

## CHAPTER 1

### POINTS OF DEPARTURE FOR CONSTRUCTING A DIDACTICAL THEORY

#### A. INTRODUCTION

From the extensive pedagogical literature available today it is clear that any science, and therefore also didactical pedagogics, must take its beginning point in developing and formulating a theory from somewhere. To deny this means that an a-logical consequence is introduced into the theory's design such that thinking or describing [pedagogics] begins nowhere. This implies beginning with nothing and designing such a theory really is impossible to explicate and writing it is intellectually impossible.

The origins of each theory should be contestable in the writings of a science. That is, different interpretations of such a theory can exist about what really presents itself as the point of departure for designing and writing such a theory. This does not challenge the fact that each theory has an origin or point of departure.

Also, it is obvious that there are differences in points of departure regarding the same phenomenon, or slice of experience or aspect of reality and, especially, the study of didactical pedagogics creates confusion about the interpretation of what is essential to the aspect of human experiencing that we know as "teaching".

After all, it is the aim of the descriptions of each theory to offer its particular field real essentials of that area of knowledge by disclosing, illuminating and systematizing them and by casting them in a firm, knowable and ultimately an evaluatable form. This is especially important in the so-called "experiential sciences", i.e., those sciences that are involved with describing and elucidating persons' experiential totalities with respect to their daily involvement with the world and life.

Therefore, it also is understandable that the method or methods the researcher or thinker uses are of decisive importance in designing his theory. Here no pronouncements need to be made about the various methods, their modes of application, their advantages and disadvantages, their attunement to particular areas of knowledge,

etc. For each student there is a vast literature that considers scientific methods and from which he can orient himself about the contributions that each can make to an eventual scientific outcome.

What needs to be emphasized is that an interpretation and eventual evaluation of a particular point of departure in designing a didactical theory really is an impossible matter because the student also has to ascertain for himself the method a particular author used in constructing his particular view of this slice of human experiencing—in our case teaching. Here it is repeated and emphasized that particular methods presume particular procedures by which the results of thinking and research are made available in particular ways and, therefore, they ought to be examined accordingly in evaluating the theoretical construction.

It really is not possible to evaluate the contributions of a thinker or researcher to constructing a theoretical structure without also taking these particulars into account. But then the student must also remember that many parts or aspects of research and thinking are carried out in definite or even small parts of the area of knowledge. Especially modern research, in this respect, is inclined to be a refined specialization that, because of the lack of a comprehensive overview of a particular area of knowledge, it sometimes is difficult to interpret particular research results and to discover the real point of departure that underlies the theory.

The research is so specialized that it reflects little of its general-theoretical background and really presents itself for a free interpretation with respect to the whole—but then only according to the general-scientific forming the student has undergone and that ought to put him in a position to interpret specialized results of small aspects of a large area of knowledge against a wider background and, with his knowledge of the whole, to integrate them. In studying didactics this is a matter of particular significance because the didactical continually looks to an eventual practice.

One runs the risk of running away with little details, however valuable they appear to be, and making generalizations from small aspects or facets of the experiential totality that arise and that do not really justify an exemplary interpretation. It is not necessary that, in designing a didactical theory, a small aspect of the totality of the experience has immanence in itself and, therefore, that the

finding is transferable to the whole for which the true theoretician is still searching. In such a case, to be able to make a precise pronouncement about the point of departure or origin preceding the detailed research is of essential significance if one claims that didactics is a science.

It is equally important at this stage to indicate that in the currently available literature on didactical standpoints, biases and opinions are confused with origins or points of departure and that what they are and how they are interpreted unquestionably influence the development of the theory and contribute to what ultimately emerges as essences or essentials of teaching in the form of findings, postulations, laws, etc.

For the seeker of authentic, unbiased truth in its view of origins and points of departure, this often is a comprehensive and far-reaching problem. The reason is that the form and contents in didactic acts are so profoundly intertwined that often it is difficult to differentiate them and sort the data regarding both of these components of a didactical theory. The student of didactics must understand well that, in this case, we are concerned with a parallel that places high demands on his interpretations under all circumstances. It involves eliminating [bracketing] the mentioned standpoints, biases and opinions regarding the origin or point of departure in designing a theory.

The criteria for differentiating form and contents are still not systematically and validly described in didactics as a science. The consequence is that, at present, our judgment about what a standpoint and what a point of departure really implies are relatively vague and decidedly subjective. As a science the didactical still is too little involved with a strict theory of science on the basis of which definitive criteria can be designed by which these two aspects of theory forming clearly can be held separate and, accordingly, their separate contributions to designing a theory can be judged.

Perhaps one of the greatest shortcomings is that didactics, as a science, still has a strong practical-prescriptive tendency without really being able to account for how, why and with respect to what specific prescriptions one can and ought to make for practice. Didacticians are always involved in finding out what can be implemented functionally in the practical situation in order to

clarify and test the functional nature of the series of situations as “successful teaching”.

The confusion of origins or points of departure presents this particular task with extraordinary problems when there is a search for a definite understanding of the didactic task as it manifests itself in the situation. On the other hand, this leads the didactician to carefully draw the form and contents apart from each other and, in its turn, to design criteria that can be used to really evaluate each of these matters for what they are.

If one considers that the form is the universally valid and, therefore, also the describable, i.e., represents a theoretically accountable structure of teaching, then this places very definite expectations, even demands, on the student regarding his ability to make distinctions in interpreting the theoretical design regarding the form as well as the contents, but also regarding bias and point of departure.

Before considering the synthesis that is contained in the last mentioned position, it is noted that the distinction between the form and the contents, in the course of teaching, is one of the aspects that really makes possible a precise description of the human activity “teaching”. When a student remains stuck in his inability to differentiate these aspects of the event, this simply means that he can arbitrarily alternate his standpoint and point of departure without establishing a valid theory that can account for the origin of teaching as well as its practice.

A deficient differentiation regarding the form and the contents implies the intermingling of the particular and the general that so often takes on the appearance of truth and validity, in itself, and that makes strictly factual pronouncements about the theoretical design flowing from this difficult.

Thus, four matters, namely, (1) standpoints, prejudgments and opinions; (2) origins or points of departure; (3) the didactical forms; and (4) the didactical contents in their coherencies and relations, make demands on didactic thinking with respect to analysis and synthesis. No didactical theory can really claim the name “theory” if the coherencies, entwinements, changes, overlaps, influences, etc. of these four matters are not differentiated and even set apart by careful and strict analysis.

One finds the aim of the above to be the development of the theoretical construction by sorting out and by keeping together what belongs. By implication this immediately points to a distinctive task in designing a didactical theory: suddenly there is clear mention of a science of teaching that ought to have general relevance, and of a theory of teaching grounded in that science, that will have particular relevance in a particular time period, milieu, cultural situation, etc.

