This confusion is reflected in the following classifications by persons such as Vedder [4], Tredgold[5], Robinson and Robinson[6], Trapp and Himmelstein[7], Baker[8] (whose classification has been generally accepted in England for the past few decades), and Busemann[9]:



The retarded child discussed later is classified as falling within an IQ range of 65 to 80, and also is classified in the sub-normal group [10]. From in the above classification scheme, not only are there different opinions regarding the boundaries of classifications, but also there is conceptual confusion. On the Continent, the term "mentally deficient" is preferred, while Anglo-American researchers prefer "moron", and still other writers use more comprehensive descriptions. Writers such as Herdenschee[11] and Van Liefland[12] use the term "retarded" which, however, is used by them in a broader sense than what is meant in the present study, in that they refer to **all** children with poor intellectual endowment. In this connection, a variety of labels are used, e.g., "feeble-minded", or "oligophrenic"[13], "mentally deficient"[14, 15], "backward"[16] and "mentally retarded"[17,18]. The latter concept, however, is used by some writers [19] only with respect to the scholastic. The concept "poorly talented"[20] is an unfortunate choice in this connection, because it refers to the talented in general. "Poorly talented intellectually" is more precise and acceptable.

In the present study, when reference is made to the retarded or intellectually less well-endowed child, this means a child who is

limited in his/her intelligence, as a **potentiality**. Currently, a child often is labeled retarded merely because of his/her IQ, his/her intelligence, as a level of achievement, which may not correspond with his/her intelligence, as a potentiality.

Also, it should be noted that these various classifications, in practice, are used for the sake of more effective **formal instruction**.

The critical reader might ask what has been grasped to this point? Do we understand this child? Do we understand what being a retarded child really means? In the current literature, the retarded child is described as an isolated monad, and this does not lead to an understanding of his/her world relationships, as they are embodied in his/her experiential world. Also, the child's **pedagogical situation** is not entered in these studies. This means that the ontological-anthropological fact of being a child who necessarily is committed to educating is not considered!

B. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM, AIM AND METHOD

1. Contemporary views of intelligence with special reference to the retarded child

(a) A variety of attempts have been made to define intelligence, and without going into these current definitions in any detail, according to Sonnekus[21], the following remarks are made about them: intelligence is connected with learning, thinking, adapting, acting, and goal-directed activities. As mentioned above, intelligence is an ability or capacity which allows a person to better adjust to his/her environment, where environment is interpreted in the broadest sense possible. From this it follows that the retarded child is not able "to effectively adapt to his/her environment".

(b) The initial attempts to investigate intelligence (see Binet, Terman, etc.), as well as the continued work by factor analysts, are based on its **measurement** to find one or another dimension (factor) for comparing the test performance of a child with other children of the same chronological age so that their "cleverness" or "dullness" can be quantified. Consequently, a child is often labeled retarded.

(c) On the basis of an obtained IQ, children are classified (see "Introduction"), general or typical ways of behaving are attributed to them, and predictions are made regarding their scholastic

progress. Inversely, these typical behaviors also are important means for classifying children. For example, if a child is classified as mentally retarded, he/she might be transferred to a special school to receive special instruction, which is usually more practically directed. Thus, these classifications are only made for the sake of formal instruction. But attributing stereotyped characteristics to the retarded child has the danger of establishing a **homogeneity** which is unacceptable.

(d) Regarding the **stability** (not reliability in the psychometric sense--G.Y.) of intelligence, the current view is that it is primarily inherited, that it gradually grows and develops until 16, or even 20 years of age, but after that no important changes occur. Also, it is recognized that the milieu can have an effect, but that hereditary factors are decisive. For these reasons, intelligence is relatively stable or constant, although small fluctuations can occur. To obtain a "reliable score" for school children, normally the child's intelligence is "tested" twice in his/her school career by means of group tests. If there is a difference, the higher score is counted in the child's favor.

