

## CHAPTER 4

### DIDACTIC-PEDAGOGICAL PERSPECTIVE ON ORIGINAL EXPERIENCING, LIVED EXPERIENCING AND LEARNING

#### A. EXPERIENCING AND LIVED EXPERIENCING: CONSIDERATIONS FOR TEACHING

In the previous chapters there was repeated reference to the concept “structure” as a meaningful matter for constructing a didactic-pedagogical theory. It has been stated that the pedagogical relevance of “structure”, in addition to many others, certainly is manifested in the fact that it also is a matter of announcing a problem in the sense that “structure” as an origin (in this case, of the reality of educating) is necessary for disclosing certain essentials of educating (teaching). From a psychopedagogical side, “*structura*” as origin shows various tasks for didactics, including intentionality, learning, experiencing, lived experiencing, all as origins (ways of being in the world). The important coherence of experiencing and learning as well as experiencing and lived experiencing are remarked on and must be taken into account from a didactical perspective.

If one considers that all of the above perspectives focus on one aspect of reality (educating), the problem of lived experiencing for teaching theory is of particular significance because actualizing it in all of its possible respects meets our expectations, especially in light of Sonnekus’ contribution to our insights into this aspect of Didactical Pedagogics.

This didactic-pedagogical significance mainly is that the two concepts “experience” and “lived experience” speak to didactic practice in light of psychopedagogical findings by announcing the forms and contents of actualizing these two important pedagogical tendencies. There certainly are different ways to come to terms with a didactic-pedagogical design: Alas, not so much in a methodological sense as judging exploratory possibilities, but in perspective indications or variations because the actualization designs cannot be simple. In dealing with the coherence of original

experiencing and learning, the matter once again will become clear. Meanings such as “*pathos*”, “*gnosis*”, “*logos*”, “*ethos*” beyond any doubt have relevance when lived experiencing in thought is disclosed, verbalized and expressed in the form of fundamental didactical theory. Possibly it would be meaningful initially to formulate the problem as follows: How does the coherence of experiencing and lived experiencing appear in educative reality as it is realized in teaching and of what value is the didactic design, i.e.: how does the matter figure in didactical theory building? Can didactic practice be anything other than deliberately providing for the appearance of experiencing and lived experiencing? After all, these are two fundamental aspects of lifestyle, expressions of one’s participation in world and life that must deliberately be realized (i.e., with pedagogical objectives in mind) in a set series of situations.

The contrary of this view would be that Didactical Pedagogics could, among other things, ignore the concepts “experience” and “lived experience” or the Didactical Pedagogical should or could apply everything written about experience and lived experience. His task then would be to seek ways of application to his subjects in order to try to bring to teaching expressions of what currently is known about the two matters. In such a case, theory building would have to reach over Psychopedagogics, Fundamental Pedagogics as well as Sociopedagogics to Anthropology. Related fields such as Psychology and Biology also should be taken into account. This would confront Didactical Pedagogics with some of its oldest problems: as soon as he proceeds to seek and apply application trends that he himself has not set, he is in the field of applying what is worth knowing.

The consequences are obvious, since he cannot interpret these statements accordingly. With this, as often was done in the past, he gives up his disciplinary autonomy. It only is when Didactical Pedagogics asks its *own* questions and provides its own answers in real pedagogical respects (i.e., in accordance with the reality of educating) that it can link up with the other pedagogical disciplines that in turn expose the same reality to other objectives and interpretations in terms of its own particular criteria. Thus, the pedagogical comes to fullness in Pedagogics.

One has to understand well that Didactical Pedagogics has a task with respect to the two concepts “experience” and “lived experience” without which a pedagogical perspective is incomplete. In this case, he also must, in his practice, design forms of actualization according to the original field of knowledge (the reality of educating), choose contents, plan didactic modalities, etc. If experiencing and lived experiencing are not problem areas for didactical thinking, the absence of these two aspects of lifestyle first must be shown in the reality of educating. If practice proves that they appear clearly in the pedagogical tasks, i.e., if the reality of educating discloses itself such that experiencing and lived experiencing have important pedagogical consequences in any other pedagogical discipline, then Didactical Pedagogics has no doubt that the matter is a task because its actualization *also* is brought into didactic activities.

Similarly, with respect to didactical theory it must be remembered that these two aspects of a person’s being in the world also will surface in therapeutic pedagogical situations as revealed in, among others, Orthopedagogics and in Vocational Orientation. Thus, this didactic task cannot be eliminated. If experiencing and lived experiencing in their coherence cannot actually arise in didactic designs they cannot actually appear in Orthopedagogics because then one would have to deny that these concepts have pedagogical connotations.

Let us begin by examining the didactic-pedagogical possibilities for theory building. In the first place, didactical pedagogics can refer back to other pedagogical disciplines and even to other subject matter areas because the idea of “application” presupposes a wider field than the reality of educating, including Anthropology, Axiology, Psychology, Sociology, etc. The aim of such a referring back not only would simply be to augment their data but also to come to an interpretation of them.

Another possibility that can be chosen is to turn back to the totality of pedagogical disciplines in their coherent statements and interpretations and then try to plan the didactic use of this information for teaching. Obviously, this is a more acceptable approach than the first because it is pedagogically focused. A

problem that didactical theory building faces in such a case is that it is fundamentally different from the first possibility, but in principle they are the same. Namely, he can try to acquire other information, insights and perspectives than his own and in this way announce his own.

Also, there is a third possibility: that didactic-pedagogical issues are formulated in terms of these two concepts from a didactic-pedagogical perspective and then compiled as didactical questioning a way of reflecting on their implementation so that the other pedagogical disciplines have the opportunity to provide a direct perspective from autonomous questioning. This direct perspective would announce the one important issue, i.e., the actualization of the coherence of “experience” and “lived experience” as a central didactical problem on which the other disciplines could shed light in a progressive sense. But also in a regressive sense, insights and questions about actualizing experiencing and lived experiencing could be asked from a didactic situation. This would make possible joint pedagogical writing as answers to particular questions.

