CHAPTER 1.

THE RELATIONSHIPS: PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY/FUNDAMENTAL PEDAGOGICS/PEDAGOGY

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[1.1] INTRODUCTION

In a recent article in *Tijdschrift voor Opvoedkunde*, Keersmaekers makes the following statement: “*The pedagogical is also distinguished from sociology in one other respect. The pedagogical maintains, in particular, a positive relation with philosophy although it no longer is a deduced addendum to a closed philosophical system. This is not to say that sociology does not maintain a positive relation with philosophy but that this relation is different from that between the pedagogical and philosophy. The relationship of the pedagogical is more intense and close precisely because the pedagogical has a totality-phenomenon as its object (just as philosophy does) and sociology is a science of an aspect [of human reality]. The bond between the pedagogical and philosophical is called positive with regard to content as well as method.*”¹ It cannot be denied that there is a positive connection between the pedagogical and the philosophical. That the pedagogical cannot be deductively inferred from a particular philosophical system must also be agreed with. Whoever wants to construct the pedagogical in a deductive way reduces it to an applied philosophy and such a “pedagogics” cannot make the claim of autonomy. However, the question remains about how this positive bond between pedagogics and philosophy can be seen in its real essentiality. In the quotation two essences are mentioned in this regard, i.e., *content* and *method*. A clear example of the latter is the use in pedagogical thinking of the philosophical approach


known as the phenomenological method. As is known by all, the philosopher Edmund Husserl is the initiator of this method and today it is applied by a number of subject scientists, among which are pedagogicians, although in a way that deviates from Husserl’s phenomenological method. The “methodological” bond between philosophy and the pedagogical cannot be denied and today it is accepted.

As far as the “content” is concerned, it must first be determined what such a bond means. It can mean nothing other than that certain content with which philosophy involves itself also can be meaningful for pedagogics. In this context, one especially thinks of that philosophical area of scientific study known as philosophical anthropology that, in turn, involves itself with the question of the essence of being human. It interrogates and considers fully the humanness of being human, i.e., what it is that makes a human being human as a totality. This questioning of and thinking can only occur by human being itself; thus, the subject at the same time is also the object and viewed in this way, the central task of philosophical anthropology is self-reflection.²a

When there is talk of a “content” bond, in the first place this means the bond between pedagogics and philosophical anthropology.

[1.2] THE RELATIONSHIP: PHILOSOPHY/PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY

Before the relationship between philosophical anthropology and pedagogics can be more closely considered, brief attention first must be paid to the concept “philosophy” itself and then to the relationship between philosophy and philosophical anthropology. To obtain clarity about this there must be a consideration of the relationship philosophy/subject science.

Philosophy is a system of knowledge or, as Langeveld describes it, it is radical and systematic, i.e., a logical, accountable consideration of the entirety of everything that is.²b To be in such a position, a philosopher must take into account the results of the various subject

sciences but without making any of these data absolute and also without viewing philosophy as the sum total of all subject scientific knowledge. A philosopher must inquire about the deepest foundation, the sense and meaning of the appearing world. On the other hand, a subject scientist who wants to penetrate to the ground of his subject must independently enter the terrain of the philosophical. By ground is meant that he must inquire about the essence, the from which and the to which of his empirical data. Regarding this deepest scientific ground, H. de Vos expresses himself as follows: “With the question of the ground and essence of reality or of everything connected with it, a new question easily arises about all of this, i.e., of the totality of their being and occurrence and in particular of the human being, his world and his life.” In their deepest ground, then, philosophy and subject sciences are not in opposition to each other but are meaningfully related to each other. The ground of both can be traced back to human being as a practitioner of science and each can profit from the thought of the other because knowledge acquired by a human being never remains unelaborated.

From the above, it is clear that a philosopher and a subject scientist ultimately are confronted with the question of himself as a practitioner of science. Derbolov states this as follows: “Der Mensch, das in Frage gestellte Wesen, ist zugleich das in die Frage hineingestellte Wesen.” This question can be carried back more deeply, i.e., to the question that a human being asks of himself. Such a self-questioning is only possible because a human being is existence. He is in a position to step out of himself, to transcend himself so that he can interrogate himself and the ways of his being in the world as well as the ways in which this questioning occurs. This means that not only the ultimate scientific ground of each human science, but also of each science, must be sought in the terrain of philosophical anthropology. This truth holds all the more for the human sciences. Thus, W. Loch indicates directly that for its part philosophical anthropology has contributed to a more adequate knowledge of being human so that the various sciences that involve themselves with being human also feel compelled to expand on such

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a regional anthropology.\(^5\) (Here regional anthropology means a [philosophical] part perspective on being human). The foregoing implies that each human science that interrogates being human from its own dimension or perspective, thus also pedagogics, the science that interrogates being human from a pedagogical perspective, must be grounded philosophically anthropologically.

Before the relation philosophical anthropology/pedagogics can be ascertained, there must first be a look at precisely what ”philosophical anthropology” means.

By philosophical anthropology is meant interrogating and reflecting on the essence of being human that reaches further than external data. However, in no sense does this mean that philosophical anthropology is reducible to one or another philosophical system. Philosophical anthropology will only understand being human in terms of itself and thus will only make use of categories (existentialia) that are applicable to being human. According to Loch philosophical anthropology, as “Wissenschaft vom Menschen” proceeds from three suppositions:

1. the essence of being human can only be understood from the phenomena and actions of human life itself and not from extra-human data;
2. the essence of being human is not [completely] definable and fathomable; and
3. no form of human phenomena might be made absolute.

Following these criteria it is easy to distinguish between a philosophical anthropological and a natural scientific approach to being human. Where the former arrives at a deeper understanding, the latter stipulates being human as a “type or class” that is morphologically as well as physiologically compared with “other” types of animals in order to establish a genetic [i.e., developmental] bond for purposes of classification.\(^6\) Where the questions of philosophical anthropology are directed to the qualitative, to the

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essence, origin and destiny of being human, a natural science anthropology only gives importance to the quantitative and measureable. This is not to minimize in any way that empirical data can contribute to philosophical anthropology. Indeed, Portmann, e.g., has made an essential contribution to philosophical anthropology from biology. However, there must be a warning against a view such as H. Mohr’s that an anthropology can only claim to be scientific if it is grounded in biology. Indeed, such an anthropology will be in a position for phylogenetic and ontogenetic research but will ignore the humanness of being human because the reciprocal dependence of person and world is not noticed. Always whoever says human being says world, and whoever negates a human world by proceeding in a so-called “objective and scientific” way, e.g., by only taking into account his biological way of being in the world, and thus not recognizing him as a totality in communication, will also deprive him of his humanness. Such an objectivism is a scientism that amounts to a complete absolutizing of a natural science way of thinking and thus also amounts to annulling the lifeworld.

When in this chapter there is talk of an anthropological pedagogics, this implies that it is a philosophical anthropological pedagogics; philosophical anthropological because it will refer to a view of being human that is more than the sum total of the variety of his “characteristics” and that also recognizes a human being’s relatedness to being and, therefore, that sees him as a totality in communication. For these reasons it can be summarized with Dienelt that in all cases pedagogics is only justified by philosophy. The pedagogical is always an exclusively human matter and a pedagogician turns himself to that way of being human without making it absolute. However, now the problem is: Is pedagogics a philosophy or is it an autonomous science?

[1.3] THE RELATIONSHIP: PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY/PEDAGOGICS

[1.3.1] Introduction

In the previous section it was indicated that the ultimate scientific ground [of pedagogics] must be sought in philosophical anthropology. Also, as a subject-science with its own area of research, it does not have a focus different from pedagogics. Indeed, pedagogics is most closely concerned with philosophical anthropology because it primarily involves itself with human beings. Pedagogics is so closely related to philosophical anthropology that the question arises about whether it is a part-area of knowledge of philosophical anthropology and, therefore, can be nothing more than an applied anthropology.

These and a number of related questions are closely related to the concepts pedagogical anthropology and anthropological pedagogics that are so often used, and sometimes confusedly, in pedagogical works.

That pedagogics is closely connected with philosophical anthropology has already been noted and discussed by fundamental pedagogues of note at one time or another. Rohrs indicates that Kant, under the direct influence of Rousseau, had already stated clearly that “der Mensch das einzige Wesen, das erzogen werden muss und nur durch die Erziehung Mensch zu werden vermag”.11

Further, Rohrs indicates that Pestalozzi, in his writings, also is deeply aware of the anthropological foundations of pedagogics. Also Poggeler, commenting about the relationship between pedagogics and anthropology, says that these sciences define each other and, in addition, are committed to each other because pedagogics inquires about the meaning of being human and also because a human being can only be what he ought to be through education.12

Schoeman expresses himself astutely about this connection: “When the pedagogic is now seen as an anthropological phenomenon it is permissible to assert that the pedagogic problem shows another side

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of the nature of the anthropological. In other words, the pedagogical refers in an undeniable way to the anthropological: when the question about the essence of educating is asked, it is also a question about its possibility. When this essence-question is formulated, indeed, there is a stepping into the terrain of the anthropological. The question of possibility, as an anthropological question, can be formulated as follows: what kind of being is a human being that he educates, is educated and who lends himself to and is committed to education.\(^\text{13}\) For Schoeman stepping into the area of philosophical anthropology by pedagogics is not only permissible but is a decisive precondition “when the possibility of educating, as a way of being humanly situated, is readable from it”.\(^\text{14}\) Elsewhere, in this connection, Schoeman also talks of a thematized anthropology because the pedagogical has to do with “the human phenomenon that is called pedagogics”.\(^\text{15}\) From these quotations it appears as if pedagogics can be a part-area of knowledge of philosophical anthropology or that pedagogics is only an applied anthropology that can make no claim of autonomy. Later it will become clear that this is not the case, and not because pedagogics has an autonomously delimited terrain of research and also independently interrogates life reality from its own particular perspective. It is, however, clear that the problem of grounding pedagogics can be a thorny matter from which many problems flow of which the most central are that pedagogics is viewed as a form of philosophical anthropology and that its practice is seen as the application of philosophical results. Before proceeding to a possible solution to this problem it is necessary to look further into how prominent thinkers view this problem.

For Dopp-Verwald the question of the essence of educating is also a question of the essence of being human because being human without educating is unthinkable.\(^\text{16}\) Thus, the question about the possibility of educating is also a question about the essence of being human. However, Zopfl warns against pedagogics venturing to make

\(^{13}\) Schoeman, S. J.: “Die Mensbeeld by die Pedagogiek”. In Nel, B. F.: Jubileumlesings, Faculty of Education, University of Pretoria, 28.

\(^{14}\) Ibid, 29.


pronouncements about the essence of being human. For him this is the exclusive task of philosophical anthropology.\textsuperscript{17} For Zarzil it is again clear that the pronouncements of philosophical anthropology are also mainly pronouncements of philosophical essences.\textsuperscript{18} Speck summarizes these ideas as follows: \textit{"Paedagogik und Anthropologie sind aufeinander bezogen; die Frage nach dem Sinn der Erziehung nicht zu trennen."}\textsuperscript{19} Also, for Loch the question of the essence, meaningfulness and necessity of educating is simultaneously a question about the essence of being human and to meaningfully answer this latter question, he must also find a meaningful answer to the question of the possibility and meaningfulness of educating.\textsuperscript{20} Groothoff indicates further that without an image of being human educating is just not possible because there must first be an understanding of everything that being human includes so that educating can proceed in accordance with that image. Before one can arrive at a founded image of being human one must first consult or study philosophical anthropology. Thus, as Langeveld points out, not just any image of being human makes a pedagogics possible. For him, an accountable pedagogics is not possible if being human is viewed as a mere product of nature. Also, Dreschler points out that the pedagogic indeed is a part of [philosophical] anthropology because the latter deals with being human as a totality, i.e., with being human in its total involvement with world and reality.\textsuperscript{21}

From the discussion so far and with reference to a number of prominent educationists it will increasingly become evident whether the pedagogic can be indentified with philosophical anthropology. They seem to be so intertwined that it will be difficult, if possible, to make an adequate distinction. For Roth pedagogics is nothing more than a philosophy made practical: \textit{"Wenn die Philosophie als Philosophische Anthropologie oder Ethik praktisch wird, wird sie Paedagogik."}\textsuperscript{22} However, for him the reverse is also true: if

\textsuperscript{20} Loch, W.: \textit{"Der Paedagogische Sinn der Anthropologischen Betrachtungsweise"}. In \textit{Suid-Afrikaanse Tydskrif vir die Pedagogiek}, Vol. 1, No. 2, 81, 1968.
pedagogics is the further inquiry of empirical data then it is philosophy, i.e., educational philosophy. Also, for Bohme pedagogics is a practical philosophy. This philosophy has become practical because it has a practical function to fulfill. “Die Philosophie muss so vorgetragen werden, dass sie die Bildung des Menschen wesentlich mitbestimmt.” If indeed the pedagogic is a practical philosophy then it has no right to exist as an autonomous science.

Another problem that is closely related to the pedagogic as “practical philosophy” is the relationship between pedagogics as a pure science and its application in practice. For example, is it logical to speak, as does Langeveld, of the pedagogic as a normative-practical task of philosophy? Indeed, if philosophy is practiced by applying it in concrete educative situations, it is no longer philosophy! Dopp-Vorwald and Dreschler, then also make a clear distinction between pedagogics and the science of education. Accordingly, pedagogics is the more practical-normative science while the science of education is purely theoretical in nature. Also, Derbolav indicates that the science of education does not interest itself primarily in what a human being ought to be but in what a human being factually is.

This distinction that is made between pedagogics and the science of education is not scientifically accountable because pedagogics can be nothing other than a science and science is a theoretical matter although the theory is also a theory of a practice. Thus, there cannot be agreement with Dopp-Vorwald, Dreschler and Derbolav because, as a science, pedagogics is necessarily theoretical and cannot dare to be prescriptive. Roth and Bollnow make a distinction between a science of education and pedagogics on the basis that for them pedagogics is concerned with a teaching aim—it

must give prescriptions to practice about how educating ought to be, while the science of education is a purely theoretical matter. Also, for Strasser a phenomenologically oriented pedagogics, that for him is therefore a fundamental pedagogics, is not yet a fullfledged pedagogics because it is only descriptive. For it to become a fullfledged pedagogics, it must be supplemented by philosophy of life contents.30

As indicated above, because pedagogics is a science and not a practical or post-scientific matter, it cannot be other than descriptive, although it does also describe norms! However, it cannot be agreed that the pedagogic then must prescribe what is proper. The huge problem that the above thinkers run up against is that pedagogics, unlike other human sciences, is concerned not only with being human as it is but also with being human as it ought to be, and instead of describing the proper or the norms as they are found in practice, pedagogics must also prescribe how the norms ought to be, i.e., it will prescribe practice. Thus, Roth, e.g., indicates that the aim of educating cannot be separated from the question of the destination of being human.31 In addition, for him pedagogics always remains historically bounded and therefore is not in a position to independently formulate an educative aim. If it is so that pedagogics is not in a position to formulate its own formal aim, and therefore it must make use of aims that might be prescribed externally, it cannot be a science because, in advance, it gives up its autonomy! At most pedagogics will then be a system of applied dogmatic or metaphysical biases. However, the fact is that pedagogics is in a position to formulate a formal aim or aim structure. Hence, Landman views ‘adulthood’ as the formal aim with the following part-structures as criteria for adulthood:

1. Meaningful existence
2. Self-judgment and self-understanding
3. Respect for human dignity
4. Morally independent choosing and acting
5. Responsibility
6. Norm identification

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Outlook on life (philosophy of life)

This structure is universal because it is valid for all educative situations. However, what disturbs Roth, Speck, Strasser and others is that they also want to view the scientifically formulated aim as a particular matter that, therefore, ought to be full of philosophy of life contents. If this indeed is the task of pedagogics then it could not be in a position to independently set its aim and its aim must be prescribed from outside of pedagogics and, in which case, pedagogics will become an applied science. Indeed, a science can only be descriptive and if it now will prescribe, then it must overstep its own boundary in which case it will discontinue being a science. However, it is certainly the case that the generally valid aim structures must be furnished with philosophy of life contents and this is possible because these structures are viable; then it must be realized that this is a post-scientific matter. That is, the fundamental pedagogical structures can be made viable in particular situations of educating, but this is other than practicing science and is not pedagogics but pedagogy [educating].