With respect to mental deficiency (and, thus, of relevance in considering the retarded child), Goddard[22], with his study of the Kallikak family, indicates the role of heredity, while various other researchers point to the role of environmental factors. Fodder[23], who classifies the retarded as “mentally deficient”, describes it as a condition where the prominent phenomenon is a serious defect in intellectual development existing since birth, or acquired in the first year of life. Later, the question of the stability of intelligence is considered again.

(e) The child, and especially the retarded child, is approached in the current literature as having an intellectuality which is viewed as a **purely** cognitive matter. This perspective stems from the psychology of consciousness with its atomistic view that consciousness is several functions. This also is a matter which is treated later.

Related to the above is the notion that a child who is poorly endowed intellectually should be capable of **practical training**. However, according to research done in this connection, Landman [24] rightly concludes that a child with a low level of general intelligence does not necessarily display a high degree of dexterity.

For educative and vocational orientation purposes, according to Landman, dull-normal children should be divided into two groups:

> **(i)** those with a relatively high degree of practical ability; and
> **(ii)** those who not only have a low intelligence but also a retarded practical ability.

To summarily deliver a retarded child to practical training is unaccountable because he/she might also be limited in this regard.

2. The question of intelligence as the point of departure for exploring the retarded child

(a) In 1905, after researching intellectual differences in children, a French psychologist, Binet, with the assistance of a physician, Simon, published the first intelligence test. The original Binet-Simon scale was expanded, modified, and restandardized by various researchers in several countries, and published in 1908 and 1911. Binet's first effort was an **individual test** meant to test or **measure** an individual child's intelligence. The aim of this test is to try to ascertain how intelligent or dull a child is; i.e., the test is designed to indicate a **level of achievement**. Thus, Sonnekus[25] rightly point out that the aim of such tests is not to determine the nature of intelligence. They involve establishing a level of achievement and the ways this achievement is attained, but not the **nature** or **essence** of intelligence as such.

(b) Among the (revisions and) **re-standardizations** of the Binet-Simon test is that of Terman in 1916, and an expansion of the same test with Merrill (1937), known as the Stanford-Binet, or Terman-Merrill intelligence test. In South Africa, in the field of individual intelligence tests, there now is the "Individual intelligence Scale of the National Bureau of Educational and Social Research", a revision of a test by Dr. M. L. Frick, published in 1927, which is a revision of the Binet-Simon test, as restandardized by Terman in 1916 (and known as the Frick Scale). The above bureau (now known as the Human Science Research Council) also recently released the **New South African Individual Scale (NSAIS).**

(c) The first large-scale standardization of a **group** intelligence test occurred during World War I, with the aim of classifying and selecting recruits for the United States Army. This research by

Yerkes resulted in the Army Alpha and Army Beta tests. Thus, group tests originated from research on adults, and did not arise from the child's situation. Since World War I, group intelligence tests have been applied on a large scale in different countries. In South Africa, the **South African Group Intelligence Test** for pupils from 10-16 was compiled and standardized under the direction of Professor R.W. Wilcocks. It has been replaced by the **New South African Group Intelligence Test**, standardized by the National Bureau of Educational and Social Research (now the Human Science Research Council).

(d)Thus, initially, the research on intelligence was concerned with constructing and standardizing intelligence tests. With this "test approach" to intelligence, by using **factor analysis**, many investigators attempted to study intelligence in terms of its constitutive factors. In this way, an attempt was made to determine **what** was being measured by intelligence tests. In this context, Spearman is mentioned with his general and specific factors of intelligence, which later were expanded by other researchers [(26)].