One must note that in the first two possibilities, in each case there is a move from a structure to the didactical and in the latter case from the didactical problematic in theory building, questions are asked of the other pedagogical disciplines and of other areas of knowledge, where necessary. But also in a regressive sense, insights and questions can be asked about actualizing experiencing and lived experiencing in a didactic situation. This would make possible joint pedagogical writings as answers to particular questions. This does not imply that a didactic perspective will, should or can explain the central problematic but only that its tasks are as unique as especially that of Psychopedagogics which nevertheless must be questioned largely in terms of the didactic task. The benefits of methodological progressiveness and regression should be clear. Probably the most important thing for didactical theory building is that the details of experiencing and lived experiencing can be considered in terms of the didactic task (actualizing teaching forms).

It would be irresponsible to try to claim that in this section the problem of the coherent meaning of experiencing and lived

experiencing will be formulated sufficiently from a didactical point of view. In this particular case, didactical thinking still shows three major shortcomings that would make such a claim false and unscientific.

In the first place, statements about experiencing and lived experiencing in didactical thinking mostly are fragmental and disperse which makes a synthesis extremely difficult, especially as interpretation. Secondly, from other perspectives on the matter, pronouncements and interpretation still are being made such that details for didacticians are not yet complete and often are incoherent. Finally, thinking about this matter in terms of the reality of educating is quite recent with the result that an overview also is extremely difficult, especially because of the sporadic, incomplete nature of such descriptions.

The integrated magnitude (scope and relief) that should be inherent in the concept “structure” simple is not there yet. Today, however, many definitive questions have come to light in the sense that they are formulated such that a greater synthesis (perspective on essences) has become possible.

Given the scope of the issue and the limited space available, I would like to concentrate somewhat on indicating the problem of the coherence between the two matters from a didactic to a psychopedagogical field.

Let us state the problem as follows: Can one possibly not put the question of the value of experiencing and lived experiencing in the clearest relief possible by asking questions of the psychopedagogical from the perspective of a lesson structure? If one reflects from a lesson structure to Psychpedagogics, this reflection is not in the form of an answer but, as far as the didactic is concerned, in the form of questions to which important answers must be provided by a psychopedagogue.

With this, Didactical Pedagogics does not want to prescribe to Psychopedagogics its area or draw attention to gaps in its structure. Rather, the intention is to show that the didactical and the psychopedagogical perspectives both are directed to the same

reality (educative reality), that both are pedagogical matters and that pedagogical essences cannot be understood in a didactical sense unless a person also can be understood psychopedagogically.

If we can briefly refer to the synthesis to which didacticians, especially at the University of Pretoria, so far have come with respect to a lesson structure, certainly the following is important. The author began with the matter of a lesson structure in the first semester of 1968. At that time, there was mention of a “lesson analysis” to indicate that a presented lesson lends itself to analyses in order to highlight its structural aspects with a view to seeking generally valid form constructions for a lesson, especially in accord with the research on didactic ground forms completed at the end of 1968.

These first efforts, in particular, brought forth two important matters or aspects of the task. The first was the design consequences of the didactic ground forms. At the time, the functional meaning of the ground form in a lesson structure was indicated in relatively broad strokes although very many details still needed to be worked out. Moreover, there was a clear relation shown between didactic ground form and didactic methodology. However, it must be pointed out that these pronouncements were only made in a general didactic sense and a perspective on the different lesson types was not mentioned.

It was not until the first semester of 1970 that insight, and thus also a perspective, emerged with respect to the coherence of ground forms and teaching methods. Statements relevant to form building and lesson type initially were sporadic and unreasoned and thus were dispersed and not integrated insights. All collaborators were aware that form building eventually should make visible the types of lessons and that the principles of ordering relevant to lesson content should somehow appear somewhere in the structure of functional meaning, i.e., it cannot merely be theory but implies assignments (tasks) that must be realized somewhere in a lesson. However, this aspect could not be well placed.

Initially this was linked to teaching methods in accordance with trying to almost get the lesson content in perspective. In fact, the

effect was somewhat obscuring because the approach and hypotheses used were incorrect. Only later was it realized that two issues must be explicated in the context of a lesson structure before related and supplementary view could be brought into perspective. These two matters were “form” and “content” that jointly and in their coherence gave rise to the possibility of a matter such as a lesson structure. Stated differently: Insight into the coherence of lesson form and lesson content is a precondition for the structure of a lesson (as a general didactical theory) and its realization in disclosing (describing), among other things, certain lesson types (realizing insight in a practical situation). Thus, the meaning of form and content constitutes a particular equilibrium in a lesson situation that enables a balanced movement (dynamics) of a lesson as a matter of action. In the last chapter, these orienting remarks are elaborated on in greater detail.

In harmony, the two identities “form” and “content” constitute a lesson structure that is of particular didactical significance. Therefore, the issue of lesson contents began to gain more prominence in constructing a theory about a lesson structure. The main problem around which much of the thinking revolved was: How does content function in terms of the didactic-pedagogical course [of a lesson]?

In unraveling the problems, it came to light that three aspects of the perspective on content are of particular significance. Taking a lesson structure into account, the first matter is that a presentation in the form of a lesson in its formalized consequences is not possible unless such content is reduced to the essences that must carry a person’s insight. In conjunction with this, and parallel to it, is the formulation of a meaningful problem that can carry a teaching aim. Thirdly, taking into account modes of learning relevant to a lesson situation, the formulation of an actual learning aim.

These three matters were compiled under the concept “teaching aim”. This aim becomes visible in three aspects (learning aim, teaching aim, content reduction). Next we also worked through the lesson form. Thus, this lesson form must reveal what ground form is relevant, as indicated in the previous chapter. The binding factor with respect to lesson form and lesson content at the time was

perceived to be the ways of ordering such content precisely because it pointed to the beginning of understanding the matter called the lesson sequence. For example, if one should choose a symbiotic ordering of content in accordance with judgments regarding the teaching aim, in principle one already has indicated the beginning point for the lesson sequence.

