

CHAPTER 3

THE CATEGORICAL STRUCTURE OF TEACHING

A. MOTIVATION FOR THE CATEGORICAL STRUCTURE

As explained earlier about the possibilities regarding the beginning points or approaches to constructing a didactical theory, a fundamental approach to such theory construction is posed as the point of departure within reach of one who wants to know why something is essential to this discipline of pedagogics but also what is essential to the experiential totality of the phenomenon of teaching within an educative context in order to shed light on its commonplaceness and its significance for intervening as an everyday form of living within the reality of educating. As a matter of fact, the everyday commonplaceness of teaching for penetrating this aspect of the phenomenon of educating is deceiving.

In a variety of areas that fall outside of the activities of educating, teaching manifests itself as a didactical matter that cannot be eliminated from a person's usual course of life. Thus, when there is a search for the *fundamentalia* by which this activity constitutes itself, understandably there are a variety of implications that a person must also take into account in order to reveal the essences that today generally are known as categories. In the most general sense under no circumstances should a categorical structure of teaching ever allow certain assumptions of the thinker to be left out of the particular reality to which he is attuned. This is of particular importance in designing a didactical pedagogical theory. After all, a teaching situation such as one learns to know in the course of everyday life is largely an *altered* situation. As a type of situation its origin certainly is in the reality of educating. This is described fully in the previous chapters but also in currently well-known publications.

The possibility of a categorical structure is rooted in this original reality of educating. The way in which this reality continually makes itself evident already is an alteration and difference with respect to the original reality of educating in the sense that it is,

e.g., formalized anew in an institutional form in the lifeworld so that anyone who wants to participate in it is compelled to deal with this altered form. Therefore, the reality that offers itself to perception in the form of schooling is no longer itself the original reality. Consequently, the didactician must be well aware that should he direct his “fundamental” thinking to the school he involves himself with an altered occurrence of the original phenomenon that, *ipso facto*, must lead to the fact that his pronouncements about such an altered reality will not necessarily have taken up the essences (categories) of the original phenomenon.

In this way the thinker cannot possibly arrive at a categorical construction in his theoretical descriptions and often his theory building loses the anticipated appeal because the origins of the experience are not necessarily disclosed in all their essences in the situation that he has chosen to describe and analyze. This last aspect is extraordinary importance. The altered situation is not an original part of human experience. As an altered situation, it is presented by those who hold it as necessary. The school situation constitutes such an altered slice of reality. Any didactical theory that is grounded in the school as an institution, necessarily must disclose this altered situation as the first essence and only in so far as the school shows itself as a categorical construction can a theory claim the title “categorical structure”.

In this light, the culmination of the motivations for a categorical structure in a theory of teaching in which the following matter, among others. There is no preferred order.

1. Fundamental thinking about “*didaskhein*” presumes that a thinker proceeds from the fact that originally and inevitably a person is involved with structures and courses of reality. Indeed, there is no distance between person and reality. From the outset, he is a participant in a sequence of changing situations and events that influence his destination but also his attunement brings about change, creates tension, decisions, etc. A person is *with* things, he actively participates in living life—be that negative or positive, worthy of approval or disapproval.

The dynamics of life and the demanding character of the situation in which he finds himself actually is touching in a literal sense. This does not mean that he is delivered to the course of life—he continually changes his circumstances. But he must act, even when sometimes he waits for things to happen to him. To wait also is a way of acting. Thus a person also *is with* teaching. Teaching is part of the actualization of everyday life; it belongs to the original form of his experiencing—in fact, this is one of the original ways in which a person is involved in reality. To participate in the course of reality means to learn about and from it, to discover its mysteries but also to be taught about its secrets for the purpose of having his own orientation to reality fulfilled.

In fact, the experienceable reality is not always harmless and, insight into and control of its structures is not immediately available to a person who participates in it. Within and outside of the course of teaching, a person goes to reality; his passage through life is a passage through reality – repeating, implementing, integrating, creating, rejecting, initiating. His forms of living and lifestyle are interwoven into specific realities and as he becomes older, the more he is determined by them.

2. The fact that a person continuously participates in reality certainly shows that this participation is meaningful for him, that in his own way he give meaning to it in accordance with who he is. Sometimes a person hesitates about the demands of a situation, sometimes he tries to escape, sometimes he cries and sometimes he shouts. Whatever determines his mood and how his destination is seen, this always is a matter of a particular way in which sense and meaning are given to what is happening to him.

It has been noted that the various moods that appear in life also occur in a teaching situation. Anxiety, hesitation, jubilation, melancholy, homesickness, hope, etc. continually are realized in what we know as a “teaching situation”. If one includes a person’s involvement in reality, his being in the world as the first, most fundamental category, in an

ontological sense, to also understand, in this light, then the original, fundamental appearance of teaching implies that it is a meaning giving activity that expresses the relationship one establishes with this reality.

The fact that a person establishes particular relationships with reality on the basis of his being-here speaks for itself. He likes some experiences and not others. He has preferences regarding others, he likes certain activities such as being leisurely, etc. In general he establishes very specific relationships that really are evidence of the ways he gives meaning to the things and people around him.

This question of relationships as a manifestation of giving meaning is of utmost importance when a didactician wants to reflect fundamentally about his practice. A person who thinks proceeds from the fact that his involvement in reality is meaningful to him. If his going out to reality is not meaningful, thinking about the whole matter would be impossible because then the only act noticeable would be withdrawal. A person does not withdraw himself from reality, he continually teaches his child because his child's being – there and his future are matters that are meaningful to him. Thus, a person's being in the world implies meaning-giving activities of which teaching is one of the most important.

3. These activities that a person engages in are human acts. In this respect, a didactician must be thoroughly aware that in his theoretical constructions he is dealing with particular pronouncements about persons after their appearance. Statements about human beings are possible only in light of essential, undeniable facts, i.e., anthropological categories, made possible by a person's being in the world as one who thinks about being human.

Formally, here we are dealing with anthropological categories that have ontological status and that illuminate the ground or foundation of a person's ways of engaging in reality by a didactician. A didactician does not design a situation for non-human beings and he cannot penetrate into what in this

respect is essential for his own practice if he doesn't take notice of a participating person as he is. Today it is generally acceptable that it only is people who educate. To educate is a particular human act specifically directed to intervening directed to self-awareness. An adult cannot educate with respect to nothing. His educating is about "something"—values norms codes of behavior, skills, attitudes, etc.

