

S. G. ROOS, RELATIONSHIPS: Key study questions*

1.1 INTRODUCTION (pp. 1-2)

1. What is the positive relationship between the pedagogical and philosophy as viewed by Keersmaekers?
2. Why, for him, is this relationship more intense and close than is the case between sociology and philosophy?
3. What is meant by a 'content bond'?
4. What is the content bond between pedagogics and philosophy?
5. What is meant by a 'methodological bond'?

1.2 THE RELATIONSHIP: PHILOSOPHY/ PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY (pp. 2-5)

1. What is philosophy?
2. What is meant by: 'A philosopher must inquire about the deepest foundation, the sense and meaning of the appearing world'?
3. What is meant by 'ground'/foundation?
4. What is the connection between 'ground' and 'sense'/essence as de Vos sees it?
5. On what basis can it be said that philosophy and the subject sciences are meaningfully related to each other?
6. What is the deepest ground of each science?
7. On what basis can the question that man asks himself be carried back still further to a question about this question?
8. What does it mean if it is said that each human science must be grounded philosophical anthropologically?
9. What is meant by philosophical anthropology?
10. According to Loch, from what three suppositions does philosophical anthropology proceed as '*Wissensschaft vom Menschen*'?
11. How can these points of departure be applied as criteria to distinguish between philosophical anthropology and a natural science oriented human science?
12. What is a main difference between a philosophical anthropology and natural science anthropology?

* Questions translated in March 2014 pp. 223-235.

13. Can the subject sciences contribute to philosophical anthropology?
14. Can an anthropology then only claim to be scientific if it is grounded in biology?
15. What would such an anthropology not consider?
16. What would such an anthropology amount to?

1.3 THE RELATIONSHIP: PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY/ PEDAGOGICS (pp. 5-24)

1.3.1 Introduction (pp. 6-11)

1. How do Rohrs, Schoeman, Poggeler, Dopp-Vorwald, Zopfl, Zdarzil, Speck, Loch, Groothoff, Langeveld and Drechsler each view the relationship between pedagogics and philosophical anthropology?
2. Do you agree with Roth and Bohme that the pedagogic is a practical philosophy? (Give reasons for your answer).
3. Can you agree with Langeveld that pedagogics is a normative-practical task of philosophy? (Give reasons for your answer).
4. What distinction do Drechsler and Dopp-Vorwals make between pedagogics and the science of education?
5. Why is this distinction not scientifically accountable?
6. On what basis do Roth and Bollnow distinguish between pedagogics and a science of education?
7. Why is a phenomenologically oriented pedagogics not a fullfledged pedagogics for Strasser?
8. When would such a pedagogics become a fullfledged pedagogics for him?
9. Would pedagogics lose its scientific character if it is prescriptive?
10. What problem do the above thinkers run up against?
11. How would it influence the scientific nature of the pedagogic if it would not be able to formulate its own aim or aim structure?
12. How does Landman formulate the formal aim structure and what aim structures can serve as criteria for this?
13. Are these structures universally valid?
14. Can these generally valid aim structures be furnished with philosophy of life contents and if so on what basis is this possible?
15. Is giving contents to these structures in particular educative situations still practicing science?

1.3.2 The idea of perspective (pp. 11-14)

1. What does 'pedagogical perspective' mean?
2. Clearly distinguish among the following concepts and give examples of each: Reality, Non-living reality, Living reality, Non-human life reality and Lifeworld.
3. Would you agree that all human sciences are involved with the lifeworld?
4. How then do they differ from each other?
5. How can the specific pedagogic question be formulated?
6. What must a pedagogue do if he wants to acquire an answer to this question?
7. What is meant by: 'An authentic pedagogical perspective is only possible if it is a phenomenological perspective'?

1.3.3 The possibility and meaning of an anthropological pedagogics

(pp. 14-17)

1. To what does 'anthropological pedagogics' refer?
2. What significance do Loch and Bollnow attribute to the concept 'anthropological pedagogics'?
3. What is emphasized by the name 'anthropological pedagogics'?

1.3.4 The possibility and meaning of a pedagogical anthropology

(pp. 17-20)

1. To what does the term 'pedagogical anthropology' refer?
2. According to your view, what is the difference between an 'anthropological pedagogics' and a 'pedagogical anthropology'?
3. How does Loch distinguish between an 'anthropological pedagogics' and a pedagogical anthropology'?
4. What meaning does the concept 'pedagogical anthropology' have for Debolav, for Bollnow and for Sussmuth?
5. Why is it that no authentic anthropology can neglect to study the human need for education?
6. How would you distinguish between 'pedagogical anthropology' and 'pedagogics'?
7. Can the category 'educating' be applied to illuminate the various ways of human being-in-the-world?