Thus, in a didactic sense, a presentation using an inductive and/or deductive approach already has been compromised greatly. That is to say, this compromising necessarily actualizes itself with respect to the possibilities of the ground form as well as the methodological principles that are viewed as valid. These aspects of a lesson structure indeed can be shown but not separately in constructing a theory.

Here one is dealing with various shades of color just as didactic light separates in a prism. One obtains a similar construction in Psychopedagogics when psychopedagogues begin working with the concepts “experience” and “lived experience”. When then a didactician turns his attention to Psychopedagogics for an illumination of the matter, he also is well aware that here he is dealing with a matter of shades that in many respects make difficult demands on his ability to distinguish.

There are three aspects that, in a didactical sense, are investigated in inquiring about experiencing- and lived experiencing-tendencies from knowledge of a lesson structure that are of significance: the lesson form, the lesson content and the course of a lesson. The latter comes into motion by implementing a teaching method. It has its nodal point in the forms of teaching that are chosen with respect to contents on the basis of which the application of particular methods can be justified in the course of a lesson. In this way, the highly important aspects of the modes of learning again are taken into account that understandably are connected with the learning aim aspect of the lesson aim.

It particularly is in the division of a teaching aim into a lesson form and a lesson content along with the associated modes of learning that makes the matter of experiencing and lived experiencing didactically meaningful. That is, a didactician faces the question: Is



the question of experiencing and lived experiencing a matter of a learning aim and a way of learning? It must be understood well that the one especially is prominent in the synthesis regarding the lesson content (the experiencing of a learning person). The other especially is prominent in the synthesis of insight regarding the course of a lesson, i.e., the initiating skill of a teacher with an eye to a teaching effect (the lived experiencing of a learning person).

This parallel separation of the two matters “experience” and lived experience” occurs simply in order better to put the emphasis, and thus its didactic meaning, into better perspective. If this reduction seems simplistic, it only was done for the purpose of bringing to the surface the didactic problem in sharper relief. The root of the matter is: the assertion that experiencing and lived experiencing are not meaningful didactical concepts actually falls away with this. Neither the learning aim nor the modes of learning can be considered as occurring outside of experiencing and lived experiencing when constructing a didactical theory.

What, after all, is one of the basic pedagogical insights we have in order to bring the entire person-world relationship to pedagogical interpretation?

A person participates in the world and changes it. Thus, a person learns to know the world and becomes familiar with it. If Pedagogics asserts that a person becomes familiar with the world, actually it also means that eventually he makes himself at home in the world. In other words, he orients himself to contents that proclaim world as world. If one now were to proceed to continually replace concepts which also disclose the particular relevance of “*didaskhein*”, one very quickly would set down a collection of didactical categories. Thus, when one works with the concepts “experience” and “lived experience”, this means that one is involved with these reciprocal concepts in constructing a didactical theory.

In the present state of Pedagogical thinking, in particular at Pretoria University,<sup>1</sup> this reciprocal meaning of experiencing and lived experiencing is evident. Also it is important to note here that the term “reciprocal” does not mean “congruent”. An interdisciplinary interpretation shows clearly that lived experiencing can flow from

experiencing, but also it can constitute original experiencing as such – especially in a pathic (affective) sense. Hence, lived experiencing can refer back to experiencing, but on the other hand, it also is clear that experiencing, especially in its acting-choosing-diversity, also can flow from lived experiencing, that lived experiencing in its motivating power provides the possibility, and in realizing it, also to establish reality from new experiences. If it is true that these two aspects of a lifestyle are of reciprocal significance, a first task for a didactic design is in initiating the reciprocal movement of the two in a formal situation.

In connection with Sonnekus<sup>2</sup>, there are four psychopedagogical statements that one can make to bring didactical thinking into motion, especially with a view to returning to the field of knowledge mentioned.

1. The stream of lived experiencing varies with respect to its pathic-affective and gnostic-cognitive moments. If one must interpret this statement didactically in search of the above action-task-character, the following can be said:

In so far as there is mention of experiencing and lived experiencing in the didactic-pedagogical course of teaching events, one also could speak of post-affective and pre-cognitive aspects in the stream of lived experiencing in order to disclose distinctions with the aim of a securer design in the lesson structure. One must note that this statement actually directly transfers you to the didactic imperative. The lived experiencing stream *varies* with regard to its two aspects cited above. First and foremost, this variation is not of relevance to a school situation but indeed to the primary pedagogical situation, i.e., the original educative reality in which the didactic imperative also is embedded – as was shown above.

2. Lived experiencing is a matter of meaning. Is meaning possible without content? The answer is no because meaning cannot be given to nothing. Meaning, as an aspect of a person's "being-in-the-world", only is possible with respect to "something", i.e., content. The stream of lived experiencing is a matter of lived experienceable and meaningful contents. As a matter of content, the above postulate immediately suggests the didactic imperative.

3. The modes of being (modes of learning) as modes of actualizing lived experiencing imply the didactic imperative. One is unable to learn about nothing. Anyone who learns always learns something. In educating, these learning acts do not always occur spontaneously and without reservation. Often, an educator initiates it. Also, it occurs in a wide variety of situations. Indeed, this is the one important consequence for building a didactical theory that flows from Landman's exposition of the pedagogical sequence structure. In this, a teaching moment is rooted as a matter of educating in particular as a matter of "engagement".