Educating is about contents, life contents, that directly flow from a person's life- and world-views. Maintaining particular life and world-views is human. They exemplify the meanings that a person gives to his life and world. But a child is not born with knowledge about life and world, and just as little, with incomplete educating the first light is not seen. These contents must be made known, they must be presented with repeated emphasis. Regarding the contents, there must be teaching because a child does not know and he can't obey what he doesn't know.

To introduce the contents that will guarantee the ultimate form of adulthood and from the start will establish a particular lifestyle in accordance with life- and worldviews is a specific human act. To teach is a human activity because there are no predisposing instincts that spontaneously guarantee a lifestyle. What is considered to be of human worthiness are the themes or contents of educating that are continually actualized in teaching. Without teaching, educating is inconceivable because the meaningful relationship between person and reality must also be built into a solid form. The humanness of a person is actualized in teaching and brings about movement in a creative, constitutive sense. "Didaskein" is fundamentally unique to being human.

4. It has been shown that the first ontological category is "being in the world" and has fundamental value for insight into being human itself and, by implication, also for didactical theory forming. One of the main motivations is that it provides insight into what original experiencing of teaching means. That is, how the original experiencing of teaching is

continually, accumulatively taking form. Thus, teaching contributes formatively to the fact that a person is in the world.

Here it must be well understood that the category “man in the world”, as such, is completely original and cannot be redirected or attributed to one or another experience structure. Understandably, a person’s participation in reality has its content as well as form aspects that are manifested as forms of teaching, i.e., didactic forms, among other ways. A person in the world actualizes his participation in reality in the form of the activity of teaching.

This is not the only form in which a person’s being in the world will reveal itself. He will also pray, trade, judge, play, etc. None of these forms of living are placed ahead of or above another. They all are useful forms of manifestation in which and by which experiencing is verbalized on the basis of a meaning-constitution of life contents, i.e., they show a knowable form.

The outcome of the form that a person reveals in the world, this original, simple and everyday way of *doing* by a person also could be described as the forms of actualizing his involvement in reality. In so far as the multiplicity in the life of each person unfolds or is completed in regard to its quantity and scope, i.e., to the extent that a person in his ways of participating does not expand further, there is a closed form of living in inhabiting the world.

It is important to point out that although a person can make a choice about whether he wants to trade something, to get married, etc., in his participation in teaching, he has no such choice. He cannot display the image of being human, he cannot remain in life biologically if he does not subject himself to and participate in the form of living that we know as teaching. Thus, teaching belongs to his most original experiencing. Where and when the notion of “person in the world” is expressed, necessarily it speaks of his participation in the course of teaching. The specific humanness speaks in

the form of teaching. And when here there is reference to a specific human being, a particular way of being human, or way of being is assumed.

Here it must be emphasized that this original experiencing reveals a very definitive and demonstrable voice regarding a person's forms of living in general and in particular. It must be well understood that in this case, as a form of living, teaching remains static, unmoving with respect to his other human activities until it serves as a container for life contents. This form of living thus becomes visible on the basis that it fills this container with contents that give his life meaning. This is an essential insight into the fact that inevitably a person participates in the course of living, but especially regarding our fundamental understanding of the matter "teaching".

In teaching, the content brings the form into motion, and even more, it brings to the surface the varied, fulfilling original experiencing so that a description of the didactic is made possible. A person only experiences something rather than nothing. An experience is qualified, named on the basis of contents that bring it into motion. With this, experiencing includes teaching as an inherent possibility that must be actualized if a situation demands it. Learning to pray, trade, play or speak correctly essentially are inherent possibilities of these forms of living. The contents will speak in these forms of living (teaching) or can be brought to expression.

5. In order to indicate how easy a thinker can lose his original trail, I show the understandable but theoretically unforgivable interchange of primary and secondary structures in designing a scientific theory. This issue has been raised in the preceding introduction and once again is highlighted here for the sake of completeness because the validity of a scientific construction is entirely dependent on it.

In the preceding section it was emphasized repeatedly that in order to penetrate to the fundamentals of the didactical pedagogical, the original experiencing [of teaching] must be sought. To ground a theoretical design on secondary

structures would have the same implication as trying to isolate the basic elements or raw materials from a finished product. Such a compilation could not, however, be described other than in terms of the separate matters that constitute the completed product.

To understand the form of teaching, there must be a return to its original form in the lifeworld and not to a secondary, already refined, combined and formalized structure for the purpose of describing its origins. As far as teaching is concerned, this does not mean that the second-order school practice cannot contribute to insights and explanations, i.e., to the theoretical designs to which a didactician is headed. But teaching occurred, and had form long before schools had existed.

A school is not an essential matter in a child's experiential world; school can be eliminated from a child's life. In fact, setting up schools and organizations of systematic, formal practice was possible because teaching was more original than schools. One can build upon the experiential totality of teaching as a form of living, carefully refine its form, combine aims, make available physical facilities for the course of action and set up such a school. A school is the synthesis of a person's involvement in reality and, as such it is not original experiencing [of teaching] itself.

6. Therefore, a didactician must realize that the original sense of the lifeworld act that announces itself to him as teaching also will announce its original structure in this slice of experiencing as a first, primitive form of a person's being in the world. This original sense, as a manifestation of original structure, speaks to a thinker in this case because the harmony of form and content, as ways of giving meaning, are unique to human existence.

It is well to note that although the form experienced will be of a general nature, the contents will have particular significance terms of a number of factors determined by the contents, including the ways in which a person transcends reality by

transforming it into a reality for himself in a particular milieu, period of time, etc. When a didactician then reflects on the practice that he wishes to describe in light of its original sense as manifested in its original structure (the reality of educating), teaching gives form to this original sense of a person's presence here in the world and, therefore, teaching, as a tendency of the reality of educating, makes its (educating) original sense visible again in an activity (teaching) that creates the opportunity to interpret it.

As far as contents are concerned, the fact of contents is general but the nature of the contents is particular. Indeed, this cannot be otherwise. In his first disclosure of the real, undeniable essences of the slice of reality that we know as teaching, a didactician must concentrate his thinking on its form rather than on the original sense-giving of a person's presence in the world.