Sonnekus[(27)] indicates that, as far as the **essence** of intelligence is concerned, a factor analytic approach has contributed little. The aim of factor analysis is to try to ascertain the degree of relationship among different psychic functions, or dispositions and to determine the number of distinguishable factors defining the relationships. The question of the nature or essence of intelligence is neither asked nor answered. Further, under the influence of factor analysis, intelligence as such, is approached as an isolated quantity or magnitude, as an autonomous ability or factor(s) without viewing it in relation to the person, as a totality-in-communication with his/her world. Even today, this view is found in the current practice of labeling a retarded child as having a low intelligence, with the consequence that such a child, often on the basis of low intelligence, as measured, and possibly considering other information, is doomed to spend the rest of his/her school career in a special school, as a retarded child, where the opportunity is limited for actualizing his/her potentialities. The child, as a totality-in-communication with his/her world is misunderstood, and there is no mention of a phenomenological fathoming of his/her **experiential world** (see below).

(e) The question of the **stability** of intelligence deserves to be examined again. This issue is seriously criticized, especially by

Kohnstamm,[28] from the perspective of the measurement of intelligence. A purely quantitative judgment of intelligence is responsible for ignoring the complex structural interconnections of intelligence, and for not considering important qualitative matters. The view that intelligence is stable points to a danger of and a deficiency in its current measurement.

In contrast to the current view of intelligence as a constant, stable quantity which cannot be markedly changed by schooling, forming, or educating, Selz (psychology of thought) and his co-workers[29] reveal that thought processes, and also intelligence test performances, can be elevated to a higher level, provided the right methods of solution are acquired and provided, there is the necessary intellectual "maturity". Building on these findings, Kohnstamm[30] concludes that the character of intelligence is not so much **stable** as **meta-stable**; i.e., not only is it subject to gradual change, but it also can change by leaps-and-bounds.

By discovering and using appropriate methods of solution, a breakthrough of insight can occur, which suddenly elevates the meta-stable intellectual level to a higher one **if** there is enough intellectual "maturity" to implement the necessary methods of solution. These findings have important implications for the measurement of intelligence:

> First, this means that an intelligence test result need not be valid. Naturally, it is possible that the result corresponds to the maximum level of which a person is capable, but it also is possible that the test result lies lower than this level, i.e., that his/her level of intelligence is still in a meta-stable state. Second, the creation of a secure and favorable space can elevate the intelligence test performance.

The implications of the above for the retarded child are obvious. Often, children are divided into groups according to their intellectual level, particularly the "borderline" cases, where, from an IQ, it is determined whether a child should be placed in a special class or school.

Intelligence test results should not be interpreted as exact, and should be handled with extreme caution. Thus, an important

supplement to this quantitative measurement is a **qualitative** analysis of the intelligence test performance.

(f) A **qualitative analysis** of the structure of intelligence means a descriptive analysis of the **ways** a child achieves his/her intelligence test performance. Today, many voices are calling for a qualitative evaluation of intelligence test performance since the limitations of a purely quantitative approach are becoming evident. Thus, Chorus [31] states that a qualitative analysis of performances on the old Individual Scale (Stanford-Binet type) is done in four ways, viewed as a totality:

(i) Level analysis: this refers to the scattering of a child's responses over items at different chronological age levels. In other words, it is ascertained which of the child's responses spread above and below his/her chronological age. Particularly, whether the correct responses lie concentrated at or near the child's chronological age is considered. It can be that a child who gives relatively difficult correct answers, shows a qualitatively better structure, even though quantitatively, he/she does not give as many correct answers as another child.

(ii) Structure analysis: is a further analysis of the types of items a child answers correctly which lie above his/her chronological age. In other words, the strong points in the structure of intelligence are considered; and so are the weak points by analyzing the types of erroneous responses to items below the child's chronological age.

(iii) Individual analysis: is a descriptive analysis of all answered items, with a view to how these answers are arrived at. Thus, while the test is administered, **what** the child says and does ,as well as **how** are noted.

(iv) Observation or character analysis: is acquiring data about the "personal temperament" (being a person) of the child, and thus is not directly involved with the test items, but with the child's behaviors, or expression, in the broadest sense, during the investigation as a whole.

