(a) Introductory comments:
In the very first issue of this journal in the last paragraph of my article “The significance of phenomenology for pedagogical thinking”, the following sentence appeared: “One of the most important questions has remained unanswered, namely, if pedagogical thinking implies reflecting on pedagogical events in their ontical structure, and if this reflecting must occur in terms of purely pedagogical categories, which categories reveal the pedagogical in an unadulterated manner?” What is made available here is an attempt to complete this remaining task!(1) However, there is another highly important question remaining, namely, what is pedagogically admissible and what is not; in other words, this is the question of the justification of pedagogical criteria. Pedagogical categories and criteria are not the same: the former are a matter of reflecting and the latter are the result of reflecting with an eye to the admissible or the inadmissible, to what is acceptable or objectionable about the ways of actualizing the event that is known as the pedagogical. The former are a distinguishing and describing understanding and the latter are a judging and thus an oppositional matter.

At the outset it is declared with the greatest emphasis and deepest sincerity that it is imperatively essential that whoever pretends that he is thinking pedagogically has to make sure that he, indeed, is so involved, and he must consistently be aware that he remains concerned with what it is he professes to be involved. Thus, if he is concerned with the practice of science on a pedagogical level this can be nothing more than pedagogical reflection. Indeed, one has the right to expect from a practitioner of a science that in his publications regarding that with which he deals that he continually fulfill the demand of critical self-reflection and accountability toward others. If someone pretends that he is thinking

pedagogically but serves himself truisms that have no rhyme or reason, then he is not practicing any science of the pedagogical but he is an apologist and is making propaganda for a particular educative practice in which the demands of a particular philosophy of life are embodied. As a pre-scientific matter, no one has any objection to this since, regarding our philosophy of life, all of us are propagandists. However, a science lives and progresses not out of propaganda that is perpetuated but out of a critical questioning of the primordial factualities of specific aspects of the life world.

Science, as a matter of critical questioning, has its demands that each and every practitioner must meet; that is why there is the need to strictly distinguish and to give a correct accounting to one’s self of what one is involved with and how the practice is carried out. When someone is thinking psychologically then this has to do with the psychological and not with the pedagogical, the biological, the physical, the theological, etc. This holds for each and every area of scientific practice, also for the pedagogical. This is not to give notice that the practitioner of a particular area of science can hermetically seal himself off from other subject sciences. This is not possible simply because a strict demarcating and cutting off destroys the unity of a science. The demand is that a practitioner ought to know that he is involved with partial knowledge and, at the same time, he should be aware of when he commits a transgression. And when he should decline knowing of related areas then he has absolutized his area and is involved in a distressing nihilism, a philosophy of the nothing other than … .

When a scientist oversteps the boundary of his own area, especially with the aim of coming to know which insights [from another area] can be useful for his own research aims, he must remain aware that he is dealing with “borrowed” insights and for them to be useful they first must be revised to make them of relevance to his own aims. If this is not done he is guilty of a metabasis eis allo genos, a moving from one area of being with its truisms and applying them to another, a practice that is completely unacceptable for science and its practice but that, alas, so often is the practice of human scientists in this country, especially in the areas of philosophy, ethics and pedagogics. It can happen so easily that a practitioner of one or another façade of being a person can profess a
comprehensive creed about a human’s place and status. When this chapter is finalized, or at least a foreword is written, this matter is quietly closed if not sealed, and in the succeeding chapters, even by exemplary Christians, it is argued for in the most unambiguous naturalistic style of thinking. This means making use of categories by which persons are deprived of their high status and exceptional position as radically different from the non-human totality of beings. Then there is mention of adaptation, development, the learning processes of a child, often after the analogy of so-called animal learning, of reactions, of mechanisms and even adaptive mechanisms, of ripening, growth and endlessly more such categories that are on the level of application of the mathematical and biological natural sciences from which they stem. And for this reason, should one dispute this application when dealing with human matters and prefer to talk about events in their existential-ethical subjectivity, then one runs the great risk of being branded an existentialist. Those who use categories such as those just mentioned usually say that they mean something other than to view a human as an extension of nature in reflecting on him. In many cases this might be so but then in the design and application of categories, as time passes, it becomes more evident that a human being occupies an exceptional position.

The above comments mutatis mutandis also apply to the advocates and the pleaders for a so-called Christian science and, thus, also at least for Christian pedagogical thinking. They so easily say they think fundamentally. What this fundamental thinking means, precisely or even approximately, still cannot be discovered by this author. If this should mean that one’s point of departure for scientific practice is in a particular philosophy of life with its implied hierarchy of preferred values and correlated norms then this author states emphatically that he will not see that his way is not open to mixing his moral values with his thinking on whatever façade or activity of human life, i.e., philosophical, moral, pedagogical, psychological or whatever else. To think and to practice science, and to do this under the demands of critical accountability, one’s point of departure must be taken in that which is, that which is necessary and generally valid, and to accept each irrespective of what principles one might hold. The practice of science, including the pedagogical as a human [anthropological]
science, certainly requires that there be a common point of departure, a firm ground of facts in their indisputableness. If a Christian, in his scientific practice, cannot follow the same path with a non-Christian regarding pedagogical matters in terms of pedagogical categories and also on the pedagogical permissibility of such an event in its concrete individuality, then something will falter somewhere and this faltering can be no place else than in the point of departure. The possibility of eliminating [bracketing] this talking past each other must be seen as one of the finest results of phenomenology. The watchword of Husserl, namely, return-to-the-things themselves, drives us to the truth in its there-ness, to that which is and makes itself accessible to everyone.

