

CHAPTER 5

UNLOCKING REALITY: A DIDACTICAL ANALYSIS

A. DIDACTICAL ANALYSIS

In the preceding paragraphs, repeatedly it was noted that any didactical theory building should result in a lesson structure. This lesson structure must be shaped in accordance with the essences of original experiencing as it presents itself in the reality of educating. Also it was pointed out that it is possible to move progressively from the reality of educating to a lesson structure by which the latter should then disclose the essences of the experiencing.

On the other hand, it has been stated that second-order practice [e.g., schooling] itself also is a field of thought and research for didactical theory building and that a regressive view of “*didaskein*” from a lesson structure can highlight important controlling (criterial) aspects that no longer can be left out of consideration. The first way then, as it were, represents the primary didactical inquiry, while the last way is attending to a second-order, established practice with a view to verifying thoroughly insights that emerged from the primary view.

This last way, i.e., regressively looking at teaching activity in a general sense from a teaching situation constitutes what in the didactical literature of today generally is known as “didactical analysis”. On the European continent this matter already has received attention from various angles such that, no doubt, this theme has been elevated to an area of study for those intensively engaged in didactical theory. Taken together, and taking into account the particular literature, didactical analysis points to a regressive view in theory construction about teaching in order to make generally valid statements about the act of teaching and teaching constructions from formal teaching on the basis of the analytical sorting out the *fundamentalia* [essences] of the course of a lesson.¹

Any didactical analysis, therefore, very definitely is a theoretical construction. Understandably, in such a construction there are particular approaches such as didactical presuppositions, methodological variations, different points of fixation in the course of a lesson that serve as a basis for thinking, etc. Thus, probably it would make sense to ask questions beforehand regarding the meaning of a didactical analysis without which criteria for constructing as well as judging a lesson structure in terms of original experiencing is possible.

What then does didactical theory building have to do with a didactical analysis? If one were to work from the conceptual meaning of formulating “didaskhein analysis”, it is important to note that here the emphasis is on analyses, conspicuously on the analytical aspect of “didaskhein”, i.e., to analyze what teaching as a practice essentially is, especially because any theoretical analysis must presume an ultimate synthesis.

On the other hand, I would like to point out that in such a formulation (didactical analysis) many definitive methodological considerations are implied, which does not necessarily claim that a concept’s composition is the most felicitous choice for verbalizing the purpose or idea of concern. By implication, this formulation clearly is a move away from a phenomenological view, precisely because original reality, in the first place, is not addressed here such that dialectics and hermeneutics as methods in structuring theoretical results certainly can play a very important role. Therefore, here it should be emphasized that any didactical analysis only makes sense for didactical theory building if such theory has already explored the reality of educating, described its essences and has pointed out structural coherences for establishing a second-order practice.

A school practice that a didactical analysis concentrates on can be conceptualized as being absent from the reality of educating even though such a practice can be seen as essential in the modern lifeworld. The concept “didactical analysis” also assumes that in theory building one already has set something apart for analysis, i.e., that a certain structure already is available for analysis, that already there is mention of knowledge, even verbalized science with

respect to which such an analysis can occur. Thus, in didactical analysis one assumes that a didactical construction is available in both theoretical and practical terms – otherwise the concept would be meaningless since then there would be nothing to analyze. In this light, the literature on this theme that currently is available should be read and questioned.

Consequently, the first problem that comes to mind is a relatively concrete one, i.e., to what extent does a practice present itself for analysis in the sense that the conclusions will have universally value? Considering that the ways in which didactical analysis is done agrees in a particular sense with the results of a didactically valid theory, this question becomes far more complicated than seems to be the case.

For example, if one arrives at specific conclusions from a programmed teaching structure or from cybernetic teaching models or from the question of teaching content based on revealed didactical constructions, the results (value) of a didactical analysis will vary significantly. These variations largely are the consequence of different emphases and are not primarily a question of more or less value. It is therefore of particular significance for didactical theory building above all to determine by a didactical analysis what is theoretically fundamental in order to try to determine *why* it is going to be essential in the analysis.

The significance of the fundamental, original reality of educating as it is realized in teaching necessarily is the basis of any didactical theory has been shown. That this original (essentials of) teaching, already was described in detail and summarized into a structure are considered to be a precondition for the possibility of a didactical analysis. This fundamental-theoretical exposition must, after all, provide the criteria on which an analysis of a second-order practice must be carried out.

Let us illustrate this with an example: Would it be possible to evaluate didactically the course structure of teaching in the well-known school systems of Montessori, Dalton, etc. without insight into a ground structure, i.e., without an answer to the question: What is teaching? However, none of these systems provide their

own criteria for the evaluation to which any didactical analysis necessarily is directed. It only is possible to place such systems in the spotlight of didactical analysis insofar as they bring forward the essences of teaching through which the teaching moments contained therein are expressed.

In this line of argument, it should be clear that the concept “analysis” immediately implies an evaluation as the ultimate or final trend of an analysis and, what is more, any evaluation immediately raises the question of criteria in terms of which [something] can be analyzed. Therefore, a good question to consider is if a person can measure an evaluation in the case of a didactical analysis with other criteria than generally valid didactical criteria, also in light of a particular character of a situation that needs to be evaluated didactically.

For a didactician who is looking for the scientific aspects (here as opposed to the application aspects) of the matter of a didactical analysis, this situation is relatively fluid. In light of currently existing insights there is a definite point of focus that can serve as a point of departure for relatively sound theoretical reasoning. In this point of departure, at this stage of writing a didactical theory, already it has been advanced that one can speak of a lesson structure in a generally valid sense. By this it is meant that didacticians have unfolded a lesson structure as an eventuality of practice (i.e., theory that proceeds to practice; a theory that can and should become practice). From the insights into the original reality of educating, currently it is possible to describe a lesson structure in its experiential side fairly reasonably and test its theoretical structure in practical situations. This structure is outlined in broad strokes in the next to last paragraph of this chapter so that by implication a lesson structure also is partly the result of a responsible didactical analysis.

To return to the original statement of the problem: What does a didactician want from a didactical analysis in his fundamental theory building?

First and foremost this has to do with the question of concretizing the functional-didactic course that assumes that teaching is a

practical, everyday human experience and, in particular, an educative one. As an experiential structure, a didactician is involved with a functional matter; i.e., a matter that is functionalized, brought into motion and thus, however one looks at it, it does not exist in a purely theoretical respect. Any didactical theory, construction or structure (and thus a lesson structure) is not conceptual in nature but represents the empirical totality of particular details that manifest themselves in such a theory, construction or structure.

The implication is that practice must make visible the structural aspect of thinking. As such, it must be able to be functionalized. It must be *structurally* repeatable. This is not to claim that a didactical structure has a pragmatic nature. Not all educative and teaching aims necessarily are useful. In this respect, a theorist must distinguish carefully between the concepts “useful” and “functional”. The meaning of a didactical design is not primarily in its usefulness but in the fact that in practice it comes to life or is functionalized. After all, there is a wealth of teaching content that has no pragmatic value at all.

If then one uses the concepts “functional-didactical” in theory construction, firstly it is intended to verbalize from practice (here a second-order practice) the situation’s course, in its actualization tendency. If in practice there is a non-functional aspect this means that such an aspect is sterile, that it cannot be fulfilled in some way, that it is a theoretical-didactical concept that is unrelated to the original dynamic character of teaching. In such a case, one simply is not involved with didactical theory.

The concretization of a functional-didactical exposition reveals itself as a didactic course. The functional-didactical can be seen only as a progression, something that occurs as a progressive dynamic that will fulfill itself eventually in accordance with the teaching aims. A didactical analysis is possible insofar as something *happens* during the course of a situation.

In the first and second chapters it was pointed out that these didactic events cannot be thought of and understood independently of the pedagogical course (sequence/progression) structures. From

within an educative point of view, the implication is that the structural course of teaching necessarily corresponds with the general course of educating. However, in this case, the correspondence noted by a didactician in his analysis is not complete because a second-order [e.g., school] didactical practice, after all, is a re-established, refined and combined coherence of structural aspects that, in this respect, does not always manifest itself as being *the same* as in original experiencing.

On the basis of these refinements, combinations and the general diversity of teaching that a school situation shows, a didactical analysis of its course will make more details available than is the case with an original, naively constituted educative situation. This does not violate the proposition that the structure of educating is realized in teaching and that the structure of teaching is in agreement with a pedagogical course structure. The meaning of a formalized act of teaching always is found in these original givens, by which the original [situation] necessarily retains its co-partnership in the meaning of a second-order situation.

In the first place, the functional aspect of a second-order teaching situation does not always strive for realizing educative aims. It is obvious that a didactical analysis implied greater detail of a refined and compiled practice. A self-initiated didactical course is chosen to thereby expose the didactical designs. Here the central issue is that in order to try to expose, via didactical analysis, the unique nature of a didactical course, one now looks into the didactical modalities.²

The concept “didactical modality” was created to try to illuminate and verbalize the harmony between presentational forms/ways and ways/modes of learning as this comes forth in a lesson structure. To the extent that didactical modalities come into play in a didactical analysis, the assumption is that planning for and realizing the modes of learning will become clear in the analyses. Thus, here it is asserted that the issue of didactical modalities is fundamental to why it involves the course aspect of the didactical analysis; precisely it is because there can be no course if one does not realize that it is the equilibrium created in the presentation and the learning activities that makes the course possible.

Therefore, the concretization of a functional-didactical course only is possible on the basis of the analytic possibilities offered for consideration by the didactical modalities. In summary: In a didactical analysis, a didactician tries in a systematic way to make visible the functional-dynamic aspect of the original structure of teaching (from the reality of educating) in accordance with the combinations and refinements that consciously and in a performance sense must be fulfilled in a second-order, reconstituted situation. Without such a view, there is no concretization.

In concretizing, a didactical analysis must indicate the extent to which a structure used in a classroom situation is a matter of mastery, demarcation and a teaching effect. This indicates the first task for or meaning of a didactical analysis, but without answering how or in which way analysis can be concretized. Nevertheless, the experience of teaching indicates beyond any doubt that there is a wealth of detail regarding the functional sequences that must be brought together and tied somewhere in order to be able to talk about a structure as a result of such an analysis. To concretize means to make [something] visible, manipulable and implementable such that, in the end, a didactical analysis also must have functional value for designing and realizing new teaching situations.