With this discussion of the connection between philosophy and pedagogics and also the relationship between theory and practice we have not yet come closer to a solution to how pedagogics can claim to be autonomous. A possible solution perhaps can be found by investigating whether the particular perspective on the anthropos taken by pedagogics can guarantee its autonomy. Indeed, with a unique area of research it ought to be able to be clearly distinguished from the other sciences involved with human being.

[1.3.2] The idea of perspective

The pedagogic is an exclusive but not the only anthropological reality. Human being is a totality in communication and if a pedagogician will now begin with the pedagogic situation he can do nothing else than to also view being human in his total involvement with reality. Indeed, even if the pedagogic moments are to be

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distinguished, they cannot be separated absolutely from a person’s total being in the world because a person is not the sum total of various ways of being in the world. His way of being-there refers to the fact that he is an existing unity. In other words, the different realities out of which a person’s lifeworld exists, such as the reality of educating, of society, etc. are not independent but are co-constitutive of each other and thus also of his entire being-there in the world. Now it also is so that it would be naïve and presumptuous to claim that one science can penetrate the entire lifeworld. If a scientist will make any claim to a scientific penetration, then he must take a slice of the lifeworld without separating this slice (aspect, facet, area of reality) from its relationships with the universal lifeworld. Thus, from a specific position he must focus his view on that slice of reality he has delimited for his scientific practice and in doing so describe its being and meaning against the background of the universal lifeworld itself. To be able to take a pedagogical perspective a pedagogician must first turn to the lifeworld (in contrast to non-living reality) so that he can look at the lifeworld (in contrast to the non-human life reality) because it is only there that he will find the reality of educating. This ‘reality and world’-problematic is schematically (also logically and clearly) explained by Landman\(^\text{33}\) as follows:

![Diagram of lifeworld](image-url)

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As one intervenes with them

(1) World = what I understand from a), b) and c). (World = horizon of what is understandable, knowable).
(2) Experiential world = what I experience from a), b) and c).

As can be seen from this scheme, all of the human sciences are involved with the lifeworld. They each interrogate being human but each formulates its question in a particular way in accordance with the facet of being human to which it is directed. The specific pedagogic question can be formulated as follows: “How must a knowing educator, as authoritative, trustworthy person and representative of the norm image of adulthood, in his association with and encounter of an authority-questioning child who is possibility in becoming, who ought-to-be-someone-himself and who is entrusted to him, support him so that he can progressively be recognized as the human person [he ought to be]?”

To obtain an answer to this question a pedagogue must turn himself to the total person in the reality of educating in order to understand him as a being becoming educated. It is only through a *phenomenological* attunement or disposition that a person is grasped as a continually becoming totality within his spatial and temporal being-bound. This personal becoming and the help an educating adult offers a child who is becoming adult is the terrain on which pedagogical-anthropological questions are focused. These questions implicate the tension between what is and what ought to be.

Above it was mentioned that the real essentials of being human can only be understood through a phenomenological attunement. Consequently, an authentic pedagogical perspective will only be possible if it is a phenomenological perspective by which also all non-phenomenological perspectives must be bracketed. In other words, a pedagogical perspective alone will not be a guarantee that the pedagogic questions can be answered meaningfully. It is only when a pedagogue clearly prepares himself to enter the reality of educating itself *and* also is prepared to perceive, describe and explicate this reality as it essentially is without disturbing or obscuring his topic of investigation by another obscuring

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perspective that the scientific nature and autonomy of pedagogics can be a possibility.

Because all of the human sciences have their own perspective on the lifeworld and thus their own delimited terrain of research, it is easy to distinguish them from each other. As far as pedagogics as such is concerned, there is still a problem that, although illuminated, is not yet solved; i.e., the other sciences are concerned with human being as what it is and thus, without jeopardizing their scientific nature, they can describe the reality that they illuminate as what it is. It seems to be otherwise with pedagogics because in a pedagogic situation the concern is also with what is proper. Indeed, if the pedagogic question is how to support a child so that he can become the person he ought to be then a pedagogue[/practitioner] (not a pedagogician[/scientist]) must venture into the terrain of what ought to be in particular educative situations. Now, a pedagogue really can only venture into this terrain if he first has made a scientific study of the proper in its essence. This problematic of how what is and what ought to be affect the scientific nature of pedagogics is dealt with later.

Thus far a phenomenological pedagogical perspective on the lifeworld seems to be a precondition for guaranteeing the autonomy and scientific nature of pedagogics. However, a number of prominent pedagogicians also talk of an anthropological dimension of or anthropological approach to the pedagogic event. It will thus appear as if the anthropological can also be a perspective on this event. To attempt to determine in any sense an answer to the possibility of such a perspective it will be necessary to consider the possibility and meaning of an anthropological pedagogics.

[1.3.3] The possibility and meaning of an anthropological pedagogics

Viewed globally the term ‘anthropological pedagogics’ refers to the contemporary educative thinking that is characterized by the fact that being human is interrogated from being human, or as Van der Stoep states it: “Anthropological pedagogics refers to a modern direction of educative thinking by which questions [arising] from
being human are asked and answered about the fact of educating.”

Before the possibility of an anthropological pedagogics can be reflected on a closer look must be taken of what precisely is understood by this concept, especially as used by Loch and Bollnow.

For Loch anthropological pedagogics is a part-science of pedagogics that has its own terrain. It studies all of the possible forms of human expressions and behaviors from a pedagogical perspective. Hence, its task is the study of the different forms, means, contents and aims of educating. Thus viewed, anthropological pedagogics looks for anthropological categories within pedagogics. It asks what the phenomenon of educating has to offer the illumination of the question of the essence of being human as well as what human preconditions belong to realizing the pedagogical. Briefly: It will understand being human from educating. Loch states that if a pedagogue starts with an educative situation with the anthropological question, i.e., the question of the essence, origin and destination of being human then he will necessarily come to the conclusion that a human being is dependent on education to be considered as a human being.

Also, Bollnow is of the opinion that anthropological pedagogics is a part-science of pedagogics. It only makes use of the approach of philosophical anthropology. In other words, for him anthropological pedagogics is not involved with the findings of philosophical anthropology, in which case it would only be an applied science, but indeed with its approach. There is a question of the particular modes by which being human manifests itself, such as trust, safety and hope, in order to see what pedagogic significance they have.

Now the question arises whether it is necessary to talk of an anthropological way of reflecting in pedagogics. Indeed, the phenomenon of educating can only be found where it is embedded in an educative situation as this arises between and among human

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36 Loch, W.: Die Anthropologische Dimension der Paedagogik, 82.
37 Ibid, 104.
beings. If there is mention of the pedagogic, this already presumes human being. However, the fact is that in the early years many pedagogical works appeared that emphasized the anthropological of the pedagogic event. These works must be seen as an objection against particular anthropological conceptions where one aspect of being human becomes equated with being human as such and also against the non-anthropological approaches to pedagogics. Here one thinks of all of the natural science terms and expressions that are used to ‘illuminate’ a pedagogic event. The ‘pedagogical’ terminology is closely connected with natural science methods and techniques that are used, and indeed used in education. It is especially the case with an objectivistic attitude of knowing that a human being as subject is dismissed as far as possible. Thus human being is approached from nature and then he also is nothing more than an extension of nature. He is also approached from being animal. Since animal experiments are much easier, data from animals are used to describe and explicate the reality of educating. Indeed, in this connection there can be talk of an ‘animal pedagogics’. However, this is nonsense because this name already refers to a contradiction; indeed, ‘animal’ completely excludes the possibility of the pedagogical.

The name ‘anthropological pedagogics’ thus must only be seen as an attempt to emphasize the specific human nature of educating. With this name a distinction is made between pedagogics and an unscientific natural science oriented pedagogics. In addition, this concept indicates that such a pedagogics sees human being as a totality in communication without making one of the ways of his being-there absolute and without falling into one or another anthropological conception.

However, this author is convinced that the name pedagogic alone is sufficient. Even so, there are educationists who, in addition to anthropological pedagogics, also make use of the concepts ‘personal pedagogics’ or ‘personalistic anthropology’, but this also is unnecessary.\[^39\] If there will be a further development of the idea of anthropological sciences then [the names of] all of the sciences that are concerned with human beings and their behavior would be

preceded by the adjective ‘anthropological’. However, this is unnecessary since a human science, indeed, cannot be involved with anything other than a human being.

Also, if the name ‘anthropological’ acknowledges that human being is questioned from being human then this also would be an unnecessary label since no science can have its origin anywhere other than in being human. Indeed, an animal cannot practice science! However, when one proceeds to the grounding of a science it is necessary that there must be reflection on how a human being can account for what appears to him as reality. Although this is a fundamental question still it remains unnecessary to place anthropological before [the name of] a human or even a non-human science because no science is possible except from being human!

[1.3.4] The possibility and meaning of a pedagogical anthropology

The concept ‘pedagogical anthropology’ refers to a certain perspective on being human, i.e., the pedagogical. Consequently, pedagogics is thus a subdivision of philosophical anthropology. It describes being human which is necessarily dependent on education.

For Loch pedagogical anthropology is also not an autonomous science. For him it is only concerned with the contributions that the phenomenon educating makes to the better understanding of being human. Just as in the case of anthropological pedagogics, pedagogical anthropology also views human being in educating; however, it goes further and views being human as a whole. In other words, it does not limit itself just to an educative situation as such but to all human activities such as, e.g., traditions, culture and religion in order to see what pedagogical meaning they have. Viewed in this way, the pedagogical event is a category of human Dasein. Derbolav’s view of pedagogical anthropology is in agreement with this. For him it is a science that views the entirety of human life from a pedagogical perspective.\(^{40}\) Thus for him the result of the other subject sciences such as biology, psychology,

sociology and the cultural sciences can be looked at from a pedagogical perspective with the aim of applying the acquired insights to pedagogics. So viewed, pedagogical anthropology is only an auxiliary science of pedagogics and no autonomous science.

Also for Bollnow pedagogical anthropology is a part science of philosophical anthropology and an auxiliary science of pedagogics. Pedagogical anthropology is philosophical anthropology in the sense that it not only has the same method and point of departure as the latter but also because it makes an essential contribution to philosophical anthropology. In other words, pedagogical anthropology is an anthropological endeavor from a pedagogical perspective but not only an anthropology that is practiced only for the sake of the pedagogical.

For Sussmuth the question of an educative need at the same time is a question of the essence of being human but now for her the concept of educative need is also a ‘Zentral-kategorie anthropologisch-paedagogischer Forschung’ and now there is an attempt to illuminate this category from a pedagogical perspective with the aim of making an educative pronouncement about the educative need and to disclose the need for education in its anthropological meaning. In other words, pedagogical anthropology will study the human need for education to be able to arrive at a grounded image of being human.

Long before Sussmuth, Langeveld had emphatically referred to the human need for educating. For him the fact that a human being is a being that educates, is educated and is committed to education is ‘one of the most fundamental characteristics of the image of being human’. To now acquire fundamental knowledge about the essence of being human one must start from this fundamental fact of being. If this approach is followed then this points to the possibility of a pedagogical anthropology as a part science of philosophical anthropology.

Above it is indicated that educating is one of the most fundamental characteristics of an image of being human which implies that there are still other ways in which a person’s being-in-the-world is characterized. Thus, e.g., Gerber\textsuperscript{44} refers to religious activities that are studied by theology, social activities studied by sociology, etc. But none of these activities could be studied without accepting educating as a fait accompli. Indeed, without educating, a person could not have become a religious or social being and he would be in even less a position to practice science. Consequently, educating is the most fundamental human activity because without it other ways of manifesting being human could not possibly be meaningful. Thus, by studying the educative event, fundamental knowledge about being human can be illuminated. Hence, no genuine anthropology can neglect studying this fundamental way of being human without its image of being human being ungrounded. The part science of philosophical anthropology that is involved with this basic aspect of being human is known as ‘pedagogical anthropology’. A pedagogue who studies the reality of educating, however, is known as a pedagogician and the science that he practices is known as ‘pedagogics’. Thus viewed, there is a clear distinction to be made between ‘pedagogical anthropology’ as a part science of philosophical anthropology that has the aim of acquiring fundamental knowledge about being human and ‘pedagogics’ as an autonomous science that studies the reality of educating as it is in order to obtain authentic knowledge about [the phenomenon] educating. Here, as it is indicates that a pedagogician can only be in a position to be an authentic scientist [of educating] if he follows the phenomenological method.

Summary: Since educating is so fundamental to being human it can be used as a category for illumination the various ways of human being-in-the-world such as being-in-a-meaningful-world, co-existence (being-with), temporality (futurity) and being-someone-oneself. Thus an anthropologist can use the category ‘educating’ to illuminate these different ways of being-in-the-world with the aim of disclosing basic knowledge about being human from an educative

perspective. However, to be in a position to do this the anthropologist must first enter into a conversation with a pedagogician because he has already made a thorough study of the reality of educating and therefore has purely pedagogical categories at his disposal that the anthropologist can then implement to still better illuminate the essence of being human. In other words an anthropologist who wants to study being human from the pedagogical perspective must first consult pedagogics in order to understand the category educating that he will use as an illuminative means of thinking. Again, a pedagogue is going to implement the category ‘educating’ to illuminate the different ways of being-in-the-world in order to obtain authentic knowledge of educating and thus he will not then practice an anthropological pedagogics but indeed an autonomous pedagogics that reflectively particularizes and applies its own means of thinking [categories].

[1.3.5] Summary

After discussing the possibility and meaning of a pedagogical anthropology it seems that the connection between pedagogics and philosophical anthropology is very strong and that some pedagogicians view pedagogics as a scientific area of philosophical anthropology and hence not as an autonomous science. This may appear to be the case but this author is convinced that it is not. The problem is in the name ‘pedagogical anthropology’ because it implies that the pedagogic is a subdivision of philosophical anthropology. If one proceeds from this assumption then it is easy to criticize others who recognize pedagogics as an autonomous science. For example, Van der Linden contends that Langeveld’s world-renowned work, ‘Beknopte theoretische pedagogiek’, is primarily philosophical and secondarily scientific. Then he also contends that the title of this work must rather be ‘Beknopte theoretische anthropologie’. Van der Linden also accuses Langeveld of ambiguity because “he uses the term pedagogics ambiguously. Sometimes he means anthropological pedagogics is the empirical (especially when he speaks about adolescence), sometimes pedagogical anthropology is a regional ontology (especially when he speaks about the aim of the pedagogic)”.

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Is it indeed the case that the reality of educating shows itself ambiguously; or is it much simpler, i.e., that there is only educating among and between persons and that the concept ‘pedagogics’ already expresses unambiguously that it is a science that deals with the phenomenon of educating as it arises with persons in educative situations. If the adjective “anthropological” is placed before or after pedagogics it can serve no other purpose than to promote obscurity. Regarding the needlessness for this, Oberholzer expresses himself as follows: “These days so readily there is talk of an anthropological pedagogics and that, in the construction of pedagogics as a system of critical-accountable knowledge, anthropological work needs to be done. The former is and remains a tautology since all pedagogics is anthropologically oriented. The latter refers to a method (methodological technique) that is advocated in contrast to a scientistic-naturalistic-objectivistic approach. It remains inconceivable how anthropological work can be done in the practice of human sciences.” Also, the concept pedagogical anthropology is inadequate for that science that defines itself by the event of educating because then it is limited to one part of philosophical anthropology. Now, however, it is the case that pedagogics is an autonomous science with its own area of study, i.e., the educative event. In addition, pedagogics makes autonomous decisions regarding its own aims by reflecting on the educative event itself and thus does not allow philosophy or any other subject to prescribe what must be pursued by pedagogics. Pedagogics is also in a position to disclose purely pedagogical categories in independent ways through the phenomenological approach. Just as it is absurd to speak of a social [sociological] anthropology, a psychological anthropology, an economical anthropology, a linguistic anthropology or whatever other anthropology, it is just as absurd to speak of a pedagogical anthropology! Whenever there is reflection about the science of education it is much simpler and more correct to speak only of a pedagogics and thus avoid any ambiguity.