(b) The essence of pedagogical thought and pedagogical categories

Pedagogical thinking means a critically accountable reflection on the pedagogical. “Pedagogical” thinking, as a reflection on the non-pedagogical, is not pedagogical thinking at all. Non-pedagogical thinking in so many cases claims the right to be pedagogically relevant and, what is also annoying, to find fault with the pedagogue in his reflections on the pedagogical itself. Theological, ethical, biological, psychological, etc. thinking still are not pedagogical thinking. There is no transition possible from the first-mentioned areas of thinking to the latter [pedagogical] or the reverse. What does the theological as theological or the psychological as psychological have to do with the pedagogical? There are so many who assume that there is this transition and that, consequently, the pedagogical should be the sum-total of the most irreconcilable series of scientific pronouncements about persons, irrespective of whether the pedagogical and what it is involved in ever is noticed. The pedagogical, as the result of critical-accountable reflection on the pedagogical, thus, should not be anything other than the obedient handmaiden and the pallbearer of the essential non-pedagogical, which amounts to an interesting hodge-podge or collection plate of knowing about persons from everywhere, thus, a pure “borrowing”. Such a view can mean only one thing and that is that the autonomy, or at least the relative autonomy, of the pedagogical is a thing of the past. Thanks to phenomenology, this hodge-podge position of the pedagogical now is something of the past.
The pedagogical thinker, on a phenomenological-ontological foundation, also no longer has a need to involve himself with rearguard action. Pedagogical thinking and a pedagogically accountable practice are the result of reflecting on a distinctive primordial human phenomenon along with the justification of a practice anchored in the demands, as criteria, as they arise from this primordial inter-human event. Thus, this has to do with designing and applying pedagogical categories as well as pedagogical criteria. But once again, pedagogical criteria are not dealt with in this article.

When a person thinks pedagogically he does not operate with a different kind of understanding than when there is thought about the physical, biological, psychological, theological or any other area whatever. It is one and the same understanding bound by the same general principles of thinking and restricted by the same limitations as any other topic of research or thinking. The difference is that in the case of pedagogical thinking, the intentionality of consciousness, as a being directed to and a standing open to the beings of being, is attuned to a specific being and, indeed, to a primordial inter-human being in its framework of an inter-human event as one of encountering and becoming encountered. Consciousness, in reflecting on this phenomenon, designs distinct categories by which the essence of this phenomenon is disclosed. It is the otherness of the phenomenon that makes necessary other and distinct categories and by virtue of which the situation is elevated to the pedagogical, and that there can be talk of pedagogical thinking.

With reference to the immediately preceding, and also to what is suggested in the title of this article, it is necessary briefly to illuminate what is meant by the term “category”. It must always be kept in mind that a practitioner of science is someone who in his investigation of phenomena makes critically accountable propositions, claims or pronouncements. Such pronouncements give evidence that there is something to be said about something and, indeed, because it can be said. In what is communicated, something is brought to light; something steps into the light, it becomes dis-closed. The fact of the expressible thus refers to someone who says or pronounces something as well as to that about which the said is concerned. One predicates something about the
phenomena, about them as processes, events or states. At the same time this means that the phenomena throw themselves open and become accessible in order to be expressed. They “open” themselves by which something becomes “created”. The investigator designs his truisms, predicables or categories in terms of his creative thinking, but then, at the same time, in his thinking he reflects on the phenomena not as he wants to but as he must. Thus, this is more than a purely rational activity; it is “sensible”, by which is meant that what is predicated must have its correlate in what is there. Each scientific expression, as an accountable one, then, consistently refers to the there-ness that continually is corroborated or confirmed by the expression. Such expressions, predicables, categories, truisms or expressive possibilities offer a grasp of or a handle on the phenomena; the truisms, as they are expressed, lay bare and dis-close the phenomena as they are. The latter are benefited and promoted in surprising ways by means of knowing, such as eidetic viewing and intuition. They provide such ingenious grasps of the concerned phenomena by which the truth in its essential there-ness comes to light. It is so remarkable that scientific progress in an area amounts to new, original, ingenious grasps of phenomena and, therefore, intuition and eidetic viewing are indispensable means of knowing. The phenomena are grasped in their there-ness and thereby also are understood.

Communicating, as introducing the grasped as understood, occurs through the language that the science uses; the latter lets one hear what manifests itself as it is given. Scientific language is a refined and critically accountable categorical language. When the same categories originating from the same area are used, scientists understand each other and an open conversation can occur. If these preconditions are not met, they speak past each other, which means that they speak about anything but the same matter. This problem frequently arises in the human (anthropological) sciences and perhaps most strikingly in pedagogical thinking. It easily occurs that someone can spend hours on end on the pedagogical and even write ponderous books on it without ever or, at best, rarely, making use of authentic pedagogical categories. Then he talks and writes about matters other than the pedagogical, mostly about matters that have nothing or very little to do with the pedagogical, as such. In the majority of such cases there is no attempt to disclose the
pedagogical in terms of authentic pedagogical categories but rather
to assault the pedagogical in its primordial phenomenality with the
ready-made clarity of a system-truth and, as so often occurs, to
force into the recesses of this closed system the facts and
phenomena in their primordial design and given-ness in order to
interpret them in terms of the principles and norms of this system
of thinking. This means that the categories used do not originate in
(are not created from) the phenomena themselves but are applied
from the system to the phenomena. Then it is no longer the facts
that “speak” in their phenomenality but rather the influence and
results of a philosophy of life “speaks” with its acknowledged
hierarchy of preferred values, its own implied norms and categories.

(c) Pedagogical categories as the expression of the pedagogical in its
primordial phenomenality.