A further contribution to the qualitative analysis of intelligence is provided by Swart [32]. She engaged in work which supplements that of Chorus and, briefly, she differentiates the following additional analyses:

(i) Language analysis in the investigation of intelligence. This aspect is especially important since language is the means of actualizing intelligence. Here, she emphasizes the quantitative, as well as qualitative analysis of the child's vocabulary, sentence structure, reading, typical linguistic errors, or deviations, and the level (visual or abstract) on which the child's language usage moves.

(ii) Analysis of thinking, in terms of all thought and language items attempted. The criteria here are those of the psychology of thought, where thinking is viewed as occurring on various levels, e.g., the concrete-visual, the schematic, the abstract. The question is, does the thinking of this child function on a level of thought appropriate for his/her age?

(iii) Arithmetic analysis, which especially is included because of the relationships and interactions among language, arithmetic, and thinking.

(iv) Analysis of intentionality (directedness) which, according to Swart, is of interest because it is important to know **in what way** the child constitutes the situation. A child who is not intentionally directed to his/her world will not constitute it and, thus, actualize his/her intelligence adequately. It is important to determine the quality of intentionality, given the incompleteness of a purely numerical result. For example, a child can have a high IQ but, the question is whether he/she is able to exercise this intelligence, and whether he/she can direct him/herself to his/her task.

(v) Memory analysis. Swart indicates that memory and intelligence run a very parallel course but are not identical. Memory analysis is important, since each intellectual achievement includes use of knowledge by the child remembering that acquired and retained knowledge. According to Swart [33], Chorus says that intelligence manifests itself in the ways a person can use the acquired knowledge at his/her disposal in new situations, and in new combinations.

(vi) Affectivity analysis. Swart [34] draws on Sonnekus, who states that affective guiding or educating based on the principles of safety and security leads to a strengthening of the affective relationships between a child and his/her world, which also means a strengthening of the development of his/her language, as a means of exploring, and of breaking through the environment to insight.

(vii) Analysis of perceiving. A child's attitude toward the situation he/she is in will be influenced by his/her perception of it. Of special importance here is his/her directedness to the situation.

(viii) Analysis of attending/concentrating. The ways in which intelligence is implemented depend greatly on the intensity of a child's concentrating or attending.

(ix) Analysis of intellectual tempo. According to Swart,[35] Busemann especially stresses tempo as representative of the fundamental layer of intelligence, and its analysis is necessary.

(x) Analysis of projections. Swart states that, when intelligence is approached phenomenologically, it cannot be separated from the person. When, during the administration of the test, projections occur, they must not be overlooked.

Without going into it, it also is appropriate to mention the research by Steenkamp,[36] who did a qualitative analysis of intelligence test performance on the **NSAIS,** as a psychological-**pedagogical** evaluation. He points to the necessity of a pedagogical evaluation of intellectual achievements in the pedoclinical situation.

Also, Anglo-American voices speak out these days for a more qualitative analysis of intelligence. In this connection, Swart[37] refers to Rapaport, whose contribution is of value, in that he supplements the numerical achievement with an analysis of the responses to the test. Although the increasing support for qualitative analyses is highly commended, still there is no guarantee that the child is going to achieve an adequate actualization, and good performance. In this respect, what is needed is a **pedagogical evaluation** to determine if the child actualizes his/her intelligence as a potentiality in **responsible** ways.

(g) It has been noted that several persons have tried to **define** intelligence, and what the general outcome of this is. Because most researchers have not penetrated to the nature or essence of intelligence, but merely have **defined** it, these definitions are taken as the point of departure, and not the phenomenon itself. In this way, pre-established opinions are forced onto the aspect of reality investigated (e.g., intelligence), and consequently this reality withdraws from, and confuses the researcher such that he/she is unable to describe the matter clearly and distinctly. Various people have tried to define intelligence, as though the definition is its essence. This necessarily is a false track, because its nature or

essence can only be grasped through a phenomenological approach to it.

