

CHAPTER 8

EXPRESSIVE AND PROJECTIVE TECHNIQUES

1. EXPRESSION AS A PHENOMENON

Gradually it has become clear that the orthopedagogic evaluator searches for the personal meanings of a child restrained in becoming adult. In addition, it seems that these meanings, as experiential world contents, especially are **feelings** and **thoughts**. By implementing his **feelings** and thoughts, another aspect is brought to the fore, namely, **behaving**. The child's behaving also is observable in particular **movements**.

According to Buytendijk (28, 17), all movements can be subdivided into **expressive movements**, **actions** and **representative movements**. Expressive movements (e.g., mimicry) are more static in nature (28, 332), actions are more dynamic and goal-directed, and representative movements represent the descriptive, speaking, figurative and graphic gestures such as the greeting, the kneel, the kiss (28, 376-377).

The three types of movement never arise in pure form but there are transitional or mixed forms. Van den Berg (270, 28) says each movement can always be interpreted as an action, an expression and as a representation. As an example, he refers to a worker inclined to strike who in his manner of working (action) expresses (expression) his discontent and with the mistakes in his work he shows his passive resistance (representation).

All bodily movements are expressions and an **isolated expression** no more exists than a pure action or representation (266, 282). Therefore, one can differentiate as many forms of expression as there are forms of behavior. Langeveld (134, 58 [in Dutch]) says "In his movements, attitudes, facial expressions, in boasting, crying, bellowing, in language and playing, everywhere a child brings his interiority into view". According to Ten Have (257, 9), it is only through the phenomenon of expression that one can penetrate into the "absolutely individual realm" of another.

In his expressions, a person exists authentically through the forms of **expression**, as forms of being by which he communicates with the world and other persons (see 311, 27 and Van Gelder and Van Praag (289, 5)).

Lubbers (150, 12-14) refers to a number of authors (148, 23-29; 284, 148; 5, 370; 24; 267, 22, 31; 214) who agree that a child also reveals various "problems" through different modes of expression.

According to Helberg (86, 28), expression implies that emotional movement becomes observable which arises in a person through impressions, representations, intentions and reasoning and which are mostly of a fleeting nature. According to Wellek, expression means "the inwardness appears outside" (316 [in English]). Helberg (86, 29) stresses that no "emotional movement" can occur without one or another form of expression. Therefore, expression always exposes something of a person's being directed to his world or landscape (51, 131).

Consequently, a child's momentary situation has to be looked at in interpreting his expressions because their meaning springs from this situation, says Linschoten (142, 110).

According to Van den Berg (270, 428) there are three possible sources from which the sense of expression can spring, namely, a person's landscape, his unique interior and the look of another.

So far it seems that a child's expressions can occur in different forms, e.g., through his **attitude**. From this attitude one can infer pride, self-consciousness, readiness to act, candor, brutality, outspokenness, stubbornness, contempt, depression, submission, obedience, meditating, curiosity, distrust, disapproval, etc.

In addition, there are **gestures** which Fast (60) refers to as "body language"; **facial expressions**; expression by **quickness of breath** and movements related to sensory perception such as looking, listening, feeling, tasting; **motor disorganization**, because each motor disorganization refers to an overwhelming feeling, to being pathically (emotionally) flooded; the surrender of one's own body--as, e.g., in laughing and crying that are never an expression of one particular emotion, not only of happiness or sadness. A person can laugh because he is amused, irritated, surprised, engrossed, captivated and cry if he is impressed, moved,

stirred (see 86, 32-34). In crying and laughing, a child brings his interiority into view (311, 35; 134, 58).

Also a child expresses himself through **representations**, e.g., through drawings because he draws what for him in reality has an emotional significance, and his earlier experiences, present desires and future expectations are represented in them (311, 35).

According to Lubbers (150, 34; also see 114, 82) "image" signifies the way the world appears in its practical character, and in his image a child gives one another access to his personal world (150, 39).

Also, **color** has a particular emotional value for the child and he chooses a specific color on the basis of his lived experiencing and not necessarily because the object in reality, for example, is red, green, etc. (see 148, 17).