8. If the above indeed is possible, what sorts of knowledge will then come to light?

1.3.5 Summary (pp. 20-24)

1. Briefly state the problems that can arise from the names 'anthropological pedagogics' and 'pedagogical anthropology'.
2. What does Oberholzer say about the concept 'anthropological pedagogics'?
3. What does the following mean: :By taking the pedagogical event as a point of departure, the pedagogical, the pedagogical cannot be anthropological-ized, just as the anthropological cannot be pedagogical-ized by doing this?
4. Explain what the scheme on page 23 means.
5. State in your own words the term 'pedagogics' is sufficient for the science that directs itself to the phenomenon of educating.

1.4 THE RELATIONSHIP: PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY/CHILD ANTHROPOLOGY (p. 24)

1.5 THE RELATIONSHIP: PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY/CHILD ANTHROPOLOGY/PEDAGOGICS (pp. 24- 30)

1. Why can't traditional philosophy make an essential contribution to child anthropology?
2. Why is it not correct to speak of a child as a non-adult?
3. What is meant by the concept 'child anthropology'? (In your answer, refer to the view of C. K. Oberholzer in this regard).
4. On what basis does Langeveld emphasize that child anthropology is a situation anthropology?
5. Why is this concerned with an educative situation?
6. Why must a pedagogue also make a study of child anthropology?
7. Name two categories that Langeveld views as fundamental categories of a child anthropology.
8. From what perspective must a pedagogue study child anthropology?
9. What is meant by the concept 'pedocentrism'?
10. Against what must a pedagogue be vigilant in order not to fall into a pedocentrism?
11. What do you understand by the concept 'pedology'?

12. On what basis can it be asserted that pedagogics is more than the study of only a child and an adult?
13. Why can knowledge of the pedagogical situation not be deductively inferred from a general philosophical anthropology?
14. Why is a human's Dasein or his being-in-the-world called the *ontological category*?
15. What ways of manifestation of Dasein have already been illuminated?
16. Do these ways of manifestation have pedagogical significance?

1.6 THE RELATIONSHIP: PHILOSOPHICAL PEDAGOGICS/FUNDAMENTAL PEDAGOGICS (pp. 30-39)

1.6.1 Philosophical pedagogics (pp. 30-31)

1. What part discipline of pedagogics is especially closely related to philosophical anthropology and why?
2. What is objectionable about the name 'philosophical pedagogics'?

1.6.2 The category 'fundamental' (pp. 31-33)

1. Explain the word 'fundamental' etymologically.
2. How does Landman distinguish between 'ontic' and 'being'?
3. To what does ontic founding refer?
4. What does it mean when Heidegger says he will ask the question of the *being of being* anew and develop it further?
5. Why must the ground of being be epistemologically sought in being human?
6. What is meant if it is said that a person must turn his intentionality, as a beam of attending, back to his consciousness as a consciousness of being-with, thus with his Dasein as being in the world?
7. Why were traditional ontologies not fundamental?
8. According to Heidegger, where must the origin of all ontologies be sought?
9. What is a fundamental ontology?

1.6.3 Philosophical pedagogics as fundamental pedagogics (pp. 33-39)

1. Why does a philosopher search for the primordial ground of what is?
2. Where does the philosopher search for this ground?
3. On what three cornerstones is fundamental pedagogics grounded?
4. Why is preference given to the name 'fundamental pedagogics'?
5. What are fundamental pedagogical categories?
6. What procedure is followed to particularize fundamental pedagogical categories?
7. What are 'pedagogical activities'?
8. Name the pedagogical activities that have been brought to light so far.
9. How have the mentioned pedagogical activities been illuminated?
10. In what ways can the verbalized pedagogical activities be applied as categories (i.e., as illuminative means of thinking)?
11. In what way can the founded pedagogical activities provide ontological-anthropological status to the other fundamental pedagogical structures that have already been brought to light?
12. In what way will the fundamental pedagogical structures, their real essences and their meaning and coherences be better understood if *child anthropological categories* can also be particularized?
13. What approach must be followed to particularized child-anthropological categories?
14. What real essences of a situation have already been brought to light?
15. Is a child situated in the world in the same way as an adult?
16. Name the child-anthropological categories that have already been brought to light.

1.7 THE RELATIONSHIP: EDUCATIVE REALITY/METHODOLOGY (pp. 39-51)

1. What does 'ontological understanding' mean?
2. On what basis can a pedagogue make use of the dialectical method?
3. Explain how a pedagogue can also make use of the contradictory method.