On the other hand, different aspects included in a didactical analysis do not allow themselves to be concretized easily if they can be isolated, e.g., the affective and thinking. Also it is obvious that in light of the fact that the meaning of a didactical analysis is that a better account of the structure of teaching can be given, then the only logical result of a didactical analysis is to be found in a lesson structure. In light of this statement, perhaps at this stage the problem for a didactical analysis can be reformulated: In the context of an accountable lesson structure, a didactical analysis must indicate the extent to which a functional-didactical course can be concretized. In turn, a lesson structure must summarize the didactical aspects identified in an analysis as *fundamentalia* [essences] for a course of teaching in a firm, functional teaching design.

Creating the coherences that disclose a lesson structure as identifiable, i.e., describable matters of action that then can be

indicated as the second aspect the aim of a didactical analysis. From the previous chapters it seems clear that teaching, and thus a lesson structure, only matters to the extent that an equilibrium can be built up with respect to the form and content. On the basis of this equilibrium of form and content, a concept such as a “lesson structure” becomes possible. This cannot be described other than as “structure” in light of the fact that essentially it is experiencing itself that is moving on the basis of its rootedness in experiencing and in the lifeworld.

A balanced lesson structure, therefore, indicates a balanced insight into form and content that has fundamental significance as soon as teaching is to function. Didactically speaking, a balanced relationship between form and content as a problem begins with the fact that, as far as a second-order situation is concerned, contents mostly are prescribed in curricula to which didactical designs then must give vivid form. Thus, it seems that a balanced relationship must be assumed that a didactician is involved with a relatively fixed point that weighs heavily on educators and has to be balanced by a didactical design.

Certainly such a view is true to some extent, but the content remains a matter of thematic announcements, indications because no curriculum can prescribe a meaningful integration of content into a teaching situation precisely because it cannot guarantee it. The reduction of content in accordance with announced themes in a curriculum places demands on the design, but also it provides freedom in implementing in terms of a great impetus for the didactic modalities.

Definitely it is true that in the course of the situation a teacher makes no contribution to the original insights into the coherence of realities (contents) he teaches. On the other hand, the essences of these realities (Physics, Linguistics, History, Art, etc.) do not always speak for themselves. In addition, these aspects are not self-evident matters of life problems for children, although the aim of teaching is life orienting.

Whatever a curriculum might prescribe in this regard, a teacher always must bring it to its essence and in accordance with the life

involvement of his pupils in a lesson structure in order to claim that he is teaching meaningfully. Teachers do not write an original subject matter science. They implement available and existing insights as a lesson problem, learning aim and lesson sequence for the sake of the children entrusted to them becoming stronger. The initiating acumen, in a didactical sense, is inconceivable if the skillful and justifiable handling of content does not precede a free teaching design as a possible precondition. This free and justifiable involvement with the content, therefore, is a primary aspect of an identifiable lesson structure. Without a good insight in this regard, equilibrium of form and content is not possible.

As far as form is concerned, usually it is referred to as a field of play for the free, initiating acumen of a didactician. In fact, it is not the case that content provides for this in terms of particular didactically formulated stipulations that can serve as clues for anyone who initiates a teaching situation. In a didactical sense, form is a matter of thinking about design. Here a designer is unbound because, in different ways and on the basis various principles, he can work through to the form in accountable ways (modes). To the extent that there are didactical modalities, the equilibrium of form and content is non-determinative. At this point, a designer acts in accordance with his judgments -- judgments that he incorporates into a design in order to provide for certain modes of learning in terms of particular learning content. After all, these provisions for particular learning activities in accordance with a teacher's knowledge of the content and of a child contribute to the equilibrium of form and content in a lesson structure.

The balanced coherence between content and modes of presentation for the sake of actualizing the modes of learning has been considered in previous pages as a matter of didactical modality. The didactical modalities guarantee as far as possible the achievement nature of teaching previously described as a teaching effect. If a didactical analysis is not able to describe systematically the identifiable matters (presenting and learning) as a lesson structure matter, there is no didactical analysis. Indeed, this *course* takes a clearly identifiable order. There is no course without order that also indicates other important aspects such as teaching and learning models [regarding this order] for a more refined analysis

that a didactical analysis must arrive at as well as to indicate important areas of research.

A third aspect of the aim of a didactical analysis is to succeed in disclosing the didactical modalities, especially in the particular respect that the modalities and techniques clearly show that structurally teaching takes a definite course. As far as a conceptual analysis is concerned, in this particular respect, the word “modality” is derived from “modus” meaning “way”. Theoretically, “modus” means that a *way of experiencing* becomes visible in a modality. The way in which *experiencing* is realized is knowable and describable in the modalities. When there is a consideration of technique, the emphasis is not to be separated from a way of doing but especially on the meaning of an implemented facilitation or letting [something] occur in accordance with a pre-calculated program. Technique has to do with actualizing particular skills rather than with a fundamental skill itself.

Thus, particular modalities of a lesson structure should come into play as teaching models that require technically proficient dexterity in a teaching situation before there can be any teaching effect. Hence, in a didactical sense, modalities point more to a judgment, an appraisal in a constructive sense, while one is involved with technique rather than with realizing, applying or actualizing an already existing judgment.

In a didactical analysis, this coherence is of particular importance if it also has the task of disclosing and indicating their relationship to didactical technique. In light of the progressive nature of a didactical situation, a structural explication of a lesson structure is not possible without insight into this coherence. The modalities always are actualized in the course of a lesson in one or another technique. On the other hand, a structural result also is not possible if these two concepts are leveled. A didactical analysis is aimed at describing for the sake of realizing [practice?].

The first aspect of the disclosure of modalities³ in theory building is the following: Any didactical analysis has fundamental significance only insofar as it accounts for and ultimately verifies its statements within a broader framework of didactical theory. Thus, it also is fair

to ask if a didactical analysis that has a simple focus in its theory forming (i.e., regarding its origins and possible preconditions) still can be described essentially as a didactical analysis. Would an analysis based on one-sided behavioral learning psychological views or one that fixates on content (Bildungsinhalt) really be described as didactical analysis?

A fundamental matter to which answers must be given is if such above-mentioned approaches have any points of intersection in didactical reality. If not, this means that a didactical analysis from such a background completely misses a lesson situation. In this case, the good judgment of a didactician also must ensure that a child is not thrown out with the bath water. The fact that one way of teaching is hypothesized in a didactical theory or that one aspect of a lesson structure is assumed as the alpha and omega of a teaching situation does not have to mean that such views have meaning for a more comprehensive view from the reality of educating.

A second aspect that must be pointed out here is that the didactical modalities cannot be understood well unless one realizes that, as far as a lesson structure is concerned, one is at the crown of one's structure. In disclosing didactical modalities one moves from fundamental theory (thinking) to the realization tendencies (practice) that will test the final verification of one's views of a lesson situation itself.

The coherence of the modalities with already worked out ground forms, methodological principles, forms of ordering content, etc. must be clear because the modes of didactical movement that speak from a lesson structure originate here. In this case, if the coherence of mode and technique can be described, a transition from planning (design) to execution (lesson structure) was achieved. The disclosure of the modalities has a direct influence on a future practical situation. This implies that the modalities anticipate the possibility of didactical achievement (effective teaching). The reason for the importance of didactical modalities hardly can be stated more strongly.

This brings us to a fourth question that is focused on the aims of a didactical analysis, i.e., the consideration of the possible impact of different types of lessons and the assessment of their possible connection with what today generally is known as teaching models. Understandably, the question of lesson types is as old as didactical theory writing, as well as not being discussed systematically by didacticians or not being interpreted with respect to the course of a teaching situation. Their sporadic appearance in the literature begins at least with Comenius and continues to the present time. After all, the issue of lesson types can be understood as a matter of didactical analysis because, as types, and in accordance with the ground forms, a matter of experiential accounting. Also they are undefined aspects of original experiencing, referred to as the only primary source of knowledge for didactical theory building.

Thus: The distinctions regarding types of lesson⁴ simply involve describing the manifestations (modes) of original experiencing. As such, the recognition of lesson types also is evidence of the meaningful realization of didactical modes. The coherence of mode and technique, discussed above to some extent, now reveals itself here in the sense that the relationship between the two is a matter whose visibility does not emerge from technique, as such, but from the lesson types that become possible as types of *forms* based on the relationship as a construction. As constructions, these lesson types are not bound or determined but are free, and this freedom is *possible* on the basis of general guidelines indicated by the *designation* of the lesson types. If one were to arrange the lesson types side-by-side, it becomes clear that under their designations, free construction possibilities are offered whereby the judgments that arise from the didactical modalities are fulfilled in a technical sense. For didactical methodology this is of utmost importance because it is methodological planning that makes the designation of lesson types possible. As types, this always involves ways of execution (*Methodos*).

A type of lesson is not a teaching model in the sense of a recipe, but simply announces a way of doing. Thus, it is apparent that there is a distinction in effectiveness of the two concepts. In fact, how else is it possible to talk about the impact of the concept “lesson type”? Nevertheless, a type of lesson is announced in a general sense:

lesson types are (in light of the relevance of original experiencing) a matter of general didactical knowledge. It even is so general that daily it is realized in practice without this relationship being taken into account. Lesson types are self-evident in the *course of a [teaching] situation*. However, its impact is in the structure of action that is announced in designating lesson types.

In a telling lesson, narrative is a methodological program. But there also can be narrative *without* didactic impact, e.g., as in communicating. Didactically, there is a big difference between narrating and communicating. In this respect, designating a lesson type is a relatively exact matter and it is assumed that what is announced in the designation will be realized in a lesson situation; e.g., in a telling lesson, communicating (also as a technique) will be realized.

But: What criteria does narrative have to answer in order to function effectively in a teaching situation? This question is valid for each of the lesson types and it involves a myriad of issues about which didactics cannot provide answers that hold water. Certainly, in formal teaching the designation of lesson types proclaims the matter of the course of a lesson but such a proclamation does not provide criteria for assessing effective teaching. A telling lesson does include judgment, technique and dividend (effect). However, an effect only follows if the judgment is fulfilled *in* the technique. Ultimately, a didactical analysis cannot have full value unless the criteria for the lesson types eventually are included.

General didactical criteria certainly must function in these lesson situations, but their relevance is too general to interpret the essential meaning of the designations of the lesson types in detail. This presents a didactical analysis with a comprehensive and urgent task, also and especially regarding a search for empirical approaches to such research. A lesson structure and its realization in a particular type of lesson, in its whole assessment, is a matter of practicing the total didactical spectrum presented in previous chapters, in fact, all of the insights that exist on the broad line of theory building because a teacher in a lesson situation cannot work outside of a lesson structure and its associated lesson types.