Expression in **images** includes **what** a child draws, **with what** he draws, the **ways**, e.g., he handles a paint brush, draws lines, applies shadings of color. Lubbers (150, 36) says the interpersonal world is there through images **and** concepts. A person creates this world for himself because he discovers the sense of his impressions and makes what manifests itself to him his own; indeed he assimilates it. On the basis of what **he** is able to understand, he also tries to understand his fellow persons. This is only possible by reducing the other to what is general in his own life and in this way he does not do justice to the other person's **uniqueness**. However, he also can understand him by becoming a participant in what the other reveals in his images and thus sympathize with him. Lubbers says "Although the concept functions as a description of an image, as naming experience or as reference to whatever, it does not **replace** the image"(150, 36 [in Dutch]).

Thus, the **image** refers to reality-for-me, and therefore the orthopedagogic evaluator, by participating in the image, can try to understand the meanings the child has attributed to reality.

With respect to attributing meaning, Lubbers (150, 35-37) refers to three forms: the **open**, the **personal** and the **implicit**. These forms of giving meaning are intermingled by which, say, the **open** and then the **personal** dominates and by which the **implicit** also always has a role and significance. In daily life, attributing open and

personal meanings enrich each other. By accepting a new concept (meaning), one's personal life can change just as can what is given in one's personal life, and thus also one's objective world image can change. What is acquired through attributing open meaning is something general and accessible to everyone, but the personal world cannot be "translated" into concepts. If a child presents one with a particular slice of his personal world, this can only be done through presenting an **image** of it. The reality of the attribution of personal meaning, as a reality-for-me, is not replaced. However, for a person who understands me, this reality is symbolic of itself because he recognizes in my personal existence my general humanness from my attributions of open meaning.

In attributing open meaning, the personal has to be expressed. To be able to do this, the "I" has to give form to itself and this can occur only through image-forming, e.g., when, in drawing, a person is tempted to so design himself with colors and lines that his intentions are seen reflected in his work. Such an image could be called a **symbol** since one takes a symbol as a confirmation of a most adequately expressed not-yet-known connection where "not-yet-known" means not a conceptual explanation but rather a conceptual linking up.

However, the symbol especially figures in projection where the image then is used to bring **what** must not be said into communication (306, 159). Indeed, projection concerns disclosing the deeper aspects of being a person and by which the child shows **his** real world relationships because then he **attributes** his true feelings and thoughts to someone or something else.

Lubbers (150, 35) refers to Plokker (196, 117) who discusses a variety of meanings of the term **symbol** and also cites Rumke who describes a symbol as " ... a confirmation of a not yet known relationship found in our lived experience which either descends from the external world or rises up from the inner world which it expresses in the most adequate way" (196, 118 [in Dutch]). Through a symbol one can be with another because the other's life is actualized in symbols. Without symbols a person's life would be without resonance, says Lubbers (150, 33).

In the practice of orthopedagogic evaluation, use then is made of particular media to let the child express his feelings and thoughts.

Thus, he is given the opportunity to tell, play, draw, paint, mold, model, mimic, etc.

2. CHILD DRAWINGS

With regard to child drawings as a medium for exploring his experiential world, the reader is referred to the works of Goodenough (74), Machover (153), Levy (139), Nel and Esterhuizen (177), Buck (27), Koch (101), Van Lennep (291) and Kinget (98).

By inviting and allowing the child to draw, he frequently draws what is getting the best of him because during his drawing activities he also is entrusted to an adult who participates in his world. The child's particular little world that he draws, in which he is imprisoned by his unique "problem", is amplified because via the relationship with the orthopedagogic evaluator, as representative of a "foreign" world, that foreign world is introduced.

By giving the child the opportunity to draw, similarly the orthopedagogue initiates the **possibility of an encounter** between himself and the child restrained in becoming adult.

Montagne (see 5, 370) states that children usually draw spontaneously, and according to Bloom (24) the child finds out that his "art" is a painless method for voicing his problems. Thus, if he should say that he can't draw, we can be assured that there are serious problems present regarding his becoming adult. In this regard, Lowenfeld (148 [in English]) notes "No Eskimo-child would express such lack of confidence."

