

## CHAPTER 1•

# THE RELATIONSHIPS: PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY/FUNDAMENTAL PEDAGOGICS/PEDAGOGY

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### [1.1] INTRODUCTION

In a recent article in *Tijdschrift voor Opvoedkunde*, Keersmaekers makes the following statement: *“The pedagogical is also distinguished from sociology in one other respect. The pedagogical maintains a particularly positive relation with philosophy, although it no longer is a deduced addendum to a closed philosophical system. This is not to say that sociology does not maintain a positive relation with philosophy, but that this relation is different from that between the pedagogical and philosophy. The relationship of the pedagogical is more intense and closer, precisely because the pedagogical has a totality-phenomenon as its object ( as does philosophy), and sociology is a science of an aspect [of human reality]. The bond between the pedagogical and philosophical is called positive with respect to content as well as method.”*<sup>1</sup> It cannot be denied that there is a positive connection between the pedagogical and the philosophical. That the pedagogical cannot be deductively inferred from any philosophical system must also be agreed with. Whoever tries to construct the pedagogical in a deductive way, reduces it to an applied philosophy, and such a “pedagogics” cannot make the claim of autonomy. However, the question remains about how this positive bond between pedagogics

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<sup>1</sup> Keersmaekers, K.: *“De Spanningsverhouding tussen Pedagogiek en Sociologie”* in *Tijdschrift voor Opvoedkunde*, No. 4, 1969/70.

and philosophy can be seen in its real essentiality. In the above quotation, two essences are mentioned in this regard, i.e., *content* and *method*. An example of the latter is the use, in pedagogical thinking, of the philosophical approach known as the phenomenological method. As is well-known, the philosopher Edmund Husserl is the initiator of this method, and today it is applied by many subject scientists, among which are pedagogicians, although in a way which deviates from Husserl's phenomenological method. The "*methodological*" bond between philosophy and the pedagogical cannot be denied, and today it is accepted.

As far as the "*content*" is concerned, it is first determined what such a bond means. It can mean nothing other than that certain content with which philosophy is involved, also is meaningful for pedagogics. In this context, one especially thinks of that philosophical area of scientific study known as philosophical anthropology which, in turn, is involved with the question of the essence of being human. It fully interrogates and considers the humanness of being human, i.e., what it is which makes a human being human as a totality. This questioning of and thinking can only occur by human being itself; thus, the subject, at the same time, is the object and, viewed in this way, the central task of philosophical anthropology is self-reflection<sup>2a</sup>.

When there is consideration of a "*content*" bond, in the first place, this means the bond between pedagogics and philosophical anthropology.

## [1.2] THE RELATIONSHIP: PHILOSOPHY/ PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY

Before the relationship between philosophical anthropology and pedagogics is considered more closely, attention is first paid to the concept "*philosophy*" itself, and then to the relationship between philosophy and philosophical anthropology. To obtain clarity about this, there is a consideration of the relationship philosophy/subject science [e.g., psychology].

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<sup>2a</sup> Groethuysen, B.: *Philosophische Anthropologie*, 7. R. Oldenbourg, Munich, 1969.

Philosophy is a system of knowledge or, as Langeveld describes it, it is a radical and systematic, i.e., a logical, accountable consideration of the entirety of everything which is.<sup>2b</sup> To be in such a position, a philosopher must consider the results of the various subject sciences, but without absolutizing any of their data, and without viewing philosophy as the sum of all subject scientific knowledge. A philosopher must enquire about the deepest foundation, the sense and meaning of the appearing world. On the other hand, a subject scientist, who also wants to penetrate to the ground of his/her subject, must independently enter the terrain of the philosophical. By ground is meant that he/she must enquire about the essence, the form, and the implications of his/her empirical data. Regarding this deepest scientific ground, H. de Vos expresses himself as follows: *“With the question of the ground and essence of reality, or of everything connected with it, a new question easily arises about all of this, i.e., of the totality of their being and occurrence and, particularly, of the human being, his world and his life.”*<sup>3</sup> In their deepest ground, then, philosophy and the subject sciences are not in opposition, but are meaningfully related. The ground of both is traced to human being, as a practitioner of science, and each can profit from the thought of the other because knowledge acquired by a human being never remains uninterpreted.

From the above, a philosopher and a subject scientist ultimately are confronted with the question of him/herself, as a practitioner of science. Derbolov states this as follows: *“Der Mensch, das in Frage gestellte Wesen, ist zugleich das in die Frage hineingestellte Wesen.”*<sup>4</sup> This question can be focused more deeply, i.e., on the question which a human being asks of him/herself. Such a self-questioning is only possible because a human being is existence. That is, he/she can step out of him/herself, to transcend him/herself such that he/she can interrogate him/herself and the ways of his/her being in the world, as well as the ways in which this questioning occurs. This means that, not only the ultimate scientific ground of each human science, but also of each science, must be sought in the terrain of philosophical anthropology. This truth is even more evident for the human sciences. Thus, W. Loch directly

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<sup>2b</sup> Langeveld, M. J.: *Op weg naar Wijsgerig Denken*, 4. 4<sup>th</sup> Edition, Bohn, Haarlem, 1954.

<sup>3</sup> De Vos, H.: *Inleiding tot de Wijsbegeerte*, 9. Callenbach, Nijkerk, 1951.

<sup>4</sup> Derbolav, J.: *Frage und Anspruch*, 57. Henn. Wuppertal, 1970.

indicates that, for its part, philosophical anthropology has contributed to a more adequate knowledge of being human such that the various sciences which are involved with being human also are compelled to expand on such a regional anthropology.<sup>5</sup> (Here regional anthropology means a [philosophical] part-perspective on being human). The foregoing implies that each human science, which interrogates being human from its own dimension, or perspective, thus, also pedagogics, the science which interrogates being human from a pedagogical perspective, must be grounded philosophical anthropologically.

Before the relation philosophical anthropology/pedagogics is ascertained, there is a look at precisely what “philosophical anthropology” means.

By philosophical anthropology is meant interrogating and reflecting on the essence of being human, which reaches further than external data. However, in no sense does this mean that philosophical anthropology is reducible to one or another philosophical system. Philosophical anthropology can only understand being human in terms of itself and, thus, only makes use of *categories* (existentialia) which are inherent to being human. According to Loch, philosophical anthropology, as “*Wissenschaft vom Menschen*” proceeds from three suppositions:

- (1) the essence of being human can only be understood from the phenomena and actions of human life itself, and not from extra-human data;
- (2) the essence of being human is not [completely] definable and fathomable; and
- (3) no form of human phenomena might be made absolute.

Following these criteria, it is easy to distinguish a philosophical anthropological and a natural scientific approach to being human. Where the former arrives at a deeper understanding, the latter stipulates being human as a “*type or class*”, which is morphologically, as well as physiologically compared with “*other*” types of animals to establish a genetic [i.e., developmental] bond,

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<sup>5</sup> Loch, W.: *Die Anthropologische Dimension der Paedagogik*, 9-10. Neue Deutsche Schule. Bochum, 1963.

for purposes of classification.<sup>6</sup> Where the questions of philosophical anthropology are directed to the qualitative, to the essence, origin, and destiny of being human, a natural science anthropology only gives importance to the quantitative and measurable. This is not to minimize that empirical data can contribute to philosophical anthropology. Indeed, Portmann, e.g., has made an essential contribution to philosophical anthropology from biology.<sup>7</sup> However, there must be a warning against a view, such as H. Mohr's, that an anthropology can only claim to be scientific if it is grounded in biology.<sup>8</sup> Indeed, such an anthropology is able to do phylogenetic and ontogenetic research, but ignores the humanness of being human because the reciprocal dependence of person and world is not noticed. Always, whoever says human being says world, and whoever negates a human world, by proceeding in a so-called "*objective and scientific*" way, e.g., by only considering his/her biological way of being in the world and, thus, not recognizing him/her as a totality in communication, will also deprive him/her of his/her humanness. Such an objectivism is a **scientism**, which amounts to a complete absolutizing of a natural science way of thinking and, thus, amounts to annulling the lifeworld.<sup>9</sup>

In this chapter, when there is mention of an anthropological pedagogics, this implies that it is a philosophical anthropological pedagogics; philosophical anthropological, because it refers to a view of being human which is more than the sum of the variety of his/her "*characteristics*", and which also recognizes a human being's relatedness to being and, therefore, sees him/her as a totality in communication. For these reasons, it is summarized with Dienelt that, in all cases, pedagogics is only justified by philosophy.<sup>10</sup> The pedagogical is always an exclusively human matter, and a pedagogician turns him/herself to that way of being human, without making it absolute. However, now the problem is: Is pedagogics a philosophy, or is it an autonomous science?

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<sup>6</sup> Habermas, J.: "*Anthropologie*" in Diemer, A.: *Das Fischer Lexicon*, 18. Fischer Publisher, Frankfurt am Main, 1958.

<sup>7</sup> Portmann, A.: *Het Beeld van de Mens in het Licht van de Moderne Biologie*. De Haan, 1961.

<sup>8</sup> Mohr, H.: *Wissenschaft und Menschliche Existenz*, 40. 2 Auflage. Rombach. Freiburg, 1970.

<sup>9</sup> Oberholzer, C. K.: "Hedendaagse Wysgerig-Antropologiese Konsepsies". In Cronje, G.: *Die Wysgerige Antropologie en die Menswetenskappe*, 27. J. L. van Schaik. Pretoria, 1966.

<sup>10</sup> Dienelt, K.: *Paedagogische Anthropologie*, 39. Reinhardt. Munich, 1969.

## [1.3] THE RELATIONSHIP: PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY/PEDAGOGICS

### [1.3.1] Introduction

In the previous section, it is indicated that the ultimate scientific ground [of pedagogics] must be sought in philosophical anthropology. Also, as a subject science, with its own area of research, it does not have a focus different from pedagogics. Indeed, pedagogics is most closely concerned with philosophical anthropology because it is primarily involved with being human. Pedagogics is so closely related to philosophical anthropology that the question arises about whether it is a part-area of knowledge of philosophical anthropology and, therefore, can be nothing more than an applied anthropology.

These and related questions are closely related to pedagogical anthropology and anthropological pedagogics, which are so often used, and sometimes confusedly, in pedagogical works.

That pedagogics is closely connected with philosophical anthropology has been noted and discussed by fundamental pedagogues of note, at one time or another. Rohrs indicates that Kant, under the direct influence of Rousseau, states clearly that *“der Mensch das einzige Wesen, das erzogen werden muss und nur durch die Erziehung Mensch zu werden vermag”*.<sup>11</sup>

Further, Rohrs indicates that Pestalozzi, in his writings, also is deeply aware of the anthropological foundations of pedagogics. Also, Poggeler, commenting about the relationship between pedagogics and anthropology, says that these sciences define each other and, in addition, are committed to each other because pedagogics inquirers about the meaning of being human, and because a human being can only be what he/she ought to be through educating.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> Rohrs, H.: *Allgemeine Erziehungswissenschaft*, 178. Beltz. Berlin, 1969.

<sup>12</sup> Poggeler, F.: *De Mondige Mens*, 11. De Nederlandsche Boekhandel. Antwerp, 1966.

Schoeman expresses himself astutely about this connection: “When the pedagogic is now seen as an anthropological phenomenon, it is permissible to assert that the pedagogic problem shows another side of the nature of the anthropological. In other words, the pedagogical refers in an undeniable way to the anthropological: when the question of the essence of educating is asked, it is also a question about its possibility. When this essence-question is formulated, indeed, there is a stepping into the terrain of the anthropological. The question of possibility, as an anthropological question, is formulated as follows: what kind of being is a human being such that he/she educates, is educated, and who lends him/herself to and is committed to educating.<sup>13</sup> For Schoeman, stepping into the area of philosophical anthropology by pedagogics is not only permissible, but is a decisive precondition “when the possibility of educating, as a way of being humanly situated, is readable from it”.<sup>14</sup> Elsewhere, in this connection, Schoeman also talks of a thematized anthropology because the pedagogical involves “the human phenomenon, which is called pedagogics”.<sup>15</sup> From these quotations, it appears as if pedagogics can be a part-area of knowledge of philosophical anthropology, or that pedagogics is only an applied anthropology, which can make no claim of autonomy. However, this is not the case, and not because pedagogics has an autonomously delimited terrain of research, and independently interrogates life reality from its own perspective. It is clear, however, that the problem of grounding pedagogics is a thorny matter from which many problems flow, of which the most central are that pedagogics is viewed as a form of philosophical anthropology, and that its practice is seen as the application of philosophical results. Before proceeding to a possible solution to this problem, how prominent thinkers view this problem is considered.

For Dopp-Verwald, the question of the essence of educating is also a question of the essence of being human, because being human

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<sup>13</sup> Schoeman, S. J.: “Die Mensbeeld by die Pedagogiek”. In Nel, B. F.: *Jubileumlesings*, Faculty of Education, University of Pretoria, 28.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid*, 29.

<sup>15</sup> Schoeman, S. J.: “Die Verleentheid van die Pedagogieker”. In *Suid-Afrikaanse Tydskrif vir die Pedagogiek*. Vol. 3, No. 2. 1969, 69.

without educating is unthinkable.<sup>16</sup> Thus, the question about the possibility of educating is also a question about the essence of being human. However, Zopfl warns against pedagogics venturing to make pronouncements about the essence of being human. For him, this is the exclusive task of philosophical anthropology.<sup>17</sup> For Zarzil, it is again clear that the pronouncements of philosophical anthropology are also mainly pronouncements of philosophical essences.<sup>18</sup> Speck summarizes these ideas as follows: *“Paedagogik und Anthropologie sind aufeinander bezogen; die Frage nach dem Sinn der Erziehung nicht zu trennen.”*<sup>19</sup> Also, for Loch, the question of the essence, meaningfulness, and necessity of educating is simultaneously a question about the essence of being human, and to meaningfully answer this latter question, one must also find a meaningful answer to the question of the possibility and meaningfulness of educating.<sup>20</sup> Groothoff indicates further that, without an image of being human, educating is just not possible because there must first be an understanding of everything which being human includes, so that educating can proceed in accordance with that image. Before one can arrive at a founded image of being human, one must first consult or study philosophical anthropology. Thus, as Langeveld points out, not just any image of being human makes a pedagogics possible. For him, an accountable pedagogics is not possible if being human is viewed as a mere product of nature. Also, Dreschler points out that the pedagogic, indeed, is a part of [philosophical] anthropology, because the latter deals with being human as a totality, i.e., with being human in its total involvement with world and reality.<sup>21</sup>

From the discussion so far, and with reference to some prominent educationists, it increasingly becomes evident whether the pedagogic can be equated with philosophical anthropology. They seem to be so intertwined that it is difficult, if even possible, to

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<sup>16</sup> Speck, J.: *Die Anthropologische Fundierung Erzieherischen Handelns*, 22. Deutsches Institut für Wissenschaftliche Paedagogik. Munster, 1968.

<sup>17</sup> Zopfl, H.: *Einführung in Grundfragen der Paedagogik*. 109. Auer. Donauworth, 1969.

<sup>18</sup> Zarzil, H.: *Paedagogische Anthropologie*, 216. Quelle and Meyer. Heidelberg, 1972.

<sup>19</sup> Speck, J.: *Die Anthropologische Fundierung Erzieherischen Handelns*, 23. Deutsches Institut für Wissenschaftliche Paedagogik. Munster, 1968.

<sup>20</sup> Loch, W.: *“Der Paedagogische Sinn der Anthropologischen Betrachtungsweise”*. In *Suid-Afrikaanse Tydskrif vir die Pedagogiek*, Vol. 1, No. 2, 81, 1968.

<sup>21</sup> Dreschler, J.: *Anthropologie und Paedagogik*, 9. Henn. Ratingen, 1965.



make an adequate distinction. For Roth, pedagogics is nothing more than a philosophy made practical: “*Wenn die Philosophie als Philosophische Anthropologie oder Ethik praktisch wird, wird sie Paedagogik.*”<sup>22</sup> However, for him, the reverse is also true: if pedagogics is the further inquiry of empirical data, then it is philosophy, i.e., educational philosophy. Also, for Bohme, pedagogics is a practical philosophy. This philosophy has become practical because it has a practical function to fulfill. “*Die Philosophie muss so vorgetragen werden, dass sie die Bildung des Menschen wesentlich mitbestimmt.*”<sup>23</sup> If, indeed, the pedagogic is a practical philosophy, then it has no right to exist as an autonomous science.

Another problem which is closely related to the pedagogic, as “practical philosophy”, is the relationship between pedagogics, as a pure science, and its application in practice. For example, is it logical to speak, as does Langeveld, of the pedagogic, as a normative-practical task of philosophy?<sup>24</sup> Indeed, if philosophy is practiced by applying it in concrete educative situations, it is no longer philosophy! Dopp-Vorwald<sup>25</sup> and Dreschler,<sup>26</sup> then, also make a clear distinction between pedagogics and the science of educating. Accordingly, pedagogics is the more practical-normative science, while the science of education is purely theoretical in nature. Also, Derbolav indicates that the science of education is not primarily interested in what a human being ought to be, but in what a human being factually is.<sup>27</sup>

This distinction which is made between pedagogics and the science of education is not scientifically accountable because pedagogics can be nothing other than a science, and science is a theoretical matter, although the theory is also a theory of a practice. Thus, there cannot be agreement with Dopp-Vorwald, Dreschler, and Derbolav because, as a science, pedagogics is necessarily theoretical,

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<sup>22</sup> Roth, H.: *Paedagogische Anthropologie*, 31. Schroedel. Hanover, 1966.

<sup>23</sup> Bohme, G.: *Der Paedagogische Beruf der Philosophie*, 152, 156. Reinhardt. Munich, 1968.

<sup>24</sup> Langeveld, M. J.: *Capita uit de Algemene Methodologie der Paedologie*, 10. Wolters. Groningen, 1959.

<sup>25</sup> Dopp-Vorwald, H.: *Grundfragen der Erziehungswissenschaft*, 7-22. Henn. Ratingen, 1964.

<sup>26</sup> Dreschler, J.: *Anthropologie und Paedagogik*, 6. Henn. Ratingen, 1965.