4. Lived experiencing implies "Verstehen" (Heidegger) and "Befindlichkeit". This means that understanding and existential sensitivity must become visible in the reciprocal relation of these two forms of living, and must be manifested in a first, profound power of a person's becoming, i.e., education. Thus, the actualization of this understanding includes the unlocking of reality. The motivation offered by Sonnekus in this regard is: Lived experiencing also includes learning to know; a search for what is, securing form and the impact on childlike lived experiences. This "is" (being or ontos) assumes the real, the essentials of living in this, lived experiencing is intercepted by an educator who not only focuses on what is essential, but also on helping a child learn to know it: thus, the didactic imperative.

In each of the above statements Pedagogics necessarily pushed through to didactic practice. The search for didactical fundamentals takes note of this and tries to overcome the problems of his own perspective. In this respect, pedagogical thinking remains essence thinking (Landman). The outcome of didactical theory building is one of the tasks that in this case one possibly can summarize as follows: To seek forms, ways, means, practices of actualization in order to allow the stream of lived experiencing to take its course unhindered in a constituted situation (in school).

Here "unhindered" implies that formal teaching indeed can block the stream of lived experiencing. On the other hand, "unhindered" does not also mean undirected where the ordering of reality in a didactic situation is emphasized strongly. Thus, there is clear

mention of a task for Didactical Pedagogics when lived experiencing is stated.

Now, what is the crux of the matters that didactical thinking must penetrate, i.e., what does a didactician not know when he approaches his problem in relation to the structure of lived experiencing?

1. In the first place, a didactician does not know what the question of “lived experience” means when Psychopedagogics postulates it as an area for its own and interdisciplinary research. One must acknowledge the fact that in psychopedagogics the matter of “lived experience” has not yet received systematic attention regarding its essences in studying the phenomenon of educating. With Sonnekus and Pretorius for the first time, lived experiencing became an acute topic in pedagogical writings. Just read Kant, Schliermacher, Dilthey, Kohnstamm, Waterink, Langeveld and others. The words “experience” and “lived experience” often are used differently here, also non-pedagogically, because philosophical anthropological concepts often are used as pedagogical statements regarding them.

2. In contrast, in pedagogical writings, experiencing has been used much more extensively, in definite educative contexts and with greater attention to details. Thus, a didactician must acquaint himself with particular details if he wants to know why it is in his particular perspective on the problem. The concept of experience actually is a favorite area of philosophical investigation.

Kant's *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* [*Critique of Pure Reason*] begins with a comment on experience. Experience is the basis for and *origin* of all knowledge. Without experience, knowledge is not possible. From a pedagogical view of the matter, Pestalozzi argues that the acquisition of all knowledge first occurs through experience and then through the word. Thus, experience presumes the didactic word (i.e., teaching). Brenzinka<sup>3</sup> seeks the sense of educating in one's original experiential involvement with reality. Here one must pay particular attention to the connotation of the reciprocal meaning already expressed. If the following aspects of experience

are singled out in ways similar to what was the case with lived experiencing, then the following appear:

- a) Experiencing has an a priori meaning of judgment. This is to say (a priori) that experiencing makes a judgment possible. In other words, judgment is an inevitable consequence of experiencing. Thus, experiencing presupposes knowledge in the sense that it brings together knowledge and makes it available to consciousness in order to form a judgment. Knowledge (as experience) is not always articulate or verbalized. It is not necessarily conveyed in symbolic forms. Therefore, experiencing presupposes a judgment as a matter of consciousness because, a priori, knowledge is conveyed in experience. Hence, experiencing presupposes knowledge in the first place.
- b) A priori, experiencing has a meaning of activity. To be experienced means to be able to do, to act in a situation in order to convert a situation in general to one's own situation. An act that relies on experiencing is not blind, but one that follows the appeal of particulars that speak from a situation. Experience also indicates mastery. Thus, experience is not only a matter of knowledge or verbalizing knowledge in symbolic forms. It also is a matter of doing. Thus, in the second place, experiencing presupposes a justifiable act.
- c) If the above two statements hold water, experiencing also has a transposing meaning. Then experiencing presupposes thinking. Stated formally: A priori, experiencing has a thinking meaning because the action of (b) is not described as instinctively determined in a life situation. This action always is preceded by a judgment. The judgment and action then are grounded in the possibilities of actualizing experiencing and, in real terms, expresses the thinking to which an acting person comes. Then thinking functions to bind ordering and acting in particular situations. By thinking, experiencing is transformed into symbolic form by which science becomes possible. Hence, in the third place experiencing presupposes thinking.
- d) Thinking is impossible without an experiential base, apart from the synthesis to which it can come and new constructions that can be made because neither of the two

(synthesis and construction) can be based on nothing. Experiencing thus predisposes thinking. If so, experiencing, a priori, means learning because thinking without learning at most would represent a one-time occurrence in one's life.

- e) Experiencing cannot be shared *as such*. All that can be shared is the outcome of experiencing. This statement applies equally to lived experiencing. In a didactic sequence one actually makes experience superfluous. Sharing knowledge, unlocking reality make it unnecessary to undergo again. But it is precisely this entirety of human experiences that is available as cultural goods and science that makes it possible for reality to be unlocked. These experiences are not involved directly in the unlocking, the expertise that are remnants of experiencing.

In the pedagogical literature, the extent to which the concepts of experiencing, lived experiencing, knowing, knowledge and skills are used in congruent and complimentary ways really is conspicuous. As far as didactics is concerned, the meaning of these concepts blurs into congruent and complimentary terms of use to such an extent that their meaning (nomenclature and descriptive value) becomes largely meaningless. From didactic judgment, experiencing then is equal to lived experiencing, to knowledge, etc. while each of the facets of the lifeworld in a didactic design nevertheless impose variations that must be made visible in a lesson form, lesson content and course of a lesson.

What must be taken into account in didactical theory building in this regard is that these modes of being (experiencing, lived experiencing, acting, etc.) continually intersect each other in one's lifestyle and that they are distinguished insufficiently in pedagogical terms by description with a view to making it didactic in the designs. When it is said that a situation of experiencing is created for a child, all of the above mentioned complementary aspects are included. Didactics simply does not do this.