However, it would be incorrect to force a child who will not draw, or to encourage him to just produce something. In each case, he has to be given the opportunity to choose according to his preference of whether he wants to play, draw, act, mold, etc. Regarding a younger child who especially is going to be active, it seems that he prefers play while the older child, who puts greater demands on the end product, prefers to mold and draw. Also, the orthopedagogic evaluator should not suggest to the child what his creation ought to look like because he has to represent his own feelings and thoughts and not imitate the investigator's.

The child can be asked to draw freely or draw specific subjects with ordinary or colored pencils. For example, he can be asked to draw

what he thought and how he felt during earlier periods (see 277, 83). Also he can be asked to draw a sketch of his best and worst feelings (see 35, 145, 150).

In the practice of orthopedagogic evaluation, usually the child is asked to draw, following his own choice, a person, a tree, and a house; then special media are implemented such as the Wartegg Drawing medium (207).

In this connection, because the child himself chooses his **image elements** such as line, color, outline, representation, repetition, contrast, standpoint, aspect, material, handling material, and ways of experimenting (see 289, 68), he also has to be given the freedom to do so.

Regarding the analysis and evaluation of the child's drawings, the outward appearances are not merely looked at. Van Gelder and Van Praag (289, 4) say that no matter how imperfect his drawings might be, the merit of the outward appearance should not be judged but the investigator has to try to understand his intentions (see also 311, 19).

Vorsatz (311, 19-20) refers to the phase divisions of Lowenfeld (148) and Leuschner (138) according to which a child between two and four years usually only scribbles and between four and six makes symbolic representations; a child between six and nine draws more schematically, and between nine and thirteen more realistic representations; and in puberty he progresses more to an integration of the image elements.

With reference to Vorsatz (311, 19-20), such criteria have to be rejected as primary criteria, as unreliable regarding the child's drawings since they originate from the aspects of becoming adult of a longitudinal perspective. Thus, a four year old who draws objects with sharp points, e.g., lived experiences his world as threatening and his drawings are a manifestation of his feeling of insecurity and not of the fact that a child between two and four usually draws sharp-pointed scribbles for no reason (see 311, 19).

Van Gelder and Van Praag refer to the need for valid norms for evaluating the level of a child's drawings, but they emphasize that he draws his lived experienced relationship to the world. From this it follows that norms, on the basis of which his becoming adult can be

gauged, are located jointly in the child himself, the investigator and the act of drawing. The primary question is how has the drawing as an expression arisen and how does the child express himself in it; what has he lived experienced and how has he given form to it? Thus, the meaning lies in the event itself and not in its outcome.

According to Van Gelder and Van Praag (289, 67) to evaluate child drawings, a phenomenological analysis of their image elements is indispensable.

3. THE ANALYSIS OF IMAGE ELEMENTS

3.1 Introduction

Van Gelder and Van Praag (289, 68) offer the following division of image elements that can be taken as a point of departure in terms of:

- a) Fundamental image elements**
 - i) line;
 - ii) color; and
 - iii) surface;
- b) Combined image elements**

Here is a combination of image elements, namely:

 - iv) giving form;
 - v) spatial representation;
 - vi) scheme; and
 - vii) image;
- c) Dependent image elements**
 - viii) repetition;
 - ix) composition;
 - x) rhythm;
 - xi) contrast;
 - xii) standpoint; and
 - xiii) aspect;
- d) Material image elements**

This is closely related to the material and its use, namely:

 - xiv) the material;
 - xv) the use of the material; and
 - xvi) experimentation.

Following is a discussion of the possible significance of the mentioned image elements.

3.2 The significance of line use

A secure child begins to scribble from two years (148, 12). Later, he names his scribbles and tells a story about them (311, 52). Van Gelder and Van Praag (289, 68) find that the drawn line, either light or dark, flowing or angular is a manifestation of **tension** between the child's intention and the control of expressive possibility. Therefore, already in a scribble, it can be "seen" if he explores in a tense or relaxed way.

Feelings of insecurity lead to anxiety and tension and this leads to **intensified** line use and also very sketchy lines. Because on the basis of his insecurity a child always controls his own movements, they often are stiff and spasmodic. However, one always has to be sure that there are no organic defects because then this sort of use of line arises (see 311, 54).