For the student it must be clear that if there are prejudgments regarding the experiential totality that can be subsumed under the concept “didaskhein”, then these prejudgments will manifest themselves with respect to the origins of the thinking as well as the form of the practice, but especially with respect to the contents from which there is teaching. On the other hand, if, with a theoretical design, there is truly original thinking regarding the point of departure, then, this similarly will influence the explicative aspect of the didactical form and contents accordingly. With this the student of didactics is confronted with the task of being able to differentiate in knowing and expository ways in his study of texts but also in the explications he arrives at when he proceeds to do formal research and writing.

With this the problem of the point of departure in designing a didactical theory is not yet stated clearly. Indeed, I assert that contemporary didacticians have not properly examined and described the significance of this aspect of theory forming. Still, in examining each didactical theory, it certainly is reasonable to pose the question: Is this a particularization of a particular theoretical explication? However, the fact is this is not a fundamental-didactical question.

In the particularization of any theoretical explication, it is implicit that the fundamentals of such a theory are accepted as valid (true) and in a general or particular respect, their consequences are elaborated on. It would be much more fundamental to ask: What **ought** the origin of the thinking be in designing a didactical theory? If criteria for this can be made visible, ask further: How do this theory and the facts that cannot be thought away (essences) figure forth originally (return to the origins)?

An example of the reasonableness of these two questions is: In the contemporary descriptions of a fundamental pedagogical nature that now are available in South Africa (here I refer especially to the works of W. A. Landman, S. J. Gous and C. J. G. Kilian), it is very clear that the pedagogical situation has a three-fold structure that ought to be noted most reliably if one penetrates to the essence of the pedagogical, namely, the aim structure, the relationship structure and the sequence structure.

For example, should the didactician search for the origins of the didactic pedagogical in the pedagogical situation and, from his particular perspective, describe “didaskhein” in accordance with its appearance in this primordial situation, certainly it rightly can be expected of him to indicate why, where and how the pedagogical aim structure, relationship structure and sequence structure figure in the pedagogical unfolding of the didactic act. It also can be expected of him to interpret didactically these three concepts in light of their fundamental significance for insight into the structure of original experiencing [of teaching] and the origin of his thinking to indicate and evaluate their contributory importance. Without such fundamental questions the exposition of the concept “didactical sequence” will not be able to be disclosed in its pedagogical connotations, i.e., insofar as adults give children purposeful, meaningful and formative instruction.

In light of the few problems indicated above in this introduction, perhaps it is meaningful to examine particular points of departure for designing a didactical theory in order to see their contributions but also the deficiencies they show in a didactic-theoretical design and orient oneself accordingly.

## **B. SOME POINTS OF DEPARTURE FOR DESIGNING A DIDACTICAL THEORY**

**1. Anthropology\*:** When a didactician takes his point of departure from anthropology this means that he is going to search for the origins of his practice in a theory about being human. The concept “anthropology” (“anthropos” that in Greek means “man” [human being] and “Logos” that refers to theory or thought) can, in its didactical connotations for and use in designing a didactical theory,

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\* Anthropology in this context includes images of being human found in the social science of that name as well as works in philosophical anthropology. G.D.Y.

then bring forth a particular image of being human. Although this attitude of thought (namely that “anthropology” represents a particular human image) appears quite generally, it is not a necessary, inevitable way of practicing anthropology as a scientific discipline. For example, among others, the following didactically oriented interpretations, i.e., didactical-pedagogical thinking that **begin with** anthropological pronouncements show that there are regressive as well as progressive proposals and interpretations.

The didactician who will critically distinguish between thinking and applications of thought must make sure of the theoretical implications of the definite and indefinite article as this arises in the following two views: **the** image of man is an image that speaks of a structural finality (in the sense that the human image [as described] appears as permanent, complete). Conspicuous in this pronouncement is the assumption of definiteness, being closed that is more prescriptive than descriptive. The implications for interpretations about the involvement of persons in reality are equally clear.

One frequently finds such interpretations of anthropology in pedagogical writings because, in them, an educative aim (that after all is determined by particular matters such as time, culture, life circumstances, life views, etc.), a course of educating and an educative relationship find expression. It is not the intention to indicate that this image of man is incorrect, unscientific or worthless. It is only to illustrate to what degree the image of man can really influence the design of a didactical theory.

On the other hand, however, one also finds anthropological expositions where there is mention of **an** image of man. In light of the indefinite meaning of the article in this regard, it is important that anthropological explications of this nature are much more open, i.e., descriptive-indefinite, in the sense that they are directed to the dynamic progression and becoming of a person in a changing world as a theme in its search for a universal, uniform interpretation of the concept “man” and make available, for particular interpretation, other subject sciences concerned with man in his forms of appearing.

The one explication is not “better” than the other. They differ simply regarding the interpretation of the anthropological task.

Pedagogics also knows other anthropological approaches related to the two concepts “anthropological pedagogy” and “pedagogical anthropology”. To differentiate between these two concepts one can say that in the one case there is reflecting from man about educating while in the other case it is reflecting from educating about man.

Understandably the explication of these two concepts is not our task here. Still, it must be indicated that when these two points of departure are placed against each other in all anthropological respects, this necessarily leads to pronouncements in a pedagogical connection that truly will sometimes converge but, in other respects, will diverge for the simple reason that in one case man is central in the theory forming and in the other it is the reality of educating. That views of this nature necessarily result in the eventual design of a didactical theory can be seen very clearly in the didactically-directed writings of Andreas Flitner, M. J. Langeveld, and Heinrich Roth, to mention a few.

In the evaluation of a didactic-theoretical structure, the didactician, therefore, is compelled to examine the anthropological origins, prejudgments, standpoints and views in relation with, and corresponding to, the point of departure (anthropology) in order to really grasp the results, i.e., didactical pronouncements that such writers make, and securely place them in the unique synoptic view of the total experiencing that is understood as “didaskhein”.

The concepts “human image”, “anthropology”, “pedagogical anthropology” and “anthropological pedagogy” are put in quotation marks simply to show that a particular anthropological approach holds very definite consequences for the eventual structure of general-pedagogical, as well as pedagogical-didactical theory forming. But perhaps the didactician best knows the consequences in the rather generally used concept “pedocentric”.

If “pedo” means child, as indeed is the case, and “centric” means in the middle, as is generally accepted, then the concept “pedocentric” means that in the pedagogical argument, the child is placed at the center. This is a particular anthropological approach that, especially from the Anglo-American side, has exercised an overpowering influence on teaching theory. And this is not only a question of the democratization of the teaching, activity forms in



teaching and similarly principle- and practice-pronouncements becoming connected with pedocentrism.

In designing a didactical theory, the concept pedocentrism implies an imminent, implicit design in which the child is the measuring stick for structuring and justifying a didactical theme. It is to understand that the design of a didactic theory with the child at the center does not leave room for anything else at the center. It is not only A. S. Neill and John Dewey who give evidence in their design of didactical theory that this very specific anthropological conception constitutes the origin of their thinking. One notices in many respects the same thoughts with Pestalozzi as well as Rousseau in addition to contemporary Dutch didacticians such as Van Gelder and Brus.