In the previous article, it is stated that the pedagogical event
embodies a primordial inter-human design and stake. It is a
primordial human event; it is an activity and, as such, it is an
activity-as-changing-with-the-aim-of-improvement. It characterizes
itself by a particular structure and, indeed, as a structure-in-
function. It is an encountering event in that it announces-itself-by-
answering-and-in-answering-an-appeal-to-answer: a not-yet-adult is,
in his wanting to become someone himself via his neediness for an
adult, is supported by an adult in accountable ways amenable to
becoming a person. What truisms lie enclosed in this primordial
dialogic event? The following are offered for consideration but with
the expressed understanding that they are merely second
preliminary samples. As a preliminary design, it also is an appeal
to the sympathetic reader to maintain an open discussion by
answering the appeal on his part to express better and more
insightfully the mentioned primordial inter-human event. Only in
such a way can we be co-expanders of the science of pedagogics.
The following categories are mentioned:

1. The category of expectation: For even the pedagogical thinker
well versed in a phenomenological foundation, the mention
of the category of expectation as a pedagogical possibility
might appear odd. All the same, in the writer’s judgment,
this category not only is viewed as permissible but as one of
the fundamental pedagogical categories. It must be continually kept in mind that the pedagogical event is an anthropological event. Whoever is faced with phenomena on an anthropological (human) level must continually keep in mind that all anthropological thinking, and thus pedagogical thinking, means reflecting on the foundation of the primordial fact of human openness. The latter is the stand, the Archimedean point, the essentially first given of being a person, namely, the fact of his being openness. Among all living beings the human being is the only one who never finds his world finished but it must continually be shaped and conquered for him to be able to dwell in it. In the humble judgment of this author, there is no possibility of a further cutting back from reflecting on human phenomena such as the mentioned primordial fact of being openness. It is a fait primitif. There often is talk of a religious a priori. Unquestionably there is that, but this a priori does not lay the foundation for ontic openness; it lies within it. The religious a priori does not bring being openness to the fore; it is a characteristic and unfolding as an embodiment of it. The idea of a religious a priori then also can be viewed as an ontological way of justifying what is given ontically. There also are other ontological categories such as the principle of creation, the idea of the law, moral self-consciousness, person, being a subject, freedom, responsibility, existence, transcendence, etc. Openness is at the basis of all of these categories. Why a human being is openness no one knows; it is a mystery and in this hides the mystery of our being human.

The above remarks were necessary. From this it must not be concluded, as should the author, that the pedagogical will be ontologized. However, who will design pedagogical categories on a phenomenological foundation can do this only against an ontological background. As already said, phenomenology only is possible on the basis of an ontology, thus against the background of that which is. The primary given is ontic openness. Openness not only houses the anthropological in its almost infinite wealth of linkages and variations but it also safeguards the distinctiveness and the irreducibility of the
anthropological, including the pedagogical. On this basis the 
fait primatief for constructing the pedagogical is the 
pedagogical event as a primordial inter-human event, an 
event sui generis, deducible from nothing else and that can 
be reduced to nothing else, as arising from being because of 
its rootedness in being as being human in its openness. Now 
the category of expectation lies at the center within the great 
field of openness within which all events, also those of an 
inter-human nature, play themselves out. Expectation attests 
to a primordial being interwoven with this primordial inter-
human event known as the pedagogical. The following 
succinct explications are made regarding this.

Everyone who is a person was born from a female person. 
Human birth as a human event immediately becomes an 
inter-human involvement: everyone who is a person was once 
someone’s baby, not as a possession for arbitrary disposal but 
as an expected and expecting possibility. Everyone who is a 
person had a prenatal period that he passed through during 
which he was carried and expected. Someone was on the 
look-out, and as is expected, to welcome him by letting him 
experience that he was expected and is welcome, not in order 
to leave again but to have a part in others by encountering 
them as he is encountered. In matters of this nature mention 
is made of the deep sounding ring that lies locked up in the 
idea of being an expectant mother, and with this also the 
great difference between a pregnant woman and an expectant 
mother. Pregnancy without the category of expectation refers 
to an organic process; pregnancy-in-expectation is an 
anthropological event. Merely being pregnant stands “thing-
like” over against a “growing fetus”, it is an “object-as-
organism” that preferably must be permanently gotten rid of 
as quickly as possible. There can be no provision of support 
if expectation is lacking; the “organism” that “reacts 
physiologically-biologically” at most will hold onto “life” but 
then as an “organism” that must “adapt” if he is to maintain 
himself “biologically”. However, he who is expected is 
accepted as a person involved in becoming a human being. 
This involvement in becoming human will receive an answer
to each call of distress because to be expected means the assurance of support in the vast ontic openness.

Ontic openness elevates a child’s wanting-to-be-someone-himself to pure possibility but then also to a possibility-independence on an adult for whom he has a need. This gives direction to the mentioned possibility by which the openness becomes possibility-in-expectation-as-abiding. The adult is abiding expectation. Being expectant is evidence of uncertainty and, thus, of tension because of responsibility. This state of affairs is evidence of everything except something mechanical as a process-like predictability of measured duration, of a being constrained by phases or of any form of obviousness such as being surrendered to a natural lawfulness. Childlike being certainly is no existence driven by blind processes and mechanical mechanisms but a guided existence as prospering self-guiding that, as such, accommodates possibility and potentiality. This holds the adult up to a principle of preparedness: when the possibility has occurred the continual preparedness is spontaneously ready to modify the occurrence or to support sharpening the possibility in the right direction. Also from the side of the educand the life of expectation remains: he is not a thing with characteristics but an encountering and encounter becoming being who in each moment of the life of expectation is to be encountered. Always his world openness elevates him to a being-in-need. And as the expectation is confirmed within the framework of the support giving encounter the future acquires certainty, sense and meaning in spite of its unfamiliarity. The unfamiliarity of the result of the occurrences awaken a readiness to make the certainty, the reliability, the durability, the inviolability, the unconditional validity and the meaningfulness of criteria into rules of conduct for his expectation.

The pedagogical event as the unfolding of openness is interwoven with expectation, with abiding, with hope and trust, with knowledge of security in the midst of unfamiliarity and even insecurity. To be expecting at the very least means to be a pure spectator and critical observer, but in order to
be engaged in becoming a person in inter-human concern and to prosperously remain involved in it. Expecting elevates the tension in order to remain ready to be able to answer the demands of each new situation with trust and security.

2. Category of futurity: The design of pedagogical categories as an activity of “ingenuity” is not a dividing but a discriminating function. Categories are interwoven with each other, touch and affect each other, assume each other and complement each other. Thus, the category of expectation already is futurity, while the latter is directed by expectation and especially by trust with security.