Form is a matter of universal truth that is not limited to time or space other than being earth bound, and which has occurred and will occur among persons of all eras. On the other hand, content varies as persons participate in the course of the world. Content is a variable aspect of teaching that every adult generation decides for itself and with respect to educating those for which they are responsible. Form carries the possibility of content. One also could say form is pregnant with content because a life practice that is without cause must be actualized in the world. Thus, when there is mention of didactical categories they should take the form of original experiencing (the reality of educating) after its original sense is disclosed in order to be able to be labeled as categories. In other words, then they can be eliminated from the lifeworld and with this they forfeit any claim to categorical status.

The didactical categories, therefore, will disclose the meaning or sense of original experiencing known as teaching. This implies that categories must be sought in the essences of teaching and not from another way of being, e.g., learning. Teaching and learning are not complementary concepts, although one assumes the origin of the other and the sense

of the activity. In this regard, in his theory forming, a didactician should note the following:

- a) The original meaning of teaching is closely related to the original meaning of educating. Educating is a matter that always directs itself to reality. However, reality is not self-evident beforehand for those who are dependent on being educated. Therefore, reality must be made accessible. To make it accessible necessarily leads to didactic action in two respects: Firstly, there is mention of contents in terms of which an educand's becoming must take its course, and, secondly, there is mention of forms that make an educand's involvement in reality possible.
- b) In light of this, teaching leads to provide help to one person by another because a person's being in the world calls him to give meaning to his being-there. The meaning of a person's being in the world as an adult, and the inter-subjective relation with his child's being-there, solicits teaching as an original, spontaneous way of giving help. The being-there of the other demands that the contents coupled with his being-there must be unlocked for him – otherwise, his own being-there will make no, little or haphazard sense. Thus, the act of teaching is directly related to a person's own being in the world. Formally stated, Dasein, as an ontological structure, proclaims “didaskhein” as a way of being involved or becoming involved with things of reality on the basis of the interpretation things demand as they appear in each other's landscapes.
- c) Things, including people, objects, events, experiences, etc., are contents for a person in terms of which there also is or can be mention of reality in general. Without these contents a person's presence in the world is not possible, unthinkable, because their coherencies are manifested in these contents. Reality speaks to a person through contents. His experiences in reality are linked inextricably to that with which he is involved and that direct an appeal to him that he must

answer. A person must address the one he is intervening with and necessarily take action.

- d) From the above, clearly there are two forms of relation. Firstly, a person's relation with reality shows that he relates inter-subjectively—person to person and person to God. In addition, there are matter-of-fact relationships that a person must establish. Here it must be emphasized that these relationships are accomplished on the basis of particular contents that presumably speak implicitly or explicitly from his being-here (being in the world).

The consequence is that teaching (e.g., bringing the world closer, putting in perspective, introducing meaningful matters, unlocking and providing access to contents of reality) on the one hand, and a person's "being in the world" that is a complementary concept in the sense that the latter actually includes the former so that "being in the world", as a human matter, cannot be conceived if the teaching of it were eliminated. For a person whose presence in the world is without teaching, there will be no evidence of intentional input. The consequence is far-reaching. Where there is no intentionality there can be no question of a person establishing a relationship with all aspects of reality, i.e., he cannot live towards reality.

- e) One must accept that the statement "being attuned to the world" also establishes the meaningful possibility of "being attuned to reality". The ways in which reality discloses itself in a person's original experiencing thus assumes teaching as a way of becoming acquainted with reality in its original sense.

- 7. From the above, it seems that there is an undeniable relation between person and reality that is in and established by teaching. This meaningful relationship is one of the imperatives of original experiencing through which teaching becomes a necessary course for bringing a person (child) to others and things. A person's original involvement with reality, thus, announces teaching as an implicit matter of this

experiencing because teaching involves disclosing the meaning of being. Thus, teaching as a categorical matter of being involved with reality cannot be eliminated from the original experiencing because it constitutes a person's participation in the world and life in a fundamental way and, as such, it is inextricably embedded in the changing relationship between person and world. In didactical theory building, the following considerations are of particular importance in this regard:

- a) In light of the fact that the sense of the original experiencing ("a person's being by others and things) also assumes knowledge of things, a didactician must realize that the original way of learning to know and interpret contents also constitutes the didactical categories. The point of intersection of the parallel activities of "teaching" and "learning", that is implied from the foregoing, is that the original meaning of both is that they set and attune a person's orientation to reality.

In this light, then, the original meaning of teaching can be formulated as follows: An adult teaches under the assumption that he helps someone (a child) establish relationships with others and things (contents) that loom on a person's learning horizon. In a child's course through the world these contents do not always appear systematically and at a tempo that an educator desires and deems appropriate. Thus, he does things that *allow* the things (contents) to appear before a child. In this way, he builds a clearly identifiable harmony between life forms and life contents in accordance with an anticipated future that constitutes the warp and woof of a person's participation in reality.

- b) Therefore, the categories of teaching should be pointed out properly so that in the original experiencing [of teaching] one person allows things (contents) to appear for another because, as possessed experiences they must figure as meaningful contents in the lifeworld. Thus,

these contents are assumed in constituting didactical categories but are not incorporated or described as such in theory building because of their particular time- and culture-bound nature.

c) In looking for a didactical categorical structure, it is accepted that the totality of reality is unknown to a person who has come into the world. This does not imply that the contents are meaningless. The unknown is a task that presumes there is meaning. This meaning must be made manifest in a becoming person's learning activity, and it is assumed that as his becoming progresses, he can gain knowledge of it by:

- i) directly participating in it, and
- ii) in his above-mentioned participation, it first is interpreted; i.e., being oriented to these contents beforehand.

d) Therefore, a didactician can rightly ask where does this original experiencing ("letting reality disclose itself before anyone else has") show itself in its being, as a truism, in its undeniable essences.

The answer should address the categorical structure of teaching. The significance of such a structure is that a category is an illuminative way of thinking (Landman) in terms of which the undeniable essences of teaching, as a matter of original experiencing and original participation in reality can be verbalized so that those who have to take responsibility for teaching in face-to-face educative situations as they appear in school can do so in systematic and orderly ways.

This confronts a didactical theory with one of its most important task as well as one of its most important insights, i.e., that teaching, as a matter of experiencing, cannot be separated from the life course of any human being. As a matter of a person orienting himself to the sense and being of reality, teaching necessarily and undeniably lies on the path of life of each person.

Teaching is a *didactical imperative* that also is a life perspective. Each child must be taught and each adult, by the being-there of his child, is called up to teach. In this didactical imperative, the original sense of educating realizes itself apart from the contents that are involved.