<sup>27</sup> Derbolav, J.: *Frage und Anspruch*, 79. Henn, Wuppertal, 1970.

and cannot dare to be prescriptive. Roth<sup>28</sup> and Bollnow<sup>29</sup> make a distinction between a science of education and pedagogics on the basis that, for them, pedagogics is concerned with a teaching aim—it must give prescriptions to practice about how educating ought to be, while the science of education is a purely theoretical matter. Also, for Strasser, a phenomenologically oriented pedagogics, which for him is, therefore, a fundamental pedagogics, is not yet a full-fledged pedagogics, because it is only descriptive. For it to become a full-fledged pedagogics, it must be supplemented by philosophy of life contents.<sup>30</sup>

As indicated above, because pedagogics is a science, and not a practical or post-scientific matter, it cannot be other than descriptive, although it does also describe norms! However, it cannot be agreed that the pedagogic then must prescribe what is proper. The huge problem which the above thinkers run up against is that pedagogics, unlike other human sciences, is concerned not only with being human as it is, but also with being human as it ought to be, and instead of **describing** the proper or the norms as they are found in practice, pedagogics must also **prescribe** how the norms ought to be, i.e., it will prescribe practice. Thus, Roth, e.g., indicates that the aim of educating cannot be separated from the question of the destination of being human.<sup>31</sup> In addition, for him, pedagogics always remains historically bounded and, therefore, is not able to independently formulate an educative aim. If it is so that pedagogics is not able to formulate its own formal aim and, therefore, it must make use of aims which might be prescribed externally, it cannot be a science because, in advance, it gives up its autonomy! At most, pedagogics is then a system of applied dogmatic or metaphysical biases. However, the fact is that pedagogics can formulate a formal aim or aim structure. Hence, Landman views *'adulthood'* as the formal aim, with the following part-structures as criteria for adulthood:

- (1) Meaningful existence
- (2) Self-judgment and self-understanding

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<sup>28</sup> Roth, H.: *Paedagogische Anthropologie*, 274. Schroedel. Hanover, 1966.

<sup>29</sup> Bollnow, O. F.: *"Paedagogische Anthropologie auf Empirisch-Hermeneutischer Grundlage"*. In *Zeitschrift für Paedagogik*. Dec. 1967, 576.

<sup>30</sup> Strasser, S.: *Opvoedingswetenschap en Opvoedingswijsheid*, 76. Sixth edition, Malmberg. S'Hertogenbosch, 1969.

<sup>31</sup> Roth, H.: *Paedagogische Anthropologie*, 273. Schroedel, Hanover, 1966.

- (3) Respect for human dignity
- (4) Morally independent choosing and acting
- (5) Responsibility
- (6) Norm identification
- (7) Outlook on life (philosophy of life)<sup>32</sup>

This structure is universal because it is valid for all educative situations. However, what disturbs Roth, Speck, Strasser, and others is that they also want to view the scientifically formulated aim as a particular matter which, therefore, ought to be full of philosophy of life contents. If this, indeed, is the task of pedagogics, then it could not independently set its aim, and its aim must be prescribed from outside pedagogics and, in which case, pedagogics will become an applied science. Indeed, a science can only be descriptive, and if it now will prescribe, then it must overstep its own boundary, in which case it will discontinue being a science. However, it is certainly the case that the generally valid aim structures must be furnished with philosophy of life contents, and this is possible because these structures are viable; then it must be realized that this is a post-scientific matter. That is, the fundamental pedagogical structures can be made viable in concrete situations of educating, but this is other than practicing science, and is not pedagogics but pedagogy [educating].

With this discussion of the connection between philosophy and pedagogics, and the relationship between theory and practice, we have not yet come closer to a solution to how pedagogics can claim to be autonomous. A possible solution perhaps can be found by investigating whether the perspective on the *anthropos* taken by pedagogics can guarantee its autonomy. Indeed, with a unique area of research, it ought to be able to be clearly distinguished from the other sciences involved with human being.


### [1.3.2] The idea of perspective

The pedagogical is an *exclusive* but not the only anthropological reality. Human being is a totality in communication, and if a

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<sup>32</sup> Landman, W. A., Roos, S. G. and Liebenberg, C. R.: *Opvoedkunde en Opvoedingsleer vir Beginners*, 36-37. University Publishers and Booksellers. Stellenbosch, 1971. **English translation:** <http://www.georgeyonge.net>

pedagogician now begins with the pedagogic situation, he/she can do nothing else than to also view being human in his/her total involvement with reality. Indeed, even if the pedagogical moments are to be distinguished, they cannot be separated absolutely from a person's total being in the world, because a person is not the sum of various ways of being in the world. His/her way of being-there refers to the fact that he/she is an existing unity. In other words, the different realities out of which a person's lifeworld exists, such as the reality of educating, of society, etc. are not independent, but are co-constitutive of each other and, thus, also of his/her entire being-there in the world. Now, it also is so that it would be naïve and presumptuous to claim that one science can penetrate the entire lifeworld. If a scientist makes any claim to a scientific penetration, then he/she must take a slice of the lifeworld without separating this slice (aspect, facet, area of reality) from its relationships with the universal lifeworld. Thus, from a specific position, he/she must focus on that slice of reality he/she has delimited for his/her scientific practice and, in doing so, describe its *being* and *meaning* against the background of the universal lifeworld itself. To be able to take a pedagogical perspective, a pedagogician must first turn to the lifeworld (in contrast to non-living reality) so that he/she can look at the lifeworld (in contrast to the non-human life reality) because it is only there that he/she will find the reality of educating. This '*reality and world*'-problematic is schematically (also logically and clearly) explained by Landman<sup>33</sup> as follows:



<sup>33</sup> Landman, W. A.: *D.Ed.-Colloquium*, 23 Aug. 1972.

- (1) Animal
- (2) Vegetal

- (1) Educative reality
- (2) Social reality
  - (3) Didactic reality
  - (4) Lifeworld of the deaf, weak-sighted, toddler, woman, etc.
  - (5) a) and b) in so far as one intervenes with them

- (1) World = what I understand from a), b) and c). (World = horizon of what is understandable, knowable).
- (2) Experiential world = what I experience from a), b) and c).

As can be seen from this scheme, all the human sciences are involved with the lifeworld. They each interrogate being human, but each formulates its question in accordance with the facet of being human to which it is directed. The specific pedagogical question is formulated as follows: “How must a knowing educator, as authoritative, trustworthy person, and representative of the norm-image of adulthood, in his/her association with and encounter of an authority-questioning child, who is possibility in becoming, who ought-to-be-someone-him/herself, and who is entrusted to him/her, support him/her so that he/she can progressively be recognized as the human person [he/she ought to be]?”<sup>34</sup> To obtain an answer to this question a pedagogue must turn him/herself to the total person in the reality of educating to understand him/her as a being becoming educated. It is only through a *phenomenological* attunement, or disposition that a person is grasped as a continually becoming totality within his/her spatial and temporal being-bound. This personal becoming, and the help an educating adult offers a child, who is becoming adult, is the terrain on which pedagogical-anthropological questions are focused. These questions implicate the tension between what is and what ought to be.

Above, it is mentioned that the real essentials of being human can only be understood through a phenomenological attunement. Hence, an authentic pedagogical perspective is only possible if it is a

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<sup>34</sup> Landman, W. A. and Gous, S. J.: *Inleiding tot die Fundamentele Pedagogiek*, 60. Afrikaanse Pers. Johannesburg, 1969.

phenomenological perspective, by which also all non-phenomenological perspectives must be *bracketed* [i.e., neutralized by temporarily holding them in abeyance]. In other words, a pedagogical perspective alone does not guarantee that the pedagogical questions can be answered meaningfully. It is only when a pedagogician prepares him/herself to enter the reality of educating itself, *and* is prepared to perceive, describe, and explicate this reality as it essentially is, without disturbing or obscuring his/her topic of investigation by another obscuring perspective, that the scientific nature and autonomy of pedagogics can be a possibility.

Because the human sciences have their own perspectives on the lifeworld and, thus, their own delimited terrain of research, it is easy to distinguish them from each other. As far as pedagogics as such is concerned, there is still a problem which, although illuminated, is not yet solved, i.e., the other sciences are concerned with human being as what it *is* and, thus, without jeopardizing their scientific nature, they can describe the reality which they illuminate as what it is. It seems to be otherwise with pedagogics because, in a pedagogical situation, the concern is *also* with what is proper. Indeed, if the pedagogical question is how to support a child so that he/she can become the person he/she ought to be, then a pedagogue[/practitioner] (not a pedagogician[/scientist]) must venture into the terrain of what ought to be in an educative situation. Now, a pedagogue can only venture into this terrain if he/she first has made a scientific study of the proper in its essence. This problematic of how what is, and what ought to be affect the scientific nature of pedagogics is dealt with later.

Thus far, a phenomenological pedagogical perspective on the lifeworld seems to be a precondition for guaranteeing the autonomy and scientific nature of pedagogics. However, several prominent pedagogicians also talk of an anthropological dimension of or anthropological approach to the pedagogical event. Thus, it appears that the anthropological can also be a perspective on this event. To determine, in any sense, an answer to the possibility of such a perspective it is necessary to consider the possibility and meaning of an anthropological pedagogics.

### [1.3.3] The possibility and meaning of an anthropological pedagogics

Viewed globally, the term '*anthropological pedagogics*' refers to the contemporary educative thinking which is characterized by the fact that being human is interrogated from being human or, as Van der Stoep states it: "*Anthropological pedagogics* refers to a modern direction of educative thinking by which questions [arising] *from being human* are asked and answered about the fact of educating."<sup>35</sup> Before the possibility of an anthropological pedagogics can be reflected on, a closer look is taken of what precisely is understood by this concept, especially as used by Loch and Bollnow.

For Loch<sup>36</sup> anthropological pedagogics is a part-science of pedagogics, which has its own terrain. It studies all possible forms of human expressions and behaviors from a pedagogical perspective. Hence, its task is the study of the different forms, means, contents, and aims of educating. Thus viewed, anthropological pedagogics looks for *anthropological categories* within pedagogics. It asks what the phenomenon of educating has to offer the illumination of the question of the essence of being human, as well as what human preconditions belong to realizing the pedagogical. Briefly: It will understand being human from educating. Loch states that if a pedagogue starts with an educative situation with the anthropological question, i.e., the question of the essence, origin, and destination of being human, then he/she will necessarily conclude that a human being is dependent on educating to be considered as a human being.<sup>37</sup>

Also, Bollnow believes that anthropological pedagogics is a part-science of pedagogics.<sup>38</sup> It only makes use of the approach of philosophical anthropology. In other words, for him, anthropological pedagogics is not involved with the findings of philosophical anthropology, in which case it would only be an applied science but, indeed, with its approach. There is a question

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<sup>35</sup> Van der Stoep, F. and O. A.: *Didaktiese Orientasie*, 7, Academica. Pretoria, 1968.

<sup>36</sup> Loch, W.: *Die Anthropologische Dimension der Paedagogik*, 82.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid*, 104.

<sup>38</sup> Bollnow, O. F.: *Die Anthropologische Betrachtungsweise in der Paedagogik*, 48. Neue Deutsche Schule. Bochum, 1965.

of the modes by which being human is manifested, such as trust, safety, and hope, to see what pedagogical significance they have.

Now the question arises whether it is necessary to talk of an anthropological way of reflecting in pedagogics. Indeed, the phenomenon of educating can *only* be found where it is embedded in an educative situation as this arises between and among human beings. If there is mention of the pedagogical, this presumes human being. However, the fact is that, in the early years, many pedagogical works appeared which emphasize the anthropological of the pedagogic event. These works must be seen as an objection against certain anthropological conception, where one aspect of being human becomes equated with being human as such, and against the non-anthropological approaches to pedagogics. Here one thinks of the natural science terms and expressions which are used to *'illuminate'* a pedagogic event. The *'pedagogical'* terminology is closely connected with natural science methods and techniques which are used and, indeed, used in education. It is especially the case with an objectivistic attitude of knowing, that a human being, as subject, is dismissed as far as possible. Thus, human being is approached from nature, and then he/she also is nothing more than an extension of nature. He/she is also approached from being animal. Since animal experiments are much easier, data from animals are used to describe and explicate the reality of educating. Indeed, in this connection, there can be talk of an *'animal pedagogics'*. However, this is nonsense because this name already refers to a contradiction; indeed, *'animal'* completely excludes the possibility of the pedagogical.

The name *'anthropological pedagogics'*, thus, must only be seen as an attempt to emphasize the specific human nature of educating. With this name, a distinction is made between pedagogics and an unscientific natural science-oriented pedagogics. In addition, this concept indicates that such a pedagogics sees human being as a totality in communication, without making one of the ways of his/her being-there absolute, and without falling into one or another anthropological conception.

However, this author is convinced that the name pedagogical, alone, is sufficient. Even so, there are educationists who, in addition to



anthropological pedagogics, make use of the concepts '*personal pedagogics*' or '*personalistic anthropology*', but these also are unnecessary.<sup>39</sup> If there will be a further development of the idea of anthropological sciences, then [the names of] all the sciences which are concerned with human beings and their behavior, would be preceded by the adjective 'anthropological'. However, this is unnecessary since a human science, indeed, cannot be involved with anything other than a human being.

Also, if the name '*anthropological*' acknowledges that human being is questioned *from* being human, then this also would be an unnecessary label, since *no* science can have its origin anywhere other than in being human. Indeed, an animal cannot practice science! However, when one proceeds to the grounding of a science, there must be reflection on how a human being can account for what appears to him/her as reality. Although this is a fundamental question, still it remains unnecessary to place anthropological before [the name of] a human or even a non-human science because no science is possible except from being human!

#### [1.3.4] The possibility and meaning of a pedagogical anthropology

The concept '*pedagogical anthropology*' refers to a certain perspective on being human, i.e., the pedagogical. Thus, pedagogics is a subdivision of philosophical anthropology. It describes being human, which is necessarily dependent on educating.

For Loch, pedagogical anthropology is not an autonomous science. For him, it is only concerned with the contributions the phenomenon educating makes to the better understanding of being human. Just as in the case of anthropological pedagogics, pedagogical anthropology views human being in educating; however, it goes further, and views being human as a totality. In other words, it is not limited just to an educative situation as such, but to all human activities such as, e.g., traditions, culture, and religion, to see what pedagogical meaning they have. Viewed in this way, the pedagogical event is a *category* of human Dasein. Derbolav's view of pedagogical anthropology agrees with this. For

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<sup>39</sup> Holtershinken, D.: *Anthropologische Grundlagen Personalistische Erziehungslehren*, 143. Beltz. Berlin, 1971.

him, it is a science which views the entirety of human life from a pedagogical perspective.<sup>40</sup> Thus, for him, the result of the other subject sciences, such as biology, psychology, sociology, and the cultural sciences can be looked at from a pedagogical perspective with the aim of applying the acquired insights to pedagogics. So viewed, pedagogical anthropology is only an auxiliary science of pedagogics and no autonomous science.

Also, for Bollnow pedagogical anthropology is a part-science of philosophical anthropology, and an auxiliary science of pedagogics.<sup>41</sup>

Pedagogical anthropology is philosophical anthropology, in the sense that it not only has the same method and point of departure as the latter, but because it makes an essential contribution to philosophical anthropology. In other words, pedagogical anthropology is an anthropological endeavor from a pedagogical perspective, but not only an anthropology which is practiced only for the sake of the pedagogical.

For Sussmuth, the question of an educative need, at the same time, is a question of the essence of being human, but now, for her, the concept of educative need is also a *'Zentral-kategorie anthropologisch-paedagogischer Forschung'*<sup>42</sup>, and now there is an attempt to illuminate this category from a pedagogical perspective with the aim of making an educative pronouncement about the educative need, and to disclose the need for educating in its anthropological meaning. In other words, pedagogical anthropology will study the human need for educating to arrive at a grounded image of being human.

Long before Sussmuth, Langeveld emphatically refers to the human need for educating. For him, the fact that a human being is a being who educates, is educated, and is committed to education is *'one of the most fundamental characteristics of the image of being*

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<sup>40</sup> Derbolav, J.: *Frage und Anspruch*, 69. Henn. Wuppertal, 1970.

<sup>41</sup> Bollnow, O. F.: *Die Anthropologische Betrachtungsweise in der Paedagogik*, 45. Neue Deutsche Schule. Bochum, 1965.

<sup>42</sup> Sussmuth, R.: *"Erziehungsbedurftigkeit"*. In Speck, J. and Wehle, G. P.: *Handbuch Paedagogischer Grundbegriffe*, Part I, 407, 405. Kosel. Munich, 1970.

*human*'.<sup>43</sup> To now acquire fundamental knowledge about the essence of being human, one must start from this fundamental fact of being. If this approach is followed, then this points to the possibility of a pedagogical anthropology, as a part-science of philosophical anthropology.

Above it is indicated that educating is *one* of the most fundamental characteristics of an image of being human, which implies that there are still other ways in which a person's being-in-the-world is characterized. Thus, e.g., Gerber<sup>44</sup> refers to religious activities, which are studied by theology, social activities, studied by sociology, etc. But none of these activities could be studied without accepting educating as a *fait accompli*. Indeed, without educating, a person could not have become a religious or social being, and he/she would be even less able to practice science. Hence, educating is the most fundamental human activity because, without it, other ways of manifesting being human could not possibly be meaningful. Thus, by studying the educative event, fundamental knowledge about being human can be illuminated. Hence, no genuine anthropology can neglect studying this fundamental way of being human without its image of being human being ungrounded. The part-science of philosophical anthropology, which is involved with this basic aspect of being human, is known as '*pedagogical anthropology*'. A pedagogue who studies the reality of educating, however, is known as a pedagogician, and the science he/she practices is known as '*pedagogics*'. Thus viewed, there is a distinction to be made between '*pedagogical anthropology*', as a part-science of philosophical anthropology, which has the aim of acquiring fundamental knowledge about being human, and '*pedagogics*', as an autonomous science which studies the reality of educating *as it is* to obtain authentic knowledge about [the phenomenon] educating. Here, *as it is*, indicates that a pedagogician can only be an authentic scientist [of educating] if he/she follows the phenomenological method.

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<sup>43</sup> Langeveld, M. J.: *Beknopte Theoretische Paedagogiek*, 7<sup>th</sup> ed., 155, 162, 165. Wolters. Groningen, 1959.

<sup>44</sup> Gerber, A. E.: "*Die Kategorie In-die-Wereld-Wees en die Betekenis daarvan vir die Pedagogiekdenke*", 1. *Pedagogiekstudies*, No. 71. University of Pretoria, 1972. **English translation:** <http://www.georgeyonge.net/node/106>

*Summary:* Since educating is so fundamental to being human, it can be used as a category for illumination the various ways of human being-in-the-world, such as being-in-a-meaningful-world, co-existence (being-with), temporality (futuraity), and being-someone-oneself. Thus, a [philosophical] anthropologist can use the *category 'educating'* to illuminate these different ways of being-in-the-world, with the aim of disclosing basic knowledge about being human from an educative perspective. However, to do this, he/she must first enter a conversation with a pedagogician, because he/she has already made a thorough study of the reality of educating and, therefore, has purely *pedagogical categories* at his/her disposal, which the anthropologist can then implement to illuminate still better the essence of being human. In other words, an anthropologist who wants to study being human from the pedagogical perspective must first consult pedagogics to understand the *category educating*, which he/she will use as an illuminative means of thinking. Again, a pedagogician is going to implement the category *'educating'* to illuminate the different ways of being-in-the-world to obtain authentic knowledge of educating and, thus, he/she will not then practice an anthropological pedagogics but, indeed, an autonomous pedagogics, which reflectively particularizes and applies its own means of thinking [categories].