3.3 The significance of color use

According to De Zeeuw (49, 42), because a child turns himself in particular ways to a specific relation to color, it is possible to determine what such a child's relationship is to particular relations in human situations.

De Zeeuw (49, 14-15) finds that at about two years of age a child chooses red, green, blue and yellow colors; at about five years orange and green become more prominent while interest in red, yellow and blue decrease. From approximately six years of age, color preference seems to show the following order of importance: yellow, red, violet, green and lastly blue.

Louwenfeld (148, 62) says that the adequately becoming child of approximately seven years discovers a relationship between color and object.

Vorsatz (311, 55) indicates that to approximately thirteen years, children's color preferences are determined mainly by their emotional lived experiences and that during times of feeling happy and secure they prefer **warm** colors.

If a child feels helpless, insecure and therefore tense and anxious, he usually turns to **cold** colors, according to Louwenfeld (148, 63, 84, 107).

Van Gelder and Van Praag say that a child who uses only black is affectively disturbed [possibly] as a consequence of too strict a father, domineering brothers and sisters, parental discord; for one or another reason, this makes him feel impotent to explore (289, 75, 76).

Research has found that children who usually mix colors more freely express their feelings than those who keep colors separate (see 311, 55). Van Gelder and Van Praag find that if color mixing is extreme and uneven, such children show decidedly aggressive attitudes toward other children (285, 76).

Van Wyk (304, 18) indicates that each person has his own color historicity that arises from the unique experiences in his personal life. Color historicity means the entirety of emotional significances as these have arisen in the past in the form of actual color symbolism or tradition. This fact has to be taken into consideration when the meaning of particular colors are generally taken as ways of understanding a unique child.

With reference to De Zeeuw (49) Van Wyk (304, 18-21) indicates that the following meanings can be attributed to particular colors:

a) Red

This represents **activity**, as action that follows the primary emotions. The character of red is energetic; i.e., an affective stimulation from the vital. Thus, red can be an indication of violent activity rather than of emotionality. However, in interpreting red, the person's gender also has to be taken into account. Vorsatz (311, 36) says that often red reveals an unrestrained emotionality in the toddler.

b) Green

Green is viewed as a **tranquil** color. According to Kouwer (108, 121) qualities such as tranquility and harmony can be attributed to blue, green, gray and white. De Zeeuw (49, 133-164) believes that a clear preference for green is evidence of emotional control regarding its outward expression. Thus, it is

possible that a person who has a preference for green is less spontaneous in his emotional expressions as such. Hence, when there is anxiety about excessive self-control, this possibly can be indicated by a person's preference for green.

c) Blue

In the literature in general, a preference for blue is viewed as a favorable sign although it also can have an unfavorable meaning especially because it is a substitute for a passive voice. Blue is viewed as a search for unity, security and safety; it also is an indication of introversion. According to Kouwer (107, 121), children who are affectively neglected and thus in need of a mother figure have a ready preference for blue.

d) Yellow

According to Luscher (152, 109) yellow can indicate a striving for a multiplicity of relationships. Usually yellow shows a correspondence with red. "Yellow too, is fierce, violent, forceful, energetic, active, emotional, affective, exciting, stimulating, etc. Yellow is also a warm color although considerably less than red" (152, 109 [in German]). A person who chooses yellow usually shows a more critical and intellectual attunement.

e) White

White is empty or pure and when it has to do with emotional appreciation, the accent falls primarily on emptiness and secondarily on purity. Thus, a preference for white possibly can indicate an affective emptiness. A preference for white along with a rejection of red is an indication of pushing vital and sexual feelings aside.

f) Black

Black includes the complete absence of color and as such is a complete "blacking out". A person who chooses black usually places himself above his emotional life in terms of pushing his emotions aside. Where one acquires emotional analysis with white, with black one acquires emotional congestion. Moreover, black implies a choking of the spontaneity of emotional expressions. According to Vorsatz (311, 36) very often with a toddler, black refers to the lived experience of being bad, wicked, sad or even feeling guilty (see also 134,

63).

Van Wyk (304, 21) stresses that a thorough knowledge of the child's personal structure is necessary before the preference for the "interpretation" of a particular color can be claimed to indicate a particular meaning of an emotion, and that no color preference in itself can lay claim to being an evaluative medium.