It should be clear from the foregoing that a seeker of fundamental didactical theory in relation to the issues of experiencing and lived experiencing in many respects goes back to Psychopedagogics because the essences of pedagogical reality must be highlighted

there in order to be able to describe carefully the form, content and course of teaching for implementation in practice. The following matters currently appear to be problematic for Didactical Pedagogics because they are related most closely to the lesson structure and lesson types that form the endpoint of didactical thinking.

The root word of experience in the German languages is “fahren” meaning “to go”. When there is mention of “experience” [erfahren] the prefix gives it the meaning to undergo. When reality is experienced, it implies that a person undergoes the totality of such reality. The root word for lived experience is “living” (life). Thus, in its usual sense it means that a person is here, present in a situation, that he is there where things are. In contemporary expositions, didacticians merely identify experiencing with knowing and lived experiencing with sensing, i.e., with an affective, pathic awareness of something.

The question is whether these interpretations represent a correct structure – so correct that they can be accepted fundamentally as structural pronouncements when a lesson structure eventually is considered. If, in theory building, one cannot evaluate concepts like these in their own right and identity, how can they be interpreted meaningfully and convincingly with regard to the didactic imperative? In such vagueness, how can didactical theory provide an image, relief and outline of its ultimate task? With respect to so much vagueness is a didactic relief possible? Can such hazy explanations lay claim to be labeled as constructions? And isn't the one important problem for teaching theory also that, by virtue of such fogginess, he vaguely, gropingly searches himself in his practice because he doesn't know exactly what he is looking for?

There is little doubt that a didactician cannot give a complete answer to this question. If one encounters the problem of integrating the form, content and course of a lesson structure, necessarily one lands in a particular type of lesson that formally can bring into motion a particular teaching aim. These lesson types make claim of the lesson types based on the actualization-tendencies that are assumed in all three aforementioned aspects of a lesson structure in accordance with the lesson types, the nature of

the motion (the course of teaching and the course of learning) being expedited.

This certainly is the case in some lesson structures of appreciation, e.g., in literature, music and art. This appreciating certainly is a matter of particular contents that speaks in the “getting to know” value judgment and thus presupposes experience of dealing with such contents. Thus, in this particular case, a learning aim is linked to a reduction of content and the problem that has been formulated.

The foundation of this is [a learner’s] becoming as a lived experienced aspect that makes possible the formulation of a learning aim. This wondering does not necessarily have to be the ultimate aim; it also can be an intermediate one. The fact is that in the successive constitutions of didactic situations, becoming proceeds to appreciating, i.e., it includes a value judgment as a teaching effect. Without the “Befindlichkeit” [emotionality] previously referred to, the didactic course simply does not get on track.

Thus, a teacher focuses on this sensitivity. Sonnekus argues that this “Befindlichkeit” becomes visible in a stream of lived experiencing. Now, as a didactician, one knows that intentionality is present in the flow of lived experiencing; that intentionality flows into this affective stratum. This is so in the sense that actualizing intentionality and lived experiencing shows coherence of each other: Affects, intentionalities, lived experiences. A child’s focus on reality has everything to do with this.

Take for example fantasy, described by Sonnekus as one of the modes of actualizing lived experiencing. If one accepts this, fantasy is related directly to affects, intentionality and lived experiencing. Therefore, it also is in direct relationship to learning and the modes of learning; hence, it must be taken into account in disclosing the didactic task in a lesson structure. After all, breaking through the affective to the cognitive must be realized in the teaching. This has to do with the didactical category “achievement” becoming visible. If the mode of the stream of lived experiencing creates a barrier or resistance in the course of teaching, it reduces the teaching effect. Ultimately, here lived experiencing must proceed to a cognitive



directedness (a value judgment) by which an aspect such as a pathic-directed fantasy must be broken through.

A second problem that presents itself here for didactical thinking is that of knowledge, now as valid knowledge that must be verbalized. Is knowledge a higher level of lived experiencing? In the currently available literature it is assumed that knowledge is the highest level of experiencing because in this way (the thinking), a deliberate control of reality on the basis of experiencing becomes possible. In the course of a life situation, the effect of experiencing actually is invisible until it is transformed into a deliberate lifestyle; i.e., in verbalizing knowledge as judgments, masteries and later skills. In short, experiencing must lead to achievement. Why else does a didactician create a situation in which experiencing must take its course in its original forms? Is this then about experiencing as achieving? Nevertheless, he intends to raise the level such that knowledge must come from experiencing and must be visible in achievement.

This achievement is evaluated in terms of a purer emancipation, clearer perspective, tighter objectification, etc. At the same time, is the knowledge that is the central theme of the preceding statements also a higher level of lived experiencing? And if so, does this mean that the cognitive proclaims a higher level than the affective? Is this not just about the diversity and differentness of lived experiencing? Here is a didactician not on a one-sided track that ultimately results only in educative incompleteness regarding both form and content? How is this related to curriculum theory in this respect? Once again, is the passage of the stream of lived experiencing from the affective to the cognitive an elevation of the level of lived experiencing? If so, this constitutes a didactic ideal.

Here the didactic imperative must seek its tasks: The ways of actualization in order to lead the pathic-affective stream of lived experiencing to the gnostic-cognitive level. In this, achievement will show itself. The first didactical problem with such an action is that lived experiencing as a way of being does not allow itself to be manipulated in such a way in a child's life. Also, with this part, of a lesson structure falls away. The unique nature of a lesson structure in accordance with a teaching aim (including an appreciation

lesson) no longer corresponds with original experiencing as one has come to know it in the lifeworld. In an appreciation lesson, as a type of lesson, the judgment to which a child comes, is no more than the pure enjoyment of the contents that are made available and that pedagogically is as justifiable as any learning aim. After all, a child's forming is not reducible to the knowledge he ultimately must possess. His participation in the world and life is not in all respects a matter of quantitative accounting, but also of qualitative surrender. A return to pathic lived experiencing also is an eventuality of appreciation. Does this mean that the cognitive is a higher form of lived experiencing? Or does the cognitive fall back to the level of the affective in order to complete the circle of appreciation? Does the evidence show that gnostic affects can be stirred up, which then make the surrender to particular life contents superfluous?