B. THE CATEGORICAL STRUCTURE AND DIDACTIC PRACTICE

There can be little doubt that a categorical view of teaching is not the result of mere thought constructions or theoretical concepts that serve a didactician. There only are categories in so far as, in his theory building, a didactician reflects on the activity that appears in the original experiencing of all persons as teaching and, thus, he reflects on a practice that is carried out everyday by people. Such a reflecting, viewing, reasoning under no circumstances can be the result of a particular theory, assumption, view or ideal but must be grounded in this reality itself, i.e., in teaching practice as an everyday life experience and in accordance with its essences as ways in which the totality-experience of the greater whole of educating can be compiled and described.

Categorical penetrative thinking assumes a penetrative viewing of the reality of teaching, thus a decision by a didactician to allow the reality of teaching to speak to him and then to verbalize it as a theoretical construction or description. This matter is of extreme importance because the issue of the act of teaching is so unobtrusive in its nature and essence in human involvement in the world that its presence is accepted as self-evident and insights into its practice in the explication of educating simply are assumed. Contemporary as well as historical Western European thinking in pedagogy is a good example of this.

In the past few centuries of Western European thought on this matter, rarely has there been an attempt to answer the question: What is teaching in its essence? How should one establish a practice or plan a system to achieve the educative aims of teaching? There are no adequate answers to the question: What fundamentally is meant by the act of teaching?

Seldom in the past few centuries have the results of Western European thought been focused on trying to answer the questions: What is teaching in its essence? How would one establish practice, plan a system to accomplish educative aims by teaching? There is no adequate answer to the question: Fundamentally, what is an act of teaching?

If we summarize briefly the details mentioned in the preceding chapters, and especially in the above section of this chapter, as an introduction to the reasoning behind the above-mentioned problem, the following certainly is of essential significance: Thinking about educating necessarily presumes thinking about teaching. After all, any educative action is not realizable without teaching because contents serve as the basic means by which a child participating in reality becomes and changes. Any teaching that is not attuned to this becoming and changing will be meaningless. Educating without teaching is an existential impossibility because this would strip educating of all contents.

In so far as teaching is the other side of educating, this means that original experiencing or the primordial life form “educating” necessarily includes teaching that compels a pedagogue to consider teaching from the start in constructing a pedagogical theory. Thus, all fundamental pedagogical thinking also must necessarily include statements about teaching as well as a categorical didactical structure that must be able to withstand the same test of essence thinking as the pedagogical does.

It has been indicated that in constructing such a theory a thinker must reflect fundamentally about the activity known as teaching, and that this reflection must reach back to a person’s original ways of participating in reality. One of the most important and conspicuous insights into this approach is that a person’s original involvement in reality is a meaningful matter to him. The ontological category “person-in-the-world” (Heidegger) implies an act of giving meaning that emanates from the relationships one establishes with such a reality. After all, no one is indifferent to or turns away from the world and from this it follows that in his reflecting on one’s involvement in reality, a didactical pedagogue must accept that this “being in the world” just referred to, although compelling giving

meaning, does not announce its meaning as self-evident. To the extent that a person acquires a grasp of reality, he also gives meaning to that reality and establishes his own lifeworld, i.e., he creates a world in which he can dwell.

His own involvement with this world is a meaningful matter for him. However, this meaning is not static but is a dynamic so that giving meaning implies an **increasing** attribution of meaning (Landman) by which the didactic task becomes visible. Giving meaning does not speak for itself. The world is a matter of hidden meaning. Also God remains hidden, unless one accepts and sees that he reveals Himself in nature and Scripture.

What does an adult do? In educating he is going to disclose in systematic and orderly ways the coherences of reality for his child in the expectation that his child, as time progresses, will himself increasingly give meaning to this reality. This meaning acquires its form in terms of particular contents but these contents do not announce the form of the help given to the child.

The distinction made here by a didactician is that between life form and life content that in educating, i.e., teaching, must be synthesized harmoniously. Thus, didactical thinking is a systematic and radical on how the ordering of a person's involvement in reality (life form) and the matters that he becomes involved with (life content) that consistently are implementable in order to balance the change in a child's participation in these things. The result of these interactions is a definitely identifiable of a person to everything that emerges in reality, i.e., displaying the image of a person as an educative ideal if this intervention is to have validity.

Hence, this is not about theory as theory or theory for the sake of theory. Fundamental reflection on the experience that is known as "teaching", necessarily leads to a practice and, therefore, to a greater particularization in order to establish an accountable practice. The activities mentioned in such a practice can be nothing other than human action because only people are educated and committed to education (thus also to teaching).

To put it another way: “Person in the world” is a dynamic concept that points to the intentional relationship person-world in original experiencing that acquires its form in teaching and the description of which must be made available for evaluation. Thus, there is mention that a person’s involvement with reality takes a particular form as original, simple acts which, individually and collectively, draw a line for a person’s form of living. This form of human experience must then be seen such that the specific humanness of his acting is brought forth. The specifically human character of his forms of experience force a didactical pedagogue to assume the specific human ways of being by which he then fundamentally takes into account the form of his teaching practice.

In building a didactical theory, a thinker only can assume this specific way of being if he also understands that these original acts or experiences must be verbalized as a life form. In other words, a person’s original act, and thus experience, has an essential say with respect to the life form that thus is verbalized. For a didactician, these insights into the coherence of the life form and original experiencing are the foundation of his categorical view of teaching, but this remains merely theory unless he also realizes that this form of life serves precisely the purpose of a presentation or the possibility of creating a teaching structure in the experiential world. It must be clear, however, that the life form of a person is visible only because it also involves life content.

It is with respect to this coherence of life form and content that the didactical categories, in a descriptive and functional way, can reveal and make known the structure of the experiential whole that we know as “teaching”. “Know” and “make known” obviously raise the issue of knowledge. This knowledge is discussed relevant in theory building in a number of ways. This includes knowledge of a person’s origin, being and destiny as well as manipulation of reality. In short: thus, the entire question of the relationship that is created between person and reality is relevant.