3.4 The significance of surface use

How a child fills a surface is a very clear indication of how his gnostic/cognitive and pathic/affective lived experiences are integrated into each other. Filling surfaces with fine, decorative lines of varying nuances often indicate a strong sensitivity and fine attunement, but it also indicates that a child with this temperament exercises a strong intellectual control of his very deeply experienced emotions.

3.5 The significance of giving form

According to Langeveld (134, 23-25), from approximately six years a child purposefully tries to give form to his drawings. However, because he draws what he experiences, the functions of objects and persons speak clearly to his feelings that such objects and persons assume (289, 80-82). For example, often a person writing with a pencil is given a very insignificant form in a young child's drawing of a human figure, while the pencil is drawn disproportionately large. Also, it often is found that if he draws one parental figure larger and with better form than the other one, this can indicate that he feels more safe and secure with the one drawn with good form.

Transparent human figures sometimes are drawn by children who very strongly lived-experience an organic defect. Van Gelder and Van Praag (289, 86) also indicate that a child who lived experiences disparities in his family often draws little persons in a transparent house. Van Lennep (291, 131) says if a child, e.g., draws objects on a tree, this can indicate inner unrest and a strong need for safety on the basis of an unstable and emotionally impoverished educating.

3.6 The significance of spatial representation

Vorsatz (311, 57) refers to Van Gelder and Van Praag (289, 29-30) who find that when a little girl has to draw a doll, she tries to represent the emotional relationship between her and her doll

without any relationship between objects as such. Especially beginning at approximately nine years a child discovers horizontal and depth perspective (148, 79, 80). Thus, e.g., if the drawing of a little tree is in the upper left corner of a large sheet of drawing paper, then this indicates a strong lived experience of feeling like withdrawing from his milieu; that he even restricts his drawing space and the entire drawing space is not filled with a large tree means he does not adequately explore is Van Lennep's opinion (291, 134-135).

3.7 The significance of scheme

According to Louwenfeld (148, 38) it is especially the body scheme in a child's drawing which shows most clearly how he lived experiences persons in his relationships with them and what physical and personal life needs he has himself. Thus, e.g., the omission of arms by a twelve year-old child points to despondency and an unwillingness to explore.

With epileptic children and those with brain damage it usually is found that the head is drawn disproportionately large in relation to the rest of the body. According to Van Gelder and Van Praag (289, 106), a child usually chooses a scheme that corresponds to his emotional lived experiences.

3.8 The significance of image

What the child lived experiences and tries to represent is determined by the image elements (composition, line, color use, or giving form) he uses to attain his aim. For example, according to Van Gelder and Van Praag (289, 112), the use of miscellaneous mixed colors to represent for an eleven year old a march where such a child lived experiences the crowd moving around chaotically and on this basis he represents the march as chaotic.

3.9 The significance of repetition

The affectively labile child cannot proceed to explore adequately. Then, in his drawings he repeats only dashes, dots and circles that really show nothing of his inner life.

3.10 The significance of composition

The composition of a child's drawings should improve as he gets older otherwise this is evidence of infantilism and a pathic attunement.

3.11 The significance of rhythm

Suppleness in the child's drawings is evidence of adequate becoming. The tense child cannot adequately control his motor movements and the drawings also readily show a defect in rhythm. Naturally, here it also must be made certain that he is not burdened by organic defects.

3.12 The significance of contrast

This has to do with the differentiation of foreground and background. When this is weak there is a possibility of restrained becoming. Sometimes the use of lines is hidden under an excessive use of color instead of creating color contrast (289, 132-133).

3.13 The significance of standpoint

Here one gets an indication of how the child distances himself from his world (289, 133). The place where he puts particular objects in his drawing, and also the size of such objects and their perspective to each other are indications of how he lived experiences his world with respect to the represented objects. Thus, e.g., in his drawing, he can place a child far away from his parents.

3.14 The significance of aspect

Very often it is found that a child will draw what he has perhaps experienced the same day at school. He dramatizes his experiences in his drawings, e.g. a story he has heard irrespective of whether what he draws corresponds to the content of the real story he has heard.