Didactic insights only are present where a teacher works. The impact of a lesson type is found in the compiled didactic insights of which, as a lesson structure, must be able to speak. Otherwise, all theory is in vain. And now: As far as a lesson structure is concerned, does a connection exist (as it must be sketched in a didactical analysis) with so-called didactical or teaching models? In our understanding of the matter of “teaching models” there are three aspects that are of fundamental importance if the stated problem is to be judged, i.e.:

- a) Teaching models are models constructed from specific teaching content representing teaching units.
- b) Therefore, as a teaching model it must indicate ideal types (lessons) as far as the didactical ground forms are concerned.
- c) A teaching model must take into account the overall balanced insights of the didactical methodology.

Hence, a teaching model assumes giving form to teaching that is offered as a model (thus a grounded, valid example). The model therefore must involve an exemplary constitution that gives a teacher the opportunity to detach himself from a judgment, his own didactic design, as such, in order to be able to focus his attention on the implementing, presenting or technical aspect of lesson situation. Thus, a model provides him with a completed, didactic construction that he then can bring into motion, can actualize it in light of his particular situation.

Would this matter now belong to a didactical analysis? Would one be able to take the structure of a particular lesson type as a model in a theoretical explication such as this? In other words: Could we incorporate the realization of a general lesson structure into a particular model as an ideal type? And could such a model carry effective teaching as arises in a particular situation? With reservations, the answers certainly are affirmative – provided a generally valid lesson structure, as a fundamental construct, is found behind the model, so if a valid structure projects the model as a matter of fact and provided a teacher knows the origin of, interprets the model accordingly and anticipates the variants that practice always provides.

Obviously, the presumption of lesson types is something other than a teaching model. The latter only is a first image of a lesson type, even as an ideal image for which variation in a particular situation must be envisioned according to its differentness. A completed construction on the basis of which a teacher can work is imaginary if one takes into account the demands that changing situations continually raise. For example, if the lesson types are worked out in the finest detail (also in terms of their criteria) can they be used as teaching models?

The answer must be denied because a lesson type is established in accordance with a lesson structure in a general sense and not on the basis of particular content. Only when many model lessons are created in consecutive sequences, in accordance with a particular curriculum, will teaching models be considered as ideal types in this regard. And even then these models cannot guarantee the teaching but only can have a guiding effect for a teacher who is able to account for his interpretation and implementation in accordance with a valid lesson structure. Therefore, any didactical construction, thus also a teaching model, is dead until it is brought to lived experience (life) by a teacher's actions. No recipe guarantees a practice; it only can direct practical actions. A recipe doesn't act on its own. A teaching model runs the risk of being a nonsensical recipe unless a teacher interprets it against the background of the total concept of the didactical as outlined in a lesson structure.

A last aspect that needs to be attended to in a didactical analysis, and that has been mentioned repeatedly in other chapters, is the matter of teaching effect. If everything is taken into account, to main issues enter the foreground because they actually constitute a teaching effect: The teaching to which a teacher progresses and the action expected of a child. Without intensive collaboration, especially with a psychopedagogue, this cannot be the case. This situation required a great deal of flexibility from both participants about which we know little in a didactical sense, but that must be of decisive significance when we want to unlock [present] reality effectively. Since this matter includes a comprehensive, parallel structure in general didactics, particularly in practical and psychopedagogical fields, for the time being, this issue is left open

and a comprehensive investigation eventually will have to be undertaken.

In summary, a didactical analysis seeks to verbalize the activity-possibilities in a lesson situation in so far as it reveals its impact in a lesson structure and particularly a type of lesson. Formal teaching necessarily is rooted in a particular reality with a view to unlocking new reality. In the first place, teaching is designed and is not a mere imitation of designs. The only thing that essentially is imitated is structural forms in which original experiencing is manifested. A decisive factor in effective teaching is a didactician's initiative and not the availability of many models that lie ready for use.

B. INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS ON A LESSON STRUCTURE

1. *The origin of lesson structure.* From the foregoing one might conclude correctly that a didactical analysis is an obvious matter in its theoretical expositions. There were clear indications of functional criteria that must be established in order to disclose and describe the structure (origins) with a didactical analysis. First and foremost, these origins amount to the ways or forms in which one participates in the world or gives form to one's being in the world on the basis of which teaching then takes a definite course.

From the existing literature, it is clear that didacticians do not always deal with the same issues. Neither the meaning of an analysis nor its course are described in general or shared terms. If one can summarize the problem categorically: A didactical analysis has *significance* for the original act "didaskhein" (to teach) in so far as teaching can be made visible in its form (course) as well as its directedness to reality (contents) in such an analysis. As expressed in the details beforehand, an important indication for the issue of a lesson structure is found here:

A lesson structure is not didactically-pedagogically obvious. The structure of a lesson must be disclosed from one's original experiencing or involvement in reality.

Therefore, the first question that must be investigated is that of the origin of a lesson structure. How is it possible to determine the structure (origin) of a lesson in general? If one takes into account the totality of the theoretical-didactical exposition currently available to a student in books, it seems that the origins of a lesson in the descriptions of it announces in particular two aspects for investigation, namely (i) the form and (ii) the content.

In all attempts to account for a lesson structure, these two aspects are emphasized in one way or another; content especially gives rise to an urgent analysis in that the meaning of teaching becomes visible in it. As far as such an analysis is concerned, form often is limited to a matter of the methodological or to lesson methodology in light of the fact that presenting a lesson makes its form visible and available for description and evaluation. This does not mean that such descriptions of a lesson structure are meaningless; however, they do not present an image of “structure” in the original meaning of the word and therefore appears in the construction of a didactical theory as incorrect or incomplete.

When a didactician has arrived at a lesson structure he works with a relatively final synthesis of didactical insights. Proceeding from the fact that a design balanced with respect to form and content is the most important component of a lesson, a theoretician must realize that the syntheses he builds on have to be realized in a classroom. They must function in a formal, businesslike situation, otherwise his theoretical expositions are not valid.⁵ If we take into account that the concept “lesson” (coming from “read”) really hints that something, i.e., content must be learned and recited from outside, it seems clear that here a didactician has to reduce drastically in order to arrive at the origins of a lesson structure than what usually is mentioned thus far in didactical theory building.

2. *The form aspect of a lesson structure:* The origin of the form aspect of a lesson structure is of fundamental importance for constructing a didactical theory. If “reading” or then “giving a lesson” assumes a conscious intervention by a teacher (be it a parent or someone else), it points to an original situation in which someone, as an accompanier, moves forward and initiates an action that is attuned to effective learning. The vernacular speaks of

someone who “reads a lesson” or “to teach someone to read that clearly reaches back to a relationship of accounting in which there are norms (contents) that in an activity are insufficiently given form or still must acquire form.

The important thing to note is that the lifeworld (as expressed in verbalizing lifeworld experiences) includes a type of situation that takes a teaching course with respect to “something” (content). This *course* of a situation announces the *fact* of content but not its *nature*. The course is a matter of the *form* of a situation as is the case with every type of situation that occurs in the lifeworld. For someone to “read a lesson” implies intervening in someone else’s course of life in order to bring about a change, reorientation or modification of attitude etc. Certainly, this can occur in a comprehensive series of circumstances, but especially it appears in the being together of adults (parents) and children (non-adults). Here we are talking about a pedagogical intervention that aims to change structures of action in a child’s life.

To read a lesson undoubtedly is the formal realization of the course-structure in the reality of educating. The “lesson” refers to contents (especially normatively determined) that are presented and assumed to be included in a lifestyle. To the extent that a series of situations became formalized, the concept of a lesson underwent a change in meaning, acquired a more businesslike, scientific connotation and was seen as an important task of the reader (expert) who had to make available content of varied meaning for the mastery of reality. A reader repeats such a piece of the original reality of educating in its course in order to realize specific aims of pedagogic intervention.

Thus, the form of a lesson structure lies in a person’s lifeworld. The form is disclosed in a person’s form of living; it is part of a person’s most original experiencing. Hence, if one takes into account that educating (referred to above) belongs to the most original experiencing of a person, that an act of educating in the life of persons is not to be avoided in its structure (in its aims, relationships and course), that where there are persons, necessarily they are dependent on educating, that this educating (pedagogic intervention) reveals a definite structure, that it cannot occur in

terms of nothing and thus is attuned to particular content (life- and world-views) and this means that a lesson form appears in an important source of knowledge for the study of educating (Education), i.e., the reality of educating.

The contents of concern appear primarily from the other source of knowledge, i.e., life- and world- views. Clearly, form without content is meaningless and, therefore, cannot be incorporated *as such* in a didactical theory. The reverse also is true. With respect to these two matters, experiencing shows itself in the lifeworld and also becomes knowable. The coherence of form and content is a matter of *lived reality*. Thus, the forms of educating speak from the course of educating (the structural) while the life- and world-views will indicate the contents in terms of which the forms come into motion. The convergence of these two lines in an event (i.e., what a person allows to happen) proclaims the *sense*, the explanatory moments of human life.

The didactical presumption then rings so: Educating is realized in teaching, while the sense of teaching becomes visible in educating. Thus, educating takes place in teaching and (hypothetically) where this does not occur, educating does not appear in the human world. “Didaskein” is an immanent matter of human life since life (humanly speaking) is a matter of lived, original participation of a person in the world, as it is assumed that a person’s being in the world is to take up the educative imperative. Therefore, the form of “didaskein” also must appear in accordance with his being in the world.

One cannot deal formally with educating differently, give it formal structure and also he does not actualize his educating differently in teaching. To be able to make the form of teaching visible, didactical theory turns back to the original forms of living at one’s disposal in terms of his spontaneous, intuitive participation in reality as an experiential totality that he will have to implement anew in a teaching situation. One has no other ways of teaching at his disposal than those that become visible in his participation and life.

The essences of his forms of living therefore are refined, combined, differentiated, etc. in order to establish his teaching style *in*

accordance with his lifestyle in order to realize his educative aims. Otherwise his teaching would be completely alien to life that, after all, is impossible. One has no lifestyle at his disposal to realize in teaching other than what is specifically human. All forms of teaching can be traced back directly to the forms of living, otherwise they cannot be teaching forms. Also, this holds for the most sophisticated techniques applied in modern times when trying to move a teaching effect to the most optimal level.