If at this stage we summarize briefly so that our thinking is concentrated on the essence of the contribution that a categorical view must make to constructing a didactical theory, the following matters are important:

1. In a categorical view, the meaning of original experiencing must be revealed as it is realized in the lifeworld by verbalizing the phenomenon itself. The meaning of original experiencing implies the essence, the significance of the experience as it appears fundamentally in a person's world. A person does not put meaning into the lifeworld as such. Things have an implicit meaning, but this implicit meaning is brought to speech in the way in which people give meaning to or interpret them such that there is mention of a world in so far as we, as human beings, are aware of [these implicit meanings that are made explicit]. To become aware of an educational experience that is realized in teaching is the task of a didactical theory. This meaning inevitable directs an appeal for action. This activity-aspect in which a didactician primarily is interested is known as teaching. Therefore, categorical view must bring into relief what essentially constitutes "teaching" so that he can understand the practice with which he is involved.

2. In that original experiencing *is*, thus not established by a person, but in the fact that he is and lives as a human being and brings original experiencing to the surface, it is possible for a thinker to do this scientifically and learn to know it in its ordered coherence. He can capture this in his theory by holding it still for a moment in order to put its relief into words. He can solidify this relief in his descriptions so that his insight into and understanding of the matters with which he is involved are able to be rally indicated according to both its form and content.

These indications also can be unreal. When they are not real, this means that he has overlooked the essences of original experiencing or has shown such a skewed perspective on it that the coherences of the essences by which the experience itself is constituted are not verbalized. In this way, the categories that serve him in constructing his theory must make the essences of a practice visible and knowable. Should he get mired in purely theoretical concepts, he will sketch a practice that is alien to the experience itself.

3. Educating (and teaching) is a dynamic matter. In light of this dynamic it is required of an adult that he consciously create particular situations in order to try in this way to guarantee that the image of a person that holds true in his time and cultural situation

is consummated. Thus, educating is a matter of repetition and in this repetition an adult seeks to guarantee that the change that has already occurred will emerge. By repetition one proclaims his control of a particular situation, a life task, a technique, etc. In educating it is no different. Even in the most primary, simplest intervention of adults with children, the fact of repetition is not to be omitted. This repetition does not presume the essence of educating but works to make these essences more visible. The adult, therefore, is faced with the task of restoring and repeating the situation by which he strives to guarantee, as far as is humanly possible, that his aims are being achieved.

How would he repeat a practice he didn't know? And for what logical reasons would he entrust his children to someone (a teacher) who in the reality of educating strives next to him if the latter cannot show that he really knows the practice he dares to do?

First and foremost, this knowledge of the practice is rooted in the categorical view of the matter "teaching" as it realizes itself in the reality of educating. If a teacher does not pay attention to this structure, this means simply that he dares to practice without being able to give an account of its essences.

4. Practice does not occur with respect to nothing; also, practice itself is something. It is a matter of equilibrium of form and content and both take their origin from the lifeworld and turn back to it again. In this return to the lifeworld a person shows his own relation to this reality and everything that arises before him while in its midst.

Therefore, the categorical view, insofar as persons are trained as teachers, must introduce them to the essences of the practice to which they are on their way. Just practically and logically this matter is a condition for the question to be asked: *How* must teaching be? And further: With respect to *what* must teaching be given?

With a view to answering these two questions, a categorical view of the didactic event leads to a very clear distinction. In this respect, the reality of educating shows that a categorical view essentially

involves the *form* in which original experiencing manifests itself and which should be described and interpreted accurately for establishing a secondary structure by which a formal pathway to a school situation must be adapted to the original sense of the forms of living. It only is in this way that a didactical pedagogue can arrive at the practice to which he is moving. His categorical view is the first step in trying to describe this practice in its form and also in light of his life and worldview.

Here it should be made clear that the contents, including one's life- and world-view, do not essentially determine the form of a person's original involvement with reality. The contents are particular, they change from time to time, from community to community, even provisionally for the time being, so as to bring the following to attention.

It also is true that if there is mention of teaching as original experiencing and if one also sees that this original experiencing appears for no reason on the life horizon such that it cannot be reduced further, a thinker also must realize that the forms of teaching that one gets to know in the lifeworld in reality are forms of living. Therefore, the categorical structure of teaching will bring this original form of living to the surface. With this now it also is stated that if the experience related to an educative event (thus also an event of teaching) is original, the form in which it is given also is original. In other words, for constructing a categorical structure and implementing it in designing a didactical theory that can fruitfully be transferred to practice, it holds that teaching is original as a form of living for "human being in the world".

The scientific sense of a categorical view of teaching must be seen as disclosing to us the sense of original experiencing "person in the world", also with the aim of understanding what results from this for a construction of a second-order construction of what generally is known as "school".

Should the didactical pedagogue in his viewing and analyses of original experiencing assume didactical categories, this means that with these categories he discloses and describes in systematic and orderly ways the original experiencing in order to reestablish an

equally meaningful particular practice that originally appears in the lifeworld of a person as a meaningful matter. This has the following consequences for didactical theory building: no thinker can arrive at a categorical structure of teaching as long as he refuses to think about teaching as an original life experience in his formal thinking about the event. This original experiencing (the first, most primary way in which one deals with things educatively) is the ground from which a categorical structure of teaching arises so that, in his practice, this ground again can be return to.

C. ORIGINAL EXPERIENCING AND DIDACTICAL THEORY BUILDING

The significance of original experiencing in building a didactical theory has been highlighted so often and so prominently in the problem posed, an explanation of its significance for constructing a didactical theory no longer can be avoided. After all, teaching is a matter of acquiring knowledge that has a constituting function regarding a person's relationship to reality and therefore it would be incomplete without an explication such as was provided above regarding the categorical structure of teaching.

Theoretical statements about the coherence of knowledge acquisition and experience are found formally in Aristotle's philosophy of science that has described experience as the basis of all knowledge. He claims that the beginning of all learning is rooted in experience because the details made available in perceiving are generalized in experience and thus are declared to be valid knowledge.

For didactics, experiencing is a matter of extreme importance because teaching, as described thus far is in its essence established on new wider flourishing experiential possibilities. This contention presupposes and thus is focused on allowing the act of learning, without which teaching cannot be conceived, to manifest itself.

A didactician must not view experiencing as a blending of a variety of tiny realities of daily life. In explaining the essence of experiencing, Husserl¹ points out that insight into a matter like experience only is possible if one takes intentionality directly into

account. Intentionality is interpreted by Husserl as the attitude of turning to and living reality and to provide proof in the performances of consciousness, i.e., in learning to know this reality. Therefore, he also talks of a performing consciousness as a matter of human intentionality.