3.15 The significance of material

Usually a child uses a pencil, colored pencil, pastels or watercolors. Van Gelder and Van Praag (289, 140) emphasize that he be offered a large assortment of materials to choose from, otherwise their expressive value is biased. Specific material lends itself to particular expressive qualities. Thus, e.g., a pencil lends itself better to

drawing lines, colored pencils to the decorative filling in of a colored surface, etc. (see 289, 142).

3.16 The significance of the use of the material

Regarding this matter, particular attention is given to whether the child handles the material in accordance with his level of becoming.

3.17 The significance of experimentation

The degree to which a child test out the possibilities that the various materials offer also is looked at and if signs of creativity are manifested or not.

In his unique manner, in his drawings the child gives expression to his lived experiences through drawing lines, coloring, reducing, enlarging, etc. The course of executing the drawing task, the means used, his bodily attitude and gestures, his facial expressions and his conversation during the execution of the task show the observing investigator particular aspects of his personal structure. This amounts to the fact that an image of the child's world has to be acquired and then compared with his world image, according to Dumont (56, 47-48).

Implementing drawings as a medium also includes particular advantages such as the following (see 177, 26):

No complicated apparatus is required; the assignment is initiated with a few words after which the researcher remains in the background without disturbing the child; it can be repeated often without influencing the results too much; it is very suitable with respect to a child who is unwilling to talk; it eliminates language problems where this can restrain the communication between the investigator and the child; and it can be used by children of all ages.

4. PROJECTION AS A PHENOMENON

4.1 Introduction

In the literature, the concepts **expression** and **projection** often are used as synonyms (see 114, 73; 177, 3) or there only is reference to **projection**. However, because a clear distinction

between the two concepts can be made, [and since expression was already considered] brief attention now will be given to projection.

Etymologically, the word **projection** has its origin in the Latin **proicere**, that means "to throw forward" (see 140, 3).

Although the word **projection** was already used in the seventeenth century (140, 3), the current **concept of projection** really springs from the psychoanalysis of Sigmund Freud, who used it in 1894 in connection with his research on paranoia and hysteria (see 112, 18; 177, 11; 306, 149). He describes projection as a "process" that implies a "psychological discharge" by which a person is freed of his anxiety, among other things.

Bellak (14) substitutes the concept projection with **apperception** and describes it as the dynamic, meaningful interpretation of a perception by an individual.

According to the Anglo-American view, all expressions of "personality" are **projections** (see 204; 174, 3; 150, 41; 297, 149). Van Lennep (292, 9 [in English]) points out the error of this view and limits projection to "the phenomenon where someone attributes characteristics to one or more persons which rather are applicable to the judging person than to the judged person or persons".

The purpose is not in any sense to go into the phenomenon of projection as it is discussed in the literature but only to more clearly explicate those matters that are important for an orthopedagogic evaluative investigation.

For a lonely person, a solitary camel thorn tree with its curved and outstretched branches can be a symbol expressive of his loneliness. According to Jaspers (see 297, 152) a symbol is "an analogic view" and with reference to Heidegger, Van Lennep (294, 257) is of the opinion that our view of things is never free from our mood/attunement. According to Heidegger attunement is "essentially already being-in-the-world" (see 294, 257). This world boundness also has to be essentially distinguished from the use one makes of particular aspects of the world in order to adhere to or project one's desires and moods (see 86, 20). According to Van Lennep (294, 257), this implies that only those objects can serve as a symbolic core of projection that also are to a degree objective regarding an individual's project of being in the outer world.

However, later he asserts that "It seems to me that the most promising way of theorizing on the concept of projection is to start from the affective relationship between the subject and his world. A too intellectual cleavage between subject and object, a heritage from Descartes, conceals the fundamental connection which always exists between both terms" (295 [in English]).

Particular aspects of even the most personal "world" are always defined by the world itself and even in the most "objective" and theoretical constructions there always is a **personal** meaning. For this reason, it is not possible to determine precisely the part played by the subject and that by the object.