An inquiry into the form of teaching is rooted in one's being in the world. In accordance with the relief a didactician discloses here, he can indicate its *didactic possibilities*. *This speaks clearly of a coherence of life form, educative form (teaching form) and learning form*. A didactical design, the ultimate result of which is a lesson structure, reaches back to this coherence and makes possible the actualization of the course of teaching. A didactician can describe and justify a lesson structure in accordance with these original ways in which a person transforms the world into a lifeworld for himself. For these reasons a didactical theory does not go back to schooling, a theory of learning or anything else to illuminate his lesson structure (the possibility of a design for practical implementation) because neither schooling nor a learning theory nor anything else can make the origin of the practical forms visible.

For the sake of clarity, let's repeat the first essence: A form of teaching (lesson form, lesson structure) is grounded in a human way of living because a person, as a human being, is here in the world. Consequently, a teaching form and teaching style cannot surpass or exceed the form and style of living. For "didaskhein" there is no first source of knowledge in which form is disclosed. Understandably, from insight into form, a didactician directs himself to his aim (learning as a way to change) so that eventually the latter constitutes a third pole of a lesson structure that must be provided for in a design. This not only is what makes the presumption of didactical ground forms possible but also meaningful. These didactical ground forms represent the first profile of the relief that a lesson structure shows as it becomes visible from the forms of living.⁶

Even though the form aspect of teaching has not yet been worked out systematically and in a definite coherence in detail, nevertheless, there is a wealth of insights spread over a large area of didactical history that when studying it, didactical form really must be interpreted. Form is a first insightful aspect that makes possible a matter such as a lesson structure possible. A teacher who cannot account for this also cannot provide an account of the essences of the practice in which he is involved.

3. ***The content aspect of a lesson structure:*** Above it was indicated that a person's lifeworld also is determined in terms of content. Forms of living only are significant and meaningful because they also give rise to contents according to which one moves through the world. For a Christian, these contents especially are defined normatively by Scriptural revelation and thus the latter is the first, acceptable source of knowledge about both the origin and meaning of reality. In this regard, if one also takes into account the discussions of an achieving consciousness currently available in the literature and as discussed in previous chapters, it seems clear that the statement "lifeworld" next to "world" also has to do with living (moving) that has its fullest appearance as a lifestyle determined by content.

Lifestyle as such indeed is making visible the attribution of meaning that, in its turn, is inconceivable without life content because then the intentionalities of the moving cannot be made conscious. That is, without contents, a person would not have been aware of "world" so that teaching would never have appeared on the horizon. The alternative of "something" as content then would be "nothing" – a matter in which a person cannot imagine at all, let alone let alone immerse himself in. The life forms really become visible as a person participates in reality or gives content to his existence: The lifeworld *is* by virtue of the fact that life without content is not possible.

The things of the world are given meaning, they are ranked in order of importance while the emphasis of this meaning varies according to the ways a person participates in them. As a person participates in the world, the contents differentiate themselves categorically because he becomes *aware* of different issues and in different ways.

A person's consciousness (being aware) speaks of self-consciousness in educating as shown, e.g., in moral consciousness by which educating (teaching) has either a moral-normative meaning or does not exist at all. Thus, with respect to life contents, one finds a categorical unfolding that accords with the meaning one attributes to reality. The coherence (structure) of these categories of the lifeworld (life contents) makes it possible to ascertain how reality manifests itself essentially. The particular interpretation of a categorical structure, in its turn, assumes a person's life- and world-view and such views represent a dimensional matter of a person's outlook on reality. Therefore, all human beings have a view of life and world and everyone's involvement with the contents to some extent is determined normatively.

Apart from moral norms, e.g., also there are material norms and if the latter is a dominant factor in a dimensional perspective on reality, and, as materialism, it still is normatively determined: Based on related norms, any variation of materialism is knowable and describable in a particular way. Thus, contents of the lifeworld are visible categorically and lend themselves to an emphasis in the knowing consciousness of a person where it becomes visible as life content. In this relief, educating is a meaningful matter and one also decides on his educative aims, whether explicitly or implicitly. Hence, also he states *what* he wants to realize in his teaching. With this, by implication also he chooses his educative content – primarily according to his perspective on what *is*.

This choice of content is a lived experiential arrangement of reality in the sense of an emphasis by which there already is a *particular* (chosen) relief. That there is ordering does not imply that reality as such is seen as chaotic but that one experiences it as being without a dimension of depth until it acquires relief through meaning and emphasis. Reality is close to a child but he is removed from its *meaning*. Formally, he does not participate thoroughly in it because he is an experienced being. But experience accumulates as time elapses and he must attribute meaning to reality in order eventually to understand the multiplicity of his existence and be able to reduce to its essences his participation in the world.

Otherwise he does not arrive at a personal lifestyle in his own world. Here an adult intervenes through educating. The course of everyday experiencing is *determined* and channelized with a view to attributing meaning. An adult is aware that a child will learn whether one is directing these learning activities in accordance with justifiable preferences. However, he does not leave this matter to chance; he formalizes [this learning] through teaching in order to be able to realize pre-established aims. As far as contents are concerned, he includes certain aspects of the lifeworld at a time when he concludes that such aspects no longer are dangerous to a child or that at a particular age they inevitably appear on the horizon of his childlike life.

Thus, a father's calling used to be one aspect of the heritage of his sons – they grew up and got to know their heritage by participating in it from infancy. That this no longer is the case today does not mean that implementing a teaching practice is *not possible*. However, in our time it has become unnecessary and/or undesirable. Preferences have changed such that contents are emphasized differently. Hence, the excitement of reality looks different and a child goes a different way (to a life vocation) in reality than his father. Simply, this is a remnant of technological developments over the past several centuries. In this way, formal training actually has become the last aspect of formal teaching.

In other words: Over the past three centuries, more and more formal teaching has become important. In our modern world, adults increasingly have eliminated life contents from a primary [home] educative situation. Earlier, a child's sense of responsibility was acquired by direct work assignments that *immediately* involved their daily bread. Currently, responsibility acquires structure through study assignments by which another day's bread appears in the realm of *possibility*.

Thus, as far as formal teaching is concerned, contents of the lifeworld reveal a categorical coherence. The task of those involved in educating is that the relief [of the contents] must be shaped according to the emphasis of modern times because a child must be guided and accompanied in it. In this respect, one must understand

that the spontaneous experiencing always and today still represents the first tie of content to the course of educating.

As soon as a more businesslike teaching of the lifeworld becomes necessary, a parent shares his assignment with a teacher. Hence, a school appears where this more matter of fact involvement with life content becomes desirable or inevitable. Today in so-called "primitive" communities where this matter is irrelevant, there are no schools. Then it sounds strange that the didactical calling has been around in the Western world for centuries: Return to the lifeworld of a child? How many school and teaching systems were anchored in this calling and how much will be left of the so-called educational renewal of the past few decades if one were to remove this call [to return to the lifeworld of a child] from it?

This original experiencing asserts itself today as a lost world that must be brought back into educating. The meaning of the above callings is in a search for a harmonious synthesis between original experiencing and a first ordering of life contents. Thus, the concept of "now" acquires meaning again in modern didactical theory building. One realizes that those contents in terms of which a child must participate in the world and life are changing in such a way as to obscure that a radically changed image of reality threatens to oust a child from the original lifeworld.

This matter of contents is another aspect of a lesson structure that to some degree must be brought to a solid insight in a didactical theory. One cannot express himself structurally about the content of a lesson if indeed a didactician does not recognize and involve it in theory building such that original experiencing represents the most original ordering of the lifeworld to which one comes and from which and as a result of which any other ordering become possible -- also in the more businesslike approach of a teacher in a classroom. This also provides the meaning of the didactical ground forms as a matter of a primary giving of form to a lesson situation. Then, when form and content are in a balanced relation in a didactical investigation, and eventually show expertise, there can be a lesson structure, i.e., the implementation of theoretical insights into the origin and course of a businesslike teaching situation. An

adult only can account of a teaching aspect of schooling if he has incorporated the essences of this practice into his theory building.

C. THE EDUCATIVE TASK

A brief exposition in response to the question of a school's educative task certainly is important and meaningful in light of the preceding explications. As a matter of postulation, one probably could argue: The educative task of a school is to help a child find himself, to discover himself in the lifeworld. In searching for the didactical aspects of Didactical Pedagogics, a theoretician might find it difficult to overlook two criteria that apply particularly to the notion of "didactical" as a slice of human experiencing. One criterion shows itself as a demand or expectation that educating must be near-to-life. Teaching (*didaskhein*) must not be foreign. The other criterion is the expectation that teaching essentially must be educative. A teacher must not be upset about or averse to educating.

When educating fulfills these two criteria, one can say the first step has been taken towards a justifiable didactic pedagogical theory. They are the first to be implemented, also in the spontaneous course of an educative situation, with respect to the matter of educative form and of content. It is when educating can be described as near to life that it is justifiable substantively, that it is not foreign to realizing living as an adult sees and interprets it.

One's life environment increasingly shows the characteristics of a changed world in the sense that the original is covered by adjustments. In this, the origins not only threaten to become obscured but also to disappear such that necessarily the educative contents reflect the adjusted world, also in terms of life and worldviews. As far as educating is concerned this points to the disappearance of those forms that originally appeared in the lifeworld. Thus, the forms of educating must not appear as being totally foreign to a person, as entirely a-human or anti-human. The primary forms of living must be an inherent part of the forms of educating in a classroom event in order to try to help a child, in his original being-there, to make something of the appeal of a life situation.

In theory building, a synthesis of nearness to life and educative intervention gives rise to the postulate of the didactical imperative. The didactical imperative emerges in relief as *the* call to which a responsible adult cannot or must say no. It represents an unavoidable call to teach. Thus, when there is a relationship between form and content in a lesson structure, a person is involved in reaching back to the above-mentioned criteria that now in a lesson structure exposes categorically the failure of experiencing as teaching that makes possible the reduction of experiencing to didactical categories.

This same failure forces didactical theory building to expound on the concept of lesson. In original narrating, and later by reading to [someone] and a lesson, available knowledge is passed on to the next generation. To the extent that someone has become more matter of fact and scientific has its origin, there is a progression to reading to instead of telling. This change to a “lesson” speaks of an equilibrium regarding the form (reading, reading to) and content (what is read). This balance is the basis for any structure for presenting content with an expectation that the act of learning will be actualized.