### [1.3.5] Summary

From discussing the possibility and meaning of a pedagogical anthropology, the connection between pedagogics and philosophical anthropology is very strong, and some pedagogicians view pedagogics as a scientific area of philosophical anthropology and, hence, not as an autonomous science. This may appear to be the case, but this author is convinced it is not. The problem is in the name *'pedagogical anthropology'* because it implies that the pedagogical is a subdivision of philosophical anthropology. If one proceeds from this assumption, then it is easy to criticize others who recognize pedagogics as an autonomous science. For example, Van der Linden contends that Langeveld's world-renowned work, *'Beknopte theoretische pedagogiek'*, is primarily philosophical and secondarily scientific. Then he contends that the title of this work must rather be *'Beknopte theoretische anthropologie'*. Van der Linden also accuses Langeveld of ambiguity because *"he uses the*

*term pedagogics ambiguously. Sometimes he means anthropological pedagogics is the empirical (especially when he speaks about adolescence), sometimes pedagogical anthropology is a regional ontology (especially when he speaks about the aim of the pedagogic)".<sup>45</sup>*

Indeed, is it the case that the reality of educating shows itself ambiguously; or is it much simpler, i.e., that there is only educating among and between persons, and that the concept '*pedagogics*' already expresses unambiguously that it is a science which deals with the phenomenon of educating as it arises with persons in educative situations. If the adjective "anthropological" is placed before or after pedagogics, it serves no other purpose than to promote obscurity. Regarding the needlessness for this, Oberholzer expresses himself as follows: "These days, so readily there is talk of an anthropological pedagogics and that, in the construction of pedagogics as a system of critical-accountable knowledge, anthropological work must be done. The former is and remains a tautology, since all pedagogics is anthropologically oriented. The latter refers to a method (methodological technique), which is advocated, in contrast to a scientific-naturalistic-objectivistic approach. It remains inconceivable how anthropological work can be done in the practice of human sciences."<sup>46</sup> Also, the concept pedagogical anthropology is inadequate for that science, which is defined by the event of educating, because then it is limited to one part of philosophical anthropology. Now, however, it is the case that pedagogics is an autonomous science with its own area of study, i.e., the educative event. In addition, pedagogics makes autonomous decisions regarding its own aims by reflecting on the educative event itself and, thus, does not allow philosophy or any other subject to prescribe what must be pursued by pedagogics. Pedagogics is also able to disclose purely pedagogical categories, in independent ways, through the phenomenological approach. Since it is absurd to speak of a social [sociological] anthropology, a psychological anthropology, an economical anthropology, a

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<sup>45</sup> Van der Linden, H. J.: "*Enige Opmerkingen over de Verhouding van Pedagogiek en Wijsbegeerte*". In: *Pedagogische Studien*, No. 10, October, 1969, 478-479.


<sup>46</sup> Oberholzer, C. K.: "Die Voorwaardes vir die Konstruksie van die Pedagogiek as Wetenskap". In Sonnekus, M. C. H.: *Psychologia Pedagogica Sursum*, 120. University Publishers and Booksellers, Stellenbosch, 1970. **English translation:** <http://www.georgeyonge.net/node/27>

linguistic anthropology, or whatever other anthropology, it is as absurd to speak of a pedagogical anthropology! Whenever there is reflection about the science of educating, it is much simpler and more correct to speak only of a pedagogics and, thus, avoid any ambiguity.

Also, it can no longer be agreed that anthropology is a pedagogical way of reflecting. Indeed, anthropology is not a method! The literal meaning of the fact that a pedagogic event is approached or considered anthropologically, is that it is human beings who are approached and reflected on. But, indeed, pedagogics, as a human matter, cannot be approached except anthropologically and, thus, through the *anthropos*! Any other approach is impossible. However, the question is *how* this human phenomenon known as educating, must be approached. The only meaningful way is by means of the phenomenological method. If one attempts to penetrate, without prejudging the reality of educating, to the deepest grounds of its being, then the anthropological foundation of a pedagogical event must be observed and understood. By taking the pedagogical event as a point of departure, the pedagogical cannot be anthropological-ized, just as the anthropological cannot be pedagogical-ized by doing this. Through a phenomenological attunement, it is further seen that the pedagogical essences can also have real content, e.g., sociological, psychological, moral, and religious moments, but this does not detract from its autonomy. These moments only emphasize that an educative event is a purely human matter which can be distinguished, but not separated from a human being's total being in the world. A phenomenological attunement can also illuminate another problem which has been alluded to, i.e., the relationship between theory and practice, and how this affects the character of pedagogics. In a pedagogic situation there is not only involvement with a child or an educator but also with norms. In other words, this involves a child who must be helped by an educator to increasingly obey demands of propriety. Now, it is the case that norms are found only with human beings. However, norms, as a human matter, are also more than being human; they are a matter of the ideal, because they cannot be completely realized by a person. That a human being is a normed and norm-directed being is a scientific finding because norms are *generally valid* and necessary for all human beings. On

the other hand, no norm exists without *specific* content. This apparent contradiction has led many thinkers to doubt the scientific character of pedagogics. Although it appears as if the thesis, '*norms as universal phenomenon*', has an antithesis in, '*norms with specific content*', both are elevated and included in the synthesis, '*human being as normed and norm-directed being*'.

This reasoning is presented schematically as follows:



From the above, this means that pedagogics cannot be grounded in being human as such, and not only in norms but, indeed, in being human *in* an educative situation, where norms give direction. In other words, pedagogics, as a science, must be grounded in educative events as they appear in educative situations between and among human beings. If now there is a further inquiry into the first grounding of this situation, one finds a person's being in the world as the first [pre]condition. To the question of how this original characteristic of being has been brought to light, there is only one answer i.e., the phenomenological method. The only meaningful approach to or way of reflecting on a pedagogic event, as it is in its primordial structural being, is the phenomenological approach. In this context, when there is talk of '*pedagogics*' then, by this it is already emphasized that it is an exclusively anthropological matter and, thus, it is unnecessary, and even confusing, to speak of an anthropological dimension (Loch), or an anthropological reflection (Bollnow), or to place the adjective 'anthropological' before or after pedagogics.

In summary, it is concluded that pedagogics is an autonomous science which is directed to the exclusively human phenomenon of educating. Today, there can no longer be doubt about the autonomy of pedagogics as a science, and F. van der Stoep directly states that *'beyond all doubt, it is a settled matter'*.<sup>47</sup> The autonomy of pedagogics is closely related to the phenomenological method, because it is the only approach for disclosing the reality of educating as what it essentially is, and as its relationships essentially are. Through a phenomenological viewing, a human being's need for educating is seen as a fundamental way of his/her being-in-the-world. This need comes to light as being so fundamental that it must be investigated by an autonomous science, which cannot be an application of another one.

Now, the question which surfaces is whether a child's human situatedness is a different being in the world than that of an adult and, if this means the being-in-the-world of a human child or adult. We now consider this question, i.e. the relationship between philosophical anthropology and child anthropology, as well as the meaning of the results of this comparison for grounding pedagogics.

#### [1.4] THE RELATIONSHIP: PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY/CHILD ANTHROPOLOGY: INTRODUCTION

Educating is a human matter and, as appears in the previous pages, the phenomenological method is a particularly meaningful way of approaching this event. Whoever penetrates a pedagogic event phenomenologically will find that the event is only possible in a situation where there is at least one adult and a child. The question which must be answered is if a child is a different human being than an adult. If indeed this seems to be the case, there also must be a consideration of whether a study of child anthropology is not a precondition for practicing pedagogics. There must also be an investigation of whether there is a difference between child anthropology and pedagogics. Further, it must be determined what

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<sup>47</sup> Van der Stoep, F.: "Die Stand van die Pedagogiek in die Moderne Tyd." *Pedagogiekstudies*. University of Pretoria, 1971. **English translation:** <http://www.georgeyonge.net/node/26>



significance the findings of child anthropology have for fundamental pedagogics foundationally, as well as methodologically.

Before the above questions can be considered, there must be a precise determination of what is understood by child anthropology and of the relationship between philosophical anthropology and child anthropology.

### [1.5] THE RELATIONSHIP: PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY/CHILD ANTHROPOLOGY/PEDAGOGICS

Traditional philosophy has not noticed or studied the child as a way or mode of being human and, therefore, can make no real contribution to child anthropology. Rousseau, with his *'Emile'*, had paid attention to the child, but Noordam indicates that philosophical anthropology first began to take an interest in the child, as a way of being human, during the period of Romanticism. He indicates that Shiller, and his student Froebel paid attention to the child by showing that play is a necessary way of child being as a way of being human. Also, this philosophical anthropological disclosure did not remain without pedagogical significance, and it was especially Froebel who purposefully made use of child play to help a child on his/her way to adulthood. What, at first, was accepted as obvious, and on which the philosopher had never dwelled, i.e., that being human began as being a child, would now be viewed more clearly. In this context, Noordam writes: "*The Romantic was, then, also of the opinion that an authentic anthropology could be successfully created, if one took one's point of departure in the child.*"<sup>48</sup> Poggeler indicates that, earlier, an adult was viewed as a better form of being human, but that, today the same value and meaning are attributed to the different levels of human becoming.<sup>49</sup> Hence, in contemporary pedagogics, there is no longer consideration of a child as a non-adult but, indeed, now of a not-yet-adult. The older concept has a negative meaning, and indicates a lack in the child, with the implication that it is more proper to be an adult. Poggeler believes that philosophical anthropology, in its search for the essence of being human, must

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<sup>48</sup> Noordam, N. F.: *Het Mensbeeld in de Opvoeding*, 17. Wolters-Noordhoff. Groningen, 1969.

<sup>49</sup> Poggeler, F.: *De Mondige Mens*, 7. De Nederlandsche Boekhandel. Antwerp, 1966.

still have adulthood in view. However, he will proceed differently, and “*a human being looks to his adulthood in a specific situation of his growth*”.<sup>50</sup>

If philosophical anthropology wants to penetrate to the essence of being human then it must view it in its totality. Thus, in addition to an adult way of being human, it also must consider a child way of being human. In addition, a child must be encountered in his/her world so that child-being can be understood as a mode of being human and, thus, the latter can be grasped in its totality. Already at birth, a person is a full-fledged human being, but that he/she is still a different human being, i.e., he/she is a human child.<sup>51</sup> It seems beyond debate that a philosophical anthropology which does not also inquire about the child, will capture only a one-sided and inauthentic image of being human. For this reason, Stoffer and others distinguish a scientific area, within philosophical anthropology, which they call pedology [focused on the anthropology of child and youth].<sup>52</sup> Also, Pienaar stresses the idea that child anthropology is an essential part of philosophical anthropology.<sup>53</sup>

From the above, it seems that today child anthropology must be seen as an indispensable part of philosophical anthropology. Now, the question is what precisely is meant by child anthropology? According to Oberholzer, it is “the study of the child as *anthropos*. As such, it is the study of a form of being, in its thorough connectedness: it is a childlike way of being, which is constitutive of being-human-as-a-child. Child-being represents a mode of being human; as such it is being-in-openness, but then with the emphasis on a child-human way of being; the humanness of a human being lives and works as a child-humanness, which is just as essentially human as any other mode of being human”.<sup>54</sup> Langeveld

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<sup>50</sup> *Ibid*, 8.

<sup>51</sup> Oberholzer, C. K.: *Prolegomena van 'n Prinsipiele Pedagogiek*, 173. HAUM. Cape Town, 1968.

<sup>52</sup> Stoffer, H.: *Die Bedeutung der Kindlichkeit in der Modernen Welt*, 124. Reinhardt. Munich, 1964.

<sup>53</sup> Viljoen, T. A. and Pienaar, j. j.: *Fundamental Pedagogics*, 151. Butterworths. Durban, 1972.

<sup>54</sup> Oberholzer, C. K.: *Prolegomena van 'n Prinsipiele Pedagogiek*, 170-171. HAUM. Cape Town, 1968.

emphasizes that child anthropology is a *situation*-anthropology: *“Also: reden wir von einer ‘Anthropologie’ im Bezug auf des kindliche Sein, so handelt es sich nicht um das Junge einer Homo Sapiens-Sorte, sondern um ein situationsbedingtes, situationsschaffendes, situationsbedingendes Wesen. Diese Situation heisst und heisst nur: ‘Erziehung’.”*<sup>55</sup>

As indicated, pedagogics is concerned with an educative event, as it is realized between and among human beings. A phenomenologically oriented pedagogician finds that there is at least one adult and one child in an educative situation, and that, in this situation, help is going to be given to a child on his/her way to adulthood. To acquire authentic knowledge of educating, a study must be made of the adult as well as the child, with an emphasis on the adult, as educator, and the child, as educand. Groothoff also emphatically states that, before the question of the possibility of pedagogics can be answered, the question of the essence of a child must first be answered.<sup>58</sup> Also, for Vandenberg, the lifeworld of a child is the only authentic pedagogical grounding.<sup>57</sup> In agreement with Langeveld, Loch also unambiguously expresses himself about this: *“Die Erziehung lasst sich nicht beschreiben, ohne zugleich das Kind zu beschreiben als den Menschen, durch dessen merkwürdige Beschaffenheit die Erziehung est notwendig wird und der im Erziehungsverhältnis das Gegenüber des Erziehers ist. Gerade der Erzieher, demm es ja um das Kind leidenschaftlich und verantwortlich zu tun ist, muss an der Frage, was für ein Wesen das Kind ist, auf Grund seines paedagogischen Engagements mit einer unausweichlichen Notwendigkeit interessiert sein, weil er, um erziehung zu können, ein Bild vom Kinde haben muss.”*<sup>58</sup> Langeveld states this very clearly: *“The theory of education must undertake a serious analysis and interpretation of what the child is.”*<sup>59</sup> Such an analysis is necessary so that categories can be acquired which can

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<sup>55</sup> Diem, H. and Langeveld, M. J.: *Untersuchungen zur Anthropologie des Kindes*, 23. Quelle & Meyer. Heidelberg, 1960.

<sup>58</sup> Groothoff, H. H.: *“Zum Selbsverstaendnis der Paedagogik”*. In Rohrs, H.: *Erziehungswissenschaft und Erziehungswirklichkeit*, 105. Akademische Verlagsgesellschaft. Frankfurt, 1970.

<sup>57</sup> Vandenberg, D.: *Being and Education*, 60. Prentice-Hall. New Jersey, 1971.

<sup>58</sup> Loch, W.: *“Das Menschenbild der Paedagogik”*. In Dreschler, H. G.: *Der Menschwissenschaft und Wirklichkeit*, 205. Jugenddienst Verlag. Wuppertal-Barmen, 1966.

<sup>59</sup> Langeveld, M. J.: *“Some Recent Developments in Philosophies of Education in Europe”*. In *Education International Seminar*, 97. Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, 1966.

be applied to a child as a human being.<sup>60</sup> Thus, these must be *categories* for thinking which allow the real essentials of child-being, as being human, to be disclosed. Langeveld chooses to qualify these *categories* with the description ‘*anthropological*’. He chooses this term because it involves the being of a child as a human being.<sup>61</sup> Elsewhere, he qualifies the term anthropological with ‘*and, therefore, also ontological*’ to unambiguously express that his anthropology is ontologically founded.<sup>62</sup> For Langeveld, the two *fundamental categories* of child anthropology are ‘*educating*’ and ‘*being-someone-oneself*’. Further in the same work, he says ‘*Growing to maturity*’ is the ‘*most central fundamental category of childlike being*’. ‘*Growth*’ alone is inadequate as a category for him, because it is a purely biological category, which has nothing to do with being human. “*Im kindlichen Leben handelt es sich aber um ein Werden auf Mündigkeit hin – auf sittliche Selbständigkeit oder: auf volle Verantwortlichkeit hin.*”<sup>63</sup>

From the above, pedagogics cannot neglect to study child anthropology, but then from a pedagogical perspective. However, this does not mean that pedagogics is completely centered on the child, and that, therefore, it is only a child anthropology, or the reverse.<sup>64</sup> Indeed, if this were done, then one would fall into a *pedocentrism*,<sup>65</sup> because only one facet of the educative situation is made absolute, and the results of such a non-phenomenological reflection cannot be applied to support a child on his/her way to adulthood. Langeveld indicates that such a view loses sight of the fact that “*die Kategorie des Kindes immer schon die Erziehungsbeziehung und deshalb die Erziehungssituation als Grundbedingungen menschlichen Seins voraussetzt*”.<sup>66</sup> In other words, an educative situation involves a child in education, thus, a

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<sup>60</sup> Langeveld, M. J.: *Ontwikkelingspsychologie*, 5. Wolters. Groningen, 1954.

<sup>61</sup> Langeveld, M. J.: *Kind und Jugendlicher in Anthropologischer Sicht*, 24. Quelle & Meyer. Heidelberg, 1965.

<sup>62</sup> Langeveld, M. J.: *Über das Verhältnis vom Psychologie und Paedagogik*, 49. In: *Psychologie und Paedagogik*. Heidelberg, 1959.

<sup>63</sup> Diem, H. and Langeveld, M. J.: *Untersuchungen zur Anthropologie des Kindes*, 24, 32. Quelle & Meyer. Heidelberg, 1960.

<sup>64</sup> Oberholzer, C, K.: “Die Voorwaardes vir die Konstruksie van die Pedagogiek as Wetenskap”. In Sonnekus, M. C. H.: op. cit., 121. **English translation:** <http://www.georgeyonge.net/node/27>

<sup>65</sup> Van der Stoep, F.: *Didaskein*, 8. McGraw-Hill. Johannesburg, 1972.

<sup>66</sup> Diem, H. and Langeveld, M. J.: *Untersuchungen zur Anthropologie des Kindes*, 222.

child involved with norms, where he/she is helped by adults to obey the demands of propriety to a continually increasing degree, so that he/she can reach proper adulthood, as his/her destination. In addition, a child is also involved in an educative situation to reach proper adulthood, as a mode of being human. In other words, child anthropology is only a part-perspective of pedagogics. In agreement with W. Rest, Poggeler also talks of *pedology*, as an area of science within pedagogics which deals with the pedagogical anthropology of a child.<sup>67</sup>

From the above discussion, it is concluded that pedagogics is more than a mere study of the child or the adult. Langeveld repeatedly indicates that philosophical anthropology does not study being human, as such, but only being human in situations. Pedagogics is involved with a particular situation, i.e., a pedagogical one. A scientist who wants to engross him/herself in this situation can do nothing else than turn to the child *and* adult in it. Child anthropology, plus adult anthropology, does not equal pedagogics; it is only when an adult *and* a child associate with each other in an *educative situation* that there is a phenomenon, i.e., the pedagogic, which becomes visible and it is only in this situation that educating can be an object of study. In other words, pedagogics has child-, as well as adult-anthropology as possible areas to be studied from a pedagogical perspective. The most meaningful way to know the phenomenon '*educating*' as it appears there [in a pedagogic situation] is to let it speak for itself, and not allow one or another anthropology to prescribe to it how it must be. For example, an investigator who turns to this situation [from a non-pedagogical perspective] must be content with a disturbed appearance of it and, thus, cannot practice science, because the knowledge which he acquires is such that it cannot make the claim of being generally valid and necessary.