Van Lennep (296, 10-12) makes five distinctions regarding the act of projection, namely:

a) Projection as perceiving

In this case there actually is talk of ordinary sensory **perception** as projection. Accordingly, the perception of something in the external world gives rise to the creation of an emotional lived experience. In this regard, for Freud (see 127, 17) this means that when the need for love is not filled it is turned into hate or paranoia, which is directed from the outside to the person.

b) Projection as hallucinating and related phenomena

In this regard, Van Lennep (296, 10) refers to Carp for whom a projection occurs in a perception, where there is the projection of a **thought-image** into a **perception-image**.

c) Projection as transferring or displacing

The concept **displacement** also has its origin with Freud and Baldwin (see 77, 66). Here there is mention of a feeling being directed to an object other than the one that initiated it and The new object comes into play as a substitute for the old one (See 296, 10; 5, XII).

d) Projection as organizing or structuring the perceptual field

According to this, projection is when someone organizes and structures his perceptual field partly on the basis of affective principles. According to Carp (see 5, XIII-XIV) each person perceives the world in his own way. This implies that a person

organizes his perceptual field according to his own emotional life.

e) **Projection as attribution**

This meaning of the concept **projection** today is endorsed by most authors (see 296, 10; 181, 15; 287, 18; 110, 22; 306, 150) and implies **attributing** feelings, thoughts, strivings, etc. to another. Still there are a variety of trends depending on the particular personal vision that the interpreter holds about this.

4.2 **Projection as attribution**

From the few foregoing thoughts it is evident that a clear distinction can be made between **projection** and **expression** and that **expression** has a broader meaning in the sense that it refers to all **modes of expression** of a person, e.g., gestures, footsteps, voice, play, drawings. Thus, expression includes **projection**. For example, if a child says that the figure he has drawn resembles an anxious person, he has projected his own lived experience of anxiety into the image he has drawn. When, e.g., he gives expression to his happiness by drawing a bouquet of flowers, this is **expression**, but if he ascribes to the expressive material a form that he himself is but which he cannot accept, this is **projection**, according to Lubbers (150, 42).

A phenomenological analysis of **projection** also has revealed that it should be viewed as an inseparable part of human existence (177, 15), as a form of "giving personal meaning" which refers to the world but also to the ego that, in giving meaning, it constitutes, according to Langeveld ((136, 169).

Van Lennep emphasizes the difference between **projection** and **expression** and notes "For every projection is indeed utterance, but each utterance is certainly not a projection, and particularly not that which is called a person's expression". He says that the unique nature of projection is nowhere more clearly illustrated than in its contrast with real self expression (294, 255 [in English]).

In expression, a person communicates "consciously" or "unconsciously" with another, and according to Van Lennep (294, 255), expression is only meaningful as a **communicative** activity.

Among other things, in projection there also is mention of a truly emotional expression by which a person applies to another that which is applicable to himself. Van Lenep (294, 250) says that our affects, especially if they are strong, transform the external world so the affect can find a correlate there. For example, when someone describes another's face as anxious, his own feeling afraid creates its correlate in the external world. Then the **other** carries the describer's own emotion; then the other is entirely divested of his own, for us unpredictable, subjectivity and is used as an object, "as a peg on which to hang our own desires and thoughts" (294, 256). For these reasons, Van Lenep (296) describes projection as a **doubling of the I-in-affect**, and he distinguishes three aspects in this regard:

- i) One's own emotional structure is attributed to the other without the other being involved with the person (who is projecting);
- ii) when there is a relationship between the projector and the one projected on--e.g., by attributing an unacceptable deed to the other--then the one projecting easily reads what is disapproved in the other's looks; and
- iii) the emotional state is projected on the other but implicates himself. For example, a person loves his therapist but by means of projection, he thinks his therapist is in love with him.

Consequently, it seems that by doubling the structure, the I who is emotionally burdened is involved with the other without the other being involved himself.

Lubbers (150, 78) uses the image of a **third** person. There is the investigator, the child and **yet** another, and the child ascribes his own emotions to this third person. In this way he has the opportunity to blame the other and not himself, and thus attributes to the other his own anxiety, uncertainty, aggression, sorrow, hate, etc. Then Lubbers also refers to the child restrained in becoming adult who has to contend with affective problems. Via projection, this child sees in the other what he cannot accept in himself. He lets the impersonal third person undergo that from which he himself recoils, and in this way he defends himself against confronting what is threatening to him. In this regard, Kwakkel-Scheffer notes, "Thus,

he is **not** in communication with this 'third' person" (114, 84-85[in Dutch]).