For designing a theory, the implications are obvious: The didactical form and contents are described and, as regards the practical situation, are prescribed in accordance with all judgments (including prejudgments) regarding the child. Anyone who knows didactical history, as well as controversies in modern practice, cannot deny the particular contributions made over a long period of time and, in the present, to the transformation and reform of the school's teaching situation.

But this is not the question that we are involved with here. The question that must be answered, and that also was repeated in the above discussion, is if one can really describe the essences, the absolute essentials of teaching from such a point of departure and, especially, can validly describe its forms. It cannot be denied that virtually all of the literature brings to the area such confused thinking regarding the origins of teaching.

One of the greatest problems for the student of didactics who must interpret all of these particulars in his search for the origin of the thinking that is of anthropological origin that manifests itself in the design of didactical theory certainly lies in a firm postulate that so regularly and sometimes so naively is taken up in the theoretical constructions. This occurs so often in didactical explications that really are anthropological assumptions that recur second-handedly, as it were, in didactic-theoretical designs—especially via biology, psychology, sociology, history and even theology. The pronouncements then made in this connection give the impression of anthropological thinking that forms the beginning of didactical

pronouncements while, in essence and by careful research, they only **appear** to provide a particular anthropological conception or conceptions that are broached in the practical-didactical situation via the biological, psychological, sociological, historical and theological in their possibilities for application.

After all, here the didactician is dealing with anthropological concepts that are applied to particular subject sciences that then, according to traditional belief, have transfer possibility for designing a didactical theory. This transfer possibility is pretty much taken up hard and fast in the didactical theory under the banner that it is real. The actualization of the practical question or problem, then, justifies this way of dealing with the theory. It is obvious that this way of theory forming cannot be worthless.

The actuality of a particular issue and the transfer of anthropological conceptions via other subject sciences to the didactical, however, do not necessarily illuminate the origins of practice that ultimately are the first task for a didactical theory. It is an open question if particular ways of doing things in a didactic practice really can be purely actualized without insight into the original structure in which they function or with respect to which particularities are brought about.

Differential didactical thinking is not necessarily original. As a matter of fact, the concept “anthropology” can serve here as a collective noun for ways of viewing (opinions, pre-judgments and standpoints) original experiencing, i.e., “person in the world”, but the anthropological ought only to be seen in a secondary connection if the structure by which the didactical functions (in a theoretical respect) is not merely turned on its head and, therefore, made known through a perspective that is upside-down.

Everything considered, the problem of an anthropological beginning to constructing a theoretical-didactical structure turns on the question of anthropological categories; also when, as Kilian explains, they are invested with ontological status they have **direct** and **immediate** relevance for the total experience of “didaskhein”.<sup>1</sup> Thus, if the ways of being that are at the ground, root or origin of the pedagogical criteria and that are bound in the closest relevance to anthropological-pedagogical categories, immediately and clearly describe teaching.<sup>2</sup>

Any pedagogue certainly will affirmatively and immediately answer: But only insofar as he is aware that educating continually is realized in teaching practice and that the meaning of teaching practice is sought in the educative ideal as well as in the reality of educating. By taking note of anthropological categories with pedagogical relevance, the didactician assures himself that the meaning of “didaskhein” is a matter that only appears between and among persons.

The meaning of such activity certainly shows that there is a structure for such activity somewhere in the lifeworld and, therefore, can be made observable. However, the structure is not disclosed, described or made knowable in this way, by which a person can really state what is essentially known as “didaskhein” in its essences or essentiality in these anthropological categories made available for formal-scientific cognizance and, therefore, also for fundamental didactical theory forming.

I emphasize once again that these anthropological categories are not meaningless delusions for didactical theory. The fact that they search for their origin in the first ontological pronouncement, namely, “person in the world”, makes such a conclusion simply meaningless.

An anthropological category such as “temporality” directs an appeal, yet more: imperatives appeal to those who teach and to a child’s projection of a future in a didactically oriented situation to give him a personal, constitutive perspective. In this connection, the teaching establishes a conceptual unity for a child with respect to the past, present and future just because it is in the form and contents (without which teaching is not conceivable) that the now existing situation is illuminated in light of the past as well as the anticipated future to which the participating person (child) will proceed in order to change his own situatedness.

The new relation with reality that the learning person enters in the course of the series of learning situations, in its turn, is a didactic criterion that especially refers back to the didactical categories of forming, orientation and reduction.<sup>3</sup> These anthropological categories certainly are relevant for the didactical theoretical constructions in that they expose the pedagogical sense of “didaskhein” but do not describe its sequence structure.

Therefore, it seems as if fundamental-didactical thinking, regarding this aspect, cannot search for its structure in anthropological pronouncements and that it really is not possible to take anthropology as the point of departure for designing a didactical theory.

**2. The pedagogic norm:** That pedagogics is a normative science certainly is beyond doubt these days. Even if it were necessary one could make a long list of impressive names from other countries as well as domestically who in many publications describe and corroborate the normative character of the pedagogical as a science. Therefore, it need not seem strange that, regarding didactical theory forming, many serious attempts also have been made to find a grounding that seeks the origin and point of departure for didactical theory in the normative nature of educative activities. After all, the question of norms is absolutely essential when there is thinking about educating and, thus, also of teaching with the consequence that it is not entirely a-logical to try to find the origin of didactic activities in the normative nature, even more, in the ranking and describing of differential didactic-pedagogical norms.

If one considers that accepted and valid norms constitute the warp and woof of all educative interventions and cannot be thought away from the didactic activities just because, as explained above, educating continually actualizes itself in teaching and the meaning of teaching really has its origin in educating. Further, considering together the denotable relations of family and school, parent and teacher, life and learning, etc. deserve careful examination such as a theoretical didactician's thorough analysis in order to achieve clarity about whether or not the normative nature of educative interventions, especially considering the sense of education, constitutes the ground of didactical work.

But there is more to this matter. The didactic or teaching activity has in its spontaneous (family home) as well as formal (school) course very clear prognostic and guiding functions that essentially are normative matters. The prognostic values of the particulars that speak in the course of teaching with each breakthrough of insight, practice of skills, measurement of achievement and promotion to a subsequent class or level also foreshadow an eventuality and, thus, ultimate formedness and in this way expose a future. The didactic prognosis intercepts or anticipates in a factual, literal sense the

future and foreshadows with remarkable accuracy possibility and actuality as future relations.

At the same time this is not an obvious matter and one can describe as an essential matter of “*didaskein*” that in the course of a series of situations norms appear as accompanying (in the total meaning of the word) teaching. Neither prognosis nor accompaniment fall outside of a norm structure; what is more, it is possible to apply particular norms in the didactic situation. To a large degree, both indeed speak of and carry relations to what ought to be and of the change by which there is mention of forming.

Of the various explanations that a person would be able to summarize under this heading, as beginnings to constructing a didactical theory, that of Bokelmann, following his logic, offers a good explanation for discussion in light of our stated problem.<sup>4</sup> In his explication he indicates that in the norm structure of educating, as well as teaching, there are two aspects noted that allow the event to be realized.