From the above, there is a positive connection between pedagogics and philosophical anthropology, with the latter's child anthropological and adult anthropological facets. It also came to light that child anthropology and adult anthropology can be seen as part-perspectives of philosophical anthropology, of which a

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<sup>67</sup> Poggeler, F.: *De Mondige Mens*, 9. De Nederlandsche Boekhandel. Antwerp, 1966.

pedagogue must necessarily take note. The phenomenological method is now seen as a connection which maintains the unity among these part-perspectives on being human and pedagogics; also a pedagogue, who avails him/herself of this method, finds that he/she has being human as an area of study, just as does a philosophical anthropologist, but then, only being human in a pedagogic, situation. Knowledge of this situation, in no way can be deductively inferred from a general philosophical anthropology, but is only possible by means of an independent illumination, so that the *foundation of its being*, its fundamental structures, and its sense and meaningful connections can be seen. The *ground of its being*, or the first [pre]condition for pedagogics, and for any other science, is Dasein, a person's being-in-the-world, which, then, is also called the *ontological category*. Already illuminated are a variety of ways by which Dasein manifests itself, and which have pedagogical significance, such as: (i) Being-in-a-meaningful-world, (ii) Being-with (co-existence), (iii) Temporality (futura), and (iv) Being-someone-oneself. However, since a child is situated differently than an adult, these modes of appearing necessarily must also differ. In section [1.6.3] below, possible *categories* are looked for which verbalize specific childlike ways of being-in-the-world, and in section [1.7] there is further consideration of the degree to which such *categories* can be applied to illuminate the situation of educating, with the aim of better understanding it. It is necessary to take this approach since a pedagogic event cannot be grounded only in the world-situatedness of adult human beings.

## [1.6] THE RELATIONSHIP: PHILOSOPHICAL PEDAGOGICS/FUNDAMENTAL PEDAGOGICS

### [1.6.1] Philosophical pedagogics

A positive connection between philosophical anthropology and pedagogics has now emerged. This close relationship is especially noticeable with the part-science of pedagogics, which is involved with philosophical questions, such as the grounding and understanding of the pedagogic event. The name '*philosophical pedagogics*' or '*philosophy of education*' has long been viewed as the best name for this part-science of pedagogics. Now, a phenomenologically attuned thinker will continually make certain

whether the name he/she uses is still the best grammatical form for grasping this reality which it verbalizes. After a critical look, it seems, e.g., that the name '*philosophical pedagogics*' is sometimes interpreted as an educative doctrine of one or another philosophical or educative system. In this connection, Oberholzer expresses himself as follows: "The main reason such a name is abandoned is because one always expects that then an exposition or even a bit of apologetics must be provided for a desired pedagogical system, or teaching practice."<sup>68</sup>

From the above, it seems that there must be critical reflection on the appropriate name for that part-science of pedagogics which is especially involved with questions of grounding and understanding educating. In the following, the category '*fundamental*' is closely examined to see if a possible solution to the problem of the best name might be sought there.

### [1.6.2] The category "fundamental"

In section [1.5], it is mentioned that Langeveld wants to ground his anthropological categories ontologically (logically in being). However, the question is what is it which is most original, or most fundamental of being? Before dealing with this question, there are a few comments about the concept '*fundamental*' as such.

The origin of the word, fundamental, is traced to the Latin noun, '*fundamentum*', which means ground, foundation. When a noun is qualified by '*fundamental*', then this refers to a grounded, or founded matter. The Afrikaans verb, '*fundeer*', is also derived from the Latin verb, '*fundare*', meaning to provide a foundation of, or grounding for something.

To now find categories with ontological status, thus with the aim of grounding them, there must be an interrogation of the deepest grounding of the being of what *is*. Landman states very emphatically that the ontic is realities which are given, as not being able to be thought away, as unquestionable, as undeniable, and evident. Thus, he also differentiates between '*ontic*' and '*being*',

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<sup>68</sup> Oberholzer, C. K.: *Prolegomena van 'n Prinsipiele Pedagogiek*, op cit., 128.

where the latter is the being at hand of that without which the human lifeworld cannot be thought. This ontic founding is the opposite of a speculative metaphysics, as a fundamental emanation from above the world's sphere, because the former refers to a radical going *into* a worldly situation. In his introduction to '*Sein und Zeit*', Heidegger says that he will ask the question of the *being of being* anew, and will develop this idea further in this work. This fundamental philosophical question, stripped of all technical philosophical terminology, is stated as follows: How is it possible for something to show itself to human being as reality, and how can a person account for this?<sup>69</sup> This is the most radical or fundamental question, because it recognizes the fact of being, and asks further for its deepest foundation, as the meaning of being. To be able to answer this question, a human being, as a being of being, must turn to being human itself.<sup>70</sup>

Epistemologically, the ground of being must be sought in being human, not in the sense that being human is its origin, but merely because being can only be questioned by human being. To acquire authentic knowledge, thus, it is meaningful to begin at the beginning of all human knowledge, i.e., with being human itself. The philosophically schooled know that their point of departure, indeed, is from the world and, although it is not obvious, is influenced by presuppositions (not prejudgments!). These presuppositions only become clear to him/her when he/she purposefully directs him/herself to him/herself, and to the way he/she directs him/herself to reality. He/she is aware that he/she must turn his/her intentionality, as a beam of attending, back to his/her consciousness, as a consciousness of being-with, thus, with his/her Dasein, as being in the world. This is possible because a human being, as existing being, is able to transcend him/herself such that he/she can '*objectively*' face him/herself as well as the way he/she goes out to and communicates with the world in which he/she finds him/herself. Thus, by critically viewing him/herself, as if from a distance, he/she can acquire knowledge of what possibly impedes his/her perspective on the world and, thus, also distorts his/her dialogues with it. In knowing this, he/she can purposefully avoid these impediments and distortions, and increasingly be

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<sup>69</sup> Beerling, R. F.: *De Transcendentale Vreemdeling*, 135. De Haan. Hilversum, 1965.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid*, 61.



capable of authentic knowledge of him/herself, and his/her world. A 'scientist' who disregards human being, or cannot, or will not recognize that all human knowledge has its beginning in being human itself, must be content with false knowledge, and his/she science will remain up in the air, because it has no firm foundation.

Ontology, as one of the oldest disciplines of philosophy, has been occupied with metaphysical questions about the nature of being and, thus, various ontologies had arisen. However, these ontologies were not fundamental, because they began with being as such. Heidegger indicates that the origin of all ontologies must be sought in the existential analysis of Dasein and, in this analysis, the question of being comes up for discussion.<sup>71</sup> If the various ontologies, indeed, are founded in being, then they are fundamental because they inquire about the most original of what is. Heidegger feels very strongly about this: "*Solange jedoch die Wahrheit des Seins nicht gedacht ist, bleibt alle Ontologie ohne Fundament*".<sup>72</sup> Thus, there is a clear indication that there must be a fundamental ontology, which serves as the ground, basis, or foundation for all other (regional) ontologies. In this context, regional ontology means other sciences which are involved with the various ways of being human, such as psychology, sociology or pedagogy [i.e., in this context, pedagogics, the science of education]. These sciences cannot be labeled as '*regional*' if they are not grounded in human being in the world. However, fundamental ontology is also more than just the foundation for the other ontologies because another of its tasks is to make the meaning of being understandable. To be able to do this, a fundamental ontology must penetrate to the deepest foundation of being to bring to light its essentials, which are, thus, universally valid, and to verbalize them in an organized and systematic way. Kilian states this in a striking way: "As a science, fundamental ontology is systematic because it tries to capture universally valid insights into being, and the meaning of being, in organized and systematic ways. That which is (being), is ordered and systematized by a fundamental ontologist in practicing his/her science. Fundamental ontology, as a science, aims to be radical, in the sense that, in his/her scientific practice, a fundamental ontologist tries to penetrate to the roots (*radix*), as

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<sup>71</sup> Heidegger, M.: *Sein und Zeit*, 13. 4th Edition. Max Niemeyer. Halle, 1935.

<sup>72</sup> Heidegger, M.: *Über den Humanismus*, 41. Klostermann. Frankfurt am Main, 1949.

foundations/or preconditions (*Bedingungen der Möglichkeit*) for the being of beings in general. Through an existential-phenomenological act (*Durchsichtigmachen*), the primary aim of fundamental ontology is the illumination of beings in their being.”<sup>73</sup>

### [1.6.3] Philosophical pedagogics as fundamental pedagogics

A philosopher wants to understand reality and, therefore, he/she seeks the primordial ground of being, as the first precondition for what is. Regarding pedagogics, this means that a philosophical pedagogician will search for *fundamental pedagogical structures, their meanings, and relationships*. To be able to understand these meanings and relationships, a fundamental pedagogician must search further for the real contents of the fundamental pedagogical structures so that he/she can apply these contents as *categories* and, in doing so, to throw additional light on the phenomenon of educating so it can be increasingly seen more clearly and, thus, better understood. To be able to function as an illuminative means of thinking, the *pedagogical categories* must have ontological status, and this means that they must be grounded in the deepest foundation of the being of what is. The *pedagogical categories*, as categories of the lifeworld, thus, must be ontologically-anthropologically grounded.

For pedagogics (as well as any other science), fundamental ontology is the only firm scientific foundation. Pedagogics must begin no place else than with human being's being-in-the-world. By beginning there, the pedagogician will be able to disclose the fundamental pedagogical structures as generally valid, necessary, and indubitable essences of a pedagogical situation, provided he/she is prepared to think phenomenologically. In other words, he/she will only be able to authentically think pedagogically when he/she takes the reality of educating as his/her point of departure as it is embedded in the lifeworld, and if he/she is prepared and able to use the category 'educating' as an illuminative means of thinking. That is, fundamental pedagogics is only possible by using the phenomenological approach from a pedagogical perspective. For Landman, then, fundamental pedagogics is also fundamental,

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<sup>73</sup> Kilian, C. J. G.: "Studiebrief No. 3. Fundamentele Studiegroep". June 1972. Section A, 5.

because it is grounded on the following three fundamental *cornerstones*:

- (1) phenomenology is only meaningful as ontology
- (2) ontology is only possible as phenomenology
- (3) phenomenological thinking is categorical thinking.<sup>74</sup>

Because fundamental pedagogics searches for the deepest foundation of the being of or the radical origin of the pedagogical, it is nothing other than philosophical pedagogics. However, as indicated above, preference is given to the name '*fundamental pedagogics*' because '*philosophical*' can refer to a grounding in one or another philosophical system, while '*fundamental*' indicates that the science is *founded* in the lifeworld itself, against the background of universal reality. This means that the *fundamental pedagogical categories* are illuminative verbalizations of the lifeworld itself; that is, they are reality-expressing words, which are acquired in the light of the category '*educating*', which itself is also a verbalization of an evident, essential reality in the lifeworld. Thus, e.g., a fundamental pedagogician pursues the following procedure to particularize pure *pedagogical categories* which have ontological-anthropological status:

The *ground- or ontological- category 'being-in-the-world'* is taken as the point of departure for pedagogical thinking because, as indicated, it verbalizes the first precondition for all scientific practice, as well as for all additional categories. Now, a human being is situated in the world in a variety of essential, irreducible, indubitable, and evident [anthropological] ways, such as:

- (1) being-in-a-meaningful-world
- (2) co-existence (being-with)
- (3) temporality (futuraity)
- (4) being-someone-oneself.

Because he/she is situated in the world in a variety of ways, each of these ways of being also can be implemented as illuminative means of thinking, thus, as ontological-anthropological categories so that

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<sup>74</sup> Landman, W. A.: "*Aanwending van die Pedagogiese Kategoriee in die Fundamentele Pedagogiek*", 16, 38. *Pedagogiekstudies*, No. 68. University of Pretoria, 1971.

additional ways of being human can become visible. Thus, in the [illuminative] light of the category *'being-in-a-meaningful-world'*, it is seen that a person's giving meaning occurs on his/her own responsibility, and the concept *'giving-meaning-on-one's-own-responsibility'* can be particularized as an additional category of it. In addition, it also can be seen that a meaningful lifeworld is a world in which a person must exert him/herself to be acknowledged as a human being. Thus, the concept *'breaking-away-from-lack-of-exertion'*, as an ontologically-anthropologically grounded category, also is used as an illuminative means of thinking for bringing to light additional essential ways of being human. It is also noticed that a meaningful lifeworld is only possible through the acceptance and acknowledgment of norms and, therefore, it is meaningful and justifiable to use *'normed embodiment'* [as exemplifying and emulating norms] for thinking to better understand being human.

Summary: The following additional anthropological categories can be particularized from the general anthropological category *'being-in-a-meaningful-world'*:

- (1) giving-meaning-on-one's-own-responsibility
- (2) moving-as-a-breaking-away-from-lack-of-exertion
- (3) normed-embodiment [as exemplifying and emulating norms].

In the same way, in the light of the lifeworld realities verbalized as *'co-existence'*, *'temporality'*, and *'being-someone-oneself'*, additional essences of being human are observed, which also can be applied as categories to further illuminate these essentials of being human.

From the general anthropological category *co-existence*:

- (4) venturing-with-each-other
- (5) gratitude-for-security
- (6) responsibility-for-relationships

From the general anthropological category *temporality*:

- (7) hope-for-the-future
- (8) designing-possibilities

(9) fulfilling-destination.

From the general anthropological category *being-someone-oneself*:

(10) respect-for-dignity

(11) task-of-self-understanding

(12) freedom-to-responsibility.

If the lifeworld, as verbalized by the above twelve [anthropological] lifeworld categories, is viewed from a pedagogical perspective, i.e., if these lifeworld activities are illuminated by the category '*educating*', then pedagogical activities will become visible, which are verbalized as follows and, as such, they can be used as founded, pure pedagogical categories:

- (1) giving-meaning-with-*increasing*-responsibility
- (2) *gradually*-breaking-away-from-lack-of-exertion
- (3) exemplifying-and-emulating-norms
- (4) venturing-with-each-other-pedagogically
- (5) gratitude-for-pedagogic-security
- (6) accountability-for-educative-relationships
- (7) hope-for-future-adulthood
- (8) designing-possibilities-for-adulthood
- (9) *gradual*-fulfillment-of-destination
- (10) *increasing*-respect-for-human-dignity
- (11) becoming-adult-though-*increasing*-self-understanding
- (12) *acquiring*-responsible-freedom.

These verbalized pedagogical activities can now also be used as *categories* for illuminative thinking about all the other fundamental pedagogical structures and can, in their turn, again illuminate these structures. This means that any educative essences (fundamental pedagogical structures and their essences) can be applied as *illuminative means of thinking (categories)*. Thus viewed, *all* pedagogical structures and their real essences are applied as *fundamental* pedagogical categories to illuminate the reality of educating because they also have ontological-anthropological status by virtue of their relationships with the founded pedagogical activities. These other fundamental pedagogical structures, which have been brought to light by pedagogical thought-work, are

presented again for the purpose of further explication. (See chapter three for the educative essences).

A. *Pedagogical relationship structures:*

- (1) relationship of understanding
- (2) relationship of trust
- (3) relationship of authority.

B. *Pedagogical sequence structures:*

- (1) association
- (2) encounter
- (3) [engagement] acceptance of responsibility for interference
- (4) pedagogical interference
  - (i) intervention
  - (ii) assent
- (5) return to pedagogical association
- (6) periodic breaking away from pedagogical association.

C. *Pedagogical aim structures:*

- (1) meaningful existence
- (2) self-judgment and self-understanding
- (3) morally independent choosing and acting
- (4) respect for human dignity
- (5) responsibility
- (6) norm identification
- (7) philosophy of life

These fundamental pedagogical structures and their real essences, however, are seen even more clearly, and their meanings and relationships are understood even better if *child anthropological categories* are also particularized.

In the section [1.5] on the relationship between philosophical anthropology/child anthropology, it is indicated that child being, as a mode of being human, must also be kept in mind. This is necessary because a child, as human being, is situated in the world differently than an adult. Pedagogics must make a thorough study

of the lifeworld of a child if it wants to answer the question about the essence and the possibility of educating. Pedagogical categories which do not do justice to the real essentials of child being, as a mode of human being, cannot be categories which are founded.

To find *child anthropological categories* which have ontological status, one must begin with the first fundamental precondition which makes being human and its ways of being possible. This original characteristic of being human is his/her Dasein, or his being-in-the-world, and this refers to the totality of his/her relationships he/she design in his/her life reality. Because a child is different from an adult, one must begin from childlike being-in-the-world. Indeed, being-in-the-world refers to a being situated, and a child's being *situated* in the world is different from an adult's, as is evident from the following essences of situations. Real essences of a situation are described as follows: a human matter, actual presence, authentic communication, establishing relationships, acting, meaningful assimilation, a place for choices and aims.<sup>75</sup> These essences refer to an adult way of being situated in the world. A very small child, e.g., is not yet responsibly situated, is not yet able to make independent choices, or to meaningfully assimilate the situation. At most, he/she is childlike in his/her responsibility, he/she makes childlike choices, and he/she meaningfully assimilates his/her situation in a childlike way. This shows that a child is situated differently than how an adult ought to be situated.

Because of a child's not yet being adult, he/she is humanly different from an adult, and the verbalization of his/her ways of appearing will also differ from those of an adult person. Thus, as section [1.7] clearly shows, for conceptual clarification, it is desirable to further qualify, as '*childlike*', those modes of appearing of a child, which are verbalized as *general anthropological categories*. For example:

- (1) childlike-giving meaning-on-one's-own-responsibility
- (2) childlike-moving-as-a-breaking-away-from-lack-of-exertion
- (3) childlike-normed-embodiment
- (4) childlike-venturing-with-each-other
- (5) childlike-gratitude-for-security

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<sup>75</sup> Landman, W. A. and Kilian, C. J. G.: *Leesboek vir die Opvoedkunde-Student en Onderwyser*, 75. Juta and Kie. Johannesburg, 1972.

- (6) childlike-responsibility-for-relationships
- (7) childlike-hope-for-the-future
- (8) childlike-designing-possibilities
- (9) childlike-fulfilling-destination
- (10) childlike-respect-for-dignity
- (11) childlike-task-of-self-understanding
- (12) childlike-freedom-to-responsibility.

## [1.7] THE RELATIONSHIP: EDUCATIVE REALITY/METHODOLOGY

Rene Descartes indicates that it is not sufficient to only have good understanding at one's disposal, but it is much more important to put it to good use. To be able to do this, a correct method of thinking is required. In the present study, it is continually indicated that the phenomenological method is the only [most] meaningful way to make an essence analysis of the reality of educating so that its real essences, meanings, and relationships become clear. If the real pedagogical essences are attained in this way, they can also be further explicated and interpreted because the phenomenological approach is also dialectic, and hermeneutic in nature (See chapter three).

A phenomenological pedagogician searches phenomenologically for primordial evidence, but he/she is never satisfied only with it. He/she also wants to arrive at an ontological understand and interpretation of the meaning and relationships of what is given ontically. This requires additional thought-work, and because the reality of educating shows a dialectic structure, and because a human being is able to think dialectically, a pedagogician is committed to the dialectic method.