(h) As a primordial phenomenon, as an ontic given, as an anthropological fact of being, intelligence is only accessible phenomenologically because phenomenology is a method of knowing without which ontology, or the study of reality (being) is not possible. It is not surprising that many retarded children have been victimized by conceptions founded on a confused understanding of reality because, in current practice, there is still a lack of clarity about what intelligence essentially is. Regarding a phenomenological fathoming of intelligence, both Langeveldt[38] and Sonnekus[39] have made excellent contributions:

> There is an unbreakable bond between person and world: a person is Dasein (Heidegger), which also implies that a person is existence; he/she goes out of him/herself to meet his/her world as initiator of relationships (Buytendijk), and constitutes the world, as a world-for-him/herself, as an intentionalized world by giving meaning to it. This is possible because of a person's fundamental openness, by which this world constitution, as the constitution of an experiential world (see below) is accomplished as an event of becoming. Joining and participating in this world is an occurrence of giving meaning, as an existential way of being, i.e., as a totality-in-communication, a child designs his/her world. Thus, he/she is present **in** the world affectively, as well as normatively-existentially, as modes of lived experiencing in both affective and cognitive ways.
>
> Thus, as far as intelligence is concerned, in his/her situational relations, a child must go out to his/her world in and through his/her intelligence, and this is because he/she actualizes his/her intelligence, as a potentiality to **break through** (Langeveld), and transform the world into a world-for-him/herself. Thus, intelligence can be described[40] as a cognitive mode of being, as a power available to the child for breaking through situations to insight.

The actualization of this power to break through (especially by means of language), as a cognitive mode of being, is only a distinction within existential ways of being, as an event of giving meaning, and which is subject to the child's intentional directness on a cognitive level but backed up by the affective.

The child's **actualizing** his/her intelligence, as potentiality, is related to the adequacy of his/her **moral** guidance or educating to **responsibly** actualize it, as well as the adequacy of his/her **affective** educating to achieve a **readiness** to actualize it.

Since, in the current literature, there is not yet an accountable fathoming and description of intelligence and its actualization, it is not surprising that the retarded child is surrendered to these errors. Often, intelligence is still approached as an isolated quantity, as a detached, independent function, ability, or factor which can be "measured" without understanding it in relation to the person as a totality in his/her situation. The current views amount to objectifying a person with the aim of quantification. Only a facet of being a person is considered, and omitted is the existential-ethical-subjective [41]. Fortunately, there now are voices in favor of a more qualitative analysis of intelligence test achievements, but not evident in the current literature and practices is a pedagogical evaluation of a retarded child's responsible actualization of his/her intelligence, as a potentiality. This pedagogical evaluation requires a phenomenological fathoming of a child's experiential world (to be shown later), which allows one to do justice to the retarded child as a person.

3. The lifeworld and experiential world, as points of departure for exploring the retarded child

As noted, the close connection between person and world is primordial. Who says person, says world, and who say world, says person, or he/she falls into an objectivism or subjectivism, and the person, as Dasein, the most basic category of reality, is negated, which is not possible. Who postulates that there is a world without persons is postulating something which does not hold, because "is" refers to being, and this term has no other meaning than being-for-a-person [42].

According to Heidegger [43], as a source of potentialities, Dasein creates a network of relations among beings, by which they become

comprehensible. This constituted network of relations gives these beings their meaning, and places them within a horizon of intelligibility: "We call this horizon of intelligibility the world" or also the **lifeworld**. The lifeworld or world, thus, is a correlate of a person's directed, intentional consciousness. Thus, we must not wonder if we correctly perceive the world, but rather we must say the world is what we perceive (Merleau-Ponty). This world or lifeworld is described by Sonnekus[45] as the world which is intentionally established and constituted by each subject in all his/her relations to the beings to which he/she directs him/herself, e.g., to things, plants, animals, persons. The lifeworld is the primordial ground for one's own life, and is presupposed by all perceiving, knowing, reflecting, i.e., all sciences (knowledge). Gous[46] summarizes the above line of thought and states concisely: "The lifeworld is the field of presence of a person based on his being anchored in being."