He views the first aspect of the norm structure as norms **for** educating and calls them **meaning norms**. These meaning norms flow directly from a life- and world-view and for educating and teaching they mean that the sense of a person’s existence, the whole of *existentialia* are considered, put in relief and set the act of educating in motion. Thus, there is no doubt that the meaning norms, following this interpretation, give contents to educating—also in the sense that they steer educating in particular directions to attain particular aims.

The other aspect is described as norms **of** educating, i.e., norms that continually place the denotable of the events of educating and teaching in the foreground and that Bokelmann calls issue norms because they have to make manifest or visible the issue-like nature of the event. In this connection one also should be able to talk of the issue norms as formative norms (and in consideration of the corresponding functions of the issue norms with didactical categories). From the issue or formative norms Bokelmann proceeds to infer particular didactical norms that then must be judged to be the essential course of teaching under which are the relations among learning contents, the act of learning and the presenting itself.

These issue or formative norms are further supported and complemented by what he calls legal and economic norms. The first must give evidence that a formal policy of teaching is tied to its political-legal connection while the latter especially is attuned to the aspect of providing organized teaching. The didactical, legal and economic norms then are included in what Bokelmann calls ascetic norms in which the boundaries of educating and teaching, but especially also the formability of the learning person, are explained and made accessible for practice.

Bokelmann's explication is not simply preposterous for anyone who knows contemporary pedagogics and didactics. Indeed, in most respects it is an entirely acceptable theoretical explanation with respect to which one in various respects can make available with impressive justification. In our search for the origin or point of departure for constructing a didactical theory we also must thoroughly consider a few aspects in this regard that create very definite problems in the formal deliberation of an explication such as this (proceeding from the norm structure).

There is no doubt that teaching belongs to the most original (primordial) experiencing at one's disposal. In the same way it certainly is the case that the norm structure held by humans belongs to the most original life contents that they apply in their development of existence and that they use as beacons on their way through the world. But it is precisely in this relation of form and contents where our problem lies in deliberating on a formally construed didactical theory.

From the view that the concept "norm" explains essential contents and that form is an active, experiential tendency to act that shows itself as a matter of human being in the world, it would be very difficult to justify, on a theoretical level, that contents and form in this particular case represent an identical structure. No one doubts that the sense of existence is to be found in the norm structure contents and continually leads back to it. But the norm structure is particular with respect to time, culture, space (place), religion, life- and world-view, etc. The norm structure continually provides evidence of **what** and **why** the act of educating is a meaningful matter. But **how** this educative event (teaching event) must be put in motion does not lie within the area the norm structure addresses.

The normative character of educating and teaching has little to do with its form. The result is that in designing a didactical theory from the normative structure, as explained above, the problem is that the meaning norms indeed constitute a solid ground for educating and teaching but without providing an inferential basis for the meaning norms (didactic, conditional and ascetic norms). This necessarily poses a gap in the theory's development because the **contents** that arise with educating are accepted in the activity thoroughly and with authority while the form cannot be directly inferred from this.

To speak of didactical norms really means to give an explanation of didactic propriety. It is understandable that didactic propriety is revealed in the contents of the meaning norms. The didactic meaning of norms, in line with Bokelmann's reasoning, place many direct demands on the didactic course as far as the choice of teaching contents is concerned. The name "issue norms" implies the business-like, the matter itself, reality. But unlike the contents, reality is not particular in character.

The reality is reality by virtue of its universal and generally accepted appearances. Teaching, thus, is business-like in the sense that any contents, also particular contents, can be taught in particular ways: Roman Catholic and Protestant, Christian and Mohammedan, democratic and despotic.

Teaching essentially cannot be taken up as anything other than the original, the essence of "didaskhein", in itself, however incomplete and unsatisfactory this might appear to be. Teaching cannot exceed original experiencing and is itself really knowable in particular norms manifested, i.e., didactic norms. Also issue-didactic norms are not required in the theoretical construction as the additional terrain of criteria. This must imply opinions instead of descriptions.

In its essence teaching is not inferred from contents or standpoints. Teaching **is**. Indeed, it is one of the greatest problems of teaching through all of the centuries that as long as the content aspect is found in order, there is little attention paid to form in the sense that it is built into an accountable structure and is described. The consequence is that where content is clearly formulated, the form always has taken a secondary place while form description constitutes exactly the task for designing an accountable didactical structure (theory). "Didaskhein" is an ontological matter in its form

and only is meaning-normatively defined re content: criterially definable by issue norms.

However extensive the contributions from a norm structure to our didactical insight might be, it seems to not be possible to arrive at the origin of “didaskhein” via pedagogic-didactical norms.

**3. Didactical history:** Teaching is as old as humans for the simple reason that no one is born with particular knowledge of what occurs or must occur in this world. The acquisition of knowledge that is the ultimate aim of all teaching in each person’s life seems to be a personal, unique acquisition and integration of insights, skills, etc. No one is born with this because it is not part of any child’s inheritance.

Therefore, teaching has a history in two respects: a history in so far as teaching has developed in a chronological sense with world history and in many respects has co-determined world history. But in the second place, it also has a history in the life of each person that determines the scope and quality of his participation in reality. Without teaching no one becomes someone. With a deficiency in adequate teaching the world comes to a standstill. As a matter of fact the present is understood in terms of the past while our knowledge of what has already occurred, to a large degree, puts us in a position to know what more ought to happen. Human historicity allows one to anticipate futurity and prepare him for it’s teaching.

Therefore, it need not surprise one that various didacticians have searched for the origin or ground of didactical work in its history. Didactical history is infinitely rich and varied: Plato’s **Republic**, Augustine’s **Confessions**, Comenius’ **Great Didactic**, Rousseau’s **Emile** all are writings of phenomenal expressive power. Also didactics cannot renounce its history and, after all, it is to a great extent what it is by virtue of its development. And why should the origin of didactical thinking then not also exhibit the origin of didactic activities?

Moller<sup>5</sup> indicates that the didactic really is it’s underlying history. With this pronouncement he really means that one has to do with an overpowering, far-reaching power, not at the disposal of the present, but what in the course of time finds its sedimentation or remainder in what now is really only history. History is what



remains of the present and what we, in present times, know and describe as teaching is only knowable and describable on the basis of what always occurs and has brought the present about. Outside of history the present, therefore, is not to be described, judged or implemented. As such, history provides the answers to the questions asked with respect to the present situatedness of persons.

Accordingly, the situatedness of persons really is an historical situatedness, i.e., it is the conglomerate of determinations, motives, necessities and matters about which persons in a particular period pay for dearly. Persons belong to these historically developed forms and to reality. A person's historical definition draws for him the horizon of his possibilities as boundaries within which he can to some degree freely design himself and his existence but from which he also cannot escape.