Through his/her radical thinking, a pedagogician arrives at the deepest grounds, as preconditions for a pedagogical situation, and he/she makes certain that these essences are necessarily valid by determining if their opposite or antithesis does not also have a right to exist; if it does, then he/she can see if these essences can be united into a higher synthesis.

In section [1.6.3], a childlike way of being in the world is particularly attended to, and several *child anthropological*



*categories* are arrived at. It is necessary to find such categories because children are situated in the world differently because of their different body-ness, as well as their fewer experiences. For the time being, they are, thus, also differently situated, even while being with an educator at the same time and in the same situation; a reason for this is that their past, which gives direction to their present situatedness, is much shorter. Now, it also is the case that a child does not have the right to remain a child, and his/her childlike ways of being in the world (as verbalized by the child anthropological categories) progress in time until he/she reaches adulthood (as verbalized by the adult anthropological categories). It is pedagogically meaningful to look at this progression.

Over time, childlike giving meaning with responsibility ought to become giving meaning on one's own (adult) responsibility. Childlike responsibility is not an independent responsibility, because an educator is still co-responsible for him/her; thus, a child is given an opportunity to practice responsibility, so that later he/she can exercise it him/herself.<sup>76</sup> Philosophical anthropology has particularized a number of anthropological ways of being which can be applied as anthropological categories, and fundamental pedagogics has particularized a number of pedagogical ways of being in the world which can be applied as *pure pedagogical categories*. Now seen epistemologically, a progression is observable from the child anthropological ways of being, as verbalized by the child anthropological categories, to the pedagogical ways of being, and an authentic synthesizing of both in the adult anthropological ways of being, as verbalized by its categories. For example: it is only through giving meaning with increasing responsibility (pedagogical activity structure) that childlike giving meaning on one's own responsibility (child anthropological way of being, i.e., childlike way of being, as described by child anthropology) can become giving meaning on one's own responsibility (adult anthropological way of being).


A schematic representation of this progression is:

*CHILDLIKE* GIVING MEANING

GIVING MEANING WITH *INCREASING*


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<sup>76</sup> Landman, W. A.: *Leesboek vir die Christen-Opvoeder*, 1-2. N. G. Kerkboekhandel. Pretoria, 1972.



However, the problem is that a child cannot meaningfully exercise the educative activities if an adult does not first present them to him/her, and observe and evaluate the child's performance of these activities. Presenting them *for* a child implies that, initially, an adult does this in a simple, but accountable way. In other words, first, he/she will attribute simple, easily understandable meanings to the things and events in the world. In a progressive and accountable way, an educator must refer to the deeper meanings, and present them for a child such that he/she also is able to attribute meaning in the way a responsible adult does. To be able to do this, a child must first give meaning along with an adult, but before he/she ventures to do this *with* an adult, a trusting, understanding and authoritative encounter must be realized. A being-*by*-each-other can only be intensified to a being-*with*-each-other if the relationship structures are realized. Thus viewed, the realization of the relationship structures is a precondition for giving meaning together. However, giving responsible meaning together must proceed to giving *proper* meaning jointly, via giving meaning jointly with increasing responsibility. A child is someone who wants to be someone him/herself and, therefore, he/she must be granted an opportunity to periodically break away from a pedagogic association, so that he/she can give meaning in a childlike way, on his/her own responsibility. Childlike giving meaning on one's own responsibility can then only become giving meaning with increasing responsibility until eventually meaning is given as a proper adult does.

This dialectic course is represented as follows:



The above is a description of the preconditions, i.e., an adult giving meaning *for* a child, to a giving meaning *with* a child, which first

must be realized before *childlike giving meaning on his/her own responsibility* (first step) can progress to *giving meaning with increasing responsibility* (second step), before the authentic synthesis *giving meaning on one's own responsibility* can be realized in an educative situation. On closer inspection, each one of the pedagogical activity structures is a precondition for child anthropological ways of being to progress to adult anthropological ways of being. The progression of the other eleven verbalized pedagogical activities to the adult anthropological ways of being are stated briefly as follows:

- (1) Childlike moving as breaking away from lack of exertion (first step) : Gradual breaking away from lack of exertion (second step) : Moving as breaking away from lack of exertion (synthesis).
- (2) Childlike norm-involvement (first step) : Exemplifying and emulating norms (second step) : Normed embodiment (synthesis).
- (3) Childlike venturing with each other (first step) : Pedagogical venturing with each other (second step) : Venturing with each other (synthesis).
- (4) Childlike gratitude for security (first step) : Gratefulness for pedagogical security (second step) : Gratefulness for security (synthesis).
- (5) Childlike responsibility for relationships (first step) : Responsibility for educative relationships (second step) : Responsibility for relationships (synthesis).
- (6) Childlike hope for the future (first step) : Hope for future adulthood (second step) : Hope for the future (synthesis).
- (7) Childlike designing possibilities (first step) : Designing possibilities to adulthood (second step) : Designing possibilities (synthesis).
- (8) Childlike fulfillment of destination (first step) : Gradual fulfillment of destination (second step) : Fulfillment of destination (synthesis).
- (9) Childlike respect for human dignity (first step) : Increasing respect for human dignity (second step) : Respect for human dignity (synthesis).

- (10) Childlike task to self-understanding (first step) : Adulthood through self-understanding (second step) : Task to self-understanding (synthesis).
- (11) Childlike freedom to responsibility (first step) : Conquering freedom to responsibility (second step) : Freedom to responsibility (synthesis).

From the above examples, childlike anthropological ways of being are real essences of pedagogical ways of being. Indeed, if this were not the case, a child could not exercise them. The pedagogical ways of being refer to a progressive realization of child being in the direction of adulthood. Further, adult anthropological ways of being also are qualitatively different from pedagogical ways of being because they refer to a realization of what is prescribed by them, as they are verbalized as *pedagogical categories*. Thus, child and pedagogical ways of being are integrated to form a higher unity, i.e., adult anthropological ways of being.

Child anthropological ways of being (first step) take a course, via pedagogical ways of being (second step), to adult anthropological ways of being (synthesis). The synthesized possibility, thus, is not attained immediately\* but points to a qualitative *progression* to adulthood. In each educative situation, if he/she has had a chance to exercise the second step (educative activities), the child ought to be closer to adulthood. Thus, there is a continual elevation of a child's way of being in the world (first step) to a more adult way of being in the world, so that the last step, as a synthesis which is achieved, serves as the first step for the next pedagogical situation until, over time, proper adulthood is attained. In the previous examples, if a direct progression from the first to the third step were possible, then they would not qualify as relationships which flow from a pedagogic situation because, as mentioned, pedagogy (as scientifically accountable educating) is only possible if purposeful use is made of the results of pedagogics as a science.

At this point, a pedagogician asks the hermeneutic question, i.e., what end is served by the pedagogic activities; then, if he/she has


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\* Here "immediately" has a two-fold meaning: firstly, it indicates that adulthood cannot be attained suddenly (it needs a *temporal* progression); and, secondly, it cannot be attained without a *means* [i.e., education].

observed the dialectic course, he/she will understand that these pedagogic activities are necessary for a child's becoming toward adulthood. But this progression from childlike anthropological ways of being via the pedagogic activities is just not possible if an adult does not first exemplify [content] for a child, which is then followed by a joint exercise of the content. These preconditions are described in terms of the exemplar, '*childlike giving meaning on his/her own responsibility*'. In the same way, *adult* and *joint* activities are presented as preconditions for the course of the other eleven childlike anthropological ways of being progressing via realizing the pedagogic activities, to an adult anthropological way of being, such that the fundamental pedagogical aim structure can be realized.

The *categorical 'origin'*, i.e., the foundation of the verbalized pedagogical realities, and their progression, as described in the previous pages, are now presented schematically, and then point-by-point deductions are drawn:

**(1) BEING-IN-LIFE-REALITY**



- A1** (i) Childlike-giving-meaning-on-one's-own-responsibility.
- (ii) Childlike-moving-as-a-breaking-away-from-lack-of-exertion.
- (iii) Childlike-norm-involvement.
- A2** (i) Adult-giving-meaning-on-own-responsibility.
- (ii) Adult-moving-as-a-breaking-away-from-lack-of-exertion.
- (iii) Adult-norm-involvement.

- A3 (i) Joint giving-meaning-on-one's-own-responsibility.  
(ii) Jointly-moving-as-a-breaking-away-from-lack-of-exertion.  
(iii) Joint-involvement-with-norms.
- A4 (i) Giving-meaning-on-one's-own-responsibility.  
(ii) Moving-as-breaking-away-from-lack-of-exertion.  
(iii) Normed-embodiment.
- B1 (i) Childlike-venturing-with-each-other.  
(ii) Childlike-gratitude-for-security.  
(iii) Childlike-responsibility-for-relationships.
- B2 (i) Adult-venturing-with-each-other.  
(ii) Adult-gratefulness-for-security.  
(iii) Adult-responsibility-for-relationships.
- B3 (i) Joint-venturing-with-each-other.  
(ii) Joint-gratefulness-for-security.  
(iii) Joint-responsibility-for-relationships.
- B4 (i) Venturing-with-each-other.  
(ii) Gratefulness-for-security  
(iii) Responsibility-for-relationships.
- C1 (i) Childlike-hope-for-the-future.  
(ii) Childlike-designing-possibilities.  
(iii) Childlike-fulfilling-destination.
- C2 (i) Adult-hope-for-the-future.  
(ii) Adult-designing-possibilities.  
(iii) Adult-fulfilling-destination.
- C3 (i) Joint-hope-for-the-future.  
(ii) Joint-designing-possibilities.  
(iii) Joint-fulfilling-possibilities.
- C4 (i) Hope-for-the-future.  
(ii) Designing-possibilities.  
(iii) Fulfilling-destination.
- D1 (i) Childlike-respect-for-dignity.  
(ii) Childlike-task-of-self-understanding.  
(iii) Childlike-freedom-to-responsibility.
- D2 (i) Adult-rspect-for-dignity.  
(ii) Adult-task-of-self-understanding.  
(iii) Adult-freedom-to-responsibility.
- D3 (i) Joint-respect-for-human-dignity.  
(ii) Joint-task-of-self-understanding.  
(iii) Joint-freedom-to-responsibility.
- D4 (i) Respect-for-human-dignity.

- (ii) Task-of-self-understanding.
- (iii) Freedom-to-responsibility.

## (2) Remarks

- A1** (i) A child has the opportunity to exercise *childlike*-giving-meaning-on-his-own-responsibility.  
An adult observes the childlike giving of meaning and evaluates it.
- A2** (i) An adult has the opportunity to exemplify *for* a child *adult*-giving-meaning-on-his-own-responsibility.  
An adult has the opportunity to explain adult giving meaning *for* a child.
- A3** (i) Then there is a progression to a *joint*-giving-of-meaning-with-responsibility.
- A4** (i) Then giving-meaning-with-increasing-responsibility becomes possible for a child.

## (3) Remarks about the relationships among pedagogic activities and educative relationships

*Note well:* By educative relationships is meant the pedagogical relationship structures *AND* sequence structures.

**A1 (i) A2 (i) A3 (i) A4 (i)**

Which giving meaning is referred to? Giving meaning from the educative relationships.

**A1 (ii) A2 (ii) A3 (ii) A4 (ii)**

What must be done with increasing effort? Participate in the educative relationships.

**A1 (iii) A2 (iii) A3 (iii) A4 (iii)**

What must be exemplified and emulated as norms (demands of propriety)? The educative relationships.

**B1 (i) B2 (i) B3 (i) B4 (i)**



Where must there be venturing to an increasing degree? In the educative relationships.

**B1 (ii) B2 (ii) B3 (ii) B4 (ii)**

For what must gratefulness be expressed and lived? For the security that arises from participating in the educative relationships.

**B1 (iii) B2 (iii) B3 (iii) B4 (iii)**

Responsibility for what relationships must be accepted? For realizing the educative relationships.

**C1 (i) C2 (i) C3 (i) C4 (i)**

What must be hoped for the future? For a continually more adequate realization of educative relationships until they eventually are adult relationships. For example, pedagogical encounter becomes adult encounter, etc.

**C1 (ii) C2 (ii) C3 (ii) C4 (ii)**

What possibilities must continually be designed? The possibilities to continually design more proper educative relationships.

**C1 (iii) C2 (iii) C3 (iii) C4 (iii)**

Which destination must be fulfilled? The destination of establishing relationships in a properly adult way.

**D1 (i) D2 (i) D3 (i) D4 (i)**

For whom is an increasing degree of respect shown? For those who participate in viewing and experiencing the educative relationships as valuable.

**D1 (ii) D2 (ii) D3 (ii) D4 (ii)**

What must be increasingly understood? Understanding one's own possibilities for realizing educative relationships. Understanding one's own obligations regarding the thriving of educative relationships.

**D1 (iii) D2 (iii) D3 (iii) D4 (iii)**

Which form of freedom must be acquired? The freedom to participate in realizing the educative relationships with continually increasing responsibility until eventually all relationships can be

experienced as meaningful, morally independent, with critical self-judgment and worthiness.

#### (4) Additional remarks

A. From the remarks in section (3) it seems that the connection between the pedagogical activities and the educative relationships cannot be thought or acted away [i.e., are essential, evident, etc.]. In other words they are *ontic bonds*, thus coherencies.

In addition it seems that the activities in the pedagogical situation can also be presented as follows:

(1) *Giving meaning* from:

- (a) understanding-trusting-authority acknowledging pedagogical association
- (b) understanding-trusting-authority acknowledging pedagogical encounter
- (c) understanding-trusting-authority acknowledging accepting responsibility for interference (engagement)
- (d) understanding-trusting-authority acknowledging pedagogic interference
- (e) return to association with understanding-trusting-authority acknowledging
- (f) periodic breaking away from the educative situation with the exercise of understanding, trust and acknowledging authority without observable pedagogic supervision.

(2) *Exertion* with respect to realizing:

- (a) through (f)

(3) *Norm-involvement* regarding living:

- (a) through (f)

(4) *Venturing* in the thriving of:

- (a) through (f)

(5) *Gratitude* for being allowed to participate in:

- (a) through (f)

(6) *Responsibility* for realizing:

- (a) through (f)

(7) *Hope* for a continually more adequate participation in:

- (a) through (f)

- (8) *Design* of the following as particular possibilities:
  - (a) through (f)
- (9) *Fulfilling destination* by exercising the following in adult ways:
  - (a) through (f)
- (10) *Respect* for those who realize the following by taking them up in a proper way:
  - (a) through (f)
- (11) *Understanding* the task that one must take up to realize the following:
  - (a) through (f)
- (12) *Conquering freedom* in order to increasingly accept *responsibility* to independently realize the following:
  - (a) through (f)

B. When one now looks at the names of the pedagogical activities it seems that the activity *responsibility-for-educative-relationships* possibly shows the strongest (most intense) bond with the educative relationships since the phrase ‘educative relationships’ appears in its name. From this it seems that the following is a possible representation of an essence analysis of this pedagogical activity:

#### RESPONSIBILITY-FOR-EDUCATIVE RELATIONSHIPS

- (1) *Taking-responsibility* for:
  - the proper realization of the educative relationships with all of their essences and relationships.
- (2) *Regard-as-co-participant* of:
  - those who are prepared to stand together in realizing the educative relationships with all of their essences.
- (3) *Regard-as-co-traveler* of:
  - those who are prepared to go together in advancing the thriving of the educative relationships and all of their essences.
- (4) *Experience-of-belongingness* of:
  - those who are prepared to be participants in the realization and thriving of the educative relationships and all of their essences.
- (5) *Commitment-to-accessibility* for:
  - each other of the participants in the educative relationships.
- (6) *Making-room-for-our-space* for:
  - those who are prepared to allow ‘we-ness’, ‘mutuality’,

‘togetherness’ to thrive in and through realizing the educative relationships with all their essences.

## [1.8] PEDAGOGICAL CATEGORIES: JUSTIFICATION

In the preceding pages, the idea of *‘categories’* is continually and repeatedly implemented. Therefore, it is now meaningful to provide a justification for their implementation.

### [1.8.1] First argument

When a person remarks, *“I think”*, someone listening to him/her will immediately ask *“What are you thinking (about)?”* Suppose his/her answer is *“I am thinking about the future of South Africa”*. An additional meaningful question might then be “Let us hear what (how) you think about that”. His/her response might be, “I am thinking about the future of South Africa, especially in connection with ethnic relationships, multi-ethnicity, sports policies, the homelands, etc.”. OR, “I think about the future of South Africa *in terms of* our ethnic relationships, multi-ethnicity, etc.”. From these answers, it is concluded that the future of South Africa cannot be thought about in terms of nothing, because then there would be nothing to be thought [about]. Summary: whenever there is thought, there is always thought *about* something (or someone, or an event) *in terms of something*. A husband thinks *about* his wife *in terms of* love, taking care of the cloths, cooking, etc. A child thinks *about* his/her parents *in terms of* authority, pocket money, expectations, etc. Parents think *about* their children *in terms of* appearance, school achievement, educating, etc. In other words, South Africa is thought about in terms of the *categories* of ethnic relationships, multi-ethnicity, etc. A husband thinks about his wife in terms of the *categories* love, cooking, etc. A child thinks about his/her parents and, in doing so, he/she applies the *categories* pocket money, etc. Parents think about their children with the help of the *categories of* appearance, school achievement, educating, etc.

Thus, to think means to use *categories*. In the everyday lifeworld, categories are used as soon as there is thinking. A scientist uses categories in his/her scientific thinking about reality. However, scientific thinking differs radically from everyday thinking because:

- (1) A scientist purposefully, radically, critically, and systematically searches for the categories which he/she must apply. Thus, a physicist reflectively searches for categories of *physics* because, e.g., botanical categories are not useable for him/her, since they cannot disclose genuine knowledge of physics. It is through applying categories of physics that its essences can be brought to light. Also, a pedagogician is a pedagogician precisely because he/she reflectively searches for pedagogical categories. In other words, he/she investigates the lifeworld with the help of the category '*educating*'.
- (2) Purposeful, radical, critical, and systematic research is the essential characteristic of categorical thinking. (Actually '*categorical thinking*' is a tautology because to think is to use categories!) He/she ascertains that the categories he/she implements for thinking are *illuminative means of thinking*. With their help, he/she illuminates the reality (e.g., the reality of educating) which he/she wants to study. An educator (with or without pedagogical training) uses the category '*educating*' as a means for illumination. A pedagogician applies '*educating*' as an illuminative means of thinking in a purposeful, radical, critical, systematic, and methodological (i.e., phenomenological) way.

Since a pedagogician is someone who wants to work in the way stated above, the following question must necessarily arise for him/her: "What is the origin of the category '*educating*'?" In other words, where is the reality called '*educating*' to be found, and what will he/she elevate to an illuminative means of thinking? Answer: the reality of educating is one of the various realities which are rooted (embedded) in the lifeworld.