Understandably, guided- and self-actualization referred to in a previous chapter are relevant in that the meaning of a lesson structure also is visible in them. A lesson implies a call to someone who can and will help and a response from one who needs to be and must be helped. Equally, it also is understandable that an educative aim should reveal the results of the equilibrium of form and content because it makes a final synthesis as structure possible.

D. THE EDUCATIVE AIM

Taking the foregoing into account, it seems obvious that an educative aim is explained by the equilibrium or harmony of form and content. After all, this involves the formativeness or change that must be seen in a child. Actually the problem really is much more difficult than it seems. Forming already has been pointed to as an event and as a condition or state. The events called forming are not obvious (at least in a didactic situation) because the driving force, the intentional act, is not in the situation itself but in the plan

of an adult (teacher). Forming as a condition to which a pupil must arrive clearly is a learning effect in the sense of mastering, conquering and even manipulating reality.

Hence, we have to deal with three aspects peculiar to the course of a didactic act: A purposeful presentation according to the formative value of the particular content, an expected effective act of learning and an event, respectively the state of the change that shows that, partly or wholly, the aim has been attained. Would these three matters, in their clearly identifiable coherence, reveal the origins of “didaskhein”?

Here it is appropriate to indicate that the validity of the judgments set forth in the above statement hereby are not questioned or disputed to any extent. Even so, one should note that while the concept “Bildung” presupposes an extensive, attuned participation in life and world, the word itself does not obviously imply in a didactical sense the presentation or learning. It has to do with forming, changing, deepening, flourishing human participation in reality. That this forming occurs, is brought about or accomplished is not doubted by anyone. However, it is equally certain that it is not taken for granted or assumed to be automatic in acquiring form in a person’s life in neither of its two-fold meanings. For example and merely hypothetically, if nothing would happen to a person, forming also would not occur.

From another point of view, one also must point out that forming does not occur in a person’s life only as an effect or dividend of an act of teaching, i.e., an act of learning. By this last statement I mean that it is commonplace in the course of a didactic situation. Forming cannot be limited to a continuous course of didactic situations. A person also learns not only in a sequence of organized didactic courses. A person learns a great deal beyond any teaching intervention by acquiring experiences, making observations, interpreting sensations, etc.

The change mentioned in a theory of forming and that undeniably is visible in some way in the life of every person, cannot be limited to being a dividend of didactic intervention. Teaching is but one,

although extremely important factor, that contributes to the eventual state of being formed.

In looking for the *fundamentalia*, here one is concerned with two obvious gaps: In the first place, the change involved in forming does not presuppose *necessary teaching*, or *necessary learning*. In the second place, forming in its meaning as an event as well as a state cannot be limited to a didactic situation so that teaching and forming are even closer to didactical theory and formative theory and cannot be explained as identical concepts of equal meaning. The concept of forming strikes a notably broader field than “forming by teaching”. As a teaching dividend, the word forming actually presupposes that the change (forming) brought about by a didactic situation is preceded by an action. This action is shown by both adult and child, i.e., by presenting and by learning. Teaching is something other than the change. Teaching can predispose a change – but the change also can occur apart from it depending on whether teaching takes place or not in a person’s life.

Clearly, our problem is one of relief or perspective. When an essential aspect of teaching such as an expected change is taken out of its proper perspective and so overwhelmingly placed in the foreground that it completely or partly hides the rest of the course of teaching in its essences, the only possible result of a search for the grounding of “*didaskhein*” is a one-sided perspective. After all, the relief that a theory is supposed to state exactly of a point of view clearly shows a lack of a dimensional relationship in accordance with the totality of the experiencing of it that is available in the lifeworld.

Categorical hypostasizing is a tempting and seductive detour for a theoretical didactician because it looks so true, so realistic and even so practical in its everyday appearance. It is impossible to redirect “*didaskhein*” as such to one, fundamental category that can make visible the totality of the structure. What previously was expressed about forming as a didactical category actually applies to each of the other categories involved in designing such a theory. A student of Didactics must know that proceeding to hypostasizing in theoretical designs is a dangerous practice that puts the ultimate validity of pure theory forming into serious consideration.

An important matter that arises from the foregoing is that the equilibrium of a lesson form and lesson content is the most important matter for consideration if one wants to speak with good reason of a lesson structure. The ground of these views has been shown to be the reality of educating – a matter given with being human. The reality of educating *is* because a person *is* in the world. One must follow this line of argument well from the first search for the possibility of a didactical theory to where currently we are seeking a harmony of form and content in a classroom as revealed in a *teaching aim*. The reason for this statement is that teaching would be a meaningless activity if one did not work purposefully with form and content. After all, to have a place in one's lifeworld, a teaching situation is a conscious, decisive, intentional act that is not haphazard.

Thus, when one speaks of a teaching aim, it is acknowledged that this teaching aim seeks an equilibrium between *form* and *content*, whether consciously in a second-order, formal situation or spontaneously in an educative [primary] situation, that raises the possibility of a reasonably explainable lesson structure.

If one accepts that, in view of all of the previously discussed aspects, the essence of a lesson structure is to be found in the equilibrium that can be created between form and content, then one has to make the following deductions:

1. The meaning of a lesson structure as the result of any theoretical-didactical reflection is in the functional planning of effective teaching with a view to effective learning. This statement summarizes the meaning of a lesson structure. Thus, a lesson structure shows clearly that there is an initiating or a start to a learning effect. Teaching without learning dividends for those receiving it is a meaningless matter. Thus, a lesson structure reveals effective learning as an imperative and demand change both in the form as well as content.

The sense of the initiative we know as teaching (and with this the initiating and teaching have been brought to the level of explanation, in particular) is in creating a beginning, providing the

opportunity, making the climate favorable so a learning person can favorably participate in the course of the situation. This does not involve a teaching effect for the sake of teaching, but a teaching effect with a view to a learning effect. This is supported by the theory of didactical modalities (principles of actualization), modes of learning, teaching and learning aids.

2. If there is mention of an educative aim, two related, coherent, successive aspects must clearly be distinguished, i.e., a *teaching aim* *learning aim*. A teaching aim implies effective teaching and a learning aim effectively actualizing the act of learning. In the relationship between these two matters, a teaching aim is a narrower concept than a learning aim. A teaching aim need not have an accumulative effect because it can be effective in itself. In contrast, a learning aim is assumed to have an accumulative, thriving effect.

A learning effect must reproduce itself to be described as effective. Less effective teaching can and should be corrected but a corrected teaching structure itself never is a teaching aim except in preparing teachers. When improving teaching itself addresses a situation, e.g., based on a particular error analysis that leads to more effective teaching, this was not the aim of the lesson. Better teaching is an additional matter that does not address fundamentally a theory of the lesson structure. After all, a lesson was not originally intended to have an effect other than a learning effect, i.e., an optimal effect.

One cannot claim that a teacher teaches in order to be able to teach better the next time. But this is not the primary, defining sense of teaching. If this were the case in a [teacher] preparation situation, it still is a matter of learning effect, i.e., learning to teach better.

On the one hand, a didactician knows this side-effect of teaching as a matter of experiencing and on the other hand, in the analysis of what a teacher ought to make of his practice. However, in the first place, usually an analysis of teaching does not deal with the issue of effective teaching for the purpose of improving it if the criterion of effective teaching is not applied in the analysis. When a learning effect is not focused on in a teaching situation, a teacher proceeds to investigate his practice in order to try to remove impediment that

may exist and that block effective learning. Thus, there clearly is a narrower and broader aspect of a teaching aim.

On the other hand, a learning aim represents the learning aim, the eventuality of a didactic situation. It is in realizing a learning aim that the outcome of a didactic situation shows or manifests itself. A person who has didactically initiated must have brought something about that has had a profound effect. One could argue that it is impossible to determine with certainty the real learning effect of effective teaching. After all, it is impossible to determine the transfer effect or maneuverability effect of an act of learning that results from a thorough and justified teaching situation. In fact, viewed schematically, a learning effect has an inverted pyramidal structure whose base cannot be calculated. A teacher does begin with a small aspect of insight, intention, lived experiencing, etc., but in the maneuverability of insight and the implementation of knowledge, increasing skills and confident thinking a learner himself never determines the basis of the learning effect. Also it remains functional throughout the course of his life. Also it is in this respect that the notion of the formative value of particular learning content really is rooted. Thus, a learning effect is not only a matter of the immediate, but it only comes to an end for a person with the passage of time

In accordance with the problem originally posed, here a didactician is involved with an undeniable coherence, both in a logical and ontological sense, of lesson form and lesson content by which a person can arrive at the concept "lesson structure". A didactician must remember that here he is dealing with origins, i.e., he reaches back to a beginning or start, also the start of a lesson. On what basis can a didactic lesson be started? The answer is that a designer of a didactic situation must bring about a definite equilibrium of form and content according to an aspect of a person's lifeworld that manifests itself as a relationship between life form and life content.

In a classroom situation, this is a matter of a relationship between a teaching aim and a learning aim. Collectively, they are an educative aim. Therefore, one could speak of initiating an act of learning through teaching that should result in a continuous or thriving, broadening or effective learning event. The target of teaching as a

matter in itself is narrower than the effect of an act of learning that should follow. Thus in this case, the concepts “narrower” and “wider” indicate that teaching must not be stuck in the narrower meaning of the aim. In doing so, a didactician is forced to see this narrower aspect of his target area as a first or intermediate horizon that must be extended to the wider horizon of a learning effect.

The meaning of teaching is not in the teaching but in a learning effect because it proclaims the change that an educator seeks. Thus, a lesson, any lesson, implies giving a businesslike form to teaching with a view to effective learning. Here, could such a person actually derive this logic by saying that ultimately a lesson is focused on the activity of a teacher while the learning activity as such is taken into account nowhere or haphazardly? Such a view would be the most irresponsible didactical statement imaginable.

If it is stated that a lesson implies *giving form* to teaching with a view to effective learning, this is to acknowledge that the aim of teaching is in giving form to a learning aim by which the equilibrium of form and content crystallizes into the next important lesson criterion (in addition to a learning effect). If there is mention of a lesson form, one mainly is looking for the initiating contributions of a teacher to the course of a situation. Earlier this was referred to as a matter of educative engagement. When there is talk of a learning aim, one shifts the emphasis to the activity expected of the pupils. Is it not the great void of all known didactical constructions that they do not focus on the equilibrium of these two matters eventually to show that the form itself does not, but on the effect that this form will have as an appeal with respect to the *tasks* that they set for a learning person?