The concept of futurity, of perspectivity, of moving forward, an advancing being is integral, essential and thus inseparably interwoven with the pedagogic. And, once again: viewed anthropologically-ontologically, futurity is an ontological category as an accounting of ontic openness. Whoever says “pedagogic” says accountable and an accountable-susceptible intervention of an adult with a not-yet adult with the aim of the future of the latter. The pedagogical phenomenon, as an anthropological peculiarity, is testimony of an intervention by which change must be brought about with the aim of betterment. Both of the last mentioned propose a state of expectation that is not yet but must be brought about. A person is always that being who leads his life, which means he is behind himself, is in advance of himself and is involved in transcending himself. Thus, he not merely is, but rather he is involved with becoming human, not as a bio-psychic and morphological changeableness but as an existential-ethical-normative-and norm directedness-in-understanding-through-values. Now he can only lead his life because he possesses self-consciousness as consciousness of propriety. Consciousness of propriety is evidence of a not-yet-enough, thus a rising above the present and past. Consciousness of propriety is inseparably concerned with historical consciousness as a matter of past, present and future. Historicity must not only be viewed in its directedness toward the past but also and especially as futurity. All pedagogic intervention is prospective; pedagogic reproof, admonition,
warning, discipline, etc. are not retrospective matters. These have to do with himself taking up the future and accepting it but at the same time an acceptance by which the involvement in becoming human will be of a morally prospering nature.

Now, in addition, it also is the case that an educand meets this intervention that aims to the future, at least half way, because as a not-yet-adult he shows all of the signs and desires of wanting to be someone himself. His total attunement is directed to a future; he is futurity. If he were not this, providing support would be the greatest absurdity. Providing support is aimed at a visualized view of a future; it is horizon-making through activation: the idea of adulthood is invoked; the future is a guiding principle that, while providing support, also provides the tape measure in order to enter the future. The last mentioned are pedagogical categories; they refer to attaining a state that earlier was not. When adulthood is reached, the pedagogical wanes in the sense of giving support on the way to adulthood as futurity; this in no way means that futurity as an anthropological category now disappears. It is there just as fundamentally as earlier but it is different in nature and purpose. Now it no longer is becoming adult but adult becoming, the personal taking up oneself of one’s own future and that of others through accepting and shouldering responsibility. It almost is unnecessary to indicate that all pedagogical advice, all therapy, all vocational orientation and all guidance, on whatever level, also is future directed.

3. The category of normativeness: A person is a being who occupies an exceptional position. This exceptionality is so unique and peculiar that he is not comparable to anything else, either with respect to differences or similarities. His otherness lies in his humanness, the humanness of his being a person and, what is more, he and he alone is human. This holds for each mode of being human--his being a child, a youth, an adult or of old age.

It already was noted that a human is the being who never finds his world completed. He must continually shape and
conquer it because he is a being who dwells and must dwell. This shaping and conquering are so many ways of expressing or unfolding his ontic openness. Related to this, it must now be emphasized that this incompleteness and basic incompletability is not evidence of a handicap, defect or deficiency of a person in comparison with an animal. He is not at all an orphan of nature just as he is not an extension of it. Unlike an animal, a human is not locked up by instincts and specialized physical powers of nature in a specific way of living and thus is delivered to the blind lawfulness of a natural inevitability, but, on the contrary, is completely indeterminate. Through each deed, even the most simple, a person characterizes himself as a cultural being and not a being of nature. The so-called natural in humans is no naturalness qua nature but as culture, as human nature. Human nature is culture.

When it is said that human nature is culture it at least is implied that this refers to a ready-made or settled state. Human openness predisposes him to a cultural-being-with-a-mandate. He is involved in culture development and this is a continual, prospering, elevating and disciplining conquering-through cultivating his human nature that also has its sedimentation in cultivating nature around him. Only in doing this can he dwell. To be a dwelling being means to do a particular thing at a particular time, place and in a particular manner. This bears witness to an interference with the course of matters, an interference that gives evidence of a presence of norms or criteria, indeed, those of a moral nature. Never and nowhere does a human find himself outside of the presence of the normative and never and nowhere does a non-human find himself within it. Openness without normativeness is a contradictio in terminis: closedness with normativeness cancels the closedness. The expectant mother anticipates in normed-ness; the course of birth is a normative human event; it is normative power that receives the baby, cleans, dresses and feeds him; this in no way is a natural course [a course of nature].
From the above, it seems sufficient that a pedagogical event in its encountering and encounter becoming structuredness never can be thought of or reflected on without the normative. Giving pedagogical support, as responding to a need, means that the experienced need is involved in the meaningfulness and meaning attribution of norms, and a child prospers by remaining committed to them. This gives him the desired stage and foothold: he knows what he has, what he must do and what he can expect. Without the direction-giving and value-determining power of the normative there would be no pedagogical event at all and nothing but blind processes.

The greatest intermediary in the life of a human youth is the mother. She feeds, clothes and cleans him at a particular place, time and in a particular manner. What can originally be seen as bio-mechanical processes undergo incredible change. As soon as these processes become involved with the normative, they stop being processes. Strictly speaking, and radically viewed anthropologically, there can be no processes with respect to persons because nothing that humans are involved with and touch occurs outside of a normative relation. Be that as it may, without the presence and role of the normative, as an unfolding of the cultural of humans, they are delivered to and rooted in the dimensions of the mechanical, the physical-chemical, the biological and the psycho-biological. Consequently, it is very hazardous to speak merely of psychic development. Further, it decidedly is the case that a human is a being who must rest, who must be fed and cleaned and that, thereby and therewith, he also must take into consideration the laws of nature. What must never be lost sight of, however, is that this incorporated lawfulness is behind a person in his openness. He rests in order to be able to work again, he feeds himself in order to be in a position to act and he even takes medications in order to feel healthy again. The latter is not at all a biological state but a givenness-as-a-matter for embodying a particular future.
It is in light of the essentiality of norms, in the framework of the culture of a person, that all pedagogical intervention must be seen as normative and norming intervention.