Then, it is within this historically defined horizon that a didactical theory provides answers about the decisions that persons make regarding what they confront here and now as reality. But the human judgments that they necessarily and understandably make by virtue of their historicity also are their becoming, by which their possibilities (as taken up in the didactic practice) ultimately become observable. This, then, is what really is meant by the claim that a person cannot escape his history: he is not delivered to his history but his lifeworld is historically defined.

The task of a didactical theory in this particular connection, then, must be to provide a response to the appeal of the contemporary situation as presented by history—a response that is not possible unless it is provided in terms of the historical situatedness of persons.

Indeed, we must realize that such a way of viewing proclaims a relatively unambiguous relation between reality and possibility. It is unambiguous in that the constituents of the present situation are nothing more than historically defined and that the action possibilities correspond to historical limits because history, in this respect, demarcates the life horizon. In his search for the origin of didactical theory the thinker must make a pronouncement about whether the constituents of the situation and whether the choosing, acting, changing constituted person brought about these situational givens by what he chose and did in particular relations, perspectives and ultimately in giving new meaning. That historicity undoubtedly

hones the human spirit is disputed by no one; whether one's historicity determines his going out to reality is another problem.

The historically defined situation, however far-reaching a view it can provide, and also for designing a didactical theory, is not the most important question that one encounters here. If one accepts that what is knowable and describable after it comes to the surface of what was, this also implicitly means that there is a corresponding structure regarding what was and what is. Thus the present cannot be viewed other than in the light of the past.

In other words, if there were no correspondence between the present and historical situation, the present would not be knowable in terms of the historical. The contemporary didactical situation, then, would not be describable as a type of situation in terms of past situations, **as such**. Consequently, the present and past must manifest themselves in light of this comparable structure which means that their correspondence must be looked for.

Understandably, this correspondence is not absolute. Changes in time and place give rise to variations. However, these variations are not the structure itself but they are possible variations by virtue of the fact that there is a structure. At this stage it seems as if the past is not determined as much as the present in an historical sense but that it repeats itself in the present. What the superceded situation has constituted, therefore, also constitutes the correspondence, and the replaced identity of the present and superceded situation are related to one's insight into the constituents that correspond in the past as well as present as the past is observed, separated and described.

The differentness of the present situation is a variant of these constituents, otherwise the present situation would not be able to be known in terms of the superceded situation. After all, the present situation is not the superceded one because this is impossible according to the reality categories of time and space. Therefore, the superceded situation does not have more identity than the present one, or the reverse: both are interpretations of human situatedness after time and space appear.

Regarding the search for the origins of didactic practice in history, this pronouncement is of extraordinary importance. As a situation-type, the didactic situation, consequently, is not in time and also not

bound to history otherwise its structure would change from time to time and in this light the presence of the superceded would not have been repeatable.

A pronouncement, such as Moller's that didactics provides a response to the situation that history presents, and especially regarding the historical situatedness of persons, is quite correct. But this is irrelevant for understanding the origins, the ground or structure of the didactic course. Therefore, this also has no relevance when an analysis is performed to disclose what is essential to "didaskhein". When the present as well as the superceded situation reveal the essence of teaching, this means that the historical does not predispose the presently recognizable structure or that the historical course now presents to us something recognizably other than this general structure, as already **described** in the past.

This does not mean that didactical history does not or cannot contribute to our understanding of what teaching essentially is. Didactic problems are formulated in an historical sense and provide evidence that, in many respects, in principle, really fundamental respects, try to disclose and clarify essences. To mention but one example, historical didactics provides particular insight into what over many centuries was formulated as the didactical ideal. As history progressed, it was possible to judge the actualization of the ideal in the practical situation because time is one of the most important factors that puts a distance between a person and his lived situation and that, in this way, places him in a position to arrive at a distanced, objective view. In this way, the historical allows us in didactics to keep fancy and reality separated and on this basis to anticipate and intercept future didactic dilemmas. To the extent that there is an original structure, it must manifest itself in the contemporary situation just as in the past, otherwise there can be no mention at all of a structure, as such, i.e., of an origin.

**4. The School:** For many years, and often with good reasons, the school has served as a point of departure for designing didactical theory. It was previously noted that a didactical theory that has nothing or little to say to practice cannot rightly claim to be a "theory". Now, it is precisely the school that offers the ultimate juncture and final touchstone for didactical theory. It is especially here that the didactical perspective has to be realized and where "didaskhein" has to be dealt with in organized ways. The school is a

formal, business-like and organized institution that in all respects can make the claim that it is a far-reaching didactic-pedagogical matter in each child's life.

As an educational institution the school necessarily lies on each child's path (Langeveld) and, therefore, it is a way towards designing a world (Gous) for everyone who wants to become adult, will know something, wants to achieve independently and take his place in the world as a person. A school is a place where the future is made, where the last emancipation occurs, where becoming develops provisionally and consolidates itself in more or less all aspects of learning. The school is a matter of "didaskhein" and why shouldn't it, while still far from providing the final answer regarding the state of becoming, also be the first, primary structure made available for describing as well as evaluating becoming?

When the school is chosen as the point of departure for building a didactical theory, didacticians make use of a variety of analytic perspectives with respect to trying to make clear the origins of teaching. As far as the school is concerned, it has been indicated that it is a societal institution. Thus, it shows all of the essential constituents of the greater, comprehensive structure of society and the meaning of its activities (teaching) lies in the tense relationships that exist between school and society. The school is a preparatory or orienting community from which a child, in formal ways, joins the world of adults.

It must be clear that the emancipation-expectation fostered by the school constitutes the central theme in the search for didactic origins in the school. After all, society expects of a child who leaves school a somewhat emancipated lifestyle that offers some guarantee of his transition to occupational work, sound social relationships, socially accountable trustworthiness with the cultural and religious norms.

As far as society in general is concerned, the school especially has a two-fold task that largely determines its place in and meaning for society. On the one hand, it has a preparatory task in the sense that it makes available selected knowledge and skills for which a field of practice is created for a child to give him the opportunity to orient himself regarding societal matters (including work, the social, justice, moral-religious issues, economics, etc.) that really are valid, in a provisional sense, in the broader sphere of society. Thus, the

school weaves a basic network of relationships in a preparatory sense that realizes original educative aim and in which the origin of "didaskhein" is then sought.

In a pedagogical perspective (i.e., regarding its contribution to realizing the educational ideal), the school is not the only approach available when there is a search for the origins of didactical theory. As is nowadays generally accepted pedagogically, the school has a far-reaching and finishing educative task and as an institution it is not an inevitable part of a person's lifeworld. It is formal and purposive regarding each facet of its organized activities and in such a way that an account of the activities can be given to the whole of society (state, church, family, etc.).

Schooling implies a particular way of acting. This character of activity understandably centers on teaching because teaching represents the directed initiative of the school. When there is no teaching in an institution, calling it a school is to transfer the initiative of its action to another domain than teaching. Teaching is a cardinal and decisive factor in characterizing an institution as a "school".