There can be no question that a lesson form, as such, holds no appeal for a learning person. To claim that a teacher’s initiative does not push through to a child’s initiative is to deny the reality of educating in its entirety. A teacher’s call as evidence of his initiative compels an answer from a child who is with him. This answer is evidence of childlike initiative on the grounds that he is in the world and certainly intends to become someone. If the didactical imperative under which a teacher stands does not eventually also

speak of a learning imperative under which a pupil stands, the intervention made is meaningless.

Strikingly, the correlate is that the imperative always is the unmistakable realization that a person is someone who “cannot” *say no*. The question is if those involved in a didactic situation *must not say no*; above all, in light of his task, a teacher (adult) might indicate a “no” with non-accountable teaching. Clearly, here there is mention of a complete or rounded out educative intervention and to think of a lesson structure outside of this connotation is inconceivable. Should there then be mention of a lesson form (meaning the initiating share that a teacher takes so that, as a lesson takes its course as a type of lesson it becomes manifest or visible) indicates an intention that is accountably attuned to definite modes of learning. A last account that a teacher should be able to give of his or her structure also including an account of the modes of learning that are relevant to a particular lesson.

If in explicating a lesson structure one should start with the generally accepted statement that a lesson form indicates a way in which lesson content can be considered, one is involved with a half-truth. This statement is unfinished or incomplete because its final consequence has not been drawn. To be able to argue this opinion further, first a didactician must account for an additional problem that is addressed here, i.e., what is the linking factor between teaching aim and learning aim if one accepts them as the two components of an educative aim? How is it possible that the one (teaching) pushes through to the other (learning) and that the opposite also in the sense that it is a matter of educative initiative?

Teaching is meaningless if there is no learning. But [without teaching] learning still is possible but it is without direction if there is no teaching. A child learns in the lifeworld apart from being taught. If one sees the origin of the form and the content of learning in its coherence, one will notice that the reality of educating reveals this matter in such a way that an adult who accepts responsibility for a child does not leave the act of leaning entirely to a child’s free initiative or to chance. On the contrary, he directs it in the simplest situation by guiding a child in actualizing learning. After all, this is where the word “teaching” came from.

In German, “unterricht” comes from “recht”, i.e., to indicate a course, to show a direction, to recommend a path. If “unter” also means “between”, i.e., it implies the interpersonal, then in teaching this has to do with indicating the direction and course of the interpersonal activity. Directing a learning intention is a matter of teaching, i.e., the meaning and task of teaching. The coherence of life form and life content that culminates in a human lifestyle, is the evocative force behind the events that, in their turn, guided by a life- and world-view. In what then does a didactician find the unifying factor for a teaching aim and a learning aim of a lesson situation? There only can be one such factor, namely the content.

In teaching and learning content is important. It must be acquired, mastered, integrated and implemented in a child’s becoming. After all, content indicates the direction for the dynamic of a learning person. Also, content proclaims the meaning of teaching and offers meaningful beacons for actualizing the act of learning. Mastering contents also eventually discloses the state of [a child’s] formedness. The way in which one deals with the content makes possible the description of a matter such as what is “generally-human”. The contents state the essence of human existence. In the simplest verbalizations of a child who learns to speak, in the perception of a person or an object, there is a recognizable changing, becoming relationship to the *matters* with which reality is filled.

Therefore, one must understand that whenever and wherever a lesson structure comes into play, there are two major lines to be indicated. Schematically this would show the image of a ladder. One of its legs would represent a teaching aim, the other a learning aim, while the rungs would indicate the content by which the two legs are connected. This coherence of teaching and learning aims as linked by the contents not only makes an educative aim (i.e., a teaching aim) meaningful but also practically possible.

Everyone who has experienced educating in one or another form in its practice that in these two aspects (i.e., teaching and learning) one cannot work without definitive statements about contents. This experiencing of teaching practice is unique to all adults dealing with children and, as such, it is important for constructing a didactical

theory that *must* result in pronouncements about a lesson structure because the totality of experiencing is the first, primary ordering of the lifeworld also available in its educative context. Whether these contents come to light as a spontaneous narrative or as a formal, matter-of-fact explanation, fundamentally speaking, makes no difference to the insight that can be gained from it. Without content no teaching. Without content no educating.

Therefore, the starting point in a lesson structure is the lesson content. It is when an adult makes a decision, spontaneously or formally, about *what* to teach (i.e., point(s) of fixation for a learning person's attending) that he decides to describe more extensively according to his teaching and learning aims and (in school) as a lesson. If the content is not delimited securely, an adult essentially does not know where he is going with a child. After all, the form he creates varies according to the content in which he is involved. It is on the basis of the nature of the content that an adult proceeds to give form to the teaching. It is in terms of the unique nature of the content that a learning child proceeds to master it as content. No one masters all content in the same way, otherwise the issue of the modes of learning would have had a much smaller scope in planning the course of teaching.

In light of the foregoing, in planning a lesson, the first task of a teacher is to reduce the content to its real essences. If an adult has decided that particular content is in agreement with his lifestyle as well as his life and world views, his own mastery of reality (e.g., agriculturally or industrially) is important for a child's becoming, he also can proceed to formulate a teaching and a learning aim.

Of course, in an everyday educative situation teaching and learning aims acquire form, irrespective of the quality. This form also is fluid because it depicts a design for a situation that does not have a business-like character. In a school situation where progressions largely have been formalized, these relationships involving content are very important because so many matters of content have been *dealt with* there. Parents do not talk about matters that have been completed, teachers do. The progress of a teacher and his pupils largely depends on the contents completed. A teacher measures his

progress by having content completed in light of a student's knowledge of it.

The fact that all pupils have not mastered everything that has been dealt with offers one of the most important tasks of Orthodidactics: In this respect the educative situation at home is much simpler than in school and the scope of the contents are not necessarily prescribed. The lifestyle in the primary (i.e., home) situation allows for greater variation, it is much more fluid and plastic.

The first task for a teacher who is preparing the content to be dealt with is to reduce it to its real essences. In any theme all content is not equally essential. The most important criterion for deciding what is or is not essential is the learning aim that a teacher sets first. If it is decided *what* the pupils in *this* lesson should know and master and use, the essence of the content is determined accordingly.

For example, in treating a sonnet, immediately two possible learning aims arise: an appreciation and an analysis aim. One is lived experienced more pathetically and thus more esthetically directed (appreciative), while the other is lived experienced more gnostically and therefore is more intellectually attuned. With one there is an emotional, spiritual involvement in a piece of cultural goods, with the other an involvement with understanding a poetic form.

Obviously, there will be differentiation in the modes of learning, while reducing the content and designing a teaching form will show corresponding differences. A learning aim differs in these two variations, forcing varied teaching forms. The coherence of a teaching and a learning aim in terms of the relevant content is not unreasonable. The form of teaching and the modes of learning take their start in the content that must be offered and mastered. Teaching and learning find each other in the relevant content. Reducing the content should bring the perspective of the content into line with the learning aim. Preparing a learning aim implies that a learning effect is noticeable. At the same time attaining a learning aim also is achieving a teaching aim.

What is the outcome of this way of dealing with respect to statements about the lesson structure? On the other hand, a teacher *must* reduce content to its essences in light of his learning aim. By this, it is understandable to include understandable statements about the ways in which the content must be reduced. On the other hand, this involves formulating a learning aim that also includes verbalizing the lesson content lesson problem. This lesson problem must verbalize the essence of a teacher's reductions in accordance with the learning aim in such a way that it falls within the possible grasp of a pupil and makes sense to him. The lesson problem is verbalized such that the origins of the content are interpreted to be in harmony with the learning aim.

This actually simplifies the problem of a lesson structure. If content is reduced to essences in harmony with a learning aim and if a learning aim is meaningfully formulated as a problem that figures somewhere in a child's lifeworld, properly verbalized so that the problem also has a relief for a child, a teacher has a starting point for his formal design. Announcing a theme does not constitute a lesson problem. Somewhere a theme has a life context, actualizing value for a *becoming* modern era. The identity of a lesson problem is not recognized or described in isolation. Any lesson problem has identity because a teacher also is aware of related or opposing problems, no matter how different their nature might be for a becoming child.

This does not mean that curricula that serve schools all over the world make this principle visible. If this is not the case, it will fill a gap in a curriculum and those responsible for the teaching will pay attention to this matter in order eventually to explain the meaning of a curriculum as a starting point for the act of teaching. It cannot but help that in terms of a specific theme, a problem or problems must be highlighted with an eye to a child mastering them in order to be more maneuverable in their own lifestyle. Only then is there a didactically justified curriculum. In a lesson problem, the learning intent must be awakened so that learning can be actualized.

In addition, now a teacher plans his ways of unlocking. Already it should be clear that his presentation also can lock up instead of unlock in terms of the reduced essences. His planning for unlocking

or revealing reality obviously is a matter of form. Clearly, here there is an emphasis of teaching act as a matter of ways of presenting contents.

However, the question is: To what is this way of unlocking attuned? The significance of anticipating the modes of learning already has been shown repeatedly. In this case, it is about matters such as remembering, thinking, sensing, lived experiencing, experiencing, attending, perceiving, etc. On these issues, Pedagogics needs a wealth of research, especially in psychopedagogical terms. However, there also are other issues that must be taken into account in this regard: The experiences, and prior knowledge already available to the pupils, their level of becoming, whether they are sons or daughters, what age group is represented and much more.

In this way, a teacher's unlocking reality implicates mastering it. This mastery involves both content and form. As for a teacher's share, reality already is in relief. This is not the case with a pupil. In his case, this relief still is approaching. As the accents shift there is a change in profile of the reality presented. As a teacher moves in unlocking reality from science to lifeworld, In the act of learning, a child moves from lifeworld to science.

The content binds together the activity of *unlocking* or *disclosing* into a unity that is describable didactically as a lesson structure. In this context, ground forms, teaching methods, and forms of ordering content, didactical principles and forms of practice are meaningful and are integrated in accordance with the fundamental matters discussed so far.

E. SUMMARY: DIACTICAL THEORY AND TEACHING PRACTICE⁷

The relationship, coherence and so-called distance between didactical theory and teaching practice are one of the most inexplicable contradictions of Didactics. In the history of both science (didactics) and schooling (teaching practice) the ongoing theme of the problems already has been indicated. Practice, as the area where teaching *is dealt with*, the reproach is tossed to theory, i.e., the area in which there is *thought* about teaching, that

reflecting on practice has nothing to say for practice, that it does not take into account the dynamic, acting nature of practice, that, therefore, the theory does not illuminate incisively practice. In addition, it has little to prescribe practice. And certainly any theory can be expected to offer one or another prescription.