4. The category of open situatedness: Each mode of being human remains, in its ontic openness, a permanently open, unfinished and incomplete possibility. No person’s existence progresses on a fixed course as though he ever could become a virtual robot. No person’s life prospers in terms of schemes, systems, -isms, averages or graphs. Also, the pedagogical event, in its inter-subjectivity, is an event-in-openness; it is an expectant and abiding event that is unpredictable and uncertain. In this light, authentic pedagogical thinking is not systems thinking or reflecting by means of the categories of a closed system. It is reflecting on an event out of its open situatedness as the totality of data with which the educand is actively involved. The non-adult must be viewed in his Dasein, as existence, and in his bodiliness, as communication, which he is from the moment of his birth. Pedagogical thinking primarily is averse to any and each attempt at systematizing and schematizing with their expressed tendency of being closed. Everything in pedagogical work must prescribe that one image or another, e.g., a sickness-image, a misdeed-image, a vocational-image, an environmental-image, an aptitude-image or whatever other thought-image not be used to surrender the educand to.

Pedagogical thinking does not aim at image forming or deductions from formed images and, at the same time, also not an image of its past history with its causal relations. Definitely more important than the image is the manner in which a child as a person continually moves in the most surprising ways outside of the boundaries of a system, thus breaking through the outline of the image and, in doing so, totally escapes from formulations and definitions. This escaping gives expression to an essential characteristic of being human, also in his mode of being a child, namely, his resolute refusal to rise to a rigid formalism of systems thinking. A person, and, thus also a child, never and
nowhere appears in a manual or a theory but always outside of them and, indeed, there where he is among and with others such as in his continual encounter involving with his parents, family members, family, circle of friends, playmates, playthings, the playground, church, school, etc. thus by them and things with which he converses and where he is a field of presence. He is always related to being, an encountering and becoming encountered being, a participant in his surroundings. He is a world-establishing and world-inhabiting being, a meaning experiencing and meaning giving subject as initiator of relations, thus he is with things present and thereby he is engaged in being.

Pedagogics views a child primarily as a human child in and out of his relation with adults, especially his parents, because whoever says child means being-in-the-world-with-mother-and-father. This is the point of departure. Pedagogical thinking, as a reflection on giving support to a child in need of support, immediately is directed to a child world as a mode of a human world. Who will support a child pedagogically must be familiar with the world of the one he will support, since providing support only can occur from this familiarity with the world of this other. And this world is and remains open in a continually changing situatedness. Thus, it then also seems sufficient that designing pedagogical categories only can occur by directly turning to a child himself, and indeed to a child in his childlike existence, to his childlike situation. Whoever, then, also wants to practice pedagogics in terms of pedagogical truisims (categories) must renounce many things such as a dogmatically colored theology, but especially a naturalistically oriented biopsychology.

5. The category of a place of safety: When it is said that a situation in a pedagogical respect means to-be-with-a-mother-and-a-father, this is an expression of a fait primitif, also for reflection on the event in terms of categories that are unfolded in the event itself. And this event is primordially human in each and every aspect. It is just because of this that the pedagogical event must be completely stripped of
any and all naturalism. A human child is fully human and as a human he is a being who wants to be someone himself. At the same time, he has a need for an adult because, in his wanting to be someone himself, he experiences intense insecurity (unsafety). Also, his call of need must be answered by an adult. This response provides him with the footing to venture into the future. An adult is and remains the complement of a not-yet-adult. And now those categories that contend that the role of an adult in a child’s and youth’s life must be absent must show a declining death in spite of a most balanced diet. No person can become an adult without an adult! There is no getting away from the fact that human youth, in their radical difference from animals, in most unmistakable ways have a need for others, fellow persons, adults and especially an adult with motherliness. In his ontological need he has to be understood and thereby supported. He asks for standing room, space and dwelling in which and from which he can live, can be peaceful and can experience emotional security. A newborn shows the clearest signs and inclinations of experiencing insecurity and uncertainty. He experiences the vastness, the grandiosity and, thus, the most frequent indifference of what surrounds him. This state of affairs lasts right through early childhood and in some cases even until adulthood. His yearning for safety asks for communication to be able to live. Already a newborn is presence and presence means to stand in a particular relationship to a point of rest, a constancy as familiarity. His yearning stems from the "uncanniness" of what is surprising and anxiety provoking. The greatest comfort for this yearning is the experience of motherliness, a mother’s lap and a mother’s arms. This is a yearning for dwelling, while dwelling means realizing safety. As the experience of safety diminishes and declines, dwelling loses content. This loss means his own interiority is covered up and he is deprived of it.

To be able to genuinely dwell means to have trust in the other person as “Mitdasein” (being-there with), hence his nostalgia also is a longing for intimacy without the danger of one’s own secrets being betrayed. To be able to dwell, then,
also means actualizing intimacy, creating an inner space as safety in order that the one in need can himself communicate with the other. And this is precisely what happens between a mother and her child, that situation where the pedagogical event is seen in its purest development. It offers delimited space full of intimacy. And when a new-born asks for space, at the very least, this does not mean the unlimited space in which he can feel so lost, but the delimited space that is loaded with protection and intimacy. The latter offers a home, safety and security. One also can describe being a child, as a mode of being human, as the yearning for having a home, for intimacy and stability. He wants to know where he is, who he has and what he can expect. The child-heart expresses an intense nostalgia for dwelling. This only can be otherwise with difficulty because, by virtue of his ontic openness, he is destined to dwell but to be able to do this there must yet be a point of rest as point of departure and an eventual point of return. Dwelling is an expression of human safety with another, but just that other person where the intimacy of the conversation will be maintained.

Anyone who understands something of the pedagogical event unconditionally will agree that a safe space definitely is a pedagogical category. One indeed gives support only to someone in need, and this especially is a child. And this support can only be of a prospering nature when the experienced need is conquered. That need disappears only there where there is a safe space. The matter becomes clearer when one considers what an adult represents in the life of a child. The adult offers a delimited space against the dangers of the unlimited, and this space also offers a perspective on the future, thus a gradual shifting of the boundaries of the safe space as a broadening of its horizon. It is with reference to this that the various roles of mother and father speak so clearly in the life of their children. However, this cannot be attended to here.