Then, in this regard, he describes the coherence of learning to know and experience as follows: To learn to know reality, i.e., intentionally going out to reality, belongs to the most original whole of human actions. To be human means to have an understanding of reality. Thus, going out to reality implies achievement in mastering such reality. This achievement of actually learning to know reality above all includes perception but this leads to an experience of active association by which scientific knowledge becomes possible. The act of a person's going out to reality is the original lifestyle of a person and as such is a precondition for the possibility of scientific knowledge.

He argues further that it is impossible to come to an understanding of reality in a general sense without experience. This statement by Husserl is not new, as Kant espoused this in his *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* that was referred to above.

However, for a didactician, this is an extremely important statement because implicitly it assumes that experiencing places a person in a position to question an unknown reality meaningfully. Therefore, experiencing enables a person who is outside of himself (by virtue of being in the world) to master reality in the sense that, as an activity, he is able to get to the things he is turning to and disclose the essence of the things themselves. As such, experiencing raises the origins of a person's interest in reality which, in its turn, exercises a decisive influence on the relationships a person establishes with reality. In these relations to reality, human intentionality reveals itself in its essences, especially regarding the scope of these relations. In the life of a child, gaining experience actually means revealing the first and most fundamental understanding of things, and therefore also the primary relationships to reality and their possibilities. Thus, this matter is not merely a matter of the scope of experience, but pushes through

to the quality of experience in light of the repetitive aspect of teaching referred to earlier.

Experiencing is the original possibility that can influence the quality of mastery of a child's relationship to reality. Didactically, this fact means that on the basis of his experiencing a person can meaningfully question reality, especially because in the performance of his consciousness he proceeds to extend this line in order to anticipate situations occurring in reality. Indeed it is logical that the experiencing of reality also makes available information about reality, even if one worked so simplistically, the observation category of Dasein and its coherence with thought would make a statement such as this possible.

The order or coherence of a reality structure, as a matter of fact, is the dividend gained from human experiences. It also is important to note that the experiences of everyone are, with respect to reality, original, a first experiencing that continually appeals to one's performing consciousness to which a person simply cannot say no. It is equally important to note that however meaningful original experiencing can be for the relationships that one establishes with reality, a complete view of and insight into a particular slice of reality merely on the basis, e.g., of perceiving (even one's actual participation in it) is impossible because, as Husserl rightly points out, aspects that cannot be perceived or undergone, nonetheless are *assumed*.

Husserl calls those aspects of reality that cannot be perceived, but that are assumed, anticipations. This already has been said for one or another reason. What we need to understand well at this stage is that anticipations essentially are part of an experiencing and especially in the sense that they grasp in advance the meaning of a concrete experiencing such that the anticipations provide additional possibilities for experiencing.

The anticipations in experiencing proclaim possibilities of experience in terms both of scope and quality: experiencing can broaden and deepen, but certainly also thrive in quality and intensity. Thus, anticipations, unlike insights that flow from experiencing, are not experience dividends, but essentially are

unique to experience because experiencing often finds its origin in the anticipations. Anticipations do not predispose experiencing in a deterministic sense, but provide the source, origin of many of the modes of experiencing that figure so prominently in a didactic situation.

Also, there are additional connections that a didactician must recognize if he wants to contribute meaningfully to theory. From the brief remarks made so far, it also should be clear that the function of experiencing is far superior to perception. Put another way: Experiencing is exceeded by anticipation such that a learning person can turn in anticipation to reality even if aspects of this reality are not perceptually available.

In the constitution of reality as we find it daily in a classroom, these statements are of exceptional importance. This pre-understanding by a person from experience and his exceeding the direct perception in experience has its ultimate didactic meaning in that it illuminates the highest form of achievement in a learning situation. Here one moves in the area of the symbolic, the verbalization of the invisible, the consequences of thought and the emotional life, and therefore on one of the highest plateaus of becoming that lies within one's reach.

The fact that important data for didactical theory building are made available from the fields of psychopedagogy and the psychology of learning also is a well-known fact. As far as experiencing is concerned, it is striking that all currently recognized learning psychological views are acknowledged and each works out in its own way and by means of its own methods the connections that exist between the performance of consciousness (as learning) and experiencing.

The usual approach is that learning activity is understandable *from* achievement and that learning is available for evaluation in the achievement. This is a logical point of view and, as such, generally is acceptable in constructing a didactical theory.

In light of our argument so far, probably it would be equally fair from a didactical perspective to ask whether or not achievement

from a learning act could be understood from the pre-understanding performance of consciousness by which the preceding statement is reversed. Then learning is not only the dividend of acquiring experiences but more intensive as well as extensive experiences also are dividends of the act of learning.

The important thing for a didactician is that learning *necessarily* follows from multiple experiences. Stated differently: Learning as a performance of consciousness necessarily follows the broadening of experience and shows itself in *modified* acts of learning by which a person's grasp of reality, in its origins, is of extraordinary importance for teaching. Therefore, original experiencing cannot show an unusual, static character. A didactic situation must provide for this.

Hence, the formal consequence for constructing a didactical theory is as follows: Learning is an immanent consequence of experiencing. Therefore, experiencing necessarily has learning consequences. These learning consequences do not imply only learning to know, acquiring a grasp of reality, but moving on to something *new*. In light of this matter, by referring to Buck² and Merleau-Ponty³, one could indicate the dual meaning of experiencing as the original means of human participation in the world:

- (i) A simple, first acquaintance with a matter that arises from reality.
- (ii) A thriving, increasing involvement forcing the learning activity continually returning to itself on the basis of accumulating experience. Understandably, this second consequence is impossible without the first.

In summary, the significance of experiencing as the original way of being in the world for didactic tasks that flow from it is the following:

1. The performing character of consciousness cannot be conceived and make provision for it in a didactic sense unless experiencing is taken into account.

2. One's attribution of meaning to reality is rooted in the fact that in experience, one undergoes reality, as it were. In experiencing a person moves to reality, to something new. Ordering the multitude and chaotic appearances of reality occurs to a large extent in experience.

3. Reducing reality to its essences for anticipated mobility in new situations is impossible without previous experiencing.