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Also it can no longer be agreed that anthropology is a pedagogical way of reflecting. Indeed, anthropology is not a method! The literal meaning of the fact that a pedagogical event is approached or considered anthropologically is that it is human beings who are approached and reflected on. But indeed pedagogics, as a human matter, cannot be approached except anthropologically, and thus through the *anthropos*! Any other approach is impossible. However, the question is *how* must this human phenomenon known as educating be approached. The only meaningful way is by means of the phenomenological method. If one attempts to penetrate, without prejudging, the reality of educating to the deepest grounds of its being, then the anthropological foundations of a pedagogical event must be observed and understood. By taking the pedagogical event as a point of departure, the pedagogical cannot be anthropological-ized, just as the anthropological cannot be pedagogical-ized by doing this. Through a phenomenological attunement it will further be seen that the pedagogical essences also can have real content, e.g., sociological, psychological, moral and religious moments but that this does not detract from its autonomy. These moments only emphasizes that an educative event is a purely human matter that can be distinguished but not separated from a human being’s total being in the world. A phenomenological attunement can also illuminate another problem that has been alluded to, i.e., the relationship between theory and practice and how this affects the character of pedagogics. In a pedagogic situation there is not only involvement with a child or an educator but also with norms. In other words this involves a child who must be helped by an educator to increasingly obey particular demands of propriety. Now it is the case that norms are found only with human beings. However, norms, as a human matter, are also more than being man; they are a matter of the ideal because they cannot be completely realized by a person. That a human being is a normed and norm-directed being is a scientific finding because norms are generally valid and necessary for all human beings. On the other hand, no norm exists without particular content. This apparent contradiction has led many thinkers to doubt the scientific character of pedagogics. Although it appears as if the thesis ‘*norms as universal phenomenon*’ has an antithesis in ‘*norms with particular content*’, both are elevated and included in the synthesis ‘*human being as normed and norm-directed being*’.
This reasoning is presented schematically as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NORM AS UNIVERSAL PHENOMENON</th>
<th>NORM AS PARTICULAR CONTENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SCIENTIFIC (First thesis)</td>
<td>POST-SCIENTIFIC (Second thesis)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**HUMAN BEING AS NORMED AND NORM-DIRECTED BEING**

PRACTICE (Synthesis)

If the above is taken into account, this means that pedagogics cannot be grounded in being human as such, and also not only in norms but indeed in being human in an educative situation where norms give direction. In other words, pedagogics as a science must be grounded in educative events as they appear in educative situations between and among human beings. If now there is a further inquiry back to the first grounding of this situation one will find a person’s being in the world as the first [pre]condition. To the question of how this original characteristic of being has been brought to light, there is only one answer i.e., the phenomenological method. The only meaningful approach to or way of reflecting on a pedagogical event as it is in its primordial structural being is the phenomenological approach. In this context, when there is talk of ‘pedagogics’ then by this it is already emphasized that it is an exclusively anthropological matter and thus that it is unnecessary and even confusing to speak of an anthropological dimension (Loch) or an anthropological reflection (Bollnow) or to place the adjective ‘anthropological’ before or after pedagogics.

In summary it is concluded that pedagogics is an autonomous science that directs itself to the exclusively human phenomenon of educating. Today there can no longer be doubt about the autonomy of pedagogics as a science and F. van der Stoep directly states that ‘beyond all doubt it is a settled matter’. The autonomy of pedagogics is closely related to the phenomenological method.

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because it is the only approach for disclosing the reality of educating as what it really essentially is and as its relationships really essentially are. Through a phenomenological viewing, a human being’s need for education is seen as a fundamental way of his being-in-the-world. This need comes to light as being so fundamental that it is clear that it must be investigated by an autonomous science that cannot be an application of another one.

Now the question that surfaces is whether a child’s human situatedness is a different being in the world than that of an adult and if this means the being-in-the-world of a human child or adult. We now consider this question, i.e. the relationship between philosophical anthropology and child anthropology as well as the meaning of the results of this comparison for grounding pedagogics.

[1.4] THE RELATIONSHIP: PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY/CHILD ANTHROPOLOGY: INTRODUCTION

Educating is a human matter and, as has appeared in the previous pages, the phenomenological method is a particularly meaningful way of approaching this event. Whoever penetrates a pedagogic event phenomenologically will find that the event is only possible in a situation where there is at least one adult and a child. The question that must be answered is if a child is a different human being than an adult. If indeed this seems to be the case, there also must be a consideration of whether a study of child anthropology is not a precondition for practicing pedagogics. There must also be an investigation of whether there is a difference between child anthropology and pedagogics. Further it must also be determined what significance the findings of child anthropology have for fundamental pedagogics foundationally as well as methodologically.

Before the above question can be considered there must be a precise determination of what is understood by child anthropology and of the relationship between philosophical anthropology and child anthropology.

[1.5] THE RELATIONSHIP: PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY/CHILD ANTHROPOLOGY/PEDAGOGICS
Traditional philosophy has not noticed or studied the child as a particular way of being human and, therefore, can make no real contribution to child anthropology. Rousseau with his ‘Emile’ had paid attention to the child but Noordam indicates that philosophical anthropology first began to take an interest in the child as a way of being human during the period of Romanticism. He indicates that Shiller and his student Froebel paid attention to the child by showing that play is a necessary way of child being as a way of being human. Also, this philosophical anthropological disclosure did not remain without pedagogical significance and it was especially Froebel who purposefully made use of child play to help a child on his way to adulthood. What at first was accepted as obvious and on which the philosopher had never dwelled, i.e., that being human began as being a child, would now be viewed all the more clearly. In this context, Noordam writes: “The Romantic was then also of the opinion that an authentic anthropology could be successfully created if one took one’s point of departure in the child.”

Poggeler indicates that earlier an adult was viewed as a better form of being human but that today the same value and meaning are attributed to the different levels of human becoming. Hence, in contemporary pedagogics there is no longer talk of a child as a non-adult but indeed of a not-yet-adult. The older concept has a negative meaning and indicates a lack in the child with the implication that it is more proper to be an adult. Poggeler believes that philosophical anthropology, in its search for the essence of being human, must still have adulthood in view. However, he will proceed differently and “a human being looks to his adulthood in a specific situation of his growth.”

If philosophical anthropology wants to penetrate to the essence of being human then it must view it in its totality. Thus, in addition to an adult way of being human it also must consider a child way of being human. In addition, a child must be encountered in his world so that child-being can be understood as a mode of being human and thus the latter can be grasped in its totality. Already at birth a

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50 Ibid, 8.
person is a full-fledged human being but that he is still a different human being, i.e., he is a human child.\textsuperscript{51} It seems beyond debate that a philosophical anthropology that does not also inquire about the child will capture only a one-sided and inauthentic image of being human. For this reason Stoffer and others distinguish a scientific area within philosophical anthropology that they call pedology [focused on the anthropology of child and youth].\textsuperscript{52} Also Pienaar stresses the idea that child anthropology is an essential part of philosophical anthropology.\textsuperscript{53}

From the above it seems that today child anthropology must be seen as an indispensable part of philosophical anthropology. Now the question is what precisely is meant by child anthropology? According to Oberholzer it is “the study of the child as anthropos. As such it is the study of a form of being in its thorough connectedness: it is a childlike way of being that is constitutive of being-human-as-a-child. Child-being represents a mode of being human; as such it is being-in-openness, but then with the emphasis on a child-human way of being; the humanness of a human being lives and works as a child-humanness which is just as essentially human as any other mode of being human”.\textsuperscript{54} Langeveld emphasizes that child anthropology is a situation-anthropology: “Also: reden wir von einer ‘Anthropologie’ im Bezug auf des kindlische Sein, so handelt es sich nicht um das Junge einer Homo Sapiens-Sorte, sondern um ein situationsbedingtes, situationsschaffendes, situationsbedingendes Wesen. Diese Situation heisst und heisst nur: ‘Erziehung’.”\textsuperscript{55}

As already indicated, pedagogics concerns itself with an educative event as it is realized between and among human beings. A phenomenologically oriented pedagogician will find that there is at least one adult and one child in an educative situation and that in

\begin{itemize}
\end{itemize}
this situation help is going to be given to a child on his way to adulthood. In order to acquire authentic knowledge of educating a study must be made of the adult as well as the child with particular emphasis on the adult as educator and the child as educand. Groothoff also states emphatically that before the question of the possibility of pedagogics can be answered, the question of the essence of a child must first be answered.58 Also, for Vandenberg the lifeworld of a child is the only authentic pedagogical grounding.57 In agreement with Langeveld, Loch also unambiguously expresses himself about this: "Die Erziehung lasst sich nicht beschreiben, ohne zugleich das Kind zu beschreiben als den Menschen, durch dessen merkwürdige Beschaffenheit die Erziehung est notwendig wird und der im Erziehungsverhältnis das Gegenüber des Erziehers ist. Gerade der Erzieher, demm es ja um das Kind leidenschaftlich und verantwortlich zu tun ist, muss an der Frage, was für ein Wesen das Kind ist, auf Grund seines paedagogischen Engagements mit einer unausweichlichen Notwendigkeit interessiert sein, weil er, um erziehen zu können, ein Bild vom Kinde haben muss."58 Langeveld states this very clearly: “The theory of education has to undertake a serious analysis and interpretation of what the child is.”59 Such an analysis is necessary so that categories can be acquired that can be applied to a child as a human being.60 Thus, these must be categories for thinking that allow the real essentials of child-being as being human to be disclosed. Langeveld chooses to qualify these categories with the description ‘anthropological’. He chooses this term because it involves the being of a child as a human being.61 Elsewhere he qualifies the term anthropological with ‘and therefore also ontological’ to unambiguously express that his anthropology is

ontologically founded. For Langeveld the two *fundamental categories* of child anthropology are ‘educating’ and ‘being-someone-oneself’. Further, in the same work he says ‘Growing to maturity’ is the ‘most central fundamental category of childlike being’. ‘Growth’ alone is inadequate as a category for him because it is a purely biological category that has nothing to do with being human. “Im kindlichen Leben handelt es sich aber um ein Werden auf Mundigkeit hin – auf sittliche Selbständigkeit oder: auf volle verantwortlichkeit hin.”

From the above it is clear that pedagogics cannot neglect to study child anthropology, but then from a pedagogical perspective. However, this does not mean that pedagogics is completely centered on the child and that therefore it is only a child anthropology or the reverse. Indeed, if this were done then one would fall into a pedocentrism because only one facet of the educative situation is made absolute and the results of such a non-phenomenological reflection cannot be applied to support a child on his way to adulthood. Langeveld indicates that such a view loses sight of the fact that “die Kategorie des Kindes immer schon die Erziehungsbeziehung und deshalb die Erziehungssituation als Grundbedingungen menschlichen Seins voraussetzt”. In other words, an educative situation involves a child in education, thus a child involved with norms where he is helped by adults to obey the demands of propriety to a continually increasing degree so that he can reach proper adulthood as his destination. In addition, a child is also involved in an educative situation to reach proper adulthood as a mode of being human. In other words, child anthropology is only a part perspective of pedagogics. In agreement with W. Rest, Poggeler also talks of *pedology* as an area of science within pedagogics that deals with the pedagogical anthropology of a child.

64 Oberholzer, C, K.: “Die Voorwaardes vir die Konstruksie van die Pedagogiek as Wetenskap”. In Sonnekus, M. C. H.: op. cit., 121. **English translation:** http://www.georgeyonge.net/node/27
From the above discussion it is concluded that pedagogics is more than a mere study of the child or the adult. Langeveld repeatedly indicates that philosophical anthropology does not study being human, as such, but only being human in situations. Pedagogics is involved with a particular situation, i.e., a pedagogical one. A scientist who wants to engross himself in this situation can do nothing else than turn to the child and adult in it. Child anthropology plus adult anthropology does not equal pedagogics; it is only when an adult and a child associate with each other in an educative situation that there is a phenomenon, i.e., the pedagogical, that becomes visible and it is only in this situation that educating can be an object of study. In other words pedagogics has child- as well as adult-anthropology as possible areas to be studied from a pedagogical perspective. The most meaningful way to know the phenomenon ‘educating’ as it appears there [in a pedagogic situation] is to let it speak for itself and not allow one or another anthropology to prescribe to it how it must be. For example, an investigator who turns to this situation [from a non-pedagogical perspective] must be content with a disturbed appearance of it and thus cannot be in a position to practice science because the knowledge that he acquires is such that it cannot make the claim of being generally valid and necessary.

From the above it seems that there is a positive connection between pedagogics and philosophical anthropology with the latter’s child anthropological and adult anthropological facets. It also came to light that child anthropology and adult anthropology can be seen as part perspectives of philosophical anthropology of which a pedagogician must necessarily take note. The phenomenological method can now be seen as a connection that maintains the unity among these part perspectives on being human and pedagogics; also a pedagogician who avails himself of this method finds that he has being human as an area of study, just as does a philosophical anthropologist, but then only being human in a particular, i.e., pedagogic, situation. Knowledge of this situation in no way can be deductively inferred from a general philosophical anthropology but is only possible by means of an independent illumination so that the foundation of its being, its fundamental structures and its sense and meaningful connections can be seen. The ground of its being or the
first [pre]condition for pedagogics, and also for any other science, is Dasein, a person’s being-in-the-world, that consequently is also called the \textit{ontological category}. Already illuminated are a variety of ways that Dasein manifests itself and that have pedagogical significance such as: (i) Being-in-a-meaningful-world, (ii) Being-with (co-existence), (iii) Temporality (futurity) and (iv) Being-someone-oneself. However, since a child is situated differently than an adult these modes of appearing necessarily must also differ. In section [1.6.3] below, possible \textit{categories} are looked for that verbalize specific childlike ways of being-in-the-world and in section [1.7] there is further consideration of the degree to which such \textit{categories} can be applied to illuminate the situation of educating with the aim of better understanding it. It is necessary to take this approach since a pedagogic event cannot be grounded only in the world situatedness of adult human beings.

\section*{[1.6] THE RELATIONSHIP: PHILOSOPHICAL PEDAGOGICS/FUNDAMENTAL PEDAGOGICS}

\subsection*{[1.6.1] Philosophical pedagogics}

That there is a positive connection between philosophical anthropology and pedagogics has now clearly emerged. This close relationship is especially noticeable with the part science of pedagogics that is involved with philosophical questions such as the grounding and understanding of the pedagogic event. The name \textquote{philosophical pedagogics} or \textquote{philosophy of education} has long been viewed as the best name for this part science of pedagogics. Now, a phenomenologically attuned thinker will continually make certain whether the name he uses is still the best grammatical form for grasping this reality that it verbalizes. After a critical look it seems, e.g., that the name \textquote{philosophical pedagogics} is sometimes interpreted as a particular educative doctrine of one or another philosophical or educative system. In this connection Oberholzer expresses himself as follows: \textquote{“The main reason such a name is abandoned is because one always expects that then an exposition or even a bit of apologetics must be provided for a desired pedagogical system or teaching practice.”}\textsuperscript{68}

\textsuperscript{68} Oberholzer, C. K.: \textit{Prolegomena van ‘n Prinsipiele Pedagogiek}, op cit., 128.
From the above it seems that there must be critical reflection on the appropriate name for that part science of pedagogics that especially involves itself with questions of grounding and understanding educating. In the following the category ‘fundamental’ is closely examined to see if a possible solution to the problem of the best name must be sought there.

[1.6.2] The category “fundamental”

In section [1.5] mention was made that Langeveld wanted to ground his anthropological categories ontologically (logically in being). However, the question is what is it that is most original or most fundamental of being? Before going into this question, there are a few comments about the concept ‘fundamental’ as such.