For a pedagogician, this primarily means to investigate the reality of educating with his/her category '*educating*'. He/she will apply '*educating*' as an illuminative means of thinking to [disclose] the essential characteristics of this reality, and bring them to light. To be an adequate illuminative means of thinking, the illumination must bring to light the actual. This means that a pedagogician must continually sharpen his/her illumination. He/she notices that to

merely apply *'educating'* as a light for his/her thinking is not adequate. *'Educating'* as an illuminative means of thinking must be sharpened. How is this done? One way is to carry out an essence analysis of the reality of educating to bring to light or disclose its real essences, and then to apply these essences categorically (thus, as illuminative means of thinking). To do an essence analysis is to think, but (as pointed out) to think is to use categories. Which categories are now applied to carry out this essence analysis of the reality of educating? There is only one answer possible to this question—the category *'educating'*. From an educational perspective (thus, by applying the category of educating) there is a purposeful, radical, critical, systematic view, along with the application of the phenomenological steps of thinking (see chapter two), of where educators and children communicate with each other. Now concrete educative situations are investigated by applying the category *'educating'* (thus, they are looked at in terms of educating).

What is seen in these situations which is characteristic of educating, thus, what distinguishes the reality of educating from all other realities in the lifeworld? In other words, what is essentially pedagogical about this being together of educators and children?

Now, it is possible that different applications of the category *'educating'* will disclose the real essentially pedagogical (thus, the essential characteristics of the reality of educating) in different orders, and will even bring to light different essential characteristics (educative essences). Also, they can be named and ordered in different ways. This is possible because the reality of educating is particularly complex (involved), and largely a mystery. By [pedagogues] carrying out pedagogical conversations with each other the essence-status of the essences of educating which have been brought to light can be verified.

Out of many possibilities, one order in which a set of educative essences can be disclosed and organized is the following:

- (1) An educator helps a child to gradually change the *meanings* he/she attributes to persons, things, and events, until they are what one finds with proper adults. Thus, in educating,

this involves an educative activity known as *giving-meaning-with-increasing-responsibility*. These meanings with which a child is helped are numerous. A few of the meanings which a child *exercises* are the meanings which his/her relationships with his/her educators have for him/her. What meaning does an educator's relationship of authority, of trust, and of understanding have for him/her? What does educative association, encounter, interference, etc. mean to him/her?

- (2) As soon as a foothold on the way to proper adulthood begins to lose its tension, an educator helps a child to exert him/herself to move to a following foothold, where he/she again can live with exertion. He/she is helped to *gradually-break-away-from-his/her-lack-of-exertion* so that he/she can exercise with increasing exertion the relationships with his/her educators so that later he/she can exercise them independently and on his/her own responsibility.
- (3) An educator helps a child increasingly live in accordance with demands of propriety (norms). He/she does this by placing him/herself under the demand of these norms so that a child can see how these norms ought to be lived.

By living the demands of propriety, an educator takes an unconditional position for his/her philosophy of life, so a child can see and understand what is approvable, and this can also be emulated and eventually lived. Thus, an educative situation further involves an educative activity, i.e., *exemplifying-and-emulating-norms*.

- (4) Through a trusting, understanding, and authority acknowledging encounter, an educator and child can courageously venture with each other in a pedagogic situation. By venturing together, they will co-live and co-give meaning to the demands of propriety by which a child is gradually supported to choose and act independently so that eventually he/she can assume full responsibility and, thus, stand independently under the authority of norms.

That is, through *venturing-pedagogically-with-each-other* a child is supported to proper adulthood.

- (5) By being able to venture with an educator, a child will experience security. It is security because of the loving presence and acceptance of an educator for which the child is grateful, although he/she will not always explicitly show this. An educator must support a child to show gratitude for the secure space with him/her because *gratitude-for-pedagogic-security* is necessary for a child if he/she will progress in his/her exploration of the adult world and ,thus, also meaningfully progress on his/her way to adulthood.
- (6) An educator must help a child, in a continually progressive way, to accept responsibility him/herself. Because a child can be supported only in educative situations, independently accepting responsibility is one of the first things which he/she must be helped with, so that he/she can accept responsibility for his/her part in educative relationships. Thus, he/she must be supported in an educative situation to accept *responsibility-for-educative-relationships*.
- (7) An educator who will support a child to proper adulthood must awaken in him/her a yearning for the future. He/she can do this by allowing a child to work on his/her future in the present, so that he/she can progressively come to an understanding of future demands and, thus, he/she can look forward to them with confidence. By meaningfully directing a child to it in this way, he/she is also able to accept the future and, as a result, there is a *yearning-or-hope-for-future-adulthood*.
- (8) At birth, a child is poor in actuality but rich in potentiality, and an educator who will help a child realize his/her potentialities of proper adulthood must show an appreciation for his/her potentialities. and must take responsibility to support him/her in developing them.



Consequently, educating must also be seen as *designing-his/her-potentialities-for-adulthood*.

- (9) A child in educative situations must be supported by an educator to gradually reach his/her destination of proper adulthood. However, proper adulthood must not be viewed as a final destination and, therefore, a Christian educator will also help a child so that he/she can hear the voice of God, and can live in His honor. Through such support, a child can work in the present on *gradually-fulfilling-his/her-destination* so that he/she can increasingly be able to fulfill his/her divine calling.
- (10) A human being is a being who can know, recognize, and obey values. However, a child is not born with a hierarchy of value-preferences, but with the potentialities for realizing them. By helping a child do what is approvable, he/she will also come to realize his/her own dignity. As a value-realizing being, he/she will also respect his/her fellow persons as bearers of dignity. In educative situations, this involves increasingly supporting a child to realize values and, hence, this also is concerned with an *increasing-respect-for-human-dignity*.
- (11) An educator helps a child arrive at an accountable self-understanding. This means that he/she must arrive at an understanding of his/her positive human potentialities, so that he/she also will understand his/her being called upon, and respond by gradually realizing his/her potentialities, and putting them in the service of him/herself and his/her fellow persons, such that he/she can fulfill his/her obligations. In this context, educating is also *becoming-adult-through-self-understanding*.
- (12) An educator helps a child conquer his/her *freedom-to-responsibility*. He/she does this by increasingly indicating to a child his/her being called on, and also increasingly demanding that he/she be accountable for accepting his/her freedom. Thus, a child will increasingly become aware of the responsibility which comes with his/her

freedom, which is not a licentious freedom, but a freedom committed to values and ultimately a commitment to the authority of God.

## SUMMARY

A pedagogician has now seen phenomenologically (by applying the category '*educating*') that there are twelve possible (out of an unlimited number) educative activities which are actualized in educative situations so that the *relationships* which a child enters with his/her educators can be exercised properly. This happens because, over time, he/she must exercise these relationships as a grown adult.

A pedagogician now proceeds further with his/her category '*educating*' and undertakes a radical investigation of each of the mentioned educative activities to determine what their essential characteristics are. He/she reflectively searches for their real essences, always from a pedagogical perspective (i.e., by using the category '*educating*').

It is noted that these educative activities are aimed at realizing *relationships* with his/her educators which eventually will become his/her relationships with all other persons, and which must be realized in independent and responsible ways. Once again, a pedagogician applies his/her category '*educating*' and, this time, to undertake an essence analysis of these *relationships*. In this way, the essential characteristics (real essences) of these relationships are illuminated.

By more closely investigating the educative activities and educative relationships which he/she has seen, and their essences which he/she has brought to light by applying the category '*educating*' (thus, phenomenologically), he/she discerns that he/she can take any one of these essences as a category. This means that he/she can take any essence of educating as an illuminative means of thinking to disclose other essences of educating with the purpose of bringing to light the essential characteristics of each. Each essence of educating then has categorical status. Where, initially, he/she works with the single category '*educating*', he/she now has an unlimited

number of categories at his/her disposal. Thus, for *'educating'*, as an illuminative means of thinking, he/she has gradually designed a number of "lights-for-thinking" [denkligte]. By applying these "lights-for-thinking" [categories], additional essential characteristics of the reality of educating are brought to light, or disclosed.

A pedagogician can now proceed further and ask, how is it possible that, by applying the category *'educating'*, I am able to see that the reality of educating is essentially concerned with [pedagogical categories]:

- (1) giving-meaning-with-*increasing*-responsibility
- (2) *gradually*-breaking-away-from-lack-of-exertion
- (3) *exemplifying-and-emulating*-norms
- (4) venturing-*pedagogically*-with-each-other
- (5) gratitude-for-*pedagogical*-security
- (6) responsibility-for-*educative-relationships*
- (7) hope-for-future-*adulthood*
- (8) designing-possibilities-for-*adulthood*
- (9) *gradual*-fulfillment-of-destination
- (10) *increasing*-respect-for-human-dignity
- (11) *adulthood*-through-*increasing*-self-understanding
- (12) *conquering*-freedom-to-responsibility.

ANSWER: It is possible because a person's involvement in the lifeworld is characterized by the following [anthropological categories]:

- (a) giving-meaning-with-responsibility
- (b) moving-as-a-breaking-away-from-lack-of-exertion
- (c) normed-embodiment
- (d) venturing-with-each-other
- (e) gratefulness-for-security
- (f) responsibility-for-relationships
- (g) hope-for-the-future
- (h) designing-possibilities
- (i) fulfilling-destination
- (j) respect-for-human-dignity
- (k) task-of-self-understanding
- (l) freedom-to-responsibility

Now, a pedagogician can ask even more radical questions. For example, he/she can ask: On what foundation are the activities such as (a) through (l) possible? What are the grounds for their possibility? To be able to answer these questions, he/she must converse with the practitioners of philosophical anthropology. One of the possibilities which might appear from such a conversation(s) is that:


- (1) giving-meaning-with-responsibility,
- (2) movement-as-breaking-away-from-lack-of-exertion, and
- (3) normed-embodiment are possible because being human is characterized by its being involved in the world. It might further appear that:
  - (a) venturing-with-each-other,
  - (b) gratefulness-for-security, and
  - (c) responsibility-for-relationships are possible because being human is characterized by co-existence (being-with). It might further appear that:
    - (i) hoping-for-the-future,
    - (ii) designing-possibilities, and
    - (iii) fulfilling-destination are possible because being human is characterized by temporality.It can also be clear that:
    - (aa) respect-for-dignity,
    - (bb) task-of-self-understanding, and
    - (cc) freedom-to-responsibility are possible because being human is characterized by wanting-to-be-someone-oneself.

Being-in-a-meaningful-world, co-existence, temporality, and being-someone-oneself are applied by practitioners of philosophical anthropology as illuminative means of thinking to bring to light the essential characteristics of being human. Thus, they are *anthropological* categories (called existentialia by Heidegger).

The conversation between pedagogian and philosophical anthropologist can be carried on still further by asking the question: On what basis are the ways of being human (existentialia), which can be used as anthropological categories, possible? The answer to

this question is: Because of a human being's *being-in-the-world*. Should a human being find him/herself any other place than *in* the world, he/she could not be in the world in particular ways. Everything essential (real essences) which can be said about being human is possible because he/she is in the world. Consequently, *being-in-the-world* can be posited as an **ontological category**.

The ways of thinking followed in this section are represented as follows:



In this representation, (b) is the terrain of philosophical anthropology and (c) that of fundamental ontology. (b) + (c) can be called ontological-anthropological being, and (a) refers to the pedagogical categories (thus, to a pedagogics which is ontologically-anthropologically *grounded*), and it is the terrain of pedagogics and its part-sciences.

### [1.8.2] Second argument

A genuine pedagogician knows that, because he/she wants to understand educating, he/she must bring its essential characteristics to light. He/she must illuminate the essences of educating, which are concealed in the reality of educating itself. To bring them to light, he/she must apply the category '*educating*' as an illuminative means of thinking.

The first question he/she must now ask him/herself is: What preconditions must I fulfill to apply this category? Then, he/she sees that this application is not possible if he/she isolates

him/herself from the reality of educating itself, because then he/she cannot throw light on it. Therefore, he/she must be in the world by the reality of educating, which is embedded in it; otherwise, this reality remains hidden from him/her. Hence, being-in-the-world is the first [pre]condition for applying the category '*educating*'. By positing his/her being-in-the-world as the first [pre]condition for his/her scientific practice (applying the category '*educating*'), he/she overcomes the chasm between person (thinker, scientist) and world (reality) which was created by idealism and empiricism. In other words, being-in-the-world is his first illuminative means of thinking: illuminative thinking about the first [pre]condition which he/she must fulfill to apply the category '*educating*'. It also is said that being-in-the-world is *the* ontological category, since it makes possible all further ontological pronouncements about being human and, thus, also about being human in educative situations.

By now, a pedagogician knows that his/her own being-in-the-world is a precondition for applying his/her category '*educating*.' And now he/she can use this category to illuminate '*being-in-the-world*'. Immediately, he/she sees that there are many ways of being-in-the-world, which are also described and explicated by philosophical anthropology. Thus, in applying the category '*educating*', he/she is compelled to make a selection from these various ways, with an eye to a further radical investigation of them. That is, he/she selects those ways which are pedagogically meaningful, thus, which have relevance for the being-together of educators and children. The following are four ways, from many possibilities, which can be selected:

- (1) being-in-a-meaningful-world
- (2) co-existence (being-with)
- (3) temporality
- (4) being-someone-oneself.

Once again, the category '*educating*' is used to investigate the ways of being human to determine if they have essential characteristics which can be pedagogically meaningful. From an almost endless multitude of possible essential characteristics, the following are observed:

- (1) *Being-in-a-meaningful-world:*
  - (a) giving-meaning-on-one's-own-responsibility
  - (b) moving-as-a-breaking-away-from-lack-of-exertion
  - (c) normed embodiment.
- (2) *Co-existence (being-with):*
  - (a) venturing-with-each-other
  - (b) gratitude-for-security
  - (c) responsibility-for-relationships.
- (3) *Temporality:*
  - (a) hope-for-the-future
  - (b) designing-possibilities
  - (c) fulfilling-destination.
- (4) *Being-someone-oneself:*
  - (a) respect-for-human-dignity
  - (b) task-of-self-understanding
  - (c) freedom-to-responsibility.


(From discussions with philosophical anthropologists, it is evident that they apply these ways of being as illuminative means of thinking, thus, as anthropological categories, in their scientific practice).

A pedagogician now realizes that he/she must apply his/her category '*educating*' once again. This time he/she does this to allow the pedagogical significance of these ways of being to appear, and now there is mention of:

- (1) giving-meaning-with-*increasing*-responsibility
- (2) *gradually*-breaking-away-from-lack-of-exertion
- (3) *exemplifying*- and-*emulating*-norms
- (4) *pedagogical*-venturing-with-each-other
- (5) gratitude-for-*pedagogical*-security
- (6) responsibility-for-*educative-relationships*
- (7) hope-for-*future*-adulthood
- (8) designing-possibilities-for-*adulthood*
- (9) *gradual*-fulfillment-of-destination
- (10) *increasing*-respect-for-human-dignity
- (11) *adulthood*-through-*increasing*-self-understanding
- (12) *conquering*-freedom-to-responsibility.

Now, a pedagogician can choose to elevate these *pedagogical* ways of being to illuminative means of thinking for him/her, thus, to pedagogical categories.

The ways of thinking followed in this section, are represented as follows:



### [1.9] THE RELATIONSHIP: PEDAGOGICS/FUNDAMENTAL PEDAGOGICS

The question can arise whether fundamental pedagogics, as essence-disclosing and essence-describing, is indeed pedagogics. For Strasser, e.g., a phenomenologically oriented fundamental pedagogics is still no pedagogics because it only searches for necessary and generally valid evidence that is devoid of all particular content. For him fundamental pedagogics is rather “*a task of philosophical anthropology. It is a philosophical vision of being human in so far as he is an educating and to be educated being*”. For this reason he wants to supplement fundamental pedagogics with the sciences of norms and experiences in order to insure a useable and full-fledged pedagogics.<sup>77</sup>

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<sup>77</sup> Strasser, S.: *Opvoedingswetenschap en Opvoedingswijsheid*, 75-76. Sixth edition, Malmberg. S'Hertogenbosch, 1969.



The above view of Strasser can not be agreed with. Fundamental pedagogics *is* a full-fledged part-science of pedagogics that has its own tasks of which the most paramount is making the phenomenon ‘*educating*’ understandable and, therefore, it must uncover the reality of educating phenomenologically, disclose its universal essences, describe them and show their meanings and relationships. This is scientific reflective work and the essences of educating that come to light in this way will have currency in *all* educative situations. Fundamental pedagogics is in a position to make generally valid pronouncements and does not need to be supplemented by the sciences of norms and experiences in order to be a full-fledged science. Now, however, it is the case that a *grounded educative practice* (thus not a science) must be prescriptive. Indeed, in an educative situation this has to do with helping a particular child on his way to proper adulthood and, therefore, what is valuable to life must be impressed on him so that he can reach adulthood as one who is morally independent.

In order to be prescriptive the universal essences of educating must be filled with particular content so that they can become *enlivened essences of educating* in concrete educative situations. Thus in addition to fundamental pedagogic knowledge, “principled”<sup>77a</sup> educative knowledge is needed for a grounded educative practice, and to acquire such knowledge a study of philosophy of life writings is required. Such study will not be scientific since there will not be an attempt to prove the pronouncements in these writings because they are accepted as religious [and other] truths. The direct method will be used here. Philosophy of life writings will be directly consulted to see what direct educative prescriptions are given there. However, an educative practice that is only built on these directly given educative prescriptions will result in an impoverished educating if it does not also take into account and implement the universal essences of educating. Because the universal essences of educating are viable, these direct educative prescriptions can enliven them by providing them with philosophy of life prescriptions [i.e., content]. Now these content-filled educative essences can be made more meaningful through a pedagogical perspective-method of *post-scientific* reflection. A pedagogical

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<sup>77a</sup> “Principled” refers to moral-religious principles. (See e.g., the expression: “Out of principle I do this and not that.”)

perspective-method is where there is a move, via the various essences of educating, to philosophy of life writings to better understand *'educating'* in light of these essences and writings (see chapter two). Through this *post-scientific thinking* particular prescriptive contents will now become clear and can give additional life to the universal essences of educating and in this way these prescriptively enlivened essences of educating make a grounded educative practice possible.<sup>78</sup> In addition to making the phenomenon *'educating'* understandable through an essence analysis of the educative situation, fundamental pedagogics also has the task of reflecting on the relationships among pedagogics, a philosophy of life, and a grounded educative practice. To be able to see these relationships in the right light, fundamental pedagogics must further consider axiological, moral-, and ethical-philosophical questions, etc. and their connection with educating. For the sake of clarity, once again, it is stressed that fundamental pedagogics is not prescriptive and, therefore, only describes and explicates the above questions, and their connections with educating so that the phenomenon of educating, as it appears in practice, can be better understood

#### [1.10] THE RELATIONSHIP: FUNDAMENTAL PEDAGOGICS/PEDAGOGY

In the previous section, the task of fundamental pedagogics is noted, and it is noted that grounded reflective work makes a grounded educative practice possible. For the sake of clarity, such a grounded educating [practice] is called pedagogy, to distinguish it from educating, which must not necessarily be scientifically grounded. The relationship between fundamental pedagogics and pedagogy is now considered further.