4. What conditions must be fulfilled before childlike ways of being can proceed via pedagogical categories to the anthropological ways of being. (Adult giving meaning and joint giving meaning) Explain.
5. Explain the dialectic-hermeneutic course that has relevance from an adult giving meaning responsibly *for* a child to [a child] giving meaning on his own responsibility until eventually he gives meaning as does an adult.
6. Why is childlike responsibility not yet independent responsibility?
7. a) Give an explication of the dialectic-hermeneutic course where child anthropological ways of being are taken as first condition and the pedagogical ways of being as the second condition so that adult anthropological ways of being as an authentic synthesis becomes possible. b) What would happen if the second condition is not realized? c) What precisely is meant by 'child anthropological ways of being'?
8. Explain why child anthropological ways of being must be seen as real essences of the pedagogical ways of being.
9. Are the pedagogical ways of being listed here the same as what are verbalized by the pedagogical activity structures?
10. What is served by the actualization of the pedagogical activities?
11. Can the different ways of being as verbalized in this chapter also be used as categories?
12. Explain the origin (ground) of pedagogical categories (resp. criteria).
13. In this section (1.7) it seems clear that the real essences of the pedagogical relationship and sequence structures can also be implemented as categories. Are their categorical origins already explained by question 12? Explain.
14. Which method brings to light real essences? Explicate.
15. Which methods can serve as phenomenological verification? a) Thinking away. b) Acting away. c) Contradiction as absolute dialectic with so-called synthesis thinking. d) The so-called empirical methods and individual phenomenological investigations.
16. Which method brings coherencies to light? Explain.
17. What is the scientific meaning and necessity of the dialectic method? a) Test (verify) coherencies, b) Lead by authentic synthesizing to a more radical understanding. c) Indicate a course.

1.8 PEDAGOGICAL CATEGORIES: JUSTIFICATION (pp. 51-63)

1.8.1 First argument (pp. 51-61)

1. What do categories have to do with thinking?
2. How does scientific thinking differ from ordinary thinking?
3. In what way does a pedagogue apply the category 'educating'?
4. In what manner can the category 'educating' be sharpened as an illuminative means of thinking?
5. What category(ies) is (are) used to carry out an essence analysis of the reality of educating?
6. Name and discuss a possible order in which pedagogical essences can be disclosed and a possible way of ordering a set of educative essences.
7. Can a pedagogue now undertake a radical investigation of each of the essences of educating and educative relationships already disclosed? Explain.
8. Explain how each of the additional essences or educative relationships that have become clarified also can be used as categories.
9. Why is it necessary that the pedagogue sometimes converse with the practitioners of philosophical anthropology?
10. Discuss one of the possibilities that might appear from such a conversation.
11. On what basis is it possible to apply the ways of being human as anthropological categories?
12. Explain the ways of thinking followed in section [1.8.1 First argument].

1.8.2 Second argument (pp. 61-63)

1. What is the first precondition that must be fulfilled before a pedagogue can apply the category 'educating'?
2. What chasm must be overcome in fulfilling the mentioned precondition? Explain.
3. What does the pedagogue notice if he applies the category educating to illuminate 'being-in-the-world'?
4. What four ways of being-in-the-world, that are pedagogically meaningful, can a pedagogue possibly select as he applies the category educating?

5. Now explain how a pedagogue can further apply the category educating to bring to light pedagogical ways of being that he can use further as pedagogical categories.
6. Now explain in terms of examples how a pedagogue can apply the pedagogical ways of being (pedagogical activities) as pedagogical categories.
7. Explain the ways of thinking followed in section [1.8.2].

1.9 THE RELATIONSHIP: PEDAGOGICS/FUNDAMENTAL PEDAGOGICS

(pp. 63-65)

1. For what reasons will Strasser supplement fundamental pedagogics with the sciences of norms and experiences?
2. Why can there not be agreement with this view of Strasser?
3. Why must a grounded educational practice be prescriptive?
4. What is 'principled' educative knowledge?
5. What is the relationship among fundamental educational knowledge, principled educative knowledge and a grounded educational practice? Explain in terms of the discussion on page 65.
6. What is the task of fundamental pedagogics as a part science of pedagogics?

1.10 THE RELATIONSHIP: FUNDAMENTAL PEDAGOGICS/PEDAGOGY

(pp. 65-68)

1. Why is there a decision to speak of a grounded educating as 'pedagogy'?
2. What is the connection between pedagogics and pedagogy?
3. How does Landman view this relationship?
4. How will the knowledge a pedagogue acquires in his scientific practice touch him?
5. Explain the dialectic relationship among educative reality, pedagogics and pedagogy.
6. Explain further the dialectic relationship where educational science as first possibility proceeds to educational doctrine as second possibility so that an educative practice can be realized.
7. Explain in terms of the scheme on page 68 what the relationship is among universal essences of educating, direct educative prescriptions, and a grounded educative practice.