The origin of the word fundamental can be carried back to the Latin noun ‘fundamentum’ that means ground, foundation. When a noun is qualified by ‘fundamental’ then this refers to a grounded or founded matter. The Afrikaans verb ‘fundeer’ is also derived from the Latin verb ‘fundare’ meaning to provide a foundation of or grounding for something.

In order to now find categories with ontological status, thus with the aim of grounding them, there must be an interrogation regarding the deepest grounding of the being of what is. Landman states very emphatically that the ontic is realities that are given as not being able to be thought away, as unquestionable, as undeniable and evident. Thus he also differentiates between ‘ontic’ and ‘being’ where the latter is the being at hand of that without which the human lifeworld cannot be thought. This ontic founding is the opposite of a speculative metaphysics as a fundamental emanation from above the world’s sphere because the former refers to a radical going into a worldly situation. In his introduction to ‘Sein und Zeit’ Heidegger says that he will ask the question of the being of being anew and will develop this idea further in this work. This fundamental philosophical question, stripped of all technical philosophical terminology, is stated as follows: How is it really possible for something to shows itself to human being as reality and
how can a person account for this? This is the most radical or fundamental question because it recognizes the fact of being and asks further for its deepest foundation as the meaning of being. To be able to answer this question a human being, as a being of being, must turn to being human itself.

Epistemologically the ground of being must be sought in being human, not in the sense that being human is its origin but merely because being can only be questioned by human being. In order to acquire authentic knowledge it will thus be meaningful to begin at the beginning of all human knowledge, i.e., with being human itself. The philosophically schooled know that their point of departure is indeed from the world and, although it is not obvious, is influenced by particular presuppositions (not prejudgments!). These presuppositions only become clear to him when he purposefully directs himself to himself and to the way he directs himself to reality. He is aware that he must turn his intentionality, as a beam of attending, back to his consciousness as a consciousness of being-with, thus with his Dasein as being in the world. This is possible because a human being, as existing being, is in a position to transcend himself such that he can ‘objectively’ face himself as well as the way he goes out to and communicates with the world in which he finds himself. By thus critically viewing himself, as if from a distance, he can acquire knowledge of what possibly impedes his perspective on the world and thus also distorts his dialogues with it. In knowing this he can purposefully avoid these impediments and distortions and increasingly be capable of authentic knowledge of himself and his world. A ‘scientist’ who disregards human being or cannot or will not recognize that all human knowledge has its beginning in being human itself must be content with false knowledge and his science will remain up in the air because it has no firm foundation.

Ontology, as one of the oldest disciplines of philosophy, has been occupied with metaphysical questions about the nature of being and thus various ontologies had arisen. However, these ontologies were not fundamental because they began with being as such. Heidegger indicates that the origin of all ontologies must be sought in the

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70 Ibid, 61.
existential analysis of Dasein and in this analysis the question of being comes up for discussion.\textsuperscript{71} If the various ontologies indeed are founded in being then they are fundamental because they inquire about the most original of what is. Heidegger feels very strongly about this: “Solange jedoch die Wahrheit des Seins nicht gedacht ist, bleibt alle Ontologie ohne Fundament”.\textsuperscript{72} Thus there is a clear indication that there must be a fundamental ontology that serves as the ground, basis or foundation for all other (regional) ontologies. In this context regional ontology means other sciences that involve themselves with the various ways of being human such as psychology, sociology or pedagogy [i.e., in this context pedagogics, the science of education]. These sciences cannot be labeled as ‘regional’ if they are not grounded in human being in the world. However, fundamental ontology is also more than just the foundation for the other ontologies because another of its tasks is to make the meaning of being understandable. To be able to do this a fundamental ontology must penetrate to the deepest foundation of being to bring to light its essentials that are thus universally valid and to verbalize them in an organized and systematic way. Kilian states this in a striking way: “As a science, fundamental ontology is systematic because it tries to capture universally valid insights into being and the meaning of being in organized and systematic ways. That which is (being) is ordered and systematized by a fundamental ontologist in practicing his science. Fundamental ontology as a science aims to be radical in the sense that in his scientific practice a fundamental ontologist tries to penetrate to the roots (radix), as foundations/or preconditions (Bedingungen der Möglichkeit) for the being of beings in general. Through an existential-phenomenological act (Durchsichtigmachen), the primary aim of fundamental ontology is the illumination of beings in their being.”\textsuperscript{73}

[1.6.3] **Philosophical pedagogics as fundamental pedagogics**

A philosopher wants to understand reality and therefore he seeks the primordial ground of being as the first precondition for that which is. With regard to pedagogics, this means that a philosophical

pedagogue will search for fundamental pedagogical structures, their meanings and relationships. To be able to understand these meanings and relationships a fundamental pedagogician must search further for the real contents of the fundamental pedagogical structures so that he can apply these contents as categories and in doing so to throw additional light on the phenomenon of educating so it can be seen increasingly more clearly and thus better understood. To be able to function as an illuminative means of thinking the pedagogical categories must have ontological status and this means that they must be grounded in the deepest foundation of the being of what is. The pedagogical categories, as categories of the lifeworld, thus must be ontologically-anthropologically grounded.

For pedagogics (as well as any other science) fundamental ontology is the only firm scientific foundation. Pedagogics must begin no place else than with human being’s being-in-the-world. By beginning there the pedagogue will be in a position to disclose the fundamental pedagogical structures as generally valid, necessary and indubitable essences of a pedagogical situation, provided he is prepared to think phenomenologically. In other words, he will only be in a position to authentically think pedagogically when he takes the reality of educating as his point of departure as it is embedded in the lifeworld and if he is prepared and able to use the category ‘educating’ as an illuminative means of thinking. That is, fundamental pedagogics is only possible by using the phenomenological approach from a pedagogical perspective. For Landman then fundamental pedagogics is also fundamental because it is grounded on the following three fundamental cornerstones:

1. phenomenology is only meaningful as ontology
2. ontology is only possible as phenomenology
3. phenomenological thinking is categorical thinking.74

Because fundamental pedagogics searches for the deepest foundation of the being of or the radical origin of the pedagogical, it is nothing other than philosophical pedagogics. However, as indicated above, preference is given to the name ‘fundamental

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pedagogics’ because ‘philosophical’ can refer to a grounding in one or another philosophical system while ‘fundamental’ indicates that the science is *founded* in the lifeworld itself against the background of universal reality. This means that the *fundamental pedagogical categories* are illuminative verbalizations of the lifeworld itself; that is they are reality-expressing words that are acquired in the light of the category ‘educating’ that itself is also a verbalization of an evident, essential reality in the lifeworld. Thus, e.g., a fundamental pedagogician pursues the following procedure in order to particularize pure *pedagogical categories* that have ontological-anthropological status:

The *ground- or ontological- category ‘being-in-the-world’* is taken as the point of departure for pedagogical thinking because, as already indicated, it verbalizes the first precondition for all scientific practice as well as for all additional categories. Now, it is clear that a human being is situated in the world in a variety of essential, irreducible, indubitable and evident [anthropological] ways such as:

(1) being-in-a-meaningful-world
(2) co-existence (being-with)
(3) temporality (futurity)
(4) being-someone-oneseif.

Because he is situated in the world in a variety of ways, each of these ways of being also can be implemented as illuminative means of thinking, thus as ontological-anthropological categories so that additional ways of being human can become visible. Thus, in the [illuminative] light of the category ‘being-in-a-meaningful-world’ it is noticed that a person’s giving meaning occurs on his own responsibility and the concept ‘giving-meaning-on-one’s-own-responsibility’ can be particularized as an additional category of it. In addition, it also can be seen that a meaningful lifeworld is a world in which a person must exert himself to be acknowledged as a human being. Consequently, the concept ‘breaking-away-from-lack-of-exertion’, as an ontologically-anthropologically grounded category, also is used as an illuminative means of thinking for bringing to light additional essential ways of being human. It is also noticed that a meaningful lifeworld is only possible through the acceptance and acknowledgment of norms and therefore it is
meaningful and justifiable to use ‘normed-bodiliness’ for thinking in order to better understand being human.

Summary: The following additional anthropological categories can be particularized from the general anthropological category ‘being-in-a-meaningful-world’:

(1) giving-meaning-on-one’s-own-responsibility
(2) moving-as-a-breaking-away-from-lack-of-exertion
(3) normed-bodiliness [as exemplifying and emulating norms].

In the same way, in light of the lifeworld realities verbalized as ‘co-existence’, ‘temporality’ and ‘being-someone-oneself’ additional essence of being human are observed that also can be applied as categories to further illuminate these essentials of being human.

From the general anthropological category co-existence:

(4) venturing-with-each-other
(5) gratefulness-for-security
(6) responsibility-for-relationships

From the general anthropological category temporality:

(7) hope-for-the-future
(8) designing-possibilities
(9) fulfilling-destination.

From the general anthropological category being-someone-oneself:

(10) respect-for-dignity
(11) task-of-self-understanding
(12) freedom-to-responsibility.

If the lifeworld, as verbalized by the above twelve [anthropological] lifeworld categories, is viewed from a pedagogical perspective, i.e., if these lifeworld activities are illuminated by the category ‘educating’, then pedagogical activities will become visible that are verbalized as follows and, as such, they can be used as founded, pure pedagogical categories:
(1) giving-meaning-with-increasing-responsibility
(2) gradually-breaking-away-from-lack-of-exertion
(3) exemplifying-and-emulating-norms
(4) venturing-with-each-other-pedagogically
(5) gratitude-for-pedagogic-security
(6) accountability-for-educative-relationships
(7) hope-for-future-adulthood
(8) designing-possibilities-for-adulthood
(9) gradual-fulfillment-of-destination
(10) increasing-respect-for-human-dignity
(11) becoming-adult-though-increasing-self-understanding
(12) acquiring-responsible-freedom.

These verbalized pedagogical activities can now also be used as categories for illuminative thinking about all of the other fundamental pedagogical structures and can, in their turn, again illuminate these structures. This means that any educative essences (fundamental pedagogical structures and their essences) can be applied as illuminative means of thinking (categories). Thus viewed, all of the pedagogical structures and all of their real essences are applied as fundamental pedagogical categories to illuminate the reality of educating because they also have ontological- anthropological status by virtue of their relationships with the founded pedagogical activities. These other fundamental pedagogical structures that have already been brought to light by pedagogical thought-work, are presented again for the purpose of further explication. (See chapter three for the educative essences).

A. Pedagogical relationship structures:

(1) relationship of understanding
(2) relationship of trust
(3) relationship of authority.

B. Pedagogical sequence structures:

(1) association
(2) encounter
(3) [engagement] acceptance of responsibility for interference
(4) pedagogical interference
   (i) intervention
   (ii) assent
(5) return to pedagogical association
(6) periodic breaking away from pedagogical association.

C. Pedagogical aim structures:

(1) meaningful existence
(2) self-judgment and self-understanding
(3) morally independent choosing and acting
(4) respect for human dignity
(5) responsibility
(6) norm identification
(7) philosophy of life

These fundamental pedagogical structures and their real essences, however, will be seen even more clearly and their meanings and relationships will be understood even better if child anthropological categories can also be particularized.

In the section [1.5] on the relationship between philosophical anthropology/child anthropology it was indicated that child being, as a mode of human being, must also be kept in mind. This is necessary because a child, as human being, is situated in the world differently than an adult. Pedagogics must make a thorough study of the lifeworld of a child if it wants to answer the question about the essence and the possibility of educating. Pedagogical categories that do not do justice to the real essentials of child being, as a mode of human being, cannot be categories that are founded.

In order to find child anthropological categories that have ontological status one must begin with the first fundamental precondition that makes being human and all of its ways of being possible. This original characteristic of being human is his Dasein, or his being-in-the-world, and this refers to the totality of all of his relationships that are designed by him in his life reality. Because a child is different from an adult one must begin from childlike being-in-the-world. Indeed, being-in-the-world refers to a being situated and a child’s being situated in the world is different from an adult’s
as is evident from the following essences of situations. Real essences of a situation are described as follows: a human matter, actual presence, authentic communication, establishing relationships, acting, meaningful assimilation, a place for choices and aims. These essences refer to an adult way of being situated in the world. A very small child, e.g., is not yet responsibly situated and also is not yet in a position to make independent choices or to meaningfully assimilate the situation. At most he is childlike in his responsibility, he makes childlike choices and he meaningfully assimilates his situation in a childlike way. This shows that a child is situated differently than how an adult ought to be situated.

Because of a child’s not yet being adult he is humanly different from an adult and the verbalization of his ways of appearing will also differ from those of an adult person. For conceptual clarification it will thus be desirable, as section [1.7] clearly shows, to further qualify with ‘childlike’ those modes of appearing of a child that are verbalized as general anthropological categories. For example:

1. childlike-giving meaning-on-one’s-own-responsibility
2. childlike-moving-as-a-breaking-away-from-lack-of-exertion
3. childlike-normed-bodiliness
4. childlike-venturing-with-each-other
5. childlike-gratefulfulness-for-security
6. childlike-responsibility-for-relationships
7. childlike-hope-for-the-future
8. childlike-designing-possibilities
9. childlike-fulfilling-destination
10. childlike-respect-for-dignity
11. childlike-task-of-self-understanding
12. childlike-freedom-to-responsibility.

[1.7] THE RELATIONSHIP: EDUCATIVE REALITY/METHODOLOGY

Rene Descartes had indicated that it is not sufficient to only have good understanding at one’s disposal, but it is much more important to put it to good use. To be in a position to do this, the

correct method, as a way of thinking, is required. In the present study it is continually indicated that the phenomenological method is the only meaningful way to make an essence analysis of the reality of educating so that its real essences, meanings and relationships become clear. If the real pedagogical essences are attained in this way they can also be further explicated and interpreted because the phenomenological approach is also dialectic and hermeneutic in nature (See chapter three).

A phenomenological pedagogue searches phenomenologically for primordial evidence but he is never satisfied only with it. He also wants to arrive at an ontological understand and interpretation of the meaning and relationships of what is given ontically. This requires additional thought-work and because the reality of educating shows a dialectic structure, and also because a human being is able to think dialectically, a pedagogue is committed to the dialectic method.

Through his radical thinking a pedagogue arrives at the deepest grounds, as preconditions, for a pedagogical situation and he makes certain that these essences are necessarily valid by determining if their opposite or antithesis does not also have a right to exist; if so, then he can see if these essences can be united into a higher synthesis.

In section [1.6.3] a childlike way of being in the world was particularly attended to and a number of child anthropological categories were arrived at. It was necessary to find such categories because children are situated in the world differently owing to their different bodiliness as well as their fewer experiences. For the time being they are thus also differently situated despite being with an educator at the same time and in the same situation; a reason for this is that their past, that gives direction to their present situatedness, is much shorter. Now it also is the case that a child does not have the right to remain a child and his childlike ways of being in the world (as verbalized by the child anthropological categories) progress in time until he reaches adulthood (as verbalized by the adult anthropological categories). It will be pedagogically meaningful to look at this progression.
During the course of time, childlike giving meaning with responsibility ought to become giving meaning on one’s own (adult) responsibility. Childlike responsibility is not an independent responsibility because an educator is still co-responsible for him; thus a child is given the opportunity to practice responsibility so that later he can exercise it himself. Philosophical anthropology has already particularized a number of anthropological ways of being that can be applied as anthropological categories, and fundamental pedagogics has particularized a number of pedagogical ways of being in the world that can be applied as pure pedagogical categories. Now, seen epistemologically, a progression is observable from the child anthropological ways of being, as verbalized by the child anthropological categories, to the pedagogical ways of being and an authentic synthesizing of both in the adult anthropological ways of being, as verbalized by its particular categories. For example: it is only through giving meaning with increasing responsibility (pedagogical activity structure) that childlike giving meaning on one’s own responsibility (child anthropological way of being, i.e., childlike way of being as described by child anthropology) can become giving meaning on one’s own responsibility (adult anthropological way of being).