In his/her **intentional** going out to and participating in the beings in his/her world, as the primordial ground for experiencing, a child **lived experiences** these beings as beings-for-him/herself. Through this intentional going out to his/her lifeworld, as a meaning-giving activity, the child's lifeworld becomes his/her experiential world (the lifeworld as he/she lived experiences it). The question now arises regarding the **essence** of the **lived experiences** of the retarded child, as meaning-giving activities by which he/she establishes his/her experiential world, as a meaningful world-for-him/herself.

The following is a brief focus on Sonnekus'[47] exposition of lived experience: First and foremost, it has to be kept in mind that lived experience is a mode of being; it is one of the categories of human openness and, more specifically, of an existential way of being, as a meaning-giving activity. Thus, lived experiencing is a way of **giving meaning** to the world, and it is the original basis for the normative. But second, lived experience is actualized by the child (and, thus, also the retarded child) in his/jer progressively becoming adult on **different levels**, which change from a predominantly pathic (affective) lived experiencing to a distanced, gnostic (cognitive) way of giving meaning. Third, human body-ness, viewed as lived body-ness or corporeality, always is the **center** of the **totality of lived experiencing**.

Regarding **lived experience**, Husserl[48] indicates that, on the one hand, it has an **intentional character** and, on the other, an **act or**

activity character. With reference to Husserl's act intentionality, lived experience means a lived experiencing-of-something, thus, a lived experienced relationship directed at something (world), and this relationship indicates that this act has been **actualized**. On the other hand, a person also is **functioning intentionality** (Husserl) and, therefore, a way of being. Lived experience then simultaneously and primarily is a **relationship to being,** and is **meaning giving**.

In the light of the above, Sonnekus[49] offers the following description of lived experience: "Lived experience is the intentionally determined, subjective, personal (affective-normative) taking a position by a person. as a totality-in-function, in his communication with reality."

Provisionally, the questions of **becoming** and **actualizing** are worth mentioning with respect to lived experience, and the experiential world. In contrast to current developmental psychology, based on a naturalistic-oriented anthropology [50], becoming is an ontological-anthropological fact of being, which is given with being human, and which expresses something essential, fundamental, and meaningful about being human. Because of his/her fundamental openness, the child goes out to his/her world, but also answers the appeal which is continually directed to him/her and, in doing so, he/she **actualizes** his/her potentialities for new possibilities and, thus, he/she is always a **child-in-becoming**. This amounts to the fact that a child becomes to the degree that he/she responsibly constitutes his/her experiential world. From the appeal directed to the child, his/her self-becoming occurs through others and things. A child becomes in and through a change (elevation) in the dialogue he/she conducts with his/her world [51]. Essentially, this elevation is a change in the meanings he/she gives to his/her world relationships.

Thus far, becoming has been described as an anthropological category of being, but it must be added that, as far as a child is concerned, in his/her wanting-to-be-someone (Langeveld) based on wanting-to-be-what-he-ought-to-be (Oberholzer), he/she cannot become a proper adult by him/herself. He/she is dependent on the help and support of an adult (i.e., on educating) who, through pedagogic intervention, gives a different and proper course to his/her becoming adult, to prevent it from degenerating. In other words, becoming involves a child who must be brought up (educated) to increasingly display the image of proper adulthood.

However, as openness, a child always participates in his/her becoming because he/she actively, by lived experiencing, goes out to his/her world and, while doing this, he/she is given support and assistance to become in the direction of moral independence, and to responsibly actualize his/her potentialities. Thus, a child cannot adequately and responsibly actualize his/her intelligence, as potentiality, without being humanized and brought up [educated]; otherwise, his/her potentialities may remain stuck on the vital level [52].