1.11 THE RELATIONSHIP: PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY/VIEW OF BEING HUMAN (pp. 68-73)

1. Why is philosophical anthropology viewed as the most fundamental part-science of philosophy?
2. What did Soren Kierkegaard emphasize so strongly?
3. What is it that existential philosophy primarily interrogates? Why?
4. For what is it that philosophical anthropology must search?
5. What generally valid statements, among others, can be made about being human in terms of the anthropological categories that have already been illuminated?
6. Explain what these generally valid statements mean and indicate the ways they especially have significance for philosophical anthropology and why this is so.
7. Why can philosophical anthropology not arrive at an enlivened image of being human in a purely scientific way?
8. What is Popma's view in this regard?
9. To what benefit can it be if the results of a philosophical anthropology are supplemented by a particular view of being human?
10. What is a 'founded view of being human'?
11. What is a precondition for a *founded* view of being human? Explain.

1.12 THE RELATIONSHIP: FOUNDED VIEW OF BEING HUMAN/PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE (pp. 73-77)

1. Why is a founded view of being human alone is not sufficient for presenting a human image worthy of emulation?
2. Is it possible for a philosophy of life to espouse a contradictory human image? Explain with examples.
3. What does a worldview have to do with an ideal human image?
4. What is an ideal human image?
5. Make a distinction between a life- and worldview. In your answer refer to the views of Popma, Rautenbach and Oberholzer.
6. Why ought a person's view of life be very closely related to his view of being human?

7. Is there a dialectic progression observable from a founded view of being human via a philosophy of life to an ideal image of being human that can be presented as an educative aim?
8. How will an educative ideal be if either a founded view of being human or a philosophy of life is missing?
9. In light of the above can one be an educator without a philosophy of life?
10. On what basis can it be asserted that a philosophy of life is the reason for the diversity of pedagogical aims? (Oberholzer).
11. Where does the intrinsic connection between a philosophy of life and educating most clearly come to light?

1.13 THE RELATIONSHIP: EDUCATIVE AIM/EDUCATIONAL DOCTRINE

(pp. 77-79)

1. Why does a philosophy of life have such a high value in realizing the pedagogical activities in an educative situation?
2. What is the difference between an educative aim and an educational doctrine?
3. Explain in what way an educative aim and the pedagogic must be viewed as preconditions for a founded educative practice.
4. Explain in what way an educative practice must be seen as a synthesis of philosophical anthropology, a view of being human, a founded view of being human, philosophy of life, educational doctrine and pedagogics.

1.14 CHRISTIAN-NATIONAL DOCTRINE OF EDUCATION (pp. 79-88)

1.14.1 Introduction (pp. 79-80)

1. What is the connection between and the order of Christian and national as presented in this section?
2. Why is it incorrect to speak of 'national-Christian'?
3. What four substantial directions in Christian educating are found after the Reformation?
4. Why do these directions differ from each other?

1.14.2 The Calvinist philosophy of life (pp. 80-82)

1. On what basis can it be asserted that the Calvinist philosophy of life is much more than a scientifically elaborated theory?
2. What is the ground question of Calvinism?
3. What Biblical-theological fundamental principle does Calvinism live up to?
4. What is the Calvinist view of being human?
5. Explain the following: 'Calvinism emphasizes the Fatherhood of God and the childness of humans.'
6. Is a human being also free to betray his honor? Explain.

1.14.3 The Calvinist doctrine of education (pp. 82-85)

1. On what basis is educating meaningful and possible?
2. What does it mean that the first point of departure of any educating or doctrine of education must be the child?
3. Will the above view lead to a child-centrism?
4. Discuss the points of departure of the Calvinist doctrine of education.
5. According to Calvinism what is the major aim of human life? Why?
6. On what basis can it be said that Calvinist education includes religious and worldly knowledge as an aim?
7. How does J. Chris Coetzee view the connection between the final aim and the many continually changing incidental aims?

1.14.4 The national philosophy of life (pp. 85-87)

1. Name and discuss a few of the essences that characterize the fundamentals of the Afrikaans national philosophy of life.
2. Can religion be seen as an additional essence of the mentioned essential characteristics of the Afrikaans national philosophy of life?
3. What law places the crown on the Afrikaaner's striving for his own Christian-national education?

1.14.5 Christian-national education (pp. 87-88)

1. Discuss the preconditions for a Christian-national education.