The directed intention and initiating power, also in so far as schooling and educating are directly related, are found in the teaching itself. But the teaching is not self-evident. This means that teaching does not automatically make itself observable in school as an initiative of relationships. Namely, school teaching follows certain paths, it shows itself with respect to particular modes that are available to those who have to teach in order that the activity character of the organized (school) situation results in particular teaching effects.

Now, everyone rightly alleges that the quality and scope of the teaching effect is directly related to the quality and scope of the modes of teaching used in the school situation. The modes, ways or methods of teaching appear to be of decisive significance for grasping the origin of teaching as this is observable in the teaching effect.

A claim of this nature has two kinds of pronouncements of a fundamental nature to make regarding the origin of didactical theory:

In the first place it is clear that the two concepts "didactical theory" and "methodology" are leveled down; methodology is equated with didactical theory. From this it follows that the origin of "didaskhein" also has to be sought in the origin of methodology and that the essentials of the didactic will manifest themselves in the modes of teaching. In this way, it is postulated by some that the school, in general, and teaching methods, in particular, ought to provide the first, primary, practical ground in terms of which teaching can then be essentially grasped, described and interpreted.

Regarding the search for didactic origins in the school there is a third popular perspective that is taken as a point of departure and built on with the aim of establishing a didactical theory that is accountable. It is contended that the school has a mediating character. Therefore, in the school this involves building a bridge to the future. This bridge is only possible if the pupils proceed in systematic ways to acquire and master particular contents by which their future situatedness in the world of adulthood is placed within their grasp. Therefore, schools are involved with contents: cultural things, forms of cultural systems, experiential contents relative to living, to mention only a few of the terms generally used for learning contents.

To the extent that the teaching contents in the situation are transferred to or actualized in the pupil's command of them, there is then mention of teaching: the theoretical meaning of the activity itself is identified with the meaning of the contents while the school, as an institution, has the task of selecting, ordering and offering these contents in such a way that their imminent sense, figuratively speaking, will make visible the change striven for by teaching.

All other aspects of teaching are coordinated and concentrated on the original sense of the contents by which they are proclaimed to be the central source of knowledge of "didaskhein". Where the relation between the school's and the home's educating are described, it is argued that home educating shows itself as also dealing with particular norms, i.e., with contents that inherently carry the origin of teaching within themselves.

It is not difficult to establish that many of the arguments and views that regard the school as the place, event or theme that indicates the origin of "didaskhein" contradict and even exclude each other. By carefully considering all of these perspectives and their

contributions to establishing a grounded didactical theory, it also is appropriate to understand them well. No one contends that schooling does not make an extensive and far-reaching contribution to the education and eventual adulthood of its pupils. When it is contended that a future is made in school, that the school prepares and perfects its pupils regarding their future work situation, that its successes and failures often are attributable to methodological approaches, that the contents serve to manifest the deepest sense of being a person as this is interpreted by a particular society--all of these have didactic-pedagogical validity.

Whether or not such pronouncements are valid is not the problem with which we are concerned at the moment. The problem is designing a didactical theory in order to disclose its ground, its origin and if any of the above perspectives on the school situation dealt with, and many others that are possible but were not given prominent expression, are able to disclose the origin of teaching.

It was noted that as an institution, the school is not an original aspect of the human lifeworld. A school is a societal institution with a formal, mediating character aimed at realizing particular aims established and varied by persons, and it is kept going at the expense of society as a totality. History shows, after all, that a school has not been viewed everywhere and always as a necessary institution for the good and perfecting educative structure of children. Also, a study of societal knowledge indicates schools of particular types form a discontinuous rather than continuous line in the course of educating.

Whether a school comes into being or not depends on the complexity of the lifestyle according to societal tendencies, its prosperity and the political weight of the corresponding educative ideals. The more persons move away from the original, natural ways of being in the world, the more necessary and more differentiated the school is, as an institution, on the life horizon. In some respects the lifestyle needs to expand on the family as the original educative milieu and institution and even be partly replaced by an institution that formally and systematically can effectively take over educating.

The school is much more a matter of a human institution, in contrast to reality, than it is an original situatedness in reality. When parents become aware of particular deficiencies in their

fundamental, primary educative intervention with their children they will establish a school to fill or, if possible, even eradicate the felt deficiencies.

Therefore, a school interprets a person's original situatedness, it apes it well in the sense that it brings it about again. Its activities, aims, modes and contents were already in a child's lifeworld before he reached school age. The school's structure has a second-order character and, however accurately an analysis of it can be and no matter how illuminating and orienting the findings regarding the structure of its activities might appear, the origin of "didaskhein" cannot be indicated by this because "didaskhein" existed before there were schools. Therefore, the school's situation can be understood from "didaskhein"; however, "didaskhein" does not arise from the school.

**5. The psychology of learning:** Learning is inseparably connected to teaching. Setting aims, selecting methods and contents, choosing learning and teaching aids, practicing the new contents, testing and examining as well as promoting a child all are inherent aspects of teaching that are only meaningful and only occur in practice because it is assumed that learning is possible. Therefore, it is not strange that for a long time and on the basis of extensive research and systematic reflection didacticians have sought the origin or foundation of teaching in the knowledge amassed about learning.

In the volumes of literature on this topic that are available for consultation and for possible application to a didactic situation, learning is expounded in comprehensive ways and is interpreted with conviction with respect to the origin and course of the didactic situation. It would make little sense to give, in a few paragraphs, an overview of the historical and contemporary perspectives that are prominent. The fact is, this ought to be familiar terrain for all didacticians, and also many didacticians, in one or more respects, already have adopted perspectives on learning while omitting the issue of a "didactical theory".

It would be impossible to explain this approach as grounding for didactical theory without investigating, to some degree, the possibility of this grounding and without thinking about it in light of our problem. If the didactician, in exploring the terrain of the psychology of learning, is able to penetrate to the essentials of the



learning activity, itself, he should consider whether these disclosed essentials of the phenomenon of learning either directly or by implication provide the ground for the didactic activity that he is looking for in his theory forming.

Various scientists, at different times, and in different ways, and by emphasizing different aspects of the so-called components of the learning activity, have tried to describe them in their essentials. Among others, these essentials are described as a cognitive process, as a break-through of insight, as the acquisition of proficiencies for manipulating the surrounding milieu, as a stimulus-response mechanism, as a person's reaction to stimuli from outside, as the externalization of human interiority, as the implementation of intelligence, as a lived experience of situatedness and the related participation in the world and life.

Although the merits of the various perspectives will not be discussed here, they all have one common factor to offer that is relevant didactically and that makes possible and worthwhile a consideration of the insights of learning psychology as a foundation of didactic activities. Not one of the perspectives denies that a person can learn. To state this positively, there **is** a learning phenomenon, the learning activity necessarily is actualized in the life of each person irrespective of the differences about what learning essentially is.