Lubbers (150, 78-79) refers to these "unacceptable" meanings as **averted** meanings and on this basis, **projection** also is a **defense**. Since the orthopedagogic evaluator is in search of those meanings in the child's experiential world that are **threatening** to him, he acquires by means of a child's projections an image of the **averted** since it is manifested through its "safe" projection in a meaning-structure acceptable for the child.

According to Van Lennep (296), the act of projecting can be grouped into a scheme that, in a simplified form, can be divided into two principles with four subparts:

- i) The world is divided into human beings and things; and
- ii) the world is experienced as either in harmony with a subject's feelings and emotions or as a menacing co-partner.

Within this scheme, he then differentiates four different types of projection:

a) **Objects, things, landscapes that either are or are not in harmony with a person's feelings and emotions.** For example, someone feels despondent and walks on the beach on a dreary day. He accepts the landscape as also sad and tiresome; or he feels despondent and the day is sunny and cheerful but he accepts it as too bright and unpleasant. In everyday life, this type of projection does not arise as readily as it does during the use of a particular projective medium (see 86, 21);

b) **human intentions are attributed to the inanimate world.** Thus, in retaliation, a child strikes a table because it hurt him. Here the landscape and objects are participants in the child's moods. Of course, everyday objects do not have subjectivity in the true sense of the word. On the other hand, one person cannot "organize" another person into his world without making him into an object. This type of projection arises mainly in everyday life but sometimes also on the Rorschach and thematic projective procedures (see 86, 22).

c) **where other human and humanized beings are experienced in harmony with someone's moods;** for example,

a person who is frightened or angry accepts that the other also is afraid or angry. This type of projection arises often in everyday life but also with thematic projective media (see 86, 22).

d) human beings are accepted as co-participants in a person's own needs, feelings and aspirations. For example, someone feels guilty and then accepts that another person judges him. This type of projection arises mainly in everyday life (see 86, 22).

4.3 The interpretation of projections

With respect to interpreting a person's projections, this does not concern the factual contents as such but rather the **theme** that through the quality of the person's lived experiences "has acquired a unique appearance or physiognomy" (306, 156). Vermeer (306, 161) indicates that rendering the value of a behavior such as **projecting** in terms of a number (i.e., quantifying it--G.Y.), is objectionable because the behavior expresses polyvalent or complex meanings and the concern is precisely with these meanings (and not with reducing it to a numerical value--G.Y.).

If one isolates only particular elements, then at the same time one destroys the **coherence of meanings**. By isolating elements, analogic reasoning also is meaningless because the elements themselves also function within a meaningful structure or coherence of meanings according to Vermeer (306, 161).

The orthopedagogic evaluator has to "translate" the projections of the child restrained in becoming adult via his analogic lived-experiences, by **analogic reasoning** to be able to find correspondences in the subjective meanings of parents and child with regard to the reality of educating. Vermeer (306, 160) says not only progressive but also regressive meanings that are brought to light by projection can be placed in the perspective of the educative reality in order to be able to abolish the "short-circuits".

What needs to be elucidated is the symbolic language of the projections. With reference to Gusdorf (80, 491), Vermeer (306, 162 [in Dutch]) says "Therefore, we have to take note that the world to which the child has attributed meaning is a **coherence** of meanings". She indicates (306, 159) also that symbolic meanings moreover can be ambiguous and they cannot be correlated because

that which is said and that which is kept silent in the sum total of projections is not in harmony with the lucid language of numbers. Projections not only are polyvalent through their lived experienced thematics but also can be ambiguous because they express meanings that at the same time include a defense which will not tolerate the disillusionment or the clarification of the use of language which by logical abstraction is attempted to be made harmonious and objective.

Concepts such as **emancipation** and **domination** thus do not say much in a personal description if they cannot be viewed in relationship to the child's reality. It is only on the level of a shared context of speaking and listening that the ambiguities can be overcome, says Vermeer (306, 164) with reference to Guepin (79).

In the following chapters there are brief synoptic discussions of the analysis and interpretation of a few drawing tasks with which the child can be confronted and in terms of which his expressions and/or projections can be gauged.