A multitude of works by great pedagogical (respectively didactical) reformers has been raised on this rare objection. At the same time, in the history of didactical thinking this objection is shown to be fruitful and justified: Comenius, Pestalozzi, Froebel, Petersen, and Kurt Hahn, in the very recent past, all based their life's work on this objection and from this new, far-reaching practices are called to life by which, interestingly enough, we possess only their theoretical remains in books.

Thus, if we follow the trail of the problem in the history of Didactics, it seems beyond any doubt that the objection that theorizing has little to say to practice can be maintained consistently. On the other hand, also it is striking that the changes that have been made in practice and proclaimed to be desirable today only are descriptions, i.e., available as theory. Also it is interesting that the purest theorist in the history of Didactics, namely Herbart, in the history of schooling and to this day has had the greatest residual effect.

A comprehensive and intensive historical unraveling of this problem surely would bring many insights to the surface that today remain hidden. For the purpose of this summary, one conclusion is sufficient for an introduction to this argument. Based on the history of this issue, one can assert an undeniably real coherence and mutual relationship between theory and practice. That this historical coherence reveals itself as incomplete, narrow, wrong, one-sided or as insufficient when viewed as a whole, but this has nothing to do with the principle of the matter. Rousseau and Emile provide the clearest proof of this. In our time, to be able to talk about or describe didactical theory and teaching practice means to postulate coherence, a connection with theory and practice.

If statements about the coherence of theory and practice regarding teaching are permissible, certainly one would be able to reduce the matter to two aspects in particular and end up with their essentials:

1. What demands could a practice rightly make of a theory? and
2. Presently, what does a theory offer in its analyses and descriptions for practical implementation?

In answering both of these questions, as pedagogues we must remember that thinking about a practice always presupposes a view, a really fundamental and thorough view of the situation itself to be able to know it. This is his first, fundamental task. In its turn, practice must take note of this view or fundamental pervasiveness of the situation, but then for the purpose of acting, doing, bringing into motion, executing, completing.

1. The first demand that could be placed on a didactical theory is that it must be directed to reality and true to it. That a theory be true to reality assumes that it must take account of reality as such; that a thinker must refuse to allow himself to be displaced from this reality; that this reality must be verbalized in theoretical constructions and that nothing, absolutely nothing should be attributed to reality that is not substantive and essential to and part of it.

It is the task of a theory to disclose and not to impose. As soon as a theoretical didactician proceeds to impose, he delivers himself to other subject sciences whose statements acquire application status in a didactical course. But above all, he surrenders to his own fantasy. Then his theoretical constructions then become mere thought constructions that really cannot take into account practice at all.

Psychology, Sociology, Biology, etc. are not focused on teaching as such and that is why, in a didactical sense, they establish a gap between theory and practice; their application endeavors have nothing to do with teaching. Their results are about zero for didactic practice and rightly didactic practice finds them to be mere babble.

On the other hand, when a theorist exchanges reality for fantasy by thinking about a situation that does not exist, this means his explanation has no origins because it is not real. His expressions are

merely imposed with little more than rhetorical value. Essentially, this does not differ from the above-mentioned presumed contributions to didactical theory.

The common position of both is that they have nothing to do with didactical science. We find this problem in every other discipline of Pedagogics in its scientific context, but it particularly affects the Didactic especially because a school's teaching situation can and must show these didactical views to be true. Also, this does not mean that other disciplines do not have the same problems: Theology has struggled for many centuries with disclosing and imposing because ultimately the pulpit must be ascended.

In contrast, a didactical theory that holds fast to reality ensures a continuity of thought and action because reality *is* and becomes manifest in what occurs, i.e., in what is *done*. With this, the rightly raised objection to isolation of theory and practice actually is eliminated fundamentally because reality, i.e., the totalities of experiencing themselves form the basis on which a discussion of theory and practice can be built: After all, this is the only basis for such a discussion if the conversational partners do not talk fundamentally together. A willingness to hold onto reality guarantees the discussion between theory and practice. In this particular connection the task of theory, I think, is extensive, three of which are brought up here:

- a) To disclose reality through practice in both its essences and multiplicities. The concepts "essences" and "multiplicities" certainly indicate the depth and breadth of the theoretical expositions on the basis of which a theorist tries to avoid one-sidedness and superficiality. Thus, his descriptions will be fundamentally didactical in this regard, taking into account the historical-didactical, psycho-didactical, socio-didactical and especially fundamental-didactical statements about the origin or the structures of the original experiencing of the practice he is reflecting on.

The experiencing in question is one of the most original that a person possesses. Its essence or essentials are summarized in didactical theory today in a categorical structure that

describes the practical act of “didaskhein” (to teach). Any didactical theory that has not yet advanced so far as to claim that it has broken through the crust of the surface.

- b) Experiencing also teaches us that educating constantly is being realized in teaching. No one can educate with respect to nothing. Educating always is realized with regard to “something”, i.e., particular contents of a rich and varied nature that, after all, gives the final *sense* to the pedagogically identifiable becoming of a child and thus also to the educative interventions of an adult.

This does not claim that all educating is teaching, but only that educating outside of teaching is impossible – in the same way that teaching is meaningless without taking educative ideals into account. Today didacticians are aware that this actualization of educating in the act of teaching involves a very strong pre-scientific, subjective and also a post-scientific aspect that should be considered carefully when describing the course of teaching in its universal validity.

In order to preserve the continuity of thought and action, didactical theory in its explication must be able to indicate clearly the coherence and relationship of the universal form and the particular content but also make it available for scientific judgment. If a categorical structure, as briefly described above, discloses the essence or essentials of experiencing as such, a criterial system that serves a scientist will make possible the assessment of a practice as such (i.e., as didactic), but then under the condition that he can account for his criteria and show in them the equilibrium of form and content and thus also from a scientific perspective and view of life as revealed in original experiencing.

The spontaneity and naivety of practice presupposes this account implicitly, but didactical theory must make it explicit for those who are supposed to understand the structure of teaching, also with a view to re-implementing it in situations

that are not original and do not figure in a person's experiential totality, e.g., the school.

- c) The motivation for the two preceding matters regarding the boundness to reality of thinking and acting in teaching can be summarized in the following two concepts: to *know* the first, and to be able to *evaluate* the second.

The reality boundness of an accountable didactical theory also poses a third matter as motivation for his departure from original reality or experiencing. Insofar as a didactical theory not only is written but must be studied, insight regarding teaching also must have resulted in a teaching initiative. This means that insight into and evaluation of the act of teaching should lead to the initiation of a practical situation that will include the essentials or essences of this form of experiencing (teaching) as such. Only then can thinking *about* and activity *as teaching* can find each other in a practical situation.

That content is bound by time, place, culture and life-view speaks for itself. The continuity in thinking and acting thus can manifest itself with respect to content expressions about, in and for teaching – but it does not have to. Today divergent religious, social, political and other views are evidence that content, and what we rightly are concerned, acquires a particular emphasis without which our educative ideals cannot be realized in our teaching. However, form remains universal. Form is a matter of general-human experiencing and if a didactical theory is to be real, this means that in his investigation and explication of form must give an account of his being anchored in a lifeworld, the contemporary ways in which this can be expressed in our present time and the expectations that are cherished for the future.

Of course there are other matters that also help maintain the continuity of thought and action, theory and practice in Didactics. However, for the course of this summary, this three-fold motivation for the reality-bound character of a didactical theory suffices.

2. A second aspect in which practice legitimately can expect something from a theory is that of terminological ambiguity. Discussion about teaching, whether theoretically or practically directed, only is possible in terms of concepts. These concepts must express both thinking and experiencing precisely according to their meaning, and on this basis an exchange of thought actually becomes possible. A first matter to be accounted for by any theory or science is the commonly accepted terminology by which both the terrain he covers and the activity he describes are indicated. When the same concepts are used for different matters or phenomena, terminological ambiguity clearly is not part of a practice of science or theory by which a discussion with and about practice is going to be lost.

With regard to that aspect of the relationship between theory and practice, one must note that experiencing as such primarily is not aimed at being verbalized but at being realized. When a practice becomes verbalized there already is an objective, distanced attitude that accumulates in thinking and no longer is practice as such. Thus, a theory fulfills the task of verbalizing precisely because it describes practice. I would like to summarize the recognition owed in the following three aspects:

- a) A theory will have to engage in etymological research of conceptual lineage in order to disclose the true meanings of its verbalizations in particular and to interpret and evaluate them in relation to prevailing theoretical views. For didactical theory it has become time to distinguish between thinking and opinions or points of view. Didactical thinking focuses on formal-logical pronouncements in terms of its subject matter language, recognized scientific methods, research, etc. However, a theoretical view cannot detach itself completely from the matter of opinions or points of view because opinions mainly are grounded on or accumulate on the basis of experiential totalities and dynamic courses of situations in which people participate without necessarily expressing themselves in formal-logical ways. Both thinking (i.e., science) and opinion (i.e., experiencing, original reality as a common point of departure), finally must be able to find each other in

terminological unambiguity because they formulate about the same piece of reality.

Finally, here a theory has to make sure that the conceptual that serves him brings him to talk about practice as such. Even more closely: Care must be taken that the concepts verbalize practice essentially. On the other hand, also it is a fair task for a practitioner to familiarize himself with scientific terms in order to participate in a discussion about practice and to bring forth sound criticisms of theoretical statements. Also, the time of chattering and general knowledge finally has passed in Didactics.

- b) In doing this a didactical theorist is presented with the task of exploring the correctness of the use of such terminology in his writings. Words also have particular meanings in science. Sometimes there is mention of broadening, sometimes of restricting recognized word meanings. Sometimes new words are coined to express new insights or changed forms of living. The entrenchment will show itself in an unambiguous subject matter language that, because it is about a practice, will have or ought to have the same relevance and that cannot be used loosely or rigidly in support of his preferences or opinions.
- c) As a result, didactical theory increasingly will have to change from its formal-logical descriptions to more precise and comprehensive defining. In Latin, the verb “definire” means delimiting, precisely determine, to narrow, to limit. The form “definitio”, especially in relation to logic and rhetoric, refers to a definition, while the adverb “definitus” means clear or concrete. To define then implies that a matter, object or view is bounded, determined and verbalized exactly. Accordingly, the concept “teaching practice” then would imply a unique, situation oriented *responsible* action: An act preceded by a decision as to in what way and for what, in this situation for these children, a teaching intention must take its *real* course.