A schematic representation of this progression is:

![Schematic representation of the progression](image)

However, the problem is that a child cannot meaningfully exercise the educative activities if an adult does not first present them to him and also observe and evaluate the child’s performance of these activities. Presenting them for a child implies that initially an adult

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does this in a simple but accountable way. In other words, first he will attribute simple, easily understandable meanings to the things and events in the world. In a progressive and accountable way an educator must refer to the deeper meanings and also present them for a child so that he also is able to attribute meaning in the way a responsible adult does. To be able to do this a child must first give meaning along with an adult but before he ventures to do this with an adult a trusting, understanding and authoritative encounter must be realized. A being-by-each-other can only be intensified to a being-with-each-other if the relationship structures are realized. Thus viewed, the realization of the relationship structures is a precondition for giving meaning together. However, giving responsible meaning together must proceed to a giving of proper meaning jointly via giving meaning jointly with increasing responsibility. A child is someone who wants to be someone himself and therefore he must be granted the opportunity to periodically break away from a pedagogic association so that he is able to give meaning in a childlike way on his own responsibility. Childlike giving meaning on one’s own responsibility can then only become giving meaning with increasing responsibility until eventually meaning is given as a proper adult does.

This dialectic course is represented as follows:

FIRST STEP
Adult giving meaning with responsibility for a child
SECOND STEP
Adult giving meaning with increasing responsibility for a child
AUTHENTIC SYNTHESIS
Giving meaning as does a responsible adult

FIRST STEP
Giving meaning as does a responsible adult
SECOND STEP
Responsibility for the pedagogic relationship structures
AUTHENTIC SYNTHESIS
Giving meaning together with responsibility

FIRST STEP
Giving meaning together with responsibility
SECOND STEP
The above is a description of the preconditions, i.e., an adult giving meaning for a child, to a giving meaning with a child that first must be realized before childlike giving meaning on his own responsibility (first step) can progress to giving meaning with increasing responsibility (second step) before the authentic synthesis giving meaning on one’s own responsibility can be realized in an educative situation. On closer inspection it seems that each one of the pedagogical activity structures is a precondition for child anthropological ways of being to progress to adult anthropological ways of being. The progression of the other eleven verbalized pedagogic activities to the adult anthropological ways of being can be stated briefly as follows:

1. Childlike moving as breaking away from lack of exertion (first step) : Gradual breaking away from lack of exertion (second step) : Moving as breaking away from lack of exertion (synthesis).
(3) Childlike venturing with each other (first step): Pedagogical venturing with each other (second step): Venturing with each other (synthesis).


From the above examples it is clear that childlike anthropological ways of being are real essences of pedagogical ways of being. Indeed, if this were not the case a child would not be able to exercise them. The pedagogical ways of being refer to a progressive realization of child being in the direction of adulthood. Further, adult anthropological ways of being also are qualitatively different from pedagogical ways of being because they refer to a realization of what is prescribed by them, as they are verbalized as pedagogical categories. Thus, child and pedagogical ways of being are integrated to form a higher unity, i.e., adult anthropological ways of being.
Child anthropological ways of being (first step) take a course, via pedagogical ways of being (second step), to adult anthropological ways of being (synthesis). The synthesized possibility is thus not attained immediately but points to a qualitative progression to adulthood. In each educative situation a child, if he has had a chance to exercise the second step (educative activities), ought to be closer to adulthood. Thus there will be a continual elevation of a child’s way of being in the world (first step) to a more adult way of being in the world so that the last step, as a synthesis that is achieved, can serve as the first step for the next pedagogical situation until, during the course of time, proper adulthood is attained. In the previously mentioned examples, if a direct progression from the first to the third step were possible then they would not qualify as relationships that flow from a pedagogic situation because, as already mentioned, pedagogy (as scientifically accountable educating) is only possible if purposeful use is made of the results of pedagogics as a science.

At this point, a pedagogician asks the hermeneutic question, i.e., what end is served by the pedagogic activities; then, if he has observed the dialectic course, he will understand that these pedagogic activities are necessary for a child’s becoming toward adulthood. But this progression from childlike anthropological ways of being via the pedagogic activities is just not possible if an adult does not first exemplify [contents] for a child that is then followed by a joint exercise of the contents. These preconditions are already described in terms of the exemplar ‘childlike giving meaning on his own responsibility’. In the same way, adult and joint activities are presented as preconditions before the course of the other eleven childlike anthropological ways of being can progress, via realizing the pedagogic activities, to an adult anthropological way of being such that the fundamental pedagogical aim structure can be realized.

The categorial ‘origin’, i.e., the foundation of the verbalized pedagogical realities and their progression, as described in the

\[1\] Here “immediately” has a two-fold meaning: firstly, it indicates that adulthood cannot be attained suddenly (it needs a temporal progression); and, secondly, it cannot be attained without a means [i.e., education].
previous pages, are now presented schematically and then point-by-point deductions are drawn:

(1) **BEING-IN-LIFE-REALITY**

![Diagram showing BEING-IN-LIFE-REALITY](diagram)

### A1
(i) Childlike-giving-meaning-on-one’s-own-responsibility.
(iii) Childlike-norm-involvement.

### A2
(i) Adult-giving-meaning-on-own-responsibility.
(iii) Adult-norm-involvement.

### A3
(i) Joint giving-meaning-on-one’s-own-responsibility.
(iii) Joint-involvement-with-norms.

### A4
(i) Giving-meaning-on-one’s-own-responsibility.
(iii) Normed-bodiliness.

### B1
(i) Childlike-venturing-with-each-other.
(ii) Childlike-gratefulness-for-security.
(iii) Childlike-responsibility-for-relationships.

### B2
(i) Adult-venturing-with-each-other.
(ii) Adult-gratefulness-for-security.
(iii) Adult-responsibility-for-relationships.

### B3
(i) Joint-venturing-with-each-other.
(ii) Joint-gratefulness-for-security.
(iii) Joint-responsibility-for-relationships.

### B4
(i) Venturing-with-each-other.
(ii) Gratefulness-for-security
(iii) Responsibility-for-relationships.

C1  (i) Childlike-hope-for-the-future.
    (ii) Childlike-designing-possibilities.
    (iii) Childlike-fulfilling-destination.

C2  (i) Adult-hope-for-the-future.
    (ii) Adult-designing-possibilities.
    (iii) Adult-fulfilling-destination.

C3  (i) Joint-hope-for-the-future.
    (ii) Joint-designing-possibilities.
    (iii) Joint-fulfilling-possibilities.

C4  (i) Hope-for-the-future.
    (ii) Designing-possibilities.
    (iii) Fulfilling-destination.

D1  (i) Childlike-respect-for-dignity.
    (ii) Childlike-task-of-self-understanding.
    (iii) Childlike-freedom-to-responsibility.

D2  (i) Adult-respect-for-dignity.
    (ii) Adult-task-of-self-understanding.
    (iii) Adult-freedom-to-responsibility.

D3  (i) Joint-respect-for-human-dignity.
    (ii) Joint-task-of-self-understanding.
    (iii) Joint-freedom-to-responsibility.

D4  (i) Respect-for-human-dignity.
    (ii) Task-of-self-understanding.
    (iii) Freedom-to-responsibility.

(2) Remarks

A1  (i) A child has the opportunity to exercise childlike-giving-meaning-on-his-own-responsibility.
    An adult observes the childlike giving of meaning and evaluates it.

A2  (i) An adult has the opportunity to exemplify for a child adult-giving-meaning-on-his-own-responsibility.
    An adult has the opportunity to explain adult giving meaning for a child.

A3  (i) Then there is a progression to a joint-giving-of-meaning-
with-responsibility.

**A4** (i) Then giving-meaning-with-increasing-responsibility becomes possible for a child.

(3) **Remarks about the relationships among pedagogic activities and educative relationships**

*Note well:* By educative relationships is meant the pedagogical relationship structures AND sequence structures.

**A1** (i) **A2** (i) **A3** (i) **A4** (i)
Which giving meaning is referred to? Giving meaning from the educative relationships.

**A1** (ii) **A2** (ii) **A3** (ii) **A4** (ii)
What must be done with increasing effort? Participate in the educative relationships.

**A1** (iii) **A2** (iii) **A3** (iii) **A4** (iii)
What must be exemplified and emulated as norms (demands of propriety)? The educative relationships.

**B1** (i) **B2** (i) **B3** (i) **B4** (i)
Where must there be venturing to an increasing degree? In the educative relationships.

**B1** (ii) **B2** (ii) **B3** (ii) **B4** (ii)
For what must gratefulness be expressed and lived? For the security that arises from participating in the educative relationships.

**B1** (iii) **B2** (iii) **B3** (iii) **B4** (iii)
Responsibility for what relationships must be accepted? For realizing the educative relationships.

**C1** (i) **C2** (i) **C3** (i) **C4** (i)
What must be hoped for the future? For a continually more adequate realization of educative relationships until they eventually are adult relationships. For example, pedagogical encounter becomes adult encounter, etc.
What possibilities must continually be designed? The possibilities to continually design more proper educative relationships.

Which destination must be fulfilled? The destination of establishing relationships in a properly adult way.

For whom is an increasing degree of respect shown? For those who participate in viewing and experiencing the educative relationships as valuable.

What must be increasingly understood? Understanding one’s own possibilities for realizing educative relationships. Understanding one’s own obligations regarding the thriving of educative relationships.

Which form of freedom must be acquired? The freedom to participate in realizing the educative relationships with continually increasing responsibility until eventually all relationships can be experienced as meaningful, morally independent, with critical self-judgment and worthiness.

(4) Additional remarks

A. From the remarks in section (3) it seems that the connection between the pedagogical activities and the educative relationships cannot be thought or acted away [i.e., are essential, evident, etc.]. In other words they are **ontic bonds**, thus coherencies.

In addition it seems that the activities in the pedagogical situation can also be presented as follows:

(1) **Giving meaning** from:
   (a) understanding-trusting-authority acknowledging pedagogical association
(b) understanding-trusting-authority acknowledging pedagogical encounter
(c) understanding-trusting-authority acknowledging accepting responsibility for interference (engagement)
(d) understanding-trusting-authority acknowledging pedagogic interference
(e) return to association with understanding-trusting-authority acknowledging
(f) periodic breaking away from the educative situation with the exercise of understanding, trust and acknowledging authority without observable pedagogic supervision.

(2) Exertion with respect to realizing:
(a) through (f)
(3) Norm-involvement regarding living:
(a) through (f)
(4) Venturing in the thriving of:
(a) through (f)
(5) Gratitude for being allowed to participate in:
(a) through (f)
(6) Responsibility for realizing:
(a) through (f)
(7) Hope for a continually more adequate participation in:
(a) through (f)
(8) Design of the following as particular possibilities:
(a) through (f)
(9) Fulfilling destination by exercising the following in adult ways:
(a) through (f)
(10) Respect for those who realize the following by taking them up in a proper way:
(a) through (f)
(11) Understanding the task that one must take up to realize the following:
(a) through (f)
(12) Conquering freedom in order to increasingly accept responsibility to independently realize the following:
(a) through (f)

B. When one now looks at the names of the pedagogical activities it seems that the activity responsibility-for-educative-relationships
possibly shows the strongest (most intense) bond with the educative relationships since the phrase ‘educative relationships’ appears in its name. From this it seems that the following is a possible representation of an essence analysis of this pedagogical activity:

RESPONSIBILITY-FOR-EDUCATIVE RELATIONSHIPS

(1) Taking-responsibility for:
   the proper realization of the educative relationships with all of their essences and relationships.

(2) Regard-as-co-participant of:
   those who are prepared to stand together in realizing the educative relationships with all of their essences.

(3) Regard-as-co-traveler of:
   those who are prepared to go together in advancing the thriving of the educative relationships and all of their essences.

(4) Experience-of-belongingness of:
   those who are prepared to be participants in the realization and thriving of the educative relationships and all of their essences.

(5) Commitment-to-accessibility for:
   each other of the participants in the educative relationships.

(6) Making-room-for-our-space for:
   those who are prepared to allow ‘we-ness’, ‘mutuality’, ‘togetherness’ to thrive in and through realizing the educative relationships with all of their essences.

[1.8] PEDAGOGICAL CATEGORIES: JUSTIFICATION

In the preceding pages the idea of ‘categories’ was continually and repeatedly implemented. Therefore, it is now meaningful to provide a justification for their implementation.

[1.8.1] First argument

When a person remarks, “I think”, someone listening to him will immediately ask “What are you thinking (about)?” Suppose his answer is “I am thinking about the future of South Africa”. An additional meaningful question might then be “Let us hear what (how) you think about that”. His response might be “I am thinking
about the future of South Africa, especially in connection with ethnic relationships, multi-ethnicity, sports policies, the homelands, etc.”. OR “I think about the future of South Africa in terms of our ethnic relationships, multi-ethnicity, etc.”. From these answers it is concluded that the future of South Africa cannot be thought about in terms of nothing because then there would be nothing to be thought [about]. Summary: whenever there is thought there is always thought about something (or someone or an event) in terms of something. A husband thinks about his wife in terms of love, taking care of the clothes, cooking, etc. A child thinks about his parents in terms of authority, pocket money, expectations, etc. Parents think about their children in terms of appearance, school achievement, educating, etc. In other words, South Africa is thought about in terms of the categories of ethnic relationships, multi-ethnicity, etc. A husband thinks about his wife in terms of the categories love, cooking, etc. A child thinks about his parents and in doing so he applies the categories pocket money, etc. Parents think about their children with the help of the categories appearance, school achievement, educating, etc.

Consequently, to think means to use categories. In the everyday lifeworld categories are used as soon as there is thinking. A scientist uses categories in his scientific thinking about reality. However, scientific thinking differs radically from everyday thinking because:

(1) A scientist purposefully, radically, critically and systematically searches for the categories that he must apply. Thus, a physicist reflectively searches for categories of physics because, e.g., botanical categories are not useable for him since they cannot disclose genuine knowledge of physics. It is through applying categories of physics that its essences can be brought to light. Also, a pedagogician is a pedagogician precisely because he reflectively searches for pedagogical categories. In other words, he investigates the lifeworld with the help of the category ‘educating’.

(2) Purposeful, radical, critical and systematic research is the essential characteristic of categorical thinking. (Actually ‘categorical thinking’ is a tautology because to think is to use categories!) He ascertains that the categories he
implements for thinking are \textit{illuminative means of thinking}. With their help he illuminates the reality (e.g., the reality of educating) that he wants to study. An educator (with or without pedagogical training) uses the category \textit{‘educating’} as a means for illumination. A pedagogician applies \textit{‘educating’} as an illuminative means of thinking in a purposeful, radical, critical, systematic and methodological (i.e., phenomenological) way.

Since a pedagogician is someone who wants to work in the way stated above, the following question must necessarily arise for him: “What is the origin of the category \textit{‘educating’}?” In other words, where is the particular reality called \textit{‘educating’} to be found and what will he elevate to an illuminative means of thinking? Answer: the reality of educating is one of the various realities that are rooted (embedded) in the lifeworld.

For a pedagogician this primarily means to investigate the reality of educating with his category \textit{‘educating’}. He will apply \textit{‘educating’} as an illuminative means of thinking to [disclose] the essential characteristics of this reality and bring them to light. To be an adequate illuminative means of thinking the illumination must bring to light the actual. This means that a pedagogician must continually sharpen his illumination. He notices that to merely apply \textit{‘educating’} as a light for his thinking is not adequate. \textit{‘Educating’} as an illuminative means of thinking must be sharpened. How is this done? One way is to carry out an essence analysis of the reality of educating to bring to light or disclose its real essences and then to apply these essences categorically (thus, as illuminative means of thinking). To do an essence analysis is to think, but (as already pointed out) to think is to use categories. Which categories are now applied in order to carry out this essence analysis of the reality of educating? There is only one answer possible to this question—the category \textit{‘educating’}. From an educational perspective (thus by applying the category of educating) there is a purposeful, radical, critical, systematic view, along with the application of the phenomenological steps of thinking (see chapter two), of where educators and children communicate with each other. Now concrete educative situations are investigated by
applying the category ‘educating’ (thus, they are looked at in terms of educating).