6. The category of sympathetic, authoritative guidance: This can be dealt in a very matter of fact way since what is included in this category has already been directly and
indirectly discussed in the previous explanations. It was indicated that the pedagogical has its roots in a three-fold anthropological givenness, namely, first that a child wants to be someone himself, second this same child has a need for an adult, and third that an adult responds to a child’s call of need. The pedagogical event, as a calling-and-answering-as-self-accountable event, is rooted in these three anthropological-ontological factualities. Without the needfulness for an adult, an authentically pedagogical could never take form; a support-giving adult could never take his place in the event and, as for a child, he would be delivered to himself.

With the explication of the category of a safe space, among other things, there is reference to a child’s ontic yearning for an adult as a longing for a safe space as rest and as a point of departure for world-designing and -dwelling. He wants to know where he is, who he has, what he has and what he can expect. And it is only here where authority pays a visit. It is not a strange grownup who becomes involved from the outside but a flowing from childlike nature itself. It is he who calls for support; fundamentally viewed, he is a beggar for authority. This statement cuts radically against the naturalistic vision of a child in all of its variants. This does not mean pedagogical reflection must be “from out of the child” or that a child is an authority-recalcitrant being. Whoever draws such conclusions never succeeds in seeing the onticity and what goes with it regarding child-being, as a mode of being human. It is his wanting to be someone himself that brings him into opposition, but, at the same time, it is an opposition that is on the periphery of his personal structure; also it is an opposition that can take on unlimited dimensions. In any case, he will not be extremely intractable to authority if the authority for which he begs is of a sympathetic nature. With this the problem of the wrong also can be broached: this essentially is there and always is, also with the most admirable adult. Here, attention cannot be given to this question. The fact is only that the category of authority is an expression of an integral moment in the total pedagogical event.
An adult answers the call of need for authority by himself embodying its significance for human life. He is a carrier of authority, but, as support-giving-in-responsibility, he indeed is an authoritative guider in that he unconditionally obeys the demands of the cultural norms and, therefore, as one obedient to authority, he also is the originator of a safe space. When he acts inconsistently there can be no safe space and then he delivers an educand to insecurity and uncertainty. At the same time, the authoritative guidance must be of a sympathetic nature. It is possible that the authoritative guider, as the carrier of authority, can be an exemplary person and a rigorously dutiful person with ruthless strictness compared to himself. If the latter, he does not bring about an encounter with the educand because the pathic, as sympathy, is lacking. Such a person overtaxes his fellow subject and drives him to inner insecurity rather than offering him the desired safe space. It is only he who sees and understands the child in his own world, and it is in this world in which need is experienced that he can encounter him and can give the desired support, not only by showing him the desired way but by walking this way with him as the sympathetic ally of the not-yet adult in his life of falling and rising. Whoever says education answers by responding to the necessity of the significance of authority. Educating is and remains a norm-centric event.

7. The category of freedom-toward-responsibility: The pedagogical event in its ontic structure is an existential ethical-normative-morally-standardizing event. It is a support-giving event for conquering what is ontically given, and this includes mastering freedom as the acceptance and bearing of responsibility.

A human being, as ontic openness, also is freedom, but freedom-as-possibility. Whoever describes a human being as freedom makes an ontological pronouncement. Freedom is an ontological category on a humane dimension. Freedom is a given of being human; it is unprovable but also it is axiomatically evident and inevitable. No one, not even himself, ever can deprive him of his freedom. As openness a
human being also is a task. And freedom, in its onticity, is a
task; it is possibility and, thus, opportunity. However
paradoxical it might sound, it also is so that a human being, as
freedom, is not free. More strongly, although he is freedom,
he never is free in the sense that he is without norms and thus
is totally unbound. What is ontically given must be ethically
acquired and assimilated. Freedom, in its onticity, thus, is an
opportunity for something and, indeed, to conquer what is
given in order to be in its service. And when there is living in
the service of freedom, this means freedom from the threat of
one’s own freedom, as a freedom to responsibility in being
bound to a higher authority. One who is in the service of his
freedom is an answering and self-responsible person. As a
doer of tasks under the demanding authority of norms he is
the emodiment of dignity as the highest characteristic of a
human being. Without conquering freedom, as the acceptance
and discharge of responsibility, dignity is threatened and
indeed also damaged.

The above usually accommodates the pedagogical. A child’s
call of need for sympathetic, authoritative guidance is
ethically motivated but ontically founded. As freedom, from
the moment of his birth, a human being is ethically
threatened; as a not-yet-adult, with the best intention in the
world, he cannot yet shape his world by conquering it so that
he can dwell in it with responsibility. The ethical call of need
has no naturalistic foundation as if it arises out of his being-
driven. The call of need is task-founded because a human
being is openness as a task; he is a person. All authentic
pedagogical events are responses to a child’s call to an adult to
ward off the threat of his given freedom so he can be in the
service of his freedom. This means that during his years of
being-on-the-way to adulthood, an educand abandons his
freedom in order to conquer it under a prospering
sympathetic, authoritative guidance. He allows himself to be
bound in order to become the master of his freedom as lord of
his will and servant of his conscience. The entire period of
pre-adulthood, then, also must be seen as one of intense need
because of a threat by freedom. This is not a demand but a
needful self-actualization of the sympathetic support from
adults to obey the demands of freedom. Briefly: all pedagogical thinking also must be a reflecting on the freedom that a human child is and must conquer ethically in order that he, as athe ontic task that he also is, can master his freedom to a prospering obedience to the authority of norms. It is a difficult, tedious and demanding way that must lead with relentless necessity to moral self-destruction without the sympathetic support of those who already are in the service of conquered freedom.