3. The continuity of thought and practice as well as terminological unambiguity force an accountable didactical theory to be situation-bound, meaning to expect that it will be based on practice. Flights

of fantasy that are claimed to be science in some didactical writings actually become an impassible path for a practitioner of science. As in the previous cases regarding the expectation that practice can ask of a theory that can foster the argument is limited to three aspects that together might guarantee a situation-based didactical theory.

- a) A theory must be situation-related. Coming out of a practice, as a scientific exposition, it must have relevance for practice, literally it must refer back to practice, it must be implementable in practice, can be visibly indicated and can be repeated fruitfully with refinement if it wants to qualify as a theory. The situational involvement of a theory will highlight the pre-scientific, scientific and post-scientific aspects of a practice in a didactically clear, balanced coherence. By implication, a science of teaching can push through to a teaching doctrine.

But even more, it will show and interpret the relationship structures that *ipso facto* are in a didactical situation with respect to teaching and its progress: relationships of trust, authority and understanding cannot be removed from the experiencing that we commonly call “didaskhein”. In addition, the course structures of association, encounter, engagement and teaching intervention *(e.g., by accompanying the learning activity it must be brought to fruition with respect to the situation-related theory (Landman). The same holds for psychopedagogical statements, the modes of learning (Sonnekus), and so many more aspects of related pedagogical disciplines that must be taken into account in order to create a situation-related didactical theory that does not immediately collapse on itself when tested in practice.

- b) That a didactical theory also must be situation-ordering means that its insights can be summarized in a structure that, as far as it is scientific, eventually must result in a lesson structure whose origin, essence and implementation must be scientifically accountable in accordance with the experiential totalities that lay its foundation.
- c) Thirdly, a situation-based theory also must be situation-anticipating. Certainly it can be expected of didactical theory

that in its view of the course of teaching it will be able to advance the situations he brings about, especially in the sense that it is a particular practice that takes into account its turnaround potential. Didactical anticipation is one of the greatest tasks given to a person who is practicing daily. Essentially, this is unique to practice. When a didactical theory has not taken up a scientific planning tendency in this regard, this means he has overlooked an aspect of his practice and that the entirety of his expositions will show a skewed structure to a greater or lesser extent. On the other hand, a practitioner must be able to think ahead about his daily actions and decisions in order to have both meaning and form in a lesson structure, or more broadly, to cast a learning plan that brings to light his manner and especially his teaching style.

That a theory of this and many other matters still falls too short in the present time does not relieve a practice of its obligation to take an honest and unfettered scope of what a theory presently has to say for practice.

With this, actually we have arrived at the second question that was asked initially, i.e., what does currently known theory have for practical implementation?

It is safe to say without fear of contradiction that the theoretical-didactical explications of the past two decades give very clear evidence that didacticians, i.e., those who claim the title of “scientist”, were and still are prepared to address didactical problems radically and with originality. The encyclopedia of knowledge and insights available today in books and writings do not agree at all. But, from different standpoints, ways of view, points of departure and even pre-judgments, tangents have been drawn that, to a greater extent than ever before, have delimited a common problem regarding large-scale research undertaken in both theoretical and empirical terms. The most important of these is that didacticians have a common understanding that teaching really is an imperative of life. Among other things, being human means teaching. Teaching is life practice, life fulfilling. In teaching a

future is made, history is written and to a large extent, the destiny of people and nations is determined.

In the preceding chapters repeatedly the coherence of form and content was pointed out regarding the description a piece of original experiencing known as “teaching”. Also, it was pointed out that while content is and should be particular, form is a universal matter that, at all times and under all people and cultures, in itself has revealed an identifiable, autonomous identity and still discloses on the basis of which it is designated as “form”.

What in experience we know as “didaskhein” to some extent is describe in contemporary Didactics in both the categorical and the criterial aspects of its structure. This does not indicate that the descriptions of the structure are all good, complete or even above doubt in all respects. The fact is that now there is a structure, i.e., there are honest efforts to describe the event of teaching in its essentials and to evaluate what they are, also in line with the educative expectations that in the end always ask what they should be.

Also, it should be emphasized that these fundamental views of “didaskhein” are not available outside of particulars, but also within the particular life-views since his expositions are available because reality furnishes its contents with particulars. The particulars continually realize themselves in the structure of contents and enable a responsible didactician, especially one who calls himself a Christian, to account before God and humans of the practice he exercises for created beings in its origin and real essences, Today, a practitioner no longer can excuse himself by claiming that the theory did not explain to him the origin of his daily action.

In addition, it has been pointed out that the ultimate result of a didactical theory is that it must provide a lesson structure. Rightly, it can be asked whether present-day practitioners of a theory have really advanced to a lesson structure. If it is taken into account that a lesson structure must verbalize and portray the coherence of didactical insights, an analysis of it probably provides the best point of linkage for understanding the contributions of research to practice.

There can only be a lesson structure where the form and content of a lesson exhibit a balanced coherence by which the teaching intention can be fulfilled in formally constituted situations by repetition. One must recognize that the constant factor here is a lesson form, while the content varies according to curricula, type of school, formative and preparation aims, pedagogical presuppositions, post-scientific views, etc.

Yet it is necessary to say something about certain didactical principles with regard to lesson content. In this regard, there especially are two factors that must be emphasized for practice.

1. Where there is a lesson structure, also there is a *problem* of lesson content that must be addressed formally. Stating a lesson problem is related directly to a teacher's learning aim. Therefore, a lesson problem also is the verbalization of the learning aim as content and it takes into account every aspect that relates to the learning aim in order to try to guarantee the success of the act of learning in the course of a lesson. For a pupil, the lesson content is not an obvious problem, i.e., in itself, it does not guarantee the learning intention.

Here we have to distinguish between problematic and difficult. To the extent that content makes sense and is placed meaningfully in a lesson problem, there is a learning intention and intercepting eventual learning problems.

2. In the second place, a lesson structure makes room for reducing content to its essentials. This reduction implies that a teacher, on the basis of his exploration, and knowledge of a child, among other things, clear formulation of his learning aim and pure insight into the modes of learning, strips the lesson content of all that is superfluous and with regard to the solution of the problem in order to carry the learner securely to original acquisition, mastery and integration of new knowledge. That he is required to simplify, reformulate in a child's language and in accordance with the child's experiential totality, to schematize, to build models, to observe, etc. need not be argued further.

The fact that these two aspects emphasize is that contemporary Didactics gave up the obvious didactical nature of contents and that a lesson structure might vary from situation to situation with the same class and/or with the didactical form. The fact that this content also is ordered in a lesson structure is no didactical novelty, except that this ordering is linked closely to form and the way of ordering co-determine a lesson form.

With respect to lesson form, especially there are four matters that need didactical attention. The ground form, method, modalities and modes of learning planned for together build a didactical design that form the mold for the lesson content. From experience, these four aspects are not radically new because for centuries they have been the basis for any formalized teaching practice.

A practitioner who does not provide for each of these matters of a lesson structure for which he is responsible, does not know what he is doing. To talk about didactical theory and teaching practice actually involves a contradiction in itself. A didactical theory that qualifies as such describes practice. A didactic practitioner who can explain why a particular situation is constructed so and not otherwise, necessarily practices and implements a theory. When “didaskhein” as original experiencing is the basis of both theory and practice, on the one hand, one has a thinking, researching, looking back and forward to practice. On the other hand, we are dealing with an empirical test of insights, anticipations and expectations. A theory that cannot find its fulfillment in practice is no theory. The explanatory sense of practice in terms of form and content reveals a theory because the entirety of experiencing teaching is verbalized. To verbalize this most original of human experiencing actually means practicing Didactics as a science.

F. CONCLUSION

The search for a point of departure for constructing or designing a didactical theory on the basis of the preceding explications presents a large and varied problem. The answer to questions of essential significance for such a design do not lie on the surface of everyday experiencing for collection. It also seems as if an eclectic approach to designing such a theory, though not without value, may not

penetrate to the origins sought. If this were to be the case, one should have arrived at a structural whole that would provide fundamental questions or answers, given the preceding six possibilities or approaches to designing a didactical theory.

In each of the analyses we noted separately that insofar as a structure is involved, it could not incorporate the entirety of interpretations of “*didaskhein*”. To think that a deliberately chosen synthesis of particular *fundamentalia* that had come to light nevertheless would reveal the origins of such a theory forming would be dangerous scientifically. Everyone who today works scientifically is well aware that a total is more than the sum of its parts.

Therefore, it seems that a more accurate explanation of didactical origins in a general sense and as far as they are knowable must be researched before there is a search for the origin of “*didaskhein*” and therefore the point of departure for designing a didactical theory again must be brought to life. The problem is so varied and some of their aspects in modern times are so topical that didacticians can be forgiven often for taking a part for the whole, exchanging theory for practice, techniques for principles, ends for origins.

Without delineating the didactical problem further, one necessarily tends to make categorical statements about matters, to describe them in an unintelligible way and to announce practice without knowing how such practice essentially actualizes the didactical problem “*didaskhein*” (seen in its experiential context), which after all is the only way in which original practice can be described.

1. Compare, e.g., Van Gelder, L.: *Didaktisch analyse*; Klafki, W.: “Die didaktische Analyse” (in Dohmen & Maurer: *Unterricht*). Schulz, W.: “Grundzüge der Unterrichtsanalyse” (in Dohmen & Maurer: *Unterricht*).

2. This formulation is from my colleague and co-worker, dr. C. J. van Dyk.

3. Look at the explanation of the lesson structure.

4. The following types of lessons distinguished are obvious (only notable ones are indicated):

- i) Appreciation lesson
- ii) Tell lesson
- iii) Exposition or explication lesson
- iv) Free activity lesson
- v) Exercise (drill) lesson
- vi) Discussion lesson

- vii) Demonstration lesson
- viii) Experiment lesson
- ix) Analysis lesson

5. In this regard, also compare the remark made in the Concluding word (section E).
6. For a complete breakdown see Van der Stoep, F.: *Didaktiese Grondvorme*.
7. This part was presented in a modified form by the author during the national S.A.V.B.O. congress, 31 Jan. 1971, Port Elizabeth.