D. ORIGINAL EXPERIENCING AND DIDACTIC FORM

The possibility of disclosing "didaskēin" in both its essence and manifestation, as already has been seen, speaks from original experiencing, i.e., a person's original involvement in reality. That is, there is no primordial phenomenality as far as the pedagogical is concerned. Original experiencing is manifested in his spontaneous, non-formal, natural involvement in the things surrounding him or in his participation in the reality that looms up and passes him in the course of everyday life. This does not mean a person has this original experiencing that inevitably he enters and orders and that, pathically [affectively] as well as gnostically [cognitively], flows unimpeded with the stream of reality.

Original experiencing, however, is brought under control pathically [affectively] and rationally ordered gnostically [cognitively] by which the relief of a human landscape actually takes its form. Therefore, it is understandable that a myriad of outcomes or trajectories of original experiencing can be indicated in the human world. But in any theory building it is the case that this original reality from which one's actions speak, cannot be redirected or reduced to something else. The being there [Dasein] of a person proclaims original experiencing as the first, primary or primordial way of being involved in reality. His *original ways* of being in the world constitute original experiencing. Hence, in this light it also can be stated clearly original experiencing will show a great variety that enables a thinker to explain and describe human involvement across the board.

For original experiencing, there are no dominant tendencies or manifestations. If one or another tendency prevails, this would

imply that original experiencing varies from its origins – which, after all, is ontologically and logically unacceptable. The variants of original experiencing are actualized over the full, broad line of a person's involvement in reality, including the religious-moral, the social-political, etc.

The fact that young people come together to get to know each other is just as original an experience as educating children born outside of the resulting relationships that might arise. In the same way, one or another gathering or ritual with respect to religion is as original as some form of administering justice. Each of them is a specific way in which a person announces himself as a participant in reality: each one presumes a particular order of reality and an integration of things and events into his course of living through the world. The tendencies of original experiencing, thus, do not concern its origin. "Original experience", seen in this way, includes each variant manifested in a person's original involvement in reality. The variants or tendencies, therefore, are modes of actualizing original experiencing.

Understandably, as a unique experience, each separate tendency will be actualized identically, either as a form of original experiencing within its own field of play, or in an area of reality. The contents that matter for such an actualization are particular and are of utmost importance in the course of experiencing, and hence also for the actualization of the experiencing itself. One can hardly find better examples than in the ancient Israelite religious ritual and in the distinctions shown in the educational practices of Athens and Rome.

The important thing for theory forming that one must see here is that the variants of original experience have been cast in unmistakable *forms*. These forms are *actual* because experience takes its form in terms of them and, thus, accordingly reveals itself as a person's dynamic course through the world. Also, it is important to point out that these forms are *unique* in each tendency or variation of original experience. That is, the forms of manifestation of each variant of original experience proclaim the identity of the variant. These forms, as a manifestation of the identity of the variants themselves, understandably are linked

closely to the particular contents to which form is given. However refined, modified, combined, the contents also can be revealed in the forms; this makes no difference to the assumption that the forms bring universal human tendencies or lifestyles to the surface that may appear otherwise in a secondary area by a change in emphasis because certain aspects of the contents receive more or less emphasis which adds to the fundamental structure of forming while not detracting or interfering with anything. A comparative study of the role, structure and implementation of schools in education in ancient Sparta and Athens can serve as a good illustration.

In his theory building, the conclusion to which a didactician comes, insofar as form is concerned, is that the actualization of a particular tendency of original experiencing in a particular time, culture or community will not differ *essentially* from that in other times, cultures or communities. The secondary practice that results from these forms of actualization will differ to the extent that there is varied emphasis in the contents in order to bring a particular life- and world-view to the fore. Didactic forms must meet these particular aims, insights, etc. by providing a functional structure to allow for the fulfillment of the impact of the contents in a particular community.

In a Christian community the form of original experiencing is no different than in another community, but in practice, the particulars require a modified emphasis of contents that, from a superficial view, often looks like a modified practice. Neither the sense nor origin of this practice can deny or overlook original experiencing of a person as the ground for the forms of teaching. It is in the meaning of experiencing, its transcendence of reality, the way life imperatives are interpreted, the demands of propriety imposed for unconditional obedience that a Christian lifestyle is based on contents.

These contents are actualized continually in the particular forms of original experiencing such that a didactic form has a universal character that lends itself to particular fulfillment. The form of original experiencing then must serve to realize particular contents, attitudes, actions, etc. as a matter of being human. For didactical

theory building this means that the form of original experiencing is as original as the experiencing itself and that a constituted practice can actually strive for or negate this form as much as it can deny the meaning of original experiencing.

Repeatedly, it has been assumed and argued that education, and thus teaching, is a matter of a person's first, primary or primordial involvement in reality. "Being in the world" implies educating, i.e., teaching. As far as "didaskhein" is concerned, a didactical pedagogue continually is confronted with the task of *formally* re-establishing original experiencing as a *particular* practice. This *particular* practice presupposes certain aims, contents (values, norms, forms of cultural systems, etc.) and definitely a particular life- and world-view. The form in which these particular views can be cast is not capable of exceeding the form of original experiencing. If a didactical pedagogue, in his pronouncements about his theory building, systematizes and justifies particular contents that have validity in his particular life situation and accountably brings it to the fore, does not yet mean that he can account for the form of his practice. Therefore, his account of the form of his practice also includes an account of the form of original experiencing which, although based on his insights and refined skills, are noticed, described fundamentally and implemented in formal ways in secondary practice. His account of the original form of experiencing thus is the basis for his account of the basic forms of his practice, i.e., of the didactic ground forms.

To speak of didactic ground forms implies a theory about the practice of original experiencing and an evaluation of its possibilities for implementation in secondary (thus, also school) situations. In order to attend to the essence of the practice he wants to re-establish and eventually to account for its form, a didactician returns to the original experiencing of an adult who, in the act of education, seeks to realize his aims in teaching.

It must be stated very pertinently that the theoretical view of form from the perspective of teaching, as an aspect of original experiencing is undertaken, and not from one or another perspective of the act of learning that, after all, also is characterized as original experiencing.