What is seen in these situations that is characteristic of educating, thus what distinguishes the reality of educating from all other realities in the lifeworld? In other words, what is really essentially pedagogical about this being together of educators and children?

Now it is possible that different applications of the category ‘educating’ will disclose the real essentially pedagogical (thus the essential characteristics of the reality of educating) in different orders and will even bring to light different essential characteristics (educative essences). Also they can be named and ordered in different ways. This is possible because the reality of educating is particularly complex (involved) and largely a mystery. By [pedagogues] carrying out pedagogical conversations with each other the essence-status of the essences of educating that have been brought to light can be verified.

Out of many possibilities, one order in which a set of educative essences can be disclosed and organized is the following:

(1) An educator helps a child to gradually change the meanings he attributes to persons, things and events until they are what one finds with proper adults. Thus in educating this involves a particular educative activity known as giving-meaning-with-increasing-responsibility. These meanings with which a child is helped are numerous. A few of the meanings that a child exercises are the meanings that his relationships with his educators have for him. What meaning does an educator’s relationship of authority, of trust and of understanding have for him? What does educative association, encounter, interference, etc. mean to him?

(2) As soon as a particular foothold on the way to proper adulthood begins to lose its tension, an educator helps a child to exert himself to move to a following foothold where he again can live with exertion. He is helped to gradually-break-away-from-his-lack-of-exertion so that he can
exercise with increasing exertion the relationships with his educators so that later he can exercise them independently and on his own responsibility.

(3) An educator helps a child increasingly live in accordance with particular demands of propriety (norms). He does this by placing himself under the demand of these norms so that a child can see how these norms ought to be lived.

By living the demands of propriety an educator takes an unconditional position for his philosophy of life so a child can see and understand what is approvable and this can also be emulated and eventually lived. Thus, an educative situation further involves a particular educative activity, i.e., *exemplifying-and-emulating-norms*.

(4) Through a trusting, understanding and authority acknowledging encounter an educator and child can courageously venture with each other in a pedagogic situation. By venturing together they will co-live and co-give meaning to the demands of propriety by which a child is gradually supported to choose and act independently so that eventually he can assume full responsibility and thus stand independently under the authority of norms. That is, through *venturing-pedagogically-with-each-other* a child is supported to proper adulthood.

(5) By being able to venture with an educator a child will experience security. It is security because of the loving presence and acceptance of an educator for which the child is grateful although he will not always explicitly show this. An educator must support a child to show gratitude for the secure space with him because *gratitude-for-pedagogic-security* is necessary for a child if he will progress in his exploration of the adult world and thus also meaningfully progress on his way to adulthood.

(6) An educator must help a child in a continually progressive way to accept responsibility himself. Because a child can be supported only in educative situations, independently
accepting responsibility is one of the first things that he must be helped with so that he can accept responsibility for his part in educative relationships. Thus he must be supported in an educative situation to accept responsibility-for-educative-relationships.

(7) An educator who will support a child to proper adulthood must awaken in him a yearning for the future. He can do this by allowing a child to work on his future in the present so that he can progressively come to an understanding of future demands and thus he can look forward to them with confidence. By meaningfully directing a child to it in this way he is also able to accept the future and as a result there is a yearning-or-hope-for-future-adulthood.

(8) At birth a child is poor in actuality but rich in potentiality and an educator who will help a child realize his possibilities of proper adulthood must show an appreciation for his potentialities and must take responsibility to support him in developing them. Consequently, educating must also be seen as designing-his-possibilities-for-adulthood.

(9) A child in educative situations must be supported by an educator to gradually reach his destination of proper adulthood. However, proper adulthood must not be viewed as a final destination and, therefore, a Christian educator will also help a child so that he can hear the voice of God and can live in His honor. Through such support a child can work in the present on gradually-fulfilling-his-destination so that he can increasingly be in a position to fulfill his divine calling.

(10) A human being is a being who can know, recognize and obey values. However, a child is not born with a hierarchy of value-preferences but with the potentialities for realizing them. By helping a child do what is approvable he will also come to realize his own dignity. As a value-realizing being he will also respect his fellow persons as bearers of dignity. In educative situations this involves increasingly supporting
a child to realize particular values and hence this also is concerned with an increasing-respect-for-human-dignity.

(11) An educator helps a child arrive at an accountable self-understanding. This means that he must arrive at an understanding of his positive human potentialities so that he also will understand his being called upon and respond by gradually realizing his potentialities and putting them in the service of himself and his fellow persons such that he can fulfill his obligations. In this context, educating is also becoming-adult-through-self-understanding.

(12) An educator helps a child conquer his freedom-to-responsibility. He does this by increasingly indicating to a child his being called on and also increasingly demanding that he be accountable for accepting his freedom. Thus, a child will increasingly become aware of the responsibility that comes with his freedom, which is not a licentious freedom but a freedom committed to particular values and ultimately a commitment to the authority of God.

SUMMARY

A pedagogician has now seen phenomenologically (by applying the category ‘educating’) that there are twelve possible (out of an unlimited number) educative activities that are actualized in educative situations so that the relationships that a child enters with his educators can be exercised properly. This happens because in the course of time he must exercise these relationships as a grown adult.

A pedagogician now proceeds further with his category ‘educating’ and undertakes a radical investigation of each of the mentioned educative activities in order to determine what their essential characteristics are. He reflectively searches for their real essences, always from a pedagogical perspective (i.e., by using the category ‘educating’).

It was mentioned that these educative activities are aimed at realizing particular relationships with the educators that eventually
will become the relationships with all other persons and that they must be realized in independent and responsible ways. Once again, a pedagogician applies his category ‘educating’ and this time in order to undertake an essence analysis of these relationships. In this way the essential characteristics (real essences) of these relationships are brought to light.

By more closely investigating the educative activities and educative relationships that he has seen and their essences that he has brought to light by applying the category ‘educating’ (thus phenomenologically), he discerns that he can take any one of these essences as a category. This means that he can take any essence of educating as an illuminative means of thinking to disclose any other essence of educating with the purpose of bringing to light the essential characteristics of each. Each essence of educating then has categorical status. Where initially he worked with a single category ‘educating’ he now has an unlimited number of categories at his disposal. In reality, this comes down to the fact that for ‘educating’, as an illuminative means of thinking, he has gradually designed a great number of “lights-for-thinking” [denkligte]. By applying these “lights-for-thinking” additional essential characteristics of the reality of educating can be brought to light.

A pedagogician can now proceed further and ask, how is it possible that by applying the category ‘educating’ I am able to see that the reality of educating is essentially concerned with:

(1) giving-meaning-with-increasing-responsibility
(2) gradually-breaking-away-from-lack-of-exertion
(3) exemplifying-and-emulating-norms
(4) venturing-pedagogically-with-each-other
(5) gratitude-for-pedagogical-security
(6) responsibility-for-educative-relationships
(7) hope-for-future-adulthood
(8) designing-possibilities-for-adulthood
(9) gradual-fulfillment-of-destination
(10) increasing-respect-for-human-dignity
(11) adulthood-through-increasing-self-understanding
(12) conquering-freedom-to-responsibility.
ANSWER: It is possible because a person’s involvement in the lifeworld is characterized by the following:

(a) giving-meaning-with-responsibility
(b) moving-as-a-breaking-away-from-lack-of-exertion
(c) normed-bodiliness (See footnote page 36)
(d) venturing-with-each-other
(e) gratefulness-for-security
(f) responsibility-for-relationships
(g) hope-for-the-future
(h) designing-possibilities
(i) fulfilling-destination
(j) respect-for-human-dignity
(k) task-of-self-understanding
(l) freedom-to-responsibility

Now a pedagogician can ask even more radical questions. For example, he can ask: On what foundation are the activities such as (a) through (l) possible? What are the grounds for their possibility? To be able to answer these questions he must converse with the practitioners of philosophical anthropology. One of the possibilities that might appear from such a conversation(s) is that:

(1) giving-meaning-with-responsibility,
(2) movement-as-breaking-away-from-lack-of-exertion, and
(3) normed-bodiliness are possible because being human is characterized by its being involved in the world. It might further appear that:
   (a) venturing-with-each-other,
   (b) gratefulness-for-security, and
   (c) responsibility-for-relationships are possible because being human is characterized by co-existence (being-with). It might further appear that:
      (i) hoping-for-the-future,
      (ii) designing-possibilities, and
      (iii) fulfilling-destination are possible because being human is characterized by temporality.
It can also be clear that:
      (aa) respect-for-dignity,
      (bb) task-of-self-understanding, and
(cc) freedom-to-responsibility are possible because being human is characterized by wanting-to-be-someone-oneself.

Being-in-a-meaningful-world, co-existence, temporality and being-someone-oneself are applied by practitioners of philosophical anthropology as illuminative means of thinking to bring to light the essential characteristics of being human. Thus, they are *anthropological* categories (called existentialia by Heidegger).

The conversation between pedagogican and philosophical anthropologist can be carried on still further by asking the question: On what basis are the ways of being human (existentialia) that can be used as anthropological categories possible? The answer to this question is: On the basis of a human being’s *being-in-the-world*. Should a human being find himself any other place than *in* the world, he could not be in the world in particular ways. Everything essential (real essences) that can be said about being human is possible because he is in the world. Consequently, *being-in-the-world* can be posited as an ontological category.

The ways of thinking followed in this section are represented as follows:

(a) Pedagogical categories

(b) Anthropological categories

(c) Ontological category

In this representation, (b) is the terrain of philosophical anthropology and (c) that of fundamental ontology. (b) + (c) can be called ontological-anthropological being and (a) refers to the pedagogical categories (thus to a pedagogics that is ontologically-
anthropologically grounded) and it is the terrain of pedagogics and all of its part-sciences.

[1.8.2] Second argument

A genuine pedagogician knows that because he wants to understand educating he has to bring its essential characteristics to light. He must illuminate the essences of educating that are concealed in the reality of educating itself. To bring them to light he must apply the category ‘educating’ as an illuminative means of thinking.

The first question that he must now ask himself is: What preconditions must I fulfill in order to be able to apply this category? Then he sees that this application is not possible if he isolates himself from the reality of educating itself because then he cannot throw light on it. Therefore, he must be in the world by the reality of educating that is embedded in it; otherwise this reality remains hidden from him. Consequently, being-in-the-world is the first [pre]condition for applying the category ‘educating’. By positing his being-in-the-world as the first [pre]condition for his scientific practice (applying the category ‘educating’) he overcomes the chasm between person (thinker, scientist) and world (reality) that was created by idealism and empiricism. In other words, being-in-the-world is his first illuminative means of thinking: illuminative thinking about the first [pre]condition that he must fulfill in order to apply his category ‘educating’. It also can be said that being-in-the-world is the ontological category since it makes possible all further ontological pronouncements about being human and thus also about being human in educative situations.

By now a pedagogician knows that his own being-in-the-world is a precondition for applying his category ‘educating.’ And now he can use this category to illuminate ‘being-in-the-world’. Immediately he sees that there are a number of ways of being-in-the-world that are also described and explicated by philosophical anthropology. Thus, in applying the category ‘educating’ he is compelled to make a selection from these various ways with an eye to a further radical investigation of them. That is, he selects those ways that are pedagogically meaningful, thus that have particular relevance for
the being-together of educators and children. The following are four ways from a large number of possibilities that can be selected:

(1) being-in-a-meaningful-world
(2) co-existence (being-with)
(3) temporality
(4) being-someone-oneself.

Once again, the category ‘educating’ is used to investigate the ways of being human in order to determine if they have essential characteristics that can be pedagogically meaningful. From an almost endless multitude of possible essential characteristics, the following can be observed:

(1) **Being-in-a-meaningful-world:**
   (a) giving-meaning-on-one’s-own-responsibility
   (b) moving-as-a-breaking-away-from-lack-of-exertion
   (c) normed-bodiliness.

(2) **Co-existence (being-with):**
   (a) venturing-with-each-other
   (b) gratefulness-for-security
   (c) responsibility-for-relationships.

(3) **Temporality:**
   (a) hope-for-the-future
   (b) designing-possibilities
   (c) fulfilling-destination.

(4) **Being-someone-oneself:**
   (a) respect-for-human-dignity
   (b) task-of-self-understanding
   (c) freedom-to-responsibility.

(From discussions with philosophical anthropologists it is evident that they apply these ways of being as illuminative means of thinking, thus as anthropological categories, in their scientific practice.)

A pedagogician now realizes that he must apply his category ‘educating’ once again. This time he does this in order to allow the pedagogical significance of these ways of being to appear and now there is mention of:
Now a pedagogician can choose to elevate these pedagogical ways of being to illuminative means of thinking for him, thus to pedagogical categories.

The ways of thinking followed in this section are represented as follows:

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Ontological category

Anthropological categories

Pedagogical categories
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[1.9] THE RELATIONSHIP: PEDAGOGICS/FUNDAMENTAL PEDAGOGICS
The question can arise whether fundamental pedagogics, as essence-disclosing and essence-describing, is indeed pedagogics. For Strasser, e.g., a phenomenologically oriented fundamental pedagogics is still no pedagogics because it only searches for necessary and generally valid evidence that is devoid of all particular content. For him fundamental pedagogics is rather “a task of philosophical anthropology. It is a philosophical vision of being human in so far as he is an educating and to be educated being”. For this reason he wants to supplement fundamental pedagogics with the sciences of norms and experiences in order to insure a useable and full-fledged pedagogics.

The above view of Strasser can not be agreed with. Fundamental pedagogics is a full-fledged part-science of pedagogics that has its own tasks of which the most paramount is making the phenomenon ‘educating’ understandable and, therefore, it must uncover the reality of educating phenomenologically, disclose its universal essences, describe them and show their meanings and relationships. This is scientific reflective work and the essences of educating that come to light in this way will have currency in all educative situations. Fundamental pedagogics is in a position to make generally valid pronouncements and does not need to be supplemented by the sciences of norms and experiences in order to be a full-fledged science. Now, however, it is the case that a grounded educative practice (thus not a science) must be prescriptive. Indeed, in an educative situation this has to do with helping a particular child on his way to proper adulthood and, therefore, what is valuable to life must be impressed on him so that he can reach adulthood as one who is morally independent.

In order to be prescriptive the universal essences of educating must be filled with particular content so that they can become enlivened essences of educating in concrete educative situations. Thus in addition to fundamental pedagogic knowledge, “principled” educative knowledge is needed for a grounded educative practice, and to acquire such knowledge a study of philosophy of life writings

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77a “Principled” refers to moral-religious principles. (See e.g., the expression: “Out of principle I do this and not that.”)
is required. Such study will not be scientific since there will not be an attempt to prove the pronouncements in these writings because they are accepted as religious [and other] truths. The direct method will be used here. Philosophy of life writings will be directly consulted to see what direct educative prescriptions are given there. However, an educative practice that is only built on these directly given educative prescriptions will result in an impoverished educating if it does not also take into account and implement the universal essences of educating. Because the universal essences of educating are viable, these direct educative prescriptions can enliven them by providing them with philosophy of life prescriptions [i.e., content]. Now these content-filled educative essences can be made more meaningful through a pedagogical perspective-method of post-scientific reflection. A pedagogical perspective-method is where there is a move, via the various essences of educating, to philosophy of life writings to better understand ‘educating’ in light of these essences and writings (see chapter two). Through this post-scientific thinking particular prescriptive contents will now become clear and can give additional life to the universal essences of educating and in this way these prescriptively enlivened essences of educating make a grounded educative practice possible.78

In addition to making the phenomenon ‘educating’ understandable through an essence analysis of the educative situation, fundamental pedagogics also has the task of reflecting on the relationships among pedagogics, a philosophy of life and a grounded educative practice. To be able to see these relationships in the right light fundamental pedagogics must further consider axiological, moral- and ethical-philosophical questions, etc. and their connections with educating. For the sake of clarity, it once again is stressed that fundamental pedagogics is not prescriptive and therefore only describes and explicates the above questions and their connections with educating so that the phenomenon of educating, as it appears in practice, can be better understood.