Probably it is fair to put the following question to didactical theory: How (i.e., by what means) will lived experiencing be actualized in teaching? How imperfect are didactical insights into the modes of lived experiencing when an answer to this question must be provided? If the modes of learning imply the modes of actualizing lived experiencing, here a didactician faces a diverse task that he cannot justify in his possible designs. His lesson structure becomes haphazard regarding these matters; merely compare the issues of learning aim, reduction of content, and formulating [lesson] problems.

In the third place, if we accept that a child's world has a pathic-affective emphasis (as currently is the case), does this mean that a rational approach to reality qualitatively enhances the life essence "lived experience"? What is structurally valid for the equilibrium of this matter? In what way can the hypothetical validity of this be researched with respect to effective teaching? Would a tighter, more objective rational approach to reality actually increase the formative quality in the sense of lived experiencing? In some school subjects this matter is extremely topical in teaching. After all, they lend themselves so superbly to rational constructions of reality. If the hypothesis stated above could be proved to be true, the curriculum equilibrium for these areas of learning will need to be revised radically.

Also, there are other facets of the problem that arise in considering the matter. Must a lesson designer also ultimately be attuned to the formulation of lived experiencing, i.e., transposing lived experiencing, as a mode of being, to the level of language, especially to that of a symbolic form? Can one transpose lived experiencing in such a way that becoming aware of reality is captured in symbolic form? There are obvious boundaries in this matter, and now: to what extent does a didactic design respect these boundaries or break through them? In a general sense, can it be said of didactical aims that the formulation of lived experiencing is not regarded in its actual coherence with the preceding two aspects, i.e., lived experiencing as knowledge and lived experiencing as being rational (especially in the sense of ordering life)? In this broad context, what is the relationship between transposing (transferring to a world of symbols) and lived experiencing as such?

The problem of experiencing today is much more transparent to a didactician than lived experiencing. Didacticians know too little about lived experiencing to formulate and justify didactical judgments. If here lived experiencing also assumes a child's attitude (evidence of his participation in the course of educating), a childlike attribution of meaning to reality also cannot appear on the horizon. Should this aspect be a matter of haphazard communication, assistance provided by an adult to a child to change to a state of adulthood should show a dangerous trend towards a haphazard. Beyond the stream of lived experiencing there can be no realization of forming, and also no emancipation. From this, it follows that the self-knowledge to which a child must be able to work through to continues to fail, and, in its turn, this means that educating in the true sense of the word cannot occur.

Therefore, one must recognize that for a didactician there is a definite distinction regarding experiencing and lived experiencing, even if this merely is with respect to the extent of his expertise. To a large extent, he can make direct experiencing superfluous in a didactic situation. However, taking into account existing insights, this does not apply to lived experiencing. A breakthrough from the pathic to the Gnostic, as far as the stream of lived experiencing is concerned, must continually be shaped anew by each child.

Certainly this is a didactic task. The coherence of the pathic and the gnostic is fragile; it is violated easily. In addition, provision must be made for a return to the pathic as an eventuality of lived experiencing.

From this there are various difficult matters for consideration in a lesson structure. What claim is there to completeness in so far as the modes of lived experiencing now are indicated cognitively? This matter of modes of lived experiencing is an important problem for didactical theory building. Can one claim that a mode only is visible to the extent that it is actualized cognitively?

Currently, didactic practice shows itself in such a way that an affirmative answer is given to the last question asked. Cognitive modes of manifestation are elevated to criteria for judging lived experiencing in a didactic situation, i.e., to the extent that lived experiencing is present in the didactical designs. Many aspects of designs are attuned to lived experiencing without really being familiar with a child. Will the pathic way (mode) be the same as the gnostic modes? For a didactician this seems unlikely and he turns his questioning eyes to Psychopedagogics.

If one were to postulate that lived experiencing implies didactical aims, that pathic re-lived experiencing is necessary for breaking through to the gnostic, also that a didactic situation quickens the stream of lived experiencing and makes it acute in the attitude (attunement), one has a didactic problem. Quite generally, it is stated that (in a didactic sense) the most important criterion for the knowable is that it can be repeated. Thus, usually the sediment of knowledge in teaching that is an expression of the experience of people is available to a pedagogician for judgment in teaching: That this knowledge is repeatable, practical and thus obtainable.

Does this pronouncement apply to lived experiencing? Are there such lived experiential examples available for teaching that can guarantee the effectiveness of the stream of lived experiencing? Because the physical, chemical, biological, etc. can show definite repeatable trends (electrical current, the effect of acids on metal, osmosis) while the essence of the content remains the same and is repeatable, experiencing is called the basis of teaching.

Does this hold for lived experiencing? Is not a child's involvement in such a reality unique? The generalizations that direct the didactic in its situated progression are much more vague and their contrasts more vaguely nuanced. Certainly, a teaching effect need not be inferior but it definitely will look different. If there is mention of exercising and memorizing in lived experiencing, as modes of learning, this would directly affect the lesson structure. For example, in the pure design of an appreciation lesson, apparently there is no room for making the steam of lived experiencing visible as precisely can be given to the content in a gnostic account, e.g., in particular with a literary or musical genre. Then, the exemplary as a ground form [of teaching] strongly comes into the foreground.

But even more: Is the concept lived experience informative in a didactical exposition? Almost no details are available on this. Can a didactician isolate objective and informative moments in the course of a stream of lived experiencing and on that basis distinguish between lived experiencing and experiencing? This question clearly affects the describability of lived experiencing and thus also and particularly its didactical evaluation. For example, if each lived experiencing is a unique matter because it has been determined by content, how does a didactician arrive at a generally valid structure that he must provide for in a constitutive sense?