A **phenomenological** fathoming of the **lived experiences** of the retarded child, as these are manifested in the **experiential world** of this **child-in-becoming,** is now considered; special emphasis is placed on **actualizing intelligence, as a mode of being.**

4. Actualizing intelligence as a task for the retarded child

(a) In the preceding sections, the meaning of actualization is indicated. In the following, the actualization of intelligence, as a potentiality, by the retarded child is discussed as an **ontological-anthropological problem.**

Stemming from the childness of a child, as described by philosophical anthropology via phenomenology, there is no recourse but to postulate that a retarded child is openness, potentiality, a child-in-becoming. The question is how does the retarded child, as being different, come forward to meet his/her world, experience it, give meaning to it, constitute an experiential world, actualize potentialities, all categories of an existential way of being?

According to Nel [53], a child can be restrained in bodily, psychic, or spiritual ways of being and, thus, as a person (totality) he/she is restrained in his/her going out to his/her world. His/her dialogue with the world, as an act of giving meaning, thus, is deficient, and this restrains him/her in constituting his/her experiential world. A retarded child, as one who is restrained in his/her psychic dimension, constitutes an experiential world based on skewed relationships which are not conducive to his/her personal becoming on the way to adulthood[54] and as a result, he/she does not adequately actualize his/her potentialities. He/she enters relationships with him/herself, others, things, and his/her God, but these relationships are quantitatively and qualitatively poorer than

those of the non-restrained child [55]. These skewed relationships give rise to his/her lived experience of **being different,** and the consequence is that he/she isolates him/herself to protect his/her intimacy. [56] As his/her precautionary withdrawal from situations of failure increase, his/her communication becomes more limited, and his/her horizon shrinks along with his/her venturing attitude [57].

He/she experiences him/herself as an exceptional child,[58] and as not being "able bodied." Possibly his/her way of being is different, but decidedly it is not a lesser being; he/she is able-bodied within the limits of his/her given potentialities [59], and he/she is a moral being of equal value[60] to any person, and who must not be stripped of his/her human dignity or be judged for the sake of convenience.

How does a retarded child come forward to meet his/her world? Because of his/her fundamental openness, he/she also lived experiences his/her world, which is an act of giving meaning, which is **normative** in origin. This lived experiencing of meaning occurs on different levels, varying from a predominantly **pathic** (affective) way of giving meaning to a distanced **gnostic** (cognitive) lived experience of meaning. Later it is shown how this child gives meaning to his/her world in his/her pathic, but also gnostic lived experiences.

The **different modes of being**, as fundamental structures of Dasein, are only understood in and through each other, [61] since they are indivisibly, dynamically interacting, and mutually interdependent. Thus, the retarded child who is **cognitively** restrained, will look for other ways of being, and of giving meaning, as well as other ways of actualizing his/her potentialities. This child's **affective** going out to his/her world especially will be restrained by his/her cognitive failures, and his/her lived experience of being different; all this touches his/her emotional life. which leads to an affective braking and an obscuring of his/her intentionality. As the concretization of one of the basic structures of Dasein [62], his/her **language** must be considered further, because it is a means of actualizing intelligence and of giving meaning [63].

Language, which also is the carrier of the affective [64], will not be left unscathed. Since language is a means of actualizing intelligence, restrained language leads to a **further** under actualization of intelligence, and the lived experience of this under actualization

leads, once again, to further affective restraint. Thus, there is a vicious circle.

Because of the conspicuous relation between language and **thought** [65], the latter must be understood as a retarded child's mode of being. Thus, intelligence, as a mode of being, is actualized by the child's going out to his/her world, which is an existential mode of being. Other modes of being are of fundamental importance for this actualization and must be understood.