[1.10]  THE RELATIONSHIP:

FUNDAMENTAL PEDAGOGICS/PEDAGOGY

In the previous section the task of fundamental pedagogics was noted and it appeared that grounded reflective work makes a grounded educative practice possible. For the sake of clarity such a grounded educating [practice] is called pedagogy to distinguish it from educating that does not necessarily need to be scientifically grounded. The relationship between fundamental pedagogics and pedagogy will now be considered further.

Pedagogics is not separate from pedagogy. Time and again it has been indicated that pedagogics is the science of an educative event as it appears in educative situations but, on the other hand, it has further consideration for an educative situation because the results of its theoretical reflections can be applied there. Landman says theory and practice are not isolated from each other: “Practice is the area of study for theory and theory has practical consequences”.79 The knowledge a pedagogue acquires through his scientific practice cannot leave him untouched as a person. Indeed, if genuine educative knowledge is acquired then it will address the educator; even more, it will compel him to actualize it in his association with children.

The reality of educating, pedagogics and pedagogy (scientifically justified educating) have a particular dialectic relationship to each other. The reality of educating, where adult(s) and child(ren) are involved with each other in educative situations, can be posited as the first thesis, with pedagogics that directs itself to this situation as the second thesis. Both the first and second thesis can be elevated to a higher synthesis: pedagogy. Schematically this relationship appears as follows:

Another dialectic relationship can be indicated where educational science, as the first thesis, progresses to the second thesis, educational doctrine as a post-scientific reflection, and where both are integrated into a higher synthesis, educative practice. This is represented as follows:

From the above schematic representation it seems clear that a meaningful educative practice is only possible by integrating the results of both pedagogical and educational doctrine studies.

Also, there is yet another aspect that becomes clear with a theoretical reflection about a grounded educative practice and this is the orderly incorporation of the pedagogical into an educational doctrine. Pedagogics brings the universal essences of educating to light so that the direct educative prescriptions from a doctrine of educating can be organized, but on the other hand these prescriptions give content to the universal essences of educating so that they can become enlivened. These enlivened essences of educating, when integrated with the organized prescriptions, make possible enlivened, ordered and essential educative prescriptions without which a grounded practice of educating is impossible. Landman schematically represents the above event as follows:

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Thus, pedagogy, as grounded educative practice, presupposes fundamental pedagogics that brings to light universal essences of educating and studies philosophy of life writings [i.e., doctrines] for contents that enliven these essences. Consequently, educational theory and philosophy of life [i.e., educational doctrine] can never stand in isolation from each other in a grounded practice of educating.

[1.11] THE RELATIONSHIP: PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY/VIEW OF BEING HUMAN

Philosophical anthropology is the most fundamental part-science of philosophy. For many centuries philosophy has struggled to achieve a general theory of reality but the idea continually grows that a grounded theory of being is only possible if the peculiar way of human existence in the world is taken as the point of departure for thinking. Thus, the fundamental philosophical question ought to be about the ground condition that makes being human and all of its ways of existing in the world possible because a theory of reality that disregards human existence or passes over being human will be left hanging in the air since a theory of reality is a purely anthropological matter and can only be brought about by a human being. Soren Kirkegaard, the 19th Century Danish philosopher, also was one of the first thinkers who had emphasized very strongly that
there must first be reflection on the concrete, unique existence of the “I”. The modern philosophical direction known as existential philosophy interrogates not so much being, as such, but indeed human being as a being of being because being, as such, cannot be known without starting with human being in the world.

As a science, philosophical anthropology must search for what is essential to all human beings: In other words, it must undertake an essence analysis of being human so that the universal essences of human being-in-the-world can be illuminated. In this study, there is already reference to twelve ways of being human that have been verbalized by philosophical anthropology. These general ways of being can be applied as categories, thus as illuminative means of thinking, in order to be able to better view the humanness of being human. If this is done, a number of pronouncements can be made about being human that are generally valid. For example, in light of the general anthropological category ‘temporality’

‘responsibility-for-relationships’; then it can be seen that an individual person has not always been in the world and a person’s being-there is further illuminated by the category ‘responsibility-for-relationships’; then it can be seen that he is responsible for the relationships that arise from his being-there, but not for his original being in the world. That is, even though he cannot be held responsible for his own being-there, he can be held responsible for his way of being-there. In light of this, a generally valid pronouncement can be made, i.e., that a person is thrownness. However, if this thrownness is further illuminated by the general anthropological categories ‘being-in-a-meaningful-world’, ‘co-existing’ and ‘being-someone-oneself’, as well as their generally valid contents, then in their collective light it can clearly be seen that a human being, after he is in the world, must himself give an account of his choices and activities but that, even so, he must also be assisted by fellow persons if he is to realize the possibility of fulfilling his destination. In this way, i.e., in the collective light of these anthropological categories, in addition to “thrownness” a number of generally valid pronouncements about being human can be made such as: a human being is solitariness, solidarity, dialogue, a value-aspiring and value-realizing being, etc.81 This last generally

valid category is especially of interest to philosophical anthropology because ultimately it indeed will be relevant to a grounded, accountable image of being human. Philosophical anthropology will not view a human being as separate from his world but indeed as he is in the world. Now because of his practical attunement and willing and valuing being in the world, he also has a need for a hierarchy of preferred values to be able to appreciate/evaluate. This mention of a hierarchy of value-preferences indicates that all persons will not make the same choice of values and therefore this choice is a practical matter. In other words, if philosophical anthropology reflects on how a human being is actually in the world then it must take into account the fact that he is an appreciating/evaluating being in the world on the basis of the fact that he essentially is a value-aspiring and value-realizing being. This means there must not only be a consideration of the fact that a human being appreciates/evaluates but also how he does so.

If a philosophical anthropologist wants to reflect on being human then he must ask about the meaningfulness of human existence. These questions about the meaning of life are thus also viewed as one of the most topical questions in philosophy. If there is now reflection on the meaning of life then more than the essence of being human must also be questioned. There must also be questions about his origin and destination. Answers to these questions reach beyond the empirically perceivable of human being in the world. They refer to a particular view of being human grounded in a particular philosophy of life.

The above reasoning is briefly summarized as follows: Philosophical anthropology is a science and as such it must strive for generally valid, scientifically justifiable results, but an enlivened image of being human cannot be arrived at in this way. Indeed, the essences of being human can never be stripped of philosophy of life contents that cannot be thought or acted away and, therefore, [such essences] also cannot present an enlivened image of being human. In this context, Popma indicates that a view of being human that proceeds from human being as such, detached from his world- or life-view, almost never deals with being human but with a highly

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artificial and derived abstraction. He writes: “Deze onfeitlike, de feiten weersprekende abstractie zouden we zelfs een valse abstractie kunnen noemen. Daarmee bedoelen we dan, dat de mens wel bevoegd is abstracties te maken; daarop is geheel het werk in de vakwettenschappen en een groot deel van de wijsbegeerte gebaseerd; maar dat hij bepaald niet bevoegd is, zich een abstractief mensbeeld te vormen dat hem noodzaakt ‘mens’ te noemen wat niet ‘mens’ is maar een sort mythologische figuur op grond van een of ander geloof, b.v. een neutraliteitsgelooft inzake het mens-zijn.”

Thus, a philosophical anthropology must become particularized if it will be enlivened knowledge for being human and before one can venture to answer the question of the origin and destiny of being human. Someone like Stoker then also talks about a specific ‘Christian Philosophical Anthropology’ and Rautenbach indicates that there are various schools in philosophy that each explicates being human differently. Hence, it ought to be clear that a philosophical anthropology will exceed its scientific character as soon as it starts with a particular view of being human and if this is done it is a post-scientific matter.

The above does not mean that philosophical anthropology is without value. Not at all because if the results of this science are supplemented by a life-giving particular view of being human then a particular anthropology can arise from this that is valuable in understanding what being human is in a particular society and also what being human ought to be there. The human being, as a philosophizing being, is not merely satisfied with theoretical-scientific findings about being human but he is also practically attuned and therefore is a seeker of particular norms in terms of which he can purposefully bring about particular changes because, as a human being, he can do nothing other than this. In other words he is in search of an ideal human image that indeed is grounded so he can strive to realize that ideal. He wants to know what to do to be considered a human being and he cannot arrive at

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this knowing empirically. He must search deeper than factual existence because what ought to be is an ideal matter. In this regard, Leenhouwers expresses himself as follows: “Het filosoferen is daarom ‘practisch gericht’, maar wel steun op een verantwoord mensbeeld, een gefundeerde mens-opvatting. Naar dat ‘ideaal’ moet dan gestreefd worden.”86 Here ‘mensopvatting’ [‘conception of being human’] must be interpreted as a view of being human and this refers to a particular such view. But now Leenhouwers claims that philosophy asks about a groundedness, i.e., a view of being human that is relevant to the universal lifeworld, even more, is grounded in that lifeworld and that therefore is also scientifically justifiable but that, at the same time, is peculiar in that it expresses a particular view of being human.

There are an immense number of views of being human each of which holds a different vision. They range from the view that human beings are the product of nature to creatures of God, with many variations in between. All view the “nature” of being human differently and there is no unanimity about how human beings were created by God. Many thinkers notice only certain human ways of existing and they make their particular view the way of being human, as such. Viewed broadly, different views of being human can be organized together into groups. Oberholzer sees and verbalizes the following four directions of views of being human as a person that are dominant in this century: There are the scientific-oriented-, the ontologic-oriented-, the existential-voluntaristic-oriented- and the existential-analytic wave of personalistic thought.87

The aim of this study is not to focus on the various views of being human but merely to indicate that there are many such views. As already indicated, Leenhouwers asks for a founded view of being human and that is only possible if the universal essences of being human, as brought to light by philosophical anthropology, are supplemented with particular contents from particular views of being human. Thus, a particular view of being human must be seen

as a precondition for the science of philosophical anthropology to be able to provide an enlivened view of being human. On the other hand, a view of being human that only emanates from a particular philosophy of life cannot claim to be founded if it also does not start from the real essences of being human as disclosed by philosophical anthropology. A particular dialectic course is seen here that is schematized as follows:

This representation is an attempt to express the relationship between philosophical anthropology and a view of being human. The following must be a further consideration of what the relationship is between a founded view of being human and a philosophy of life and what this has to do with educating.

[1.12] THE RELATIONSHIP: FOUNDED VIEW OF BEING HUMAN/PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE

In the previous section it was shown that there could only be a founded or grounded view of being human if the real essentials of being human, as disclosed by philosophical anthropology, are colored by a particular view of being human. However, such a founded view of being human cannot yet serve as a human image worth emulating that can be presented as a norm image for adulthood. Before such a human image can be presented there must be further inquiry about a particular view of being human. A human being’s philosophy of life must also be looked for. This is very necessary because a particular view of being human must first be refined by a philosophy of life before it can be presented as an ideal image of being human. Even though a view of being human is closely connected with a philosophy of life, still there are a number
of historical examples where a person holds a philosophy of life that is in conflict with his view of being human. For example, there are professed Christians, even in this country, whose view of being human are not justified by their philosophy of life. Indeed, there are ‘Christians’ who believe that there is only a difference in degree between humans and animals and consequently a human is seen as an extension of nature.

In addition to a founded philosophy of life one must also proceed from a worldview before an ideal image of being human can figure forth. Thus there also must be an interrogation of the world and a human being’s place in it as well as his relationship to it. Consequently, there must not only be an enquiry about being human as such but also about human being as a being of being and who is involved in being. Even though a worldview is not so important for a human image worthy of emulation, it indeed is closely related to a human being’s philosophy of life that gives direction, meaning and purpose to his existence.

For conceptual clarity it will be necessary to first briefly distinguish between the concepts life view [philosophy of life] and worldview. Popma\textsuperscript{88} indicates that it is inaccurate to speak of a worldview and life view as if they form an indissoluble unity. Indeed, a world and life view can be combined with each other since they are correlated and continually refer to each other. Nevertheless, it is possible to deal with them separately. Popma expresses himself as follows regarding a life view: “Mensenleven is nooit zonder levensbeschouwing, en de levende mens is het, die zijn leven beschouwt. In dat beschouwing staat hij niet buiten zijn leven, maar leeft hij het. De levensbeschouwing is een integrerend bestanddeel van de levenspractijk. Ons menszijn heft de beschouwelijkheid als grondslag en in alle handeling is de beschouwing ingevlochten, en er als het ware in opgelost.

De beschouwing van ons leven is ook zelf ten volle daadwerkelijk, en dat niet alleen omdat elke gedachte volbracht en in zoverre een daad is, maar meer nog omdat is alle handeling van een men seen levensbeschouwelijke factor zit, die van niet geringe betekenis is, en

Rautenbach also distinguishes between a worldview and a philosophy of life: “A worldview must stand on the firm ground of reality as a whole, as a totality. A philosophy of life must link up with the realities of human life.” Seen in this way, a worldview is a more theoretical matter that has to do with questions of reality and involves one in the philosophical study of reality, metaphysics or ontology while a view [philosophy] of life has to do with practical matters that in philosophy give rise to an axiology (philosophical study of values that includes ethics, esthetics, etc). In connection with this, Oberholzer expresses himself as follows: “In addition to the expressed theoretical illumination as a view of reality there is also the eminently practical matter of a philosophy of life. Here the emphasis is not on what the structural nature of reality is but on what ought to be done in a given situation.”

As a matter of values in a hierarchy of preferences worth emulating, a person’s philosophy of life is closely connected with his view of being human. Indeed, a philosophy of life is the totality of beliefs about what is valuable in life as what is obligatory and demanding to a human being. If this demanding is now in conflict with the view of being human regarding its origin, essence and destination it will not be easy for him to meet the demand. For example, if a person professes that he is a Christian but nevertheless believes that he is a product of evolution and that therefore God is not his Creator, then he will have particular difficulty or be unable to be obedient to the Christian demand to live to the glory and glorification of God.

For an ideal image of being human worth emulating that can hold true as an educative aim, it thus is necessary to build up a founded image (philosophical anthroplogy + view of being human) and a philosophy of life. That is, there must be a harmony between a

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89 Ibid.
92 Ibid, 44.
founded view of being human and a philosophy of life so that an ideal image of being human can figure forth as an educative aim. A clear dialectic course is also observable here and is schematically presented as follows:

\[
\text{FOUNDED VIEW OF BEING HUMAN} \quad + \quad \text{PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE} \quad = \quad \text{EDUCATIVE AIM}
\]

(FOUNDED VIEW OF BEING HUMAN) (SECOND STEP) (GENUINE SYNTHESIS)

It has been indicated that a philosophy of life is a precondition for a proper image of being human, thus for an image of being human as he ought to be. Such a proper or worthy image cannot be acquired from a philosophical anthropology because, as a science, it can only involve itself with being human as it factually is. It also cannot be acquired from a view of being human alone because it can only remain hovering above being human as it is situated in the world. Also it is pointed out that a view of being human must be in harmony with a philosophy of life if it, together with a founded image of being human, will establish an ideal image of being human as an educative aim. Thus a philosophy of life, as the life-valuable in a hierarchy of preferences, must never be seen apart from a view of being human. Indeed, the life-valuable refers to that which is viewed as valuable for a human being's living. From the dialectic course that has so far become visible, it also is clear that a philosophy of life assumes a view of being human and a person whose view of being human conflicts with his philosophy of life cannot be satisfied with what he professes with his philosophy of life. Consequently, when a philosophy of life is in agreement with a founded view of being human and its essentials are taken into account then it can give rise to an image of being human that can be presented as what ought to be striven for. Now, it is the case that there are only so many philosophies of life if their views will be about the highly valuable. Although a philosophy of life is a particular matter, those who hold it nevertheless claim that their philosophy of life is the only true and valid one. In this connection, Oberholzer indicates that the deepest differences that exist between persons, groups and people come to light in their philosophy of life and it is with respect to this that practicing educators and pedagogicians did not, do not or cannot agree with each other. Also
he writes: “It is philosophies of life as matters of values that are the basis for the diversity of pedagogical aims.”