Pedagogics is not separate from pedagogy. Time and again, it is indicated that pedagogics is the science of an educative event, as it appears in educative situations but, on the other hand, it has further consideration for an educative situation, because the results of its theoretical reflections can be applied there. Landman says

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<sup>78</sup> Landman, W. A.: *D.Ed. Colloquium*, 23 August 1972.


theory and practice are not isolated from each other: “Practice is the area of study for theory, and theory has practical consequences”.<sup>79</sup> The knowledge a pedagogue acquires through his/her scientific[ally justified] practice cannot leave him/her untouched as a person. Indeed, if genuine educative knowledge is acquired, then it will address the educator; even more, it will compel him/her to actualize it in his/her association with children.

The reality of educating, pedagogics, and pedagogy (scientifically justified educating) have a dialectic relationship to each other. The reality of educating, where adult(s) and child(ren) are involved with each other in educative situations, can be posited as the first thesis, with pedagogics, which is directed to this situation, as the second thesis. Both the first and second thesis can be elevated to a higher synthesis: pedagogy. Schematically this relationship appears as follows:



Another dialectic relationship is indicated where educational science, as the first thesis, progresses to the second thesis, educational doctrine, as a post-scientific reflection, and where both are integrated into a higher synthesis, educative practice. This is represented as follows:

<sup>79</sup> Landman, W. A. and Gous, S. J.: *Inleiding tot die Fundamentele Pedagogiek*, 1. Afrikaanse Pers. Johannesburg, 1969.




From the above schematic representation, a meaningful educative practice is only possible by integrating the results of both pedagogical and educational doctrine studies.

Also, there is yet another aspect which becomes clear with a theoretical reflection about a grounded educative practice, and this is the orderly incorporation of the pedagogical into an educational doctrine. Pedagogics brings the universal essences of educating to light so that the direct educative prescriptions from a doctrine of educating can be organized but, on the other hand, these prescriptions give content to the universal essences of educating so that they can become enlivened. These enlivened essences of educating, when integrated with the organized prescriptions, make possible enlivened, ordered, and essential educative prescriptions, without which a grounded practice of educating is impossible. Landman schematically represents the above event as follows:<sup>80</sup>

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<sup>80</sup>Landman, W. A.: *D.Ed. Colloquium*, 23 August 1972.



Thus, pedagogy, as grounded educative practice, presupposes fundamental pedagogics, which brings to light universal essences of educating, and studies philosophy of life writings [i.e., doctrines] for contents which enliven these essences. Hence, educational theory and philosophy of life [i.e., educational doctrine] can never stand in isolation from each other in a grounded practice of educating.

### [1.11] THE RELATIONSHIP: PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY/VIEW OF BEING HUMAN

Philosophical anthropology is the most fundamental part-science of philosophy. For many centuries, philosophy has struggled to achieve a general theory of reality, but the idea continually grows that a grounded theory of being is only possible if the peculiar way of human existence in the world is taken as the point of departure for thinking. Thus, the fundamental philosophical question ought to be about the ground condition which makes being human and its ways of existing in the world possible, because a theory of reality which disregards human existence, or passes over being human, will be left hanging in the air, since a theory of reality is a purely anthropological matter, and can only be brought about by a human being. Soren Kirkegaard, the 19<sup>th</sup> Century Danish philosopher, also

is one of the first thinkers who emphasizes very strongly that there must first be reflection on the concrete, unique existence of the "I". The modern philosophical direction known as existential philosophy interrogates not so much being as such, but human being, as a being of being, because being as such, cannot be known without starting with human being in the world.

As a science, philosophical anthropology must search for what is essential to *all* human beings: In other words, it must undertake an essence analysis of being human, so that the universal essences of human being-in-the-world can be illuminated. In the present study, above there is reference to twelve ways of being human which have been verbalized by philosophical anthropology. These general ways of being can be applied as categories, thus, as illuminative means of thinking, to better view the humanness of being human. If this is done, several pronouncements can be made about being human which are generally valid. For example, through the general anthropological category '*temporality*', it is seen that an individual person has not always been in the world, and a person's being-there is further illuminated by the category '*responsibility-for-relationships*', then it is seen that he/she is responsible for the relationships which arise from his/her being-there, but not for his/her original being in the world. That is, even though he/she cannot be held responsible for his/her own being-there, he/she can be held responsible for his/her way of being-there. From this, a generally valid pronouncement can be made, i.e., that a person is *thrownness*. However, if this thrownness is further illuminated by the general anthropological categories '*being-in-a-meaningful-world*', '*co-existing*', and '*being-someone-oneself*', as well as their generally valid contents then, in their collective light, it is seen that a human being, after he/she is in the world, must *him/herself* give an account of his/her choices and activities, but that, even so, he/she must also be assisted by fellow persons if he/she is to realize the possibility of fulfilling his/her destination. In this way, i.e., in the collective light of these anthropological categories, in addition to "thrownness", some generally valid pronouncements about being human can be made such as: a human being is solitariness,

solidarity, dialogue, a value-aspiring and value-realizing being, etc.<sup>81</sup> This last generally valid category is especially of interest to philosophical anthropology because, ultimately, it will be relevant to a grounded, accountable image of being human. Philosophical anthropology will not view a human being as separate from his/her world but, indeed, as he/she is *in* the world. Now because of his/her practical attunement, and willing and valuing being in the world, he/she also has a need for a hierarchy of preferred values to be able to appreciate/evaluate. This hierarchy of *value-preferences* indicates that all persons will not make the same choice of values and, therefore, this choice is a practical matter. In other words, if philosophical anthropology reflects on how a human being is practically in the world, then it must consider that he/she is essentially an appreciating/evaluating being in the world; i.e., as a value-aspiring and value-realizing being. This means there must not only be a consideration of the fact *that* a human being appreciates/evaluates, but also *how* he/she does so.

If a philosophical anthropologist wants to reflect on being human, then he/dhe must ask about the *meaningfulness* of human existence. These questions about the meaning of life, thus, are also viewed as one of the most topical questions in philosophy.<sup>82</sup> If there is now reflection on the meaning of life, then more than the essence of being human must also be questioned. There must also be questions about his/her origin and destination. Answers to these questions reach beyond the empirically perceivable of human being in the world. They refer to a particular view of being human grounded in a particular philosophy of life.

The above reasoning is briefly summarized as follows: Philosophical anthropology is a science and, as such, it must strive for generally valid, scientifically justifiable results, but an enlivened image of being human cannot be arrived at in this way. Indeed, the essences of being human can never be stripped of philosophy of life contents, which cannot be thought or acted away, and, therefore, [such

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<sup>81</sup> Landman, W. A., Roos, S. G. and Liebenberg, C. R.: *Opvoedkunde en Opvoedingsleer vir Biginners*, 111-114. University Publisher and Booksellers. Stellenbosch, 1971. **English translation:** <http://www.georgeyonge.net>

<sup>82</sup> Rautenbach, C. H.: "Ons Lewensopvatting", Lecture given at the opening of the University of Pretoria on 11 March 1940, 5.

essences] also cannot present an enlivened image of being human. In this context, Popma indicates that a view of being human which proceeds from human being as such, detached from his/her world- or life-view, almost never deals with being human, but with a highly artificial and derived abstraction. He writes: “*Deze onfeitlike, de feiten weersprekende abstractie zouden we zelfs een valse abstractie kunnen noemen. Daarmee bedoelen we dan, dat de mens wel bevoegd is abstracties te maken; daarop is geheel het werk in de vakwettenschappen en een groot deel van de wijsbegeerte gebaseerd; maar dat hij bepaald niet bevoegd is, zich een abstractief mensbeeld te vormen dat hem noodzaakt ‘mens’ te noemen wat niet ‘mens’ is maar een sort mythologische figuur op grond van een of ander geloof, b.v. een neutraliteitsgeloof inzake het mens-zijn.*”<sup>83</sup>

Thus, a philosophical anthropology must *become* particularized if it will be enlivened knowledge for being human, and before one can venture to answer the question of the origin and destiny of being human. Someone like Stoker<sup>84</sup> then also talks about a specific ‘*Christian Philosophical Anthropology*’, and Rautenbach indicates that there are various schools in philosophy which each explicates being human differently.<sup>85</sup> Hence, a philosophical anthropology will exceed its scientific character as soon as it starts with a particular view of being human and, if this is done, it is a post-scientific matter.

The above does not mean that philosophical anthropology is without value. Not at all, because if the results of this science are supplemented by a life-giving particular *view of being human*, then a particular anthropology can arise from this, which is valuable in understanding what being human is in a particular society, and what being human ought to be there. The human being, as a philosophizing being, is not merely satisfied with theoretical-scientific findings about being human, but he/she is also practically attuned and, therefore, is a seeker of particular norms in terms of which he/she can purposefully bring about particular changes

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<sup>83</sup> Popma, K. J.: *Levensbeschouwing*, part II, 22. Buijten & Schipperheijn. Amsterdam, 1961.

<sup>84</sup> Stoker, H. G.: “Die mens as beeld van God vir Wysgerige Antropologie”. In *Homo Viator*, Feesbundel vir C. K. Oberholzer, 29. H.A.U.M. Cape Town, 1965.

<sup>85</sup>Rautenbach, C. H.: “Ons Lewensopvatting”, Lecture given at the opening of the University of Pretoria on 11 March 1940, 7.



because, as a human being, he/she can do nothing other than this. In other words, he/she is in search of an ideal human image which, indeed, is grounded so he/she can strive to realize that ideal. He/she wants to know what to do to be considered a human being, and he/she cannot arrive at this knowing empirically. He/she must search deeper than factual existence, because what ought to be is an ideal matter. In this regard, Leenhouders expresses himself as follows: *“Het filosoferen is daarom ‘practisch gericht’, maar wel steun op een verantwoord mensbeeld, een gefundeerde mensopvatting. Naar dat ‘ideaal’ moet dan gestreefd worden.”*<sup>86</sup> Here ‘*mensopvatting*’ [‘view of being human’] must be interpreted, as a view of being human and this refers to a *particular* such view. But now, Leenhouders claims that philosophy asks about a *groundedness*, i.e., a view of being human, which is relevant to the universal lifeworld, even more, is grounded in that lifeworld and which, therefore, is also scientifically justifiable, but that, at the same time, is peculiar in that it expresses a *particular view* of being human.

There are an immense number of views of being human, each of which holds a different vision. They range from the view that human beings are the product of nature to creatures of God, with many variations in between. All view the “*nature*” of being human differently, and there is no unanimity about how human beings were created by God. Many thinkers notice only certain human ways of existing, and they make their particular view *the* way of being human as such. Viewed broadly, different views of being human can be organized together into groups. Oberholzer sees and verbalizes the following four directions of views of being human as a person, which are dominant in this century: There are the scientific-oriented-, the ontologic-oriented-, the existential-voluntaristic-oriented-, and the existential-analytic wave of personalistic thought.<sup>87</sup>


The aim of this study is not to focus on the various views of being human, but merely to indicate that there are many such views. As

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<sup>86</sup> Leenhouders, P. P.: *“Mens zijn, een Opgawe”*. De Stichting Opvoedkunde Brochurenreeks, 1971, 29-30.

<sup>87</sup> Oberholzer, C. K.: “Moderne Persoonvisies”. Reprinted from: *Hervormde Theologische Studies*, Vol. 13, Part II, Sept. ’57.

indicated, Leenhouwers asks for a *founded* view of being human, and that is only possible if the universal essences of being human, as brought to light by philosophical anthropology, are supplemented with particular contents from particular views of being human. Thus, a particular view of being human must be seen as a precondition for the science of philosophical anthropology to be able to provide an enlivened view of being human. On the other hand, a view of being human which only *emanates from* a particular philosophy of life cannot claim to be founded if it also does not *start from* the real essences of being human as disclosed by philosophical anthropology. A particular dialectic course is seen here, which is schematized as follows:



This representation is an attempt to express the relationship between philosophical anthropology and a view of being human. The following must be a further consideration of what the relationship is between a founded view of being human and a philosophy of life, and what this has to do with educating.

**[1.12] THE RELATIONSHIP:  
FOUNDED VIEW OF BEING HUMAN/PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE**

In the previous section it is shown that there can only be a founded or grounded view of being human if the real essentials of being human, as disclosed by philosophical anthropology, are colored by a particular view of being human. However, such a founded view of being human cannot yet serve as a human image worth emulating which can be presented as a norm-image for adulthood. Before such a human image is presented, there is further inquiry about a

particular view of being human. A human being's philosophy of life must also be looked for. This is necessary because a particular view of being human must first be refined by a philosophy of life before it can be presented as an ideal image of being human. Even though a view of being human is closely connected with a philosophy of life, still there are many historical examples where a person holds a philosophy of life which conflicts with his/her view of being human. For example, there are professed Christians, even in this country, whose view of being human is not justified by their philosophy of life. Indeed, there are '*Christians*' who believe that there is only a difference in degree between humans and animals and, consequently, a human is seen as an extension of nature.

In addition to a founded philosophy of life, one must also proceed from a *worldview* before an ideal image of being human can figure forth. Thus, there must also be an interrogation of the world and a human being's place in it, as well as his/her relationship to it. Thus, there must not only be an inquiry about being human as such, but also about human being, as a being of being, and who is involved in being. Even though a worldview is not so important for a human image worthy of emulation, it is closely related to a human being's philosophy of life, which gives direction, meaning, and purpose to his/her existence.

For conceptual clarity, first, a distinction is made between the concepts of life view [philosophy of life] and worldview. Popma<sup>88</sup> indicates that it is inaccurate to speak of a worldview and lifeview as if they form an indissoluble unity. Indeed, a world and life view can be combined with each other since they are correlated and continually refer to each other. Nevertheless, it is possible to deal with them separately. Popma expresses himself as follows regarding a life view: "*Mensenleven is nooit zonder levensbeschouwing, en de levende mens is het, die zijn leven beschouwt. In dat beschouwing staat hij niet buiten zijn leven, maar leeft hij het. De levensbeschouwing is een integrerend bestanddeel van de levenspractijk. Ons menszijn heft de beschouwelijkheid als grondslag en in alle handeling is de beschouwing ingevlochten, en er als het ware in opgelost.*"

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<sup>88</sup> Popma, K. J.: *Levensbeschouwing*, Part I, 97. Buijten & Schipperheijn. Amsterdam, 1961.

*De beschouwing van ons leven is ook zelf ten volle daadwerkelijk, en dat niet alleen omdat elke gedachte volbracht en in zoverre een daad is, maar meer nog omdat is alle handeling van een men seen levensbeschouwelijke factor zit, die van niet geringe betekenis is, en onmisbaar. En gedurende heel ons leven werk en bouwen we aan onze levensbeschouwing.<sup>89</sup>*

Rautenbach also distinguishes between a worldview and a philosophy of life: “A worldview must stand on the firm ground of reality as a totality. A philosophy of life must link up with the realities of human life.” Seen in this way, a worldview is a more theoretical matter, which has to do with questions of reality and involves one in the philosophical study of reality, metaphysics, or ontology, while a view [philosophy] of life has to do with practical matters which, in philosophy, give rise to an axiology (philosophical study of values, which includes ethics, esthetics, etc).<sup>90</sup> In connection with this, Oberholzer expresses himself as follows: “In addition to the expressed theoretical illumination as a view of reality, there is also the eminently practical matter of a philosophy of life. Here the emphasis is not on what the structural nature of reality is, but on what ought to be done in a given situation.”<sup>91</sup>

As a matter of values in a hierarchy of preferences worth emulating, a person’s philosophy of life is closely connected with his/her view of being human. Indeed, a philosophy of life is the totality of beliefs about what is valuable in life, as what is obligatory and demanding to a human being.<sup>92</sup> If this demanding is now in conflict with the view of being human regarding its origin, essence, and destination, it will not be easy for him/her to meet the demand. For example, if a person professes that he/she is a Christian, but nevertheless believes that he/she is a product of evolution and that, therefore, God is not his/her Creator, then he/she will have difficulty, or be unable to be obedient to the Christian demand to live to the glory and glorification of God.

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<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>90</sup> Rautenbach, C. H.: “Ons Lewensopvatting”, Lecture given at the opening of the University of Pretoria on 11 March 1940, 3-4.

<sup>91</sup> Oberholzer, C. K.: “Wereldbeskouing en Lewensopvatting”. In *Die Waardes van die Afrikaner*. S. A. Akademie vir Wetenskap en Kuns, 1968, 41.

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*, 44.

For an ideal image of being human worth emulating, which can hold true as an educative aim, it, thus, is necessary to build up a founded image (philosophical anthropology + view of being human), and a philosophy of life. That is, there must be a harmony between a founded view of being human and a philosophy of life, so that an ideal image of being human can figure forth as an educative aim. A clear dialectic course is also observable here, and is schematically presented as follows:

FOUNDED VIEW OF EDUCATIVE AIM BEING HUMAN SYNTHESIS) (FIRST STEP)	+	PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE (SECOND STEP)	=	(GENUINE
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It is indicated that a philosophy of life is a precondition for a proper image of being human, thus, for an image of being human as he/she ought to be. Such a proper or worthy image cannot be acquired from a philosophical anthropology because, as a science, it is only involved with being human as it factually is. Also, it cannot be acquired from a view of being human alone because it only remains hovering above being human, as it is situated *in* the world. In addition, it is pointed out that a view of being human must be in harmony with a philosophy of life if, together with a founded image of being human, it establishes an ideal image of being human, as an educative aim. Thus, a philosophy of life, as the *life*-valuable in a hierarchy of preferences, must never be seen apart from a view of being human. Indeed, the life-valuable refers to that which is viewed as valuable for a human being's living. From the dialectic course, which has so far become visible, a philosophy of life assumes a view of being human, and a person whose view of being human conflicts with his/her philosophy of life, cannot be satisfied with what he/she professes with his/her philosophy of life. Consequently, when a philosophy of life agrees with a founded view of being human, and its essentials are considered, then it can give rise to an image of being human which can be presented as what ought to be striven for. Now, it is the case that there are only so many philosophies of life if their views will be about the highly

valuable. Although a philosophy of life is a particular matter, those who hold it, nevertheless, claim that their philosophy of life is the only true and valid one. In this connection, Oberholzer indicates that the deepest differences which exist between persons, groups, and people come to light in their philosophy of life, and it is with respect to this that practicing educators and pedagogicians did not, do not, or cannot agree with each other. Also, he writes: “It is philosophies of life, as matters of values, which are the basis for the diversity of pedagogical aims.”<sup>93</sup>

From the discussion so far about the connection between a view of being human and a philosophy of life, the practical matter embodied in a person’s philosophy of life is most closely connected with the reality of educating, as a reality of life. In this regard, J. Chris Coetzee points out that there is no true educating possible and thinkable without the central and direction-giving force of a philosophy of life. He also indicates that a philosophy of life and direction of educating are inherently interwoven with each other, and there is no philosophy of life without a similar educative movement, and no educative movement without a fundamental view of life.<sup>94</sup> Elsewhere, he strikingly expresses himself about this close connection between a philosophy of life and educating: “A person’s view of life also determines his view of educating. There is a close and necessary relationship between the philosophy of life a person holds and the education that he desires for himself and his children.” Further, he also clearly states that: “Nowhere in *educative activity* and thinking does the close connection between a view of life and educating emerge more clearly and more tellingly than in discussing the aim of educating itself.”<sup>95</sup>

A genuine (i.e., founded) life view that underlies, directs and guides pedagogic activities thus must be seen as a precondition for purposefully realizing them.