Thus, the one conclusion that a didactician can make with certainty, and that will be of fundamental importance for his argument about the grounding of the didactic event, is that learning is given with being human; thus, being human cannot be imagined without it, that it is a way of being human that cannot be thought away. To be a person means to be able to learn, to become adult; it means to have to learn and be an educator, to help those dependent on educating to necessarily engage in particular acts of learning. There can be no doubt that the learning activity, as a way of being a person, also belongs to the most primary experience available to a person. And just as teaching is actualized by each person in one way or another to the end of his life, the learning activity is a faithful companion in which and by which the effect of teaching is largely observable.

Teaching certainly could find its origin in the learning activity if "teaching" and "learning" were identical concepts. However, it has been indicated that, especially as far as the formal didactic course is

concerned, learning appears as the teaching effect. One could also say that the act of teaching manifests itself in the learning activity. Learning is the result, dividend of teaching but, at the same time, it is not the only teaching dividend. The change that is continually noticed with a learning person embraces a much broader, more comprehensive terrain than that of learning results. Changing dispositions, to mention but one example, need not necessarily be a result of teaching. At the same time, the learning activity covers a much broader terrain than that of a teaching effect. Each person also learns in situations and from experiences, observations and feelings that have nothing at all to do with "didaskhein" (teaching).

In summary: Teaching is much broader than a mere learning effect and the learning activity covers a more extensive terrain than merely teaching. The commonality or the overlap between teaching and learning, therefore, is not absolute. Also, teaching is not learning and learning is not teaching. Obviously, the didactician is involved here with two forms of experiencing, two ways of being in the world, each with their own identity, because the manifestation of one does not presume only the other in an absolute sense. And incidentally, to look back at the school, all of a child's learning activities are not at all only a matter of the school's teaching intervention.

Analogously, learning is describable as a way of being that manifests itself as an effect of teaching. Also, the appearance of this effect is not necessarily determined, inevitable. There often, even frequently, is teaching of persons individually as well as in groups without clearly recognizable learning effects in the form of learning achievements. The performing consciousness of a person allows him not to be limited to the purely cognitively calculable or perceivable. Lived experiencing, sensing, in other words the affective, are just as much a matter of learning and of the performing consciousness of a person as are the clearly recognizable, even legible learning achievements from which there in the main is mention of teaching.

If there is a difference in identity between teaching and learning the argument that the foundation of teaching is in the activity of learning falls in the terrain of the impossible and unthinkable. This not only implies that learning is more than teaching and that, conversely, teaching is more than only learning, but especially that teaching **essentially** is different from the learning activity itself.

The common factor that teaching and learning **share** doesn't warrant postulating that teaching can find its origin in the phenomenon of learning. It merely indicates that both, investigated in their appearance to a person in his original situatedness, can be described as separate ways of being in the world without needing to isolate them to confirm the identity of each. That learning often is an aim of teaching does not proclaim that this aim has the identical structure as the teaching itself.

Also, regarding attempts to ground "didaskhein" in the psychology of learning, it appears that a didactician has to take a negative attitude because what is essential to teaching cannot be expressed in terms of the activity of learning.

**6. Hypostatizing categories:** To complement the theoretical decisions made in the above sections it is fitting and timely to warn those who search for a theoretical mastery of didactic activity against categorical-hypostatizing that necessarily leads to a one-sided and therefore incomplete and unaccountable theoretical structure. With the pronouncements about the phenomenon of learning as a possible ground for a didactical theory, many potholes appeared into which a thinker can fall. There can be little doubt that learning functions categorically with respect to "didaskhein" (i.e., is an essence of it).

In other words the act of learning cannot be thought away and is undeniably entwined with the concept that really is implied by "didaskhein".

The didactic event remains impenetrable for a theoretical didactician when he refuses to take into account the act of learning and interprets it deliberately and correctly with respect to the structure he is building up. A category represents, brings to the fore, or makes visible what is essential, necessary to a particular phenomenon. By hypostatizing, one understands that a particular matter or principle is interpreted as fundamental to or foundational of a particular phenomenon. When a theorist, then, is guilty of categorical-hypostatizing, this means that a particular category is interpreted as an absolute ground of such a phenomenon by which the thinker is put in a position to reduce all other aspects, perspectives to this fundamental category and interpret the entire phenomenon in its light.

When in a didactical theory there is a move to categorical-hypostatizing this implies that the theoretician accepts or proclaims a particular category as absolutely foundational for disclosing the essence of that phenomenon (in this case teaching) and that all other essential aspects are referred back to this fundamental category and are interpreted in terms of it. A didactical theory that is constructed in this way can be nothing more than one-sided and incomplete.

Some of the effects of such reasoning have been encountered in views of the total course of teaching that reduce it to the learning phenomenon and/or interpret the entirety of the change that forms the warp and woof of teaching as learning effects or learning dividends. In order to explicate further the meaning of categorical-hypostatizing and its dangers for constructing a didactical theory, it certainly is meaningful to focus on and discuss such a possibility (i.e., apart from the learning phenomenon) and briefly discuss it, especially with the aim of unraveling in finer detail its effect on constructing a didactical grounding.

It would be difficult for any didactician to deny that German psychology of thinking, over a long period and as manifested in a multitude of writings, has made a particular contribution, and still does, to our insight into what truly is essential regarding the teaching event. In light of the age-old German philosophical tradition and considering that historically, the pedagogical, up to and including the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century, was taken up in philosophy as a discipline, one can understand that thinkers of the stature of Kant, Hegel, Fichte, Herbart, Schleiermacher, Litt, Spranger and Bollnow (to mention only a few) necessarily had discussed teaching in its pedagogical connection and, by virtue of the nature of their philosophies, freely delved into and sought the *fundamentalia* on the basis of which an accountable structure would be possible in their theory forming.

The particulars of their views are not relevant here. What one will find conspicuous in studying their views is that, especially concerning the didactic, the argument continually refers back to a central concept that in a fundamental respect establishes the foundation for their views: forming (Bildung).

The implication is that a theory of teaching is or can be reduced to a theory of forming by which forming, certainly an essential category

of “didaskhein”, reaches a state of being hypostatized. Although one is aware that the word “Bildung” in German has a very special and extensive meaning and that the totality of the teaching event often is summarized with this concept, it is conspicuous that there is little or no theoretical objection raised when this totality is so rigidly and radically reduced to one concept. Theory forming as well as skill formulating is permeated with concepts such as formative ideal, formative politics, formative economics, formative content, formative plan, formative knowledge, etc.

Therefore, it also is not surprising that didactical theory, in its most comprehensive (most general) sense, but also in a particular sense, is reduced to a theory of forming. At this stage I will not go into an amplification of the entire problem of forming—in the following chapters we will return to treating this aspect of the didactic structure in a comprehensive and interpretive sense. The problem that we have in focus compels a short explanation without which the question of categorical-hypostatizing in terms of the category of forming, as an example, cannot be viewed appropriately.