In light of the above, his distinctions become a difficult matter. Continually, he is tempted to declare that, as far as a didactical perspective is concerned, lived experiencing has an experiential quality. Somewhere in a lesson structure, all of the problems mentioned are embedded in didactical concepts consciously or unconsciously, explicitly or implicitly. The literature shows this clearly: note Klafki's exposition of the fundamental and the elemental in constructing a didactical theory. Long before him, Pestalozzi risked doing this, while Froebel's entire system of educating small children relies on this—although unconsciously.

The above problems are not mentioned to indicate, from a didactical pedagogical view, to Psychopedagogics its area of study. This would be presumptuous and unjustified. However, this radical

thinking through of “didaskhein” as it appears in the reality of educating compels a teaching doctrine to ask psychopedagogues questions which didactical pedagogics cannot answer adequately. These matters always become acute in a lesson structure. On closer inspection, both of these perspectives [didactical pedagogical and psychopedagogical] of the pedagogical are focused on disclosing the reality of educating and in some way they are involved in trying to bring the same phenomenon to light.

## **B. TEACHING EFFECT: LEARNING AS A FORM IN WHICH ORIGINAL EXPERIENCING IS EXPRESSED**

From the foregoing, one can state briefly that original experiencing announces the one important source of knowledge where a theoretical didactician must look for the origins of the practice he wants to describe. Understandably, another source of knowledge is the contents that arise with teaching where an educator’s life- and world-view particularly figure in a primary way. With this, in constructing a didactical theory two parallel lines are drawn that should serve as a path for the structure, i.e., the didactical theory.<sup>4</sup> Thus, it seems that the equilibrium and relevance of a didactical theory also depend largely on whether a thinker can create a harmonious unity among the contributions that these two sources of knowledge make to his structure in his descriptions and interpretations.

Here it is important to emphasize again that when a person considers the meaning of contents, ultimately this is a private matter, a particular interpretation of the coherence of contents and the course of one’s participation in the reality of educating. The entirety of experiencing offers itself to the study of form, as it appears universally among persons, for a reduction to essences (categories) by which they can appear on the life horizon of a learning person. Therefore, form is a matter of original structures for implementation that arises from the lifeworld that includes the reality of educating.

This form gives the first indications, the first possibilities of the expectation that didactic practice can be established in situations other than the original one of educating. This insight into the

coherence of original or primary and secondary practice (the school) is a precondition for constructing a didactical theory that, as a theory, clings to reality. Understanding of and designs for a secondary practice are not possible unless the original practice is viewed and understood in its essences. Therefore, a didactical theory for the ground forms of teaching must go back to the original reality of teaching with an attempt to view it for the purpose of establishing a secondary practice.

It only is logical that first and foremost, a didactician must consider the form that original experiencing shows before working through to selecting and structuring complexes of contents that must be mastered by learning persons, even in a broader context and in light of his life- and world-view. His findings regarding the issue of content eventually come to fruition mainly through his curriculum theory, the compilation of curricula and later, a teacher's lesson plan as part of a plan of work. Thus, ultimately a curriculum includes religious views, as a person's most valuable heritage, but also cultural goods, skills, etc. as contents in terms of which educative aims must be realized. Also, it is understandable that Afrikaners jealously protect their Christian-Protestant heritage, their language treasure, their historical development as pronounced Western people—their identity.

But these views do not apply to form because a didactical form appears as a *universal* human way of being in the world, of participating in the course of human events, realizing educative aims, actualizing a teaching intention in order to determine (through contents) a *particular* relationship to reality as a whole (God, man, culture, civilization, techniques, etc.). Thus, in the history of education one constantly gets a particular interpretation of content that then must be realized in a (sometimes) one-sided emphasis of form (school system). This [kind of] formal explication constitutes the greatest part of the history of Didactical Pedagogics.

In descriptions, form conspicuously directs itself to the *ways* in which a person inhabits the world, while the content aspects establish *beacons* in terms of which a person makes a dwelling on earth. Any didactical theory, thus, searches for equilibrium between these two matters in order to establish a practice itself as a matter of

making a future. Any didactical theory is a thinking ahead or anticipating a practice. As far as the Republic of South Africa and its scientific practice, its teacher preparation and its universities and schools are concerned, I believe this relationship of form and content is an important matter precisely because it makes possible a theoretical interception of currently burning practical issues.

If one now were to proceed to study didactic ground forms in light of a particular practice, this really means that the search for *fundamentalia* [essences] cannot avoid the task of saying something about one or another learning phenomenon from his particular perspective on the reality of educating. Thus, a didactician does not write a theory about the phenomenon of learning as such, but interprets and integrates insights from each of the other disciplines into his own problem (in particular from Psychopedagogics). Hence, a didactician does not write a theory about the possibility of the phenomenon of learning in pedagogical terms.

The origin of his questions and interpretations is the original reality (*didaskhein*) to which he directs himself such that his perspective on learning is his own. After all, the effect of his practice must be visible mainly in the act of learning. With respect to his conclusions about form and content, his practice is attuned to learning as a way of being human, especially becoming adult. Teaching is a matter of letting [someone] learn, of calling someone to open themselves to reality, i.e. to the contents of a lifeworld. Thus, the act of learning is a precondition for the possibility for teaching practice, it announces the meaning of teaching (educating) *as such* and it establishes the never ending becoming of a person's participation in the world. Unlock reality only makes sense if entry into that reality is possible.

It would be difficult to deny that learning is an original way of being in the world of a knowing person. Whatever statements psychologists also can present about learning, their views always and in all respects are predisposed by the fact that learning is way of being. Whoever wants to eradicate these boundaries in a layered or regional ontology, this fundamental statement presents insurmountable problems precisely because the distinction between consciousness and self-consciousness in human learning becomes most evident as a way of participating in the course of the world.