From the discussion so far about the connection between a view of being human and a philosophy of life it seems clear that the practical matter embodied in a person’s philosophy of life is most closely connected with the reality of educating as a reality of life. In this regard, J. Chris Coetzee points out that there is no true educating possible and thinkable without the central and direction-giving force of a philosophy of life. He also indicates that a philosophy of life and direction of educating are inherently interwoven with each other and that there is no philosophy of life without a similar educative movement and no educative movement without a fundamental view of life. Elsewhere he strikingly expresses himself about this close connection between a philosophy of life and educating: “A person’s view of life also determines his view of educating. There is a close and necessary relationship between the philosophy of life a person holds and the education that he desires for himself and his children.” Further this author also clearly states that: “Nowhere in educative activity and thinking does the close connection between a view of life and educating emerge more clearly and more tellingly than in discussing the aim of educating itself.”

A genuine (i.e., founded) life view that underlies, directs and guides pedagogic activities thus must be seen as a precondition for purposefully realizing them.

It cannot be denied that a philosophy of life requires an educative aim, but that there is a connection between an educative aim and a doctrine of education must still be indicated.


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93 Oberholzer, C. K. Prolegomena van ‘n Prinsipele Pedagogiek, 203 and 209.
Above it is indicated that a philosophy of life has a particularly high value in connection with realizing pedagogic activities in educative situations, thus, in the purposeful and effective education of children. However, to purposefully and meaningfully educate children, more is needed than merely an educative aim as prescribed by a view of life. It also requires an educational doctrine, but an educative aim and educational doctrine must not be equated to each other even though the latter cannot be thought of without a particular educative aim. It is only when the fundamental pedagogical structures, their generally valid contents and their meanings and relatedness are enlivened by a particular philosophy of life and when the essentials of a philosophy of life-prescribed educative aim is ordered by pedagogics, and when there is further use made of the pedagogical perspective-methods in order to observe and understand additional philosophy of life-prescribed aim-essences that an educational doctrine, as a particular prescriptive matter, becomes possible. It is also only when philosophy of life prescriptions and the pedagogical are synthesized that the higher unity ‘educative practice’ can figure forth. This course is represented schematically as follows:

Thus viewed, an educative practice is a synthesis of a philosophical anthropology, a view of being human, a founded view of being human, a philosophy of life, an educational doctrine and pedagogics. This entire dialectic course is presented schematically as follows:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIRST STEP</th>
<th>SECOND STEP</th>
<th>GENUINE SYNTHESIS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Philosophical anthropology</td>
<td>View of being human</td>
<td>Founded view of being human</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Founded view of being human</td>
<td>Philosophy of life</td>
<td>Doctrine of education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educative aim</td>
<td>Pedagogics</td>
<td>Educative practice</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A doctrine of education, even though well grounded, always remains a particular matter. [For the author pedagogy in the title of this chapter refers to a Christian education or pedagogy]. For the sake of conceptual clarification of this pedagogy, however, it is first necessary to focus on a particular Christian doctrine of education, i.e., Christian National Education as it is found in RSA before a dialectic-hermeneutic realization of the Christian educative event is discussed.

[1.14] CHRISTIAN-NATIONAL DOCTRINE OF EDUCATION

[1.14.1] Introduction

That no doctrine of education can be thought of apart from a view of life has already been shown and has appeared to be a compelling fact. Before a Christian National doctrine of education can be focused on it is first necessary to consider a Christian-National philosophy of life. To be able to do this an analysis must also be made of the existing parts out of which such a philosophy of life is constructed. ‘Christian’ will first be looked at closely and then ‘National’. However, in no way does this imply that there are two independent values that only subsequently must be connected to each other. Quite the contrary. This only means that in the concept ‘Christian-National’ there is an inseparable connection and a specific order. The connection is that Christian belief, as the highest value, overarches all of national thought, life and aspiration and the order is that Christian must stand first and be realized first. Thus it would be incorrect to speak of ‘National Christian’ because that would

*This section is in need of serious editing, especially re phraseology—G. D. Y. translator.*
mean that the people’s heritage, aspirations and strivings come first as independent and perhaps the highest values to the extent that they can prescribe how the beliefs must be ordered to promote national matters.\textsuperscript{96}

To discuss a Christian doctrine of education in its entirety would be too broad for the aim of this study. J. Chris Coetzee indicates that after the Reformation at least four substantial directions in Christian education are to be found, i.e., the Roman Catholic, Lutheran, Anglican and Calvinist. These are movements that essentially are all God-directed but that indeed are relatively different. In this respect he writes: “One direction of Christian education differs from another only because one direction of a Christian view of life differs from another. There is a Roman Catholic education because there is a Roman Catholic philosophy of life that differs from that of a Lutheran, Anglican or Calvinist education and view of life. There is a Calvinist education because there is a Calvinist view of life that is different from the Roman Catholic, Lutheran or Anglican.”\textsuperscript{97}

Next is a focus on the unique Afrikaans Christian philosophy of life, i.e., the Calvinist, and then on the educational doctrine that is grounded in it. What follows is closely connected with the previously mentioned work of J. Chris Coetzee.


The Calvinist philosophy of life is grounded in the Word of God and therefore it is much more than a scientifically elaborated theory that is only grounded in what is empirically observable. It can rightly be asserted that Calvinism is a God-directed philosophy of life that places Him at the center of life and thought. Consequently, the first or ground question of Calvinism is: “How does God come to His glory and right?” Coetzee expresses himself on this fundamental matter as follows: “The answer to this fundamental question given by the Calvinist creed is contained in the two fundamental dogmas regarding the Self-sufficiency and the Absolute Sovereignty of God. God is self-sufficient and man can contribute or add nothing to His

glory. And indeed the Lord, in His abundant mercy, calls man to His service in order to live in a way that God can use him in His eternal mercy for his purposes. God is the absolute Sovereign: He is all, the Creator and Ruler of everything; man is nothing, indeed, less than nothing; he is entirely submissive; God has complete command of Himself. Man must, with body and soul, in life and deed, in prayer and work, only serve and obey the living God, his Maker and King.”

From the two fundamental dogmas mentioned it is clearly concluded that Calvinism lives up to the Biblical-theological fundamental principle of the supremacy or absolute sovereignty of God as manifested in His Word. God is the absolute authority and all human authority is merely bestowed authority and, therefore, man must be accountable to God for the authority he exercises on earth. God is the highest good, the highest value and, therefore, man must serve and praise God in everything he does and says.

For a Calvinist, the image of being human is firm and certain. Man is a creature of God, created in His image and likeness but fallen into sin of his own free will and accord and is capable only of the good from himself that his correct relationship to God can restore; but by the inconceivable mercy of God a covenant with fallen man again has been established that lifts him out of his state of sinfulness.

In particular, Calvinism emphasizes the Fatherhood of God and the child-ness of humans. As a creature of God in His image and likeness God has placed His honor in human hands. Thus He has entrusted His honor to man. Man is free to honor God in everything he does, in words, thoughts and deeds. Alas, he is also free to betray his Father’s honor by misusing his body or by living such that he mutilates the image of God in his lived betrayal or so mutilates it that it is totally destroyed. As a child of God, man is free but his highest freedom is in his accountability. When God

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addresses him he must answer, in the end he must take responsibility for what he has made of God’s honor that has been entrusted to him.


(a) Introduction

J. Chris Coetzee describes education as an activity with a particular aim, i.e., to lead a child up. Thus viewed, for a Calvinist educating means an ‘educative activity’ where a child is led to God: “Therefore, in the concept ‘educating’ there also is included the idea of ‘becoming’, and rightly so: an adult gives a child the training, the forming, the caring, the educating; .... The educative activity thus really has two sides: leading an adult to the child and the becoming, the growth of the child.”

The Calvinist doctrine of education then also finds its foundation in the Calvinist philosophy of life that also includes the Calvinist view of being human. As a doctrine of education it is prescriptive in nature and it requires that a child be educated to the knowledge of and service of God. The following are some points of departure of the Calvinist doctrine of education.

(b) Points of departure of the Calvinist doctrine of education

Educating is possible and meaningful because a child is not born an adult. Consequently, the first point of departure of any educating or doctrine of education must be the child. This in no way means that there must be a falling into a child-centrism but indeed that educative situations entail helping a child on his path to adulthood. This can only be done in terms of norms. Thus any doctrine of education must take a standpoint about what a child as a human being is and also what he ought to become. In other words, pronouncements must be made about the origin, being and destination of the child as a human being normatively. A stand must also be taken regarding the norms in terms of which a child

101 Ibid, 12, 13.
must be helped on his course of becoming toward proper adulthood.

About the doctrine concerning the child that must be maintained by the Calvinist philosophy of life, Coetzee writes: “This proceeds in the first place from the fundamental fact of the Creation of man and thereby rejects the view of the evolution of man outside of the creative deed of God. According to the revelation of God’s Word the Lord God formed man out of the stuff of the earth and blew the breath of life into his nose; and then man became a living soul.”102 A second fact that the Calvinist doctrine of education thoroughly takes into account and which is founded on the Word of God is the dreadful reality of evil. Therefore, a child can no longer be left to his own devices and it is also written in the Calvinist doctrine of education that before an educator intervenes pedagogically he must admonish and, if need be, punish the child if he does what is disapproved or persists with it.

A third fact regarding man that clearly appears in the Calvinist philosophy of life is the mercy of God. About this, Coetzee writes: “In this fact of the mercy of God for man in order to allow something good in him, we find another basis for the belief that man is open for education, training.”103

Fourthly, the Calvinist doctrine of education, grounded in the Calvinist philosophy of life, teaches that nevertheless man, of himself, is not open for education and that it is only justified by earning the redemption of God. This is why the belief in the atonement of Christ has such a fundamental place in Calvinist education.104

In the fifth place the Calvinist doctrine of education takes thoroughly into account the fact that man is a hereditary being. In this context J. Chris Coetzee indicates that the inheritance of man is a given with which education must work and further indicates that

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102 Coetzee, J. Chris: Die Eerste Beginsels van die Calvinistiese Opvoeding, 12, 13. Pro-Ecclesia. Stellenbosch, 1940.
104 Ibid.
no man can be made by education but can only be formed [shaped] by it. “This makes the work of education so glorious because God calls us not to the impossible but only to the possible, i.e., to form, educate man to His glory.” An educator must accept a child as he is given to him by birth with all of his abilities and powers, with all of his positive potentialities and deficiencies. “In education we must accept a child as God has given him to us through heredity.”

By acknowledging heredity, the Calvinist doctrine of education thus also recognizes the individuality, the absolute otherness of each child and makes provisions to help each child to be able to become what he ought to be.

(c) The aim of the Calvinist doctrine of education

In section [1.12] it was indicated that a philosophy of life, as a matter of values, is the basis for the great variety of educative aims. A view of man will determine what the most important aim is of human life. Thus, the Calvinist philosophy of life also has its own independent educational aim although it is largely in agreement with other Christian philosophies of life. In his ‘Catechism’ and his ‘Institutes’ Calvin gives a clear answer to the question of the most important aim of human life, i.e., “To know God who has created us.” Without this knowledge as the highest good of human life, man would be more wretched than an animal in the veld because without knowledge of God man cannot live to His glory and His glorification.

To live to the glory of God means that man must be worthy of God’s glory entrusted to him. God has created man to reign over His work and to be in a position to do this man must work and also reflect on the reality God has created so that he can know it. Indeed, man cannot reign over the works of God without knowledge. So viewed, Calvinist education includes religious and worldly knowledge with the most important aim of knowing and honoring God.

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105 Ibid, 17.
106 Ibid.
108 Ibid, 23.
Coetzee elegantly summarizes the Calvinist educational aim in a few sentences: “There is one invariable final aim for Calvinist education—knowledge and fear of the Lord. But there are many continually changing incidental aims on man’s way to being completely equipped for all good work. Each bit of knowledge that we acquire, each little skill that we gain must work back to the end aim of our forming and becoming, to the knowledge of God, the glorification of His name and also to our own salvation in the atonement of Jesus Christ, the Mediator between God and man.

Therefore, for a Calvinist all education and teaching are part of his calling on earth. Hence even a lesson in arithmetic, language, history or anything at all, in Calvinist education, is something different than it is for someone with a different view of life.”


Above there is reference to the unique Afrikaans Christian philosophy of life. In the following attention is given to the unique National philosophy of life so that finally it can be seen what a Christian-national philosophy of life means.

As with any other people, Afrikaners make the claim of a unique national character and he is proud of and has the right to be proud of what he uniquely is. A few essences that characterize the fundamentals of the Afrikaans national philosophy of life are its own:

(i) religion,
(ii) fatherland,
(iii) community,
(iv) blood-ideology,
(v) history and tradition,
(vi) mother tongue, and
(vii) teaching policy.

(i) Religion

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The real essential of the unique Afrikaans national character is in its religiousness. The first act of the Settlers was a prayer and the Afrikaner’s history is saturated with humiliations before God and of examples of His merciful protection and guidance. The basis of the Afrikaans philosophy of life, of its history, its culture and the entire nature and essence of its Nation is found in its Christian-Calvinist nature. The Afrikaner is indeed a Church-man who accepts the Bible as the infallible word of God and by which he is also led.

(ii) **Fatherland**

The Afrikaner sees his fatherland as the place in which God has placed him to work and to serve Him. Therefore the Afrikaner is proud of his own fatherland and testifies to this each time he sings ‘Die Stem’, prepares to live and strives for his land.

(iii) **Community**

The Christian Afrikaner knows that he can work best in the space that God has established for him if he works among his own people to whom he is bound by mutual love, devotion and understanding can freely and willingly receive cooperation. Because the Afrikaner believes he can best serve God and his neighbors in his own community he allows himself such a personal space and community for those near him so that they then can dwell together in a friction-free community as an ethnic group or nation. “And because the Christian Afrikaner wants this culture to be Christian-National, therefore he has always accepted the calling to bring the Gospel of Jesus Christ to them.”

(iv) **Blood-ideology**

The Afrikaner attributes particular value to the purity of the “blood” of the White race. In this connection Rautenbach writes: “This is an inherent and expressed aim of our philosophy of life.

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We have a deep rooted aversion for miscegenation with other than Whites.”

(v) History and tradition

Christian Afrikaners have their own history, a history of which they are proud and in which they can clearly see the hand of God. They also have their own traditions that are transferred from generation to generation and which they esteem highly. The most important of these cultural goods are their religion and moral laws and, therefore, they remain conscientious in following them.

(vi) Mother tongue

For the Afrikaner his mother tongue is more than words. For him it is the verbalization of a rich tradition. Therefore, time and again in the past he has striven for the right to speak in his own language, to teach his children in it and to practice his religion with it. Because he has such love for his own language, the Afrikaner allows the other groups of people the same privilege that he had so often striven for.

(vii) Teaching policy

Throughout the Afrikaner’s history there was a desire to formulate its own Christian-National education and the crown was placed on this endeavor with Law 39 of 1967. With this Law the Republic of South Africa became the only country in the world whose education was cast in this [particular] Christian mold. This Law must be seen, as Pistorius states it,: “as a crystallization of the deepest convictions that directed our people from the beginning and without which we would not continue to exist as the particular people that we are.”


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After an analysis of the existing parts from which a Christian-National philosophy of life is built, it seems unquestionable that there is a definite order and an inseparable connection between them. The Christian and National philosophies of life form a unity that makes Christian-National education possible. In South Africa National education can never be separated from Christian education. In other words, Christian education must be presented as the first precondition for National education as it is found in this country. So viewed, there is meaning and relationships between the real essentials of ‘Christian’ and ‘National’. The Christian principles not only give meaning to National education but also steer it to an exalted God-directed aim. Consequently, Christian education must be seen as the first possibility and National education as the second possibility for a Christian-National education. This is presented schematically as follows:

![Diagram of Christian Education, National Education, and Christian-National Education](attachment:image.png)