Considering that the above pronouncements can imply that the two concepts “didaskhein” and “forming” are used as synonyms by such views, one must indicate that the German word “Bildung” has its own significance. On the one hand, the concept “Bildung” refers to an inner, i.e., generally human change that occurs on the basis of the orienting and attuning power emanating from historically and culturally acknowledged contents. These formative contents are the contents that are raised or should be broached by teaching and by which a person’s encounter with his spiritual heritage of reality can be brought about. Thus, in this case “Bildung” refers to an **event**, a course of becoming that actualizes itself especially during the school years but whose effects are life long, i.e., last through the whole course of life.

However, this last pronouncement refers to a second, different side or meaning of the concept, namely, that it also refers to a **state** of inner, attuned change that shows itself in the way one participates in reality and life. This inner, attuned change cannot occur without a minimum of knowledge and experience regarding the formative contents. Accordingly, the task of teaching is to bring about the **event** or the change (“forming”) in terms of the formative contents with the aim of reaching a **state** of inner disposition or attunement by which accountable and extensive participation in the highly

valuable on the human horizon can be accomplished. This participation, motivated by an inner disposition, constitutes the formative ideal that at the same time is elevated to a didactic aim.

The question that now arises is can the whole of the didactic event essentially be reducible to the category of forming; or conversely, can the whole of the teaching activity be described and explicated from the category of forming.

The problem is really more difficult than it seems. Forming is described as an event and as a state. The event called forming is not an obvious matter (in either case not in the didactic situation) because the intended activity is not in the situation itself but in the plan of the adult (teacher). Forming, as a state that a pupil arrives at, conspicuously is a matter of learning effect in the sense of commanding, acquiring and even manipulating reality.

Thus, here one is concerned with three aspects peculiar to the course of didactic activity: a purposive presentation corresponding to the formative value of particular contents, an anticipated effective learning activity and an event (i.e., state) of changing that indicates that the aim has wholly or partly been attained.

Would these three matters in their clearly manifest coherencies disclose the origin of “*didaskhein*”?

Here it is appropriate to indicate that the validity of the pronouncements as taken up in the above discussion cannot be placed in question or disputed to any degree. One must still note that while the concept “*Bildung*” presumes an extensive disposition to participate in life and world, the word itself does not imply presenting as well as learning in any obvious sense. Forming involves changing, deepening, flourishing human participation in reality. No one doubts that this forming can occur, be brought about or accomplished. It is equally certain that in neither of its two meanings does it acquire pedagogically qualitative shape as a matter of course or automatically in the life of a person. For example and merely hypothetically, should nothing happen with a person, forming also would not occur.

Viewed from another angle, one must also note that forming is not only a result or dividend of the teaching, and, hence, learning activity in one’s life. I intend this last statement to be trite as far as

the course of the didactic situation is concerned. Forming cannot be limited to an interconnected course of didactic situations. One does not learn merely in successively organized didactic courses. One learns a great deal outside of any teaching intervention by interpreting, experiencing, perceiving, sensing, etc. The change that is considered in forming theory and that unquestionably is observable in the life of each person cannot be limited to the dividend of didactic intervention. Teaching is but one of the factors, although an extremely important one, that eventually contribute to the state of formedness attained.

In searching for the didactical *fundamentalia* here, one is faced with two deficiencies: in the first place the change discussed in forming does not **necessarily** presume teaching and also not **necessarily** learning. In the second place, forming in its meaning as an event as well as a state cannot be limited to the didactic situation so that teaching and forming (i.e., a theory of teaching and of forming) cannot be interpreted as identical concepts or identical meanings. The concept forming covers a noticeably much broader field than “forming by teaching”; as a teaching dividend the word forming really means that the change produced by the didactic situation presumes an activity that precedes the forming. This activity shows itself by the adult as well as the child, i.e., in presenting and in learning contents. Teaching is something other than the change, although it can predispose one to change—but change will occur in a person’s life irrespective of whether there is teaching or not.

Our problem conspicuously is one of relief and perspective. When an essential aspect of teaching, such as the expected change, is taken out of its proper perspective and is so overwhelmingly placed in the foreground, the rest of the course of teaching, in its essences, is partly or entirely obscured, the only possible result for the search for the grounding of “*didaskēin*” is a one-sided, incomplete perspective. The relief that the theory presupposes in an exact sense shows a clear deficiency in dimensional relation according to the whole of experience regarding this, and that is available in the lifeworld.

Categorical-hypostatizing is, for the theoretical didactician, an attractive and tempting fork in the road because in its everydayness it appears so true, so realistic and even so practical. It is not possible to reduce “*didaskēin*” to one, fundamental category that can make visible its total structure, other than “being in the world”.

What was previously explicated regarding forming really holds for each of the other categories that crop up in designing such a theory. The student of didactics must know that to hypostatize in designing a theory is a hazardous practice that seriously jeopardizes the ultimate validity of seemingly pure theory construction.

### C. CONCLUSION

The search for a point of departure for constructing or designing a didactical theory in terms of the above pronouncements cuts to a comprehensive and varied problem. The answers to questions of essential significance for such a design are not in the superficialities of everyday experiences circulating for compilation. It also seems that an eclectic approach to designing such a theory, although not without value, does not penetrate to the origins sought. If this is the case, regarding the above six possibilities or starting points for designing a didactical theory, one has to be able to arrive at a structural whole that will provide answers to the fundamental questions.

In each of the above analyses we have noted that as far as they involve structure, they neither have nor can they assimilate the meaning of "didaskein". To think that deliberately chosen syntheses of particular fundamentals that crop up and that have brought to light the origin can serve as the basis for such theory forming would be dangerous science.

Everyone who works scientifically today is thoroughly aware that the whole is more than the sum of its parts. Therefore, it seems that a more accurate explication of the didactic problem, in a general sense, and as far as it is now available to us, has to be done before beginning a search for the origin of "didaskein" and, therefore, broached again is the point of departure for designing a didactical theory. The problem is so varied, and in modern times some aspects are so actual, that didacticians can be forgiven for often taking a part for the whole, interchanging theory for practice, techniques for principles and interchanging results with origins.

Without closely delimiting the didactic problem, one necessarily is inclined to make categorical explications about matters, myopically to describe and prescribe to practice without knowing how such practice is actually seen through these categories or what generally is possible. Also, a thorough explication of the didactic problem of



“didaskein” should be viewed and actualized in its experiential context that, after all, is the only way the original practice can be described.

<sup>1</sup> See Killian, C. J. G.: **“Die Verbesondering van pedagogiese Kriteria met ontologies-antroplogiese Status”** (Unpublished D. Ed. dissertation, U. P. 1970).

<sup>2</sup> See Landman, W. A. and Gouws, S. J.: **Inleiding tot die Fundamentele Pedagogiek**. Pp 54 et seq.

<sup>3</sup> See Van der Stoep, F.: **Didaktiese Grondvorme**. P 21 et seq.

<sup>4</sup> Bokelmann, H.: **Masstaebe paedagogischen Handelns**. P 32 et seq.

<sup>5</sup> See Moller: **Was ist Didaktik?** P 36 et seq.