The form of teaching certainly directs itself to the form of learning; i.e., to the ways or modes by which an act of learning manifests itself in educative events. But: letting learn and learning definitely are different categories of human Dasein and cannot be used as synonyms. In the original situation, the didactic act is directed to but does not originate from learning. Seen in this way, a didactic ground form is a form of actualizing “let learn” and other categories that are closely related to the original sense of experience. The letting learn that an adult proceeds to in the course of educating is a way in which he tries to achieve his aims. A categorical structure that must be brought to the surface in theory building, therefore, has the following important consequences for the didactic form:

1. In view of the fact that in its meaning original experiencing is unambiguously attuned (to providing help to a learning person to reach his own destination) and, separately and collectively, the categories acquire validity in describing form.
2. A category must emerge from experiencing itself, not only to show the original sense of this experiencing, but also to illuminate its original manifestation in a practical situation.
3. Individually and collectively, categories do not yet establish a particular practice but make its description possible and therefore repeatable.
4. A categorical structure serves as a criterial coherence for evaluating a form according to its appearance in the original experiencing.

E. CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT TEACHING CONTENTS

Finally, and in completing the above discussion of the problems posed by constructing a didactical theory, some remarks about the meaning of contents in teaching must be considered in preparing a structure such as this.

Although the problem is not always a simple one, it nonetheless is a common, everyday one. To eventually display the image of a person as an adult means, above all, that a becoming person must acquire an image of the world (worldview, view of life) for himself. This acquisition of the world and life implies that certain

information or details about this world and everything that can and should be counted on must be available to those who eventually must live in nature, community and culture.⁽⁴⁾

In its didactic-pedagogical connotation, education as a practice speaks very clearly here. It is about a life practice: involvement in realities of life, participation in life contents. The world or reality or practice in question is *there*, i.e., it is present in terms of contents that come into play in this lifeworld. Therefore, this has an imperative character in human becoming (education as a matter of providing help).

The implication for constructing a theory is relatively obvious. In a didactic-pedagogical situation an adult must proceed to provide help to a child in different ways and in terms of various forms in which he has mastery and insight to help a child construct a world for himself. This image must unlock the totality of reality that forces itself on a person so it can be known in its essentials so a child can master all of the ways in which a person comes to know things. For teaching, a particular teaching about reality certainly is important. The function of the matter is that the total reality must be unlocked for a child categorically in order not only to guarantee his orientation but also his mobility in this reality. It is in this sense that teaching contents are meaningful and deserve consideration in constructing a didactical theory.

It is no wonder that even today didacticicians fixate strongly on content when building didactical theory in which the whole spectrum of the act of teaching is considered. It is an alluring and tempting way of describing practice precisely to identify content within the field of didactics because the dividends of educational intervention are made known in the content involved. However, I believe that the following issues, as points of orientation for reflecting on the meaning of the contents in constructing didactical views, are of particular importance:

1. All persons who are involved with children educatively are linked inextricably and undeniably to the reality indices to which each day is devoted.

2. A human being, who often is described as openness, futurity, being-with, initiative of relationships, etc., only can be characterized as such by virtue of the reality indexes or *existentialia* that reveal the meaning of his moving, participating life tendencies.

3. The relief of the human life-landscape in general, but also as one's lifeworld (i.e., lifeworld for me), do not exist if there are no life contents.

4. A person's experiencing in life-reality and the sense he gives to it in his activities is woven into and around the contents of the lifeworld. The form of his experiences only has meaning in so far as it gives form to the contents.

5. A person's world is not a constant, unchanging magnitude. This means that in teaching, the matter "world" is not obvious. A person constantly is involved in the world to the extent that he gains mastery of reality, constitutes a new reality and manipulate its details technically such that reality only is mentioned in constructing a didactical theory by virtue of the contents entering the foreground in this particular connection, i.e., in accordance with the particular situation.

6. Contents presume attitudes, dispositions, values, judgments, etc. It is with respect to these matters that the didactic-pedagogical task, in relation to educative contents, is indicative of co-considerations in building the theory.

7. Contents themselves do not always appear on a child's landscape in their meaningful coherence. However simple, often they must be disclosed and this disclosure of contents comes through unlocking reality in order to bring to the surface their meaning (that especially shows a meaningful relation to reality).

8. Contents make dwelling in the world possible and implies that a temporal-spatial meaning is given to the surrounding reality: Space is *filled* as and because time *elapses*, especially with respect to education. However, it should be clear that the meaning of the acts "let learn" and "learn" is not bound to time and place.

Probably one still could quote many similar claims and/or statements. However, this is unnecessary since the above-mentioned examples are sufficient to provide some principle points about content.

The question a didactician now faces in his theory building is the following: What can one derive from “the didactic”? Even more closely: What educational imperatives stand out regarding the sense and meaning of the didactic act? However, it is very clear from the above eight statements that a didactic event is inconceivable without content. Possibly the following two questions will delineate the problem more clearly:

- a) Does the didactic practice present contents? In this respect, are contents a task for didactical theory?
- b) Are the contents *there* and lay the task for didactical theory to disclose, describe and eventually reconstitute educationally the *ways* or *forms* of a person’s original association, the ways he is being there with things?

From the above, it follows logically that didactical theory [i.e., a didactician] must be acquainted with the nature and essence of contents before they can be described formally. A theorist must know what the contents are, why one deals with them as he does before the nature of the association (its essential truisms) and the ways of associating (the life forms that have didactic relevance) can be disclosed. How these insights affect a person’s time-space dynamic will be reflected in the meaning of the didactic act. Therefore, as far as the contents are concerned, the field of didactical enquiry will need to include the nature of this dynamic and its forms of actualization as a field of orientation for reconstituting a practice. Thus, one could say categorically that the contents are there but their acquisition is not self-evident. Hence, with regard to contents, a didactical theory pays special attention to the following:

1. A study of the contents in their broadest design and also with regard to their final composition, arrangement, applications and the like.

2. The actualization of forms and methods by which the contents of the original experiencing can be available in new situations.
3. The organization of a practice that can guarantee to some extent the course of the teaching in an educational framework and in accordance with the contents.

In view of this, the practice of theorizing with regard to contents makes two particularly important demands:

- a) That the teaching will be near to life, and
- b) that teaching will strive for its ultimate effect.

If one accepts these two criteria, in its turn, this makes two important demands of the school:

- a) The school must be pedagogically accountable, and
- b) The school must concentrate on near to life contents.

Without going further into the task of the school, again we refer to the demands that a school must meet as set out in chapter two and that are crucial for insights regarding the meaning of the content in bringing about responsible didactical thinking.

¹ *Erfahrung und Urteil*, p. 28.

² Buck, G.: *Lernen und Erfahrung*.

³ Merleau-Ponty, M.: *Phenomenology of Perception*.

⁴ Roth, H.: *Paedagogische Anthropologie*, pp. 19-20.