(b) The **proper** unfolding of Dasein, i.e., the **responsible** actualization of potentialities by the retarded child, is a **pedagogical problem**. What is meant by "pedagogical"? From Landman's[66] description of the pedagogical situation, it is one in which a not-yet-adult is involved in real communication with a world in which people, as educators and educands, enter educative relationships out of which educative activities flow. These activities are aimed at promoting the child's constituting an experiential world, his/her giving meaning, his/her becoming, his/her actualization of potentialities. Hhere, one meets a way of educator and educand being involved in a relationship between two persons, where the educator presents to the educand contents selected from the world as it is, and as it ought to be. The educative activities of the educator involve his/her referring the educand to this (adult) world, with its demands of propriety, demands for executing tasks, and demands for a willingness to assume responsibility. There is an appeal to the child in this **encounter**: The position in this world of the mature, responsible, morally independent, and authoritative educator, calls the not-yet-mature, not-yet-responsible, morally dependent, authority-seeking child to adulthood [67].

The above educative actions, which occur within an understanding-trusting-authority relationship, are a totality with a two-fold structure, i.e., educating a child on an **ethical-normative** level to **responsibly** actualize his/her potentialities, **and** educating the child on an **affective** level to a **readiness** to actualize his/her potentialities.

Can the retarded child, because of his/her openness, continually give meanings to his /her world, as meanings-for-him/herself, give appropriate meanings, because norms are exemplified by the adult? What does the pedagogical imply for the retarded child's actualization of his/her intelligence? Can a child really be educated

ethically and affectively to responsibly actualize his/her intelligence? Later, an attempt is made to answer these questions.

(c) The above line of thought can be extended to an **orthopedagogic problem**, particularly regarding a **retarded** child. Orthopedagogic intervention is mentioned here, since the retarded child, as a restrained child, cannot always be educated in the usual ways. The appeal directed to the orthopedagogue is to educate the child to accept his/her being different, as a no lesser being, and to educate him/her to meaningfully accept and assimilate his/her being-different, and to design a meaningful future, and future perspective[68]. In other words, responsible acceptance and meaningful assimilation must be awakened in the child regarding hi/hers being-different, as a problematic existential situation, and regarding the problems brought about by his/her deficient educating, so that he/she can responsibly and optimally actualize his/her potentialities [69].

To illustrate the tremendous task the orthopedagogue has with regard to a retarded child, this child is contrasted with another restrained child, i.e., a blind, or weak-sighted child, about which Van Weeldon[70] says the following: "The blind child is aware of his own blindness ... . Knowledge of his own situation allows him to distance himself from it, and this can protect him from suffering his blindness. Here, then, is also the point where educating is applied." Regarding the retarded child, because he/she is poorly endowed intellectually, is he/she aware of his/her deficiency, i.e., does he/she perceive (know) he/she is restrained, is different and, thus, lived experience his/her being-different? If so, as an intellectually deficient child, is he able to gain insight into, acceptance of and a distance from his/her problem? If he/she does not perceive that he/she is different and if, consequently, this is not lived experienced intensely, is he/she confused about his/her different way of being? It seems clear that the "application" of educating is somewhat problematic here; however, he/she must not be written off as uneducable, merely for that reason.

The above problem culminates in one core question: Is it possible to educate or to re-educate a retarded child to actualize his/her intelligence? Before this question can be answered, there must be a phenomenological study of the retarded child's experiential world to acquire an image of the ways he/she actualizes his/her intelligence. Such an enquiry (and image) is the aim of this study,

which is carried out by implementing pedodiagnostic media, as media for actualizing intelligence (see Chapter 3).

By the nature of the matter, additional responses to the above question require a more comprehensive investigation than this introductory study. In such a future, more comprehensive study, there can be an involvement with the retarded child in a pedotherapeutic situation, after which (i.e., after a series of pedotherapeutic sessions) it possibly can be determined if this child's intelligence, as well as other potentialities can be actualized more responsibly as new possibilities, i.e., determine if the child can elevate the level of his/her forms of dialogue with his/her world.

Chapter 2 is an explication of the distinguishable, differentiated ways of actualizing intelligence by the retarded child viewed specifically as a problem of the psychology of becoming.

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