8. The category of adulthood: It might perhaps appear odd to pose adulthood as a pedagogical category. By reflecting, however, it ought to become quickly evident that adulthood must be viewed as an essential and, thus, as a necessary pedagogical category. What is more, all of the other categories, in their functional purpose, are attuned to it; adulthood carries and directs all of the categories.

We are faced with the undeniable fact of being that no person arrives in the world as an adult. His point of departure in his progress from un-closable openness, as an involvement in human becoming, is characterized by conspicuous helplessness, as needing help and as seeking support. He is completely dependent on an adult with motherliness. Without support by such an adult, he will die or if the support is defective he will languish and, therefore, he cannot dwell. However, the circumstance of birth does not refer to any handicaps, deficiencies or defects. It is a human ways of being that, as such, is attuned to co-human being as a thriving being in adulthood.

To be able to reach adulthood properly, he is and remains dependent on the support of someone who already is adult. What is remarkable is that he asks for and receives this support. All pedagogical giving support primarily is directed at reaching full-fledged adulthood worthy of a human being, which is the ability and constant readiness to accept responsibility for the aid he receives and to prosperously bear that accepted responsibility.
The essence of all educating is giving support to a support needing and support asking not-yet adult. To the degree that support from an adult becomes superfluous, to that extent his presence is declared to be unnecessary. As the need for an adult decreases and a safe space increases, i.e., as the authority of the norms acquires meaning, a child can design, conquer and dwell in his world without the support of another. Thus, it also is clear that the aim of giving support does not come from outside of the pedagogical event but arises from its own nature, namely, providing support towards adulthood.

Also, regarding the question of what is meant by adulthood, a consensus ought to prevail. Adulthod is that constant being-in-a-state of acting in each circumstantial situation such that this action will be in accordance with the highest demands of human dignity, also in interpersonal involvements. An adult can casuistically put the approvable aside and even violate the legalities in a particular ethics with its prescriptive flavor. The influence of a philosophy of life, at least, can be allowed to influence the contents of adulthood. There can be greater correspondence than differences between formal and moral matters. A fellow person in need allows all such differences to fade like ghostly forms.

REFERENCES

1. What the reader is offered is the subdivision of a chapter of a larger work that soon will appear under the title Prolegomena van ‘n prinsipiele pedagogiek. What is presented here will be found there.
2. A first attempt at characterizing the idea of the pedagogical is undertaken in an article that has appeared in the Extra-mural Student Annual of the University of Pretoria, 1960, Extra Mura: Die Pedagogiese [The pedagogical].

AUTHOR’S ENGLISH SUMMARY
Introduction: In the first number of this journal the author concludes his article on the significance of phenomenology for pedagogical thought by presenting the following statement: One very important question has remained unanswered, viz., if pedagogical thought implies reflection on pedagogical events in their ontical structure, and if this reflection must take place in terms of purely pedagogical categories, which categories reveal the pedagogical in an unadulterated manner?

In practicing a science, it is incumbent that one continuously questions himself about whether he is still involved with that with which he is pretending to be. This applies to pedagogical practice to an extraordinary extent, because pedagogical events are interpersonal and are related to the life of action and change, thus of approval and disapproval, of the permissible and the censurable. In his pedagogical reflection a student of pedagogy might wrongly make use of categories that have absolutely nothing to do with pedagogical phenomena, as such. In such a case pedagogy becomes a mere exposition to promote a certain practice—that practice that will give stature to the claims of a particular view of life and world philosophy. That this should happen is quite understandable, but then the essence of pedagogical events isn’t expressed in an unadulterated manner. Then pedagogy loses its autonomous character, and becomes the collection box of all kinds of scientific facts concerning the human being. In this way pedagogy cannot be constructed as a science.

The essence of pedagogical thought and pedagogical categories: The mind which reflects pedagogically is no different from that which reflects in theology, biology, physics, etc. It is the same mind, bound by the same rules as is any other scientific practice. Only the object of study differs; thus, other phenomena are reflected upon. Not any phenomenon can arbitrarily claim to be pedagogic. There must be a clear distinction between pedagogical and non-pedagogical phenomena. In reflecting on these strange events of being, different categories are made use of, in terms of which the essences of these events are revealed.
“Categories” implies those predicables (as designs of consciousness) through which is revealed what is embodied in the phenomena and that gives rise to its existence. The researcher predicates something concerning the phenomena, through which they are viewed in their essence. Therefore pedagogical categories should concern pedagogical events in their purity and originality. Designing and applying categories may not take place from within a closed system, neither in terms of schemes, -isms, averages, or graphs. In this way the pedagogical will be mutilated in its unity.

(c) Pedagogical categories: Pedagogical thought implies reflecting on a primordial interpersonal event in terms of predicables through which the mentioned events are manifested as an affair of encountering and being encountered. The following categories are briefly elucidated:

1. The category of expectation: It must be strongly emphasized that pedagogical events are not the product of processes of natural law; therefore the pedagogue dare not make use of one single law as applied by mathematics and biological, natural sciences. Pedagogical events are interpersonal events, and must be viewed against the primordial fact of human openness. All human events (including the pedagogical), as viewed against the background of existential openness, are incalculable and unpredictable. There are no blind mechanics as expressions of causal-mechanical determinations.

In the light of the above, the category of expectation is extraordinarily central in all pedagogical events. A mother expects her unborn child; it isn’t an approaching organism but a human being for whom preparation is made. She is expectant, which means that her child is accepted on his arrival, and that he innerly “experiences” that he is welcome. The expectation doesn’t end at birth, but increases definitely. A mother remains prepared, expecting to support her child when any need arises. She knows this is no organism or clockwork, but fundamental openness as
possibility. The unexpected may also arise. Also a child lives in expectation, and trusts that his parents will respond to his call of need; he also soon experiences that the unexpected may arise. Be that as it may, the pedagogical events are events of expectation and abiding; it is an event that increases tension, but not in the sense of decrease to achieve a condition of so-called homeostasis, not in the sense of fear, but of confidence, especially mutual confidence, trust and hope for good relationships.