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<sup>93</sup> Oberholzer, C. K. *Prolegomena van ‘n Prinsipeile Pedagogiek*, 203 and 209.


<sup>94</sup> Coetzee, J. Chris: *Inleiding tot die Algemene Teoretiese Opvoedkunde*, 28 and 32. Pro-Ecclesia. Stellenbosch, 1944.

<sup>95</sup> Coetzee, J. Chris: *Die Eerste Beginsels van die Calvinistiese Opvoeding*, 5 and 19. Pro-Ecclesia. Stellenbosch, 1940.

It cannot be denied that a philosophy of life requires an educative aim, but that there is a connection between an educative aim and a doctrine of education must still be indicated.

**[1.13] THE RELATIONSHIP:  
EDUCATIVE AIM/EDUCATIONAL DOCTRINE**

Above it is indicated that a philosophy of life has a particularly high value in connection with realizing pedagogic activities in educative situations, thus, in purposefully and effectively educating children. However, to educate children purposefully and meaningfully, more is required than merely an educative aim, as prescribed by a view of life. It also requires an educational doctrine, but an educative aim and educational doctrine must not be equated to each other, even though the latter cannot be thought of without an educative aim. It is only when the fundamental pedagogical structures, their generally valid contents, and their meanings and relatedness are enlivened by a particular philosophy of life, and when the essentials of a philosophy of life-prescribed educative aim is ordered by pedagogics, and when there is further use made of the pedagogical perspective-methods to observe and understand additional philosophy of life-prescribed aim-essences, that an educational doctrine, as a prescriptive matter, becomes possible. It is also only when philosophy of life prescriptions and the pedagogical are synthesized, that the higher unity '*educative practice*' can figure forth. This course is represented schematically as follows:



Thus viewed, an educative practice is a synthesis of a philosophical anthropology, a view of being human, a founded view of being human, a philosophy of life, an educational doctrine, and pedagogics. This entire dialectic course is presented schematically as follows:

FIRST STEP	SECOND STEP	GENUINE SYNTHESIS
Philosophical anthropology	View of being human	Founded view of being human
Founded view of being human	Philosophy of life	Doctrine of education
Educative aim	Pedagogics	Educative practice

A doctrine of education, even though well grounded, always remains a particular matter. [For the author, pedagogy, in the title of this chapter, refers to a Christian education or pedagogy]. For the sake of conceptual clarification of this pedagogy, however, it is first necessary to focus on a particular Christian doctrine of education, i.e., Christian National Education, as it is found in South Africa, before a dialectic-hermeneutic realization of the Christian educative event is discussed.

## [1.14] CHRISTIAN-NATIONAL DOCTRINE OF EDUCATION•

### [1.14.1] Introduction

That no doctrine of education can be thought of apart from a view of life is shown and appears to be a compelling fact. Before a Christian National doctrine of education is focused on, a Christian-National philosophy of life is first considered. To do this, an analysis must also be made of the existing parts out of which such a philosophy of life is constructed. *‘Christian’* is first looked at

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• This section is in need of seriou editing, especially re phraseology—G. D. Y. translator.



closely, and then *'National'*. However, in no way does this imply that there are two independent values which must subsequently be connected to each other. Quite the contrary, this only means that, in the concept *'Christian-National'*, there is an inseparable connection, and a specific order. The connection is that Christian belief, as the highest value, overarches all national thought, life, and aspiration, and the order is that Christian must stand first, and be realized first. Thus, it would be incorrect to speak of *'National Christian'*, because that would mean the people's heritage, aspirations, and strivings come first, as independent, and perhaps the highest values, to the extent that they can prescribe how the beliefs must be ordered to promote national matters.<sup>96</sup>

To discuss a Christian doctrine of education in its entirety is too broad for the aim of this study. J. Chris Coetzee indicates that, after the Reformation, at least four substantial directions in Christian education are to be found, i.e., the Roman Catholic, Lutheran, Anglican, and Calvinist. These are all movements which are essentially God-directed, but which are relatively different. In this respect, he writes: "One direction of Christian education differs from another only because one direction of a Christian view of life differs from another. There is a Roman Catholic education because there is a Roman Catholic philosophy of life which differs from that of a Lutheran, Anglican, or Calvinist education and view of life. There is a Calvinist education because there is a Calvinist view of life which is different from the Roman Catholic, Lutheran, or Anglican."<sup>97</sup>

Next is a focus on the unique Afrikaans Christian philosophy of life, i.e., the Calvinist, and then on the educational doctrine which is grounded in it. What follows is closely connected with the previously mentioned work of J. Chris Coetzee.

#### [1.14.2] The Calvinist philosophy of life

The Calvinist philosophy of life is grounded in the Word of God and, therefore, it is much more than a scientifically elaborated theory, which is only grounded in what is empirically observable. It can

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<sup>96</sup> Stigting Dirkie Uys: *Ons Christelik-Nasionale Lewens- en Wereldbeskouing*, 2-3, 1967.

<sup>97</sup> Coetzee. J. Chris: *Die Eerste Beginsels van die Calvinistiese Opvoeding*, 7. Pro-Ecclesia. Stellenbosch, 1940.

rightly be asserted that Calvinism is a God-directed philosophy of life which places Him at the center of life and thought.

Consequently, the first, or ground question of Calvinism is: “How does God come to His glory and right?” Coetzee expresses himself on this fundamental matter as follows: “The answer to this fundamental question given by the Calvinist creed is contained in the two fundamental dogmas regarding the Self-sufficiency and the Absolute Sovereignty of God. God is self-sufficient, and man can contribute, or add nothing to His glory. And indeed, the Lord, in His abundant mercy, calls man to His service, to live in a way which God can use him in His eternal mercy for his purposes. God is the absolute Sovereign: He is all, the Creator and Ruler of everything; man is nothing, indeed, less than nothing; he is entirely submissive; God has complete command of Himself. Man must, with body and soul, in life and deed, in prayer and work, only serve and obey the living God, his Maker and King.”<sup>98</sup>

From the two fundamental dogmas mentioned it is clearly concluded that Calvinism lives up to the Biblical-theological fundamental principle of the supremacy, or absolute sovereignty of God, as manifested in His Word.<sup>99</sup> God is the absolute authority and all human authority is merely bestowed authority and, therefore, man must be accountable to God for the authority he/she exercises on earth. God is the highest good, the highest value and, therefore, man must serve and praise God in everything he/she does and says.

For a Calvinist, the image of being human is firm and certain. Man is a creature of God, created in His image and likeness, but fallen into sin of his/her own free will and accord, and is capable only of the good from him/herself which his/her correct relationship to God can restore; but by the inconceivable mercy of God, a covenant with fallen man again has been established which lifts him/her out of his/her state of sinfulness.<sup>100</sup>

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<sup>98</sup> Coetzee, J. Chris: *Die Eerste Beginsels van die Calvinistiese Opvoeding*, 8. Pro-Ecclesia. Stellenbosch, 1940.

<sup>99</sup> Rautenbach, C. H.: “Ons Lewensopvatting”, Lecture given at the opening of the University of Pretoria on 11 March 1940, 10.

<sup>100</sup> Coetzee, J. Chris: *Die Eerste Beginsels van die Calvinistiese Opvoeding*, 9. Pro-Ecclesia. Stellenbosch, 1940.

Calvinism emphasizes the Fatherhood of God, and the childness of humans. As a creature of God in His image and likeness, God has placed His honor in human hands. Thus, He has entrusted His honor to man. Man is free to honor God in everything he/she does, in words, thoughts, and deeds. Alas, he/she is also free to betray his/her Father's honor by misusing his/her body, or by living such that he/she mutilates the image of God in his/her lived betrayal, or so mutilates it that it is totally destroyed. As a child of God, man is free, but his/her highest freedom is in his/her accountability. When God addresses him/her, he/she *must* answer, in the end he/she must take responsibility for what he/she has made of God's honor which has been entrusted to him/her.

### [1.14.3] The Calvinist doctrine of education

#### *(a) Introduction*

J. Chris Coetzee describes education as an activity with a particular aim, i.e., to lead a child up. Thus viewed, for a Calvinist, educating means an '*educative activity*' where a child is led to God: "Therefore, in the concept 'educating', there also is included the idea of 'becoming', and rightly so: an adult gives a child the training, the forming, the caring, the educating; ... . The educative activity, thus, really has two sides: leading an adult to the child, and the becoming, the growth of the child."<sup>101</sup>

The Calvinist doctrine of education then also finds its foundation in the Calvinist philosophy of life, which also includes the Calvinist view of being human. As a doctrine of education, it is prescriptive in nature, and it requires that a child be educated to the knowledge of and service of God. The following are some points of departure of the Calvinist doctrine of education.

#### *(b) Points of departure of the Calvinist doctrine of education*

Educating is possible and meaningful because a child is not born an adult. Consequently, the first point of departure of any educating, or doctrine of education must be the child. This in no way means

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<sup>101</sup> *Ibid*, 12, 13.

that there must be a falling into a child-centrism but, indeed, that educative situations entail helping a child on his/her path to adulthood. This can only be done in terms of norms. Thus, any doctrine of education must take a standpoint about what a child, as a human being is, and what he/she ought to become. In other words, pronouncements must be made about the origin, being, and destination of the child as a human being normatively. A stand must also be taken regarding the norms in terms of which a child must be helped on his/her course of becoming toward proper adulthood.

About the doctrine concerning the child which must be maintained by the Calvinist philosophy of life, Coetzee writes: “This proceeds, in the first place, from the fundamental fact of the Creation of man and, thereby rejects the view of the evolution of man outside the creative deed of God. According to the revelation of God’s Word the Lord God formed man out of the stuff of the earth, and blew the breath of life into his/her nose; and then man became a living soul.”<sup>102</sup> A second fact which the Calvinist doctrine of education thoroughly takes into account, and which is founded on the Word of God, is the dreadful reality of evil. Therefore, a child can no longer be left to his/her own devices, and it is also written in the Calvinist doctrine of education that, before an educator intervenes pedagogically, he/she must admonish and, if need be, punish the child, if he/she does what is disapproved, or persists with it.

A third fact regarding man, which clearly appears in the Calvinist philosophy of life, is the mercy of God. About this, Coetzee writes: “In this fact of the mercy of God for man, to allow something good in him/her, we find another basis for the belief that man is open for education, training.”<sup>103</sup>

Fourthly, the Calvinist doctrine of education, grounded in the Calvinist philosophy of life, teaches that, nevertheless, man, of himself, is not open for education, and that it is only justified by earning the redemption of God. This is why the belief in the

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<sup>102</sup> Coetzee, J. Chris: *Die Eerste Beginsels van die Calvinistiese Opvoeding*, 12, 13. Pro-Ecclesia. Stellenbosch, 1940.

<sup>103</sup> Coetzee, J. Chris: *Die Eerste Beginsels van die Calvinistiese Opvoeding*, 16. Pro-Ecclesia. Stellenbosch, 1940.

atonement of Christ has such a fundamental place in Calvinist education.<sup>104</sup>

In the fifth place, the Calvinist doctrine of education takes thoroughly into account the fact that man is a hereditary being. In this context, J. Chris Coetzee indicates that the inheritance of man is a given with which education must work and, further, indicates that no man can be made by education, but can only be formed [shaped] by it. “This makes the work of education is so glorious because God calls us, not to the impossible, but only to the possible, i.e., to form, educate man to His glory.”<sup>105</sup> An educator must accept a child as he/she is given to him/her by birth with all his/her abilities and powers, with all his/her positive potentialities, and deficiencies. “In education, we must accept a child as God has given him to us through heredity.”<sup>106</sup>

By acknowledging heredity, the Calvinist doctrine of education. thus, also recognizes the individuality, the absolute otherness of each child, and makes provisions to help each child to be able to become what he/she ought to be.

*(c) The aim of the Calvinist doctrine of education*

In section [1.12]. it is indicated that a philosophy of life, as a matter of values, is the basis for the great variety of educative aims. A view of man will determine what the most important aim is of human life. Thus, the Calvinist philosophy of life also has its own independent educational aim, although it is largely in agreement with other Christian philosophies of life. In his ‘*Catechism*’ and his ‘*Institutes*’, Calvin gives a clear answer to the question of the most important aim of human life, i.e., “*To know God who has created us.*” Without this knowledge, as the highest good of human life, man would be more wretched than an animal in the veld, because without knowledge of God, man cannot live to His glory and His glorification.<sup>107</sup>

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<sup>104</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>105</sup> *Ibid.*, 17.

<sup>106</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>107</sup> Coetzee, J. Chris: *Die Eerste Beginsels van die Calvinistiese Opvoeding*, 19. Pro-Ecclesia. Stellenbosch, 1940.

To live to the glory of God means that man must be worthy of God's glory entrusted to him/her. God has created man to reign over His work, and to be able to do this, man must work and also reflect on the reality God has created, so that he/dhe can know it. Indeed, man cannot reign over the works of God without knowledge. So viewed, Calvinist education includes religious *and* worldly knowledge with the most important aim of knowing and honoring God.<sup>108</sup>

Coetzee elegantly summarizes the Calvinist educational aim in a few sentences: "There is one invariable final aim for Calvinist education—knowledge and fear of the Lord. But there are many continually changing, incidental aims on man's way to being completely equipped for all good work. Each bit of knowledge that we acquire, each little skill which we gain, must work back to the end aim of our forming and becoming, to the knowledge of God, the glorification of His name, and also to our own salvation in the atonement of Jesus Christ, the Mediator between God and man.

Therefore, for a Calvinist, all education and teaching are part of his/her calling on earth. Hence, even a lesson in arithmetic, language, history, or anything at all, in Calvinist education, is something different than it is for someone with a different view of life."<sup>109</sup>

#### [1.14.4] The National philosophy of life

Above there is reference to the unique Afrikaans Christian philosophy of life. In the following, attention is given to the unique National philosophy of life so that, finally, it can be seen what a Christian-national philosophy of life means.

As with any other people, Afrikaners make the claim of a unique national character, and he/she is proud of and has the right to be proud of what he/she uniquely is. A few essences which

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<sup>108</sup> *Ibid*, 23.

<sup>109</sup> Coetzee, J. Chris: *Die Eerste Beginsels van die Calvinistiese Opvoeding*, 23-24. Pro-Ecclesia. Stellenbosch, 1940.

characterize the fundamentals of the Afrikaans national philosophy of life are its own:

- (i) religion,
- (ii) fatherland,
- (iii) community,
- (iv) blood-ideology,
- (v) history and tradition,
- (vi) mother tongue, and
- (vii) teaching policy.

(i) *Religion*

The real essential of the unique Afrikaans national character is in its religiousness. The first act of the Settlers was a prayer, and the Afrikaner's history is saturated with humiliations before God, and of examples of His merciful protection and guidance. The basis of the Afrikaans philosophy of life, of its history, its culture, and the entire nature and essence of its Nation is found in its Christian-Calvinist nature.<sup>110</sup> The Afrikaner, indeed, a Church-goer, who accepts the Bible as the infallible word of God, and by which he/she is also led.

(ii) *Fatherland*

The Afrikaner sees his/her fatherland as the place in which God has placed him/her to work and to serve Him. Therefore the Afrikaner is proud of his/her own fatherland, and testifies to this each time he/she sings '*Die Stem*', prepares to live and strives for his/her land.

(iii) *Community*

The Christian Afrikaner knows that he/she can work best in the space which God has established for him/her if he/she works among his/her own people to whom he/she is bound by mutual love, devotion, and understanding can freely and willingly receive cooperation. Because the Afrikaner believes he/she can best serve God and his/her neighbors in his/her own community, he/she allows him/herself such a personal space, and community for those

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<sup>110</sup> Stigting Dirkie Uys: *Ons Christelik-Nasionale Lewens- en Wereldbeskouing*, 1, 1967.

near him/her, so that they then can dwell together in a friction-free community, as an ethnic group or nation. “And because the Christian Afrikaner wants this culture to be *Christian-National*, therefore, he has always accepted the calling to bring the Gospel of Jesus Christ to them.”<sup>111</sup>

(iv) *Blood-ideology*

The Afrikaner attributes particular value to the purity of the “blood” of the White race. In this connection, Rautenbach writes: “This is an inherent and expressed aim of our philosophy of life. We have a deep-rooted aversion for miscegenation with other than Whites.”<sup>112</sup>

(v) *History and tradition*

Christian Afrikaners have their own history, a history of which they are proud and in which they can clearly see the hand of God. They also have their own traditions, which are transferred from generation to generation, and which they esteem highly. The most important of these cultural goods are their religion and moral laws and, therefore, they remain conscientious in following them.

(vi) *Mother tongue*

For the Afrikaner his/her mother tongue is more than words. For him/her it is the verbalization of a rich tradition. Therefore, time and again in the past, he/she has striven for the right to speak in his/her own language, to teach his/her children in it, and to practice his/her religion with it. Because he/she has such love for his/her own language, the Afrikaner allows the other groups of people the same privilege that he/she had so often striven for.

(vii) *Teaching policy*

Throughout the Afrikaner’s history, there is a desire to formulate its/her own Christian-National education, and the crown was placed

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<sup>111</sup> Stigting Dirkie Uys: *Ons Christelik-Nasionale Lewens- en Wereldbeskouing*, 5-6, 1967.


<sup>112</sup> Rautenbach, C. H.: “Ons Lewensopvatting”, Lecture given at the opening of the University of Pretoria on 11 March 1940, 8.



on this endeavor with Law 39 of 1967. With this Law, the Republic of South Africa became the only country in the world whose education is cast in this [particular] Christian mold. This Law must be seen, as Pistorius states it, “as a crystallization of the deepest convictions which directed our people from the beginning, and *without which we would not continue to exist as the particular people that we are.*”<sup>113</sup>

### [1.14.5] Christian-National education

After an analysis of the existing parts from which a Christian-National philosophy of life is built, it seems unquestionable that there is a definite order and an inseparable connection between them. The Christian and National philosophies of life form a unity which makes Christian-National education possible. In South Africa, National education can never be separated from Christian education. In other words, Christian education must be presented as the first precondition for National education, as it is found in this country. So viewed, there is meaning and relationships between the real essentials of ‘*Christian*’ and ‘*National*’. The Christian principles not only give meaning to National education, but steer it to an exalted God-directed aim. Consequently, Christian education must be seen as the first possibility, and National education as the second possibility for a Christian-National education. This is presented schematically as follows:



<sup>113</sup> Pistorius, P.: *Kaart en Kompas van die Opvoeding*, 310. Pro Rege-pers. Potchefstroom, 1969.