2. The category of futurity: The categories of expectation and futurity cut across and intertwine each other; as a matter of fact, no single category can be regarded as asunder. Pedagogical events are indeed totality events; therefore pedagogical categories may be distinguished, but never separated.

Pedagogical events (as rendering assistance) are events of action (handling). They are the rendering of assistance to bring about change—change characterized by improvement and a child’s becoming. This gives rise to the idea of futurity, a future with meaning. All pedagogical effort, all pedotherapy, all therapy, all vocational orientation and vocational guidance are constantly prospective. Not the past is of most importance, but the future, which one must take upon oneself, not as an event of blind fatalism, but as an opportunity.

3. The category of normativness: The pedagogical event is an event sui generis. It is conspicuously a human event, and as such it is neither deducible from, nor reducible to, anything else. It is a cultural event and, as such, it is charged with norms or moral standards. The human being never finds his world completed; he has to shape and conquer it continuously to be able to inhabit it. Nothing takes place obviously or automatically in a human being. In a pedagogical respect one should never refer to processes and reactions but only to events, which means to understand the presence and the functioning of norms or criteria. As soon as the pedagogical is deprived of its
normative direction, it declines as an event, and becomes a blind process. Upbringing as educating implies involving a child, and keeping him involved in becoming human (to which he is predisposed as a human being). This means an involvement in definite cultural norms, norms that possess the qualities of purity, reliability, durability, inviolability, unconditionality and meaningfulness. It is only the normative that guarantees security and meaningfulness; therefore, the categories of expectation and futurity must be regarded as expectation charged with moral standards.

4. The category of open situatedness: A few remarks have already been made about human openness. Openness is an exclusively anthropological and, par excellence, a pedagogical category. Indeed, also a child is a complete human being from the moment of his birth; thus he is openness of being; it is with regard to this openness that an adult must act pedagogically. A child is being-related, which means that he is not only a being-of-being, but also an encountered-being. Just like an adult, also a child is both being-participant and especially being-engaged. He is, however, a being in need; therefore he is so extremely dependent upon an adult to assist him in his openness. A pedagogue views a child in his openness-in-situatedness with those who are able to give the necessary assistance. A child’s being engaged means to be humanly engaged. “Child” implies a human being in dependent situatedness; in essence this means with mother and father, with house mates, companions, the school, etc.

5. The category of a place of safety: Total human existence must be reflected upon in terms of purely human categories. Everything concerning a human being is purely human. A child is extraordinarily helpless at birth, he is in need of assistance; he is seeking support. These conditions do not, however, testify to any backwardness, deficit or defect. They do give rise in a child to an intense inner experience of forlornness, and a resulting longing for safety. The encounter with his mother allays this longing. His mother, or at least an adult with motherliness, gives
him what he is longing for, i.e., a place of safety. The latter is not only a structural condition but also a peculiar characteristic of the pedagogical. Indeed, a place of safety guarantees intimacy; that a child’s own weakness will not be made public. A place of safety ensures for a child a point of rest and departure, but also a point of return. The author is immovably convinced that a child can only grow up adequately if he experiences safety. A balanced diet plays an exceedingly small part in a child’s becoming human.

6. The category of sympathetic, authoritative guidance: It is true that a child is someone who would like to be someone himself; but it is also a true fact that a child has need of an adult. The pedagogical event implies that an adult responds to a child’s call of need. A child is someone who wants to know where he is, whom he has, what he has, and what he may expect. It is an appeal to sympathetic, authoritative guidance; someone who can show him the way, but who can also accompany him on the way; someone who will not betray him when he stumbles and falls, but who will support him. The category of authority is, therefore, not forced upon the pedagogical event; it originates in the event itself, and is initiated by a child. He longs for authority, and he begs for it; but for authority that does not brutalize, tyrannize and victimize. These do not ensure stability and a place of safety, but effect exactly the opposite. What has been said concerning the category of sympathetic, authoritative guidance, not only gives proof of how integrally authority is intertwined in all pedagogical events, but also shows how fundamentally anti-naturalistic the total pedagogical event is.

7. The category of freedom-toward-responsibility: The pedagogical event, in its ontical structure, is an existential-ethical-normative-morally standardizing event. It is an event of assisting a child to conquer what is ontically given; it also includes mastering freedom as the acceptance and bearing of responsibility.
A human being is ontical openness and, at the same time, freedom. Without the latter the former has no meaning. Freedom is not something, but opportunity toward something: to give stature to the openness as possibility in a worthy manner. The freedom that was given ontically cannot be proved. At the same time it is axiomatically evident and inevitable. Nobody, not even the individual himself, can deprive him of his freedom. However, what is ontically given must be ethically conquered by a child. It sounds paradoxical, but a human being, as freedom, is, at the same time, not-free.

A human being was given freedom to further his dignity in the greatest openness. And if such is the case, then he has conquered the freedom that he is to serve. He who serves freedom, lives in responsibility. Conquering freedom is a moral concern; the more successful the conquering, the more bound a person is. Thus, conquering freedom points to freedom from being-driven as freedom toward responsibility and, therefore, before something or someone.

A child is freedom from birth onward, but, at the same time, he is threatened in his freedom, because he cannot use it yet. Thus, pedagogical support means to assist a child in his release from being-driven; he must be released from the power of his instincts to become responsible before and to the highest authority.

8. The category of adulthood: It may perhaps appear peculiar to introduce the category of adulthood as a pedagogical category. Reflection soon gives proof of the fact that it is the most inclusive pedagogical category. It directs and bears all the others and, what is more: the abovementioned categories in their functional direction are destined for adulthood. It is remarkable that no human being is born as an adult. From an early stage a child gives evidence that he is someone who would like to become someone himself. This someone falls within the frame of adulthood. Thus, a child is on his way to adulthood; therefore, pedagogical
support essentially means assisting toward adulthood as moral independence, as the acceptance and bearing of responsibility. It is a long way for a child to come. At the same time, it is a way that cannot be followed without the support of an adult. As a child progresses on his way, the part played by an adult gradually becomes unnecessary until the latter eventually becomes non-essential.