This issue is not relevant here except in the sense that, as a way of being in the world and becoming aware of oneself, it has the following important didactical consequence: to establish to what extent learning is an expression of original experiencing so designing a practice can include it for the sake of the highest possible (aspirational) effect of teaching.

I do not believe it is irresponsible to claim that when a didactician expresses himself about learning, this is not a completely foreign field to him. The phenomenon of learning (here the fact that a child learns) is an area of knowledge that, in terms of didactical categories and criteria, also partly belongs to Didactics. In his theory building, a didactician has the task of drawing conclusions about this matter from his particular perspective without which he cannot fulfill his practice. Undoubtedly, in a general sense, the phenomenon of learning is a task of educating and thus also an area of study for Pedagogics.

As far as didactical theory is concerned, it therefore is not contentious content because educating cannot be realized without teaching. If a didactician consciously wanted to express himself about entering into reality, or a let learn perspective of his field and ultimately wanted to make designs for this, he could not and should not avoid the theme “Learning”. The fact that here Psychopedagogics works side by side and together with Didactics, both in orienting and accompanying ways, is fruitful and fertilizing for both a theoretical approach and a practical realization of the didactic profession.

The meaning of a didactician’s inquiry into learning as an expression of original experiencing must be understood in order to be able to give an account of the category “opening oneself to reality”, i.e., entering reality, an appeal to learn, an anticipatory design of situations in which an intention to learn can be realized as optimally as possible in all of its diversity.

If one looks strictly from formal didactical thinking to the phenomenon of learning as a form of manifesting original experiencing as a matter of opening oneself to reality, one sees that

its meaning is sought in the fact that a learning person continually is placed in a successive series of situations. This statement applies to the reality of educating as a primary source of knowledge and is imitated formally in a school situation. The pedagogical meaning of these series of situations nevertheless lies in accelerating an entry into reality (learning) by consistently calling for it. Thus, a child is placed in the above-mentioned series of situations by which educating, in effect, has surpassed the structure of the original lifeworld.

A *situation* thus has been established that assumes that the sense of reality is inherent in an *interpretation* of it by an adult. In this way the coherence of forms and content in the course of this series of situations is accepted experientially. Undoubtedly, in the reality of educating, one assumes a meaningful reality that is disclosed for someone who has to learn it. In fact, that is the reason he was put in this situation. If this seems like a simplistic explanation of the reality of educating, one must consider its consequences before drawing conclusions.

To be placed in a situation also means that there must be action, i.e., that particular demands are made on the basis of which the series of situations take their course. Thus a situation does not only appeal to or address; it is so constituted that it demands of a child. Now one knows that in the ordinary course of living (which also is nothing but a particular series of situations) a child also is seized, e.g., in a play situation, even to such an extent that he forgets everything else and doesn't notice when they move past him. The details of the situation are what is central. His interest, attending, thinking, perceiving, etc. practically are fixated, in an absolute sense: he is so with things that they become part of him. In a formal series of situations, an adult tries to imitate this condition; to make contents of learning, as an expression of original experiencing, so available that a child will assimilate them into himself.

Therefore, an adult literally expects a pupil to grasp a piece of reality that seldom if ever can be presented in its demanding *sense*. Also it is important to note that an adult should be aware that a situation as a *type* in the lifeworld will come to light, especially in accordance with the contents of a child's original experiencing. This

typology of a series of situations is so close to the didactic ground forms that it should not be overlooked. A teacher cannot help but be aware that a situation (as such) that has appeared in original experiencing actually is unrepeatable. The reconstitution, i.e., its imitation is a *new* situation with a new task, especially a learning task and a teacher looks for an act of learning as the realization of new experiencing analogous to the *ways* in which learning was actualized in original experiencing. How then could the problem of modes of learning be ignored in writing a didactical theory?

In view of the fact that any situation is unrepeatable, necessarily it must be that very situation in which a pupil consciously is placed is new. The demand made is that he will participate in it properly. Thus, if one says that a child must enter the piece of reality offered, learning becomes an imperative matter. A child *can* and *must* (*should*) [enter it]. The moment one perceives this imperative as real (essential) and takes up forming a theory, this means that an adult throws overboard the issue of learning human propriety. In doing so, the act of learning is interpreted from the world of educating and in theory forming it is proclaimed to be a pedagogical matter.

The implication for didactic-pedagogical theory building is obvious. This is summarized as follows: In light of the imperative character of human situatedness and the continual placement of a child in a series of new situations, the pedagogical meaning of learning or entering reality or opening oneself to reality is a task for didactical theory in light of which it becomes a matter of propriety in an educative sense and must be realized in a teaching situation.

The issue of learning cannot be left out of any pedagogical discipline without doing violence to the reality of educating. Actualizing “being in the world” certainly is an educative task first and foremost. Such actualization is not possible without the act of learning, so such an act demands to be taken into account in each perspective on the phenomenon of learning. Thus, didactic-pedagogical theory forming must be aware that the totality of these insights into a practice in which all of the facets assumed in didactic preparation are actualized as optimally as possible.

In light of this last statement, this issue directs a particular appeal to didactical theory building. The following matters are of particular importance if one wants to put into didactical perspective learning as a form of expression of a child's original "being in the world".

1. Reflecting on the original experiencing of a child in terms of the first ontological category of "being in the world" assumes that this involvement of a child with reality is a meaningful matter. Reflecting on meaninglessness predisposes the idea of leaving this world as soon as possible.<sup>5</sup>

This meaningful participation in reality certainly speaks strongly to the fundamental pedagogical category of futurity and future expectation. This future expectation manifests itself as the event of "educating", as giving meaning to a particular piece of human experiencing we refer to as education. With this, the original sense of teaching is relevant *ipso facto*. No one can educate with regard to nothing and as soon as something (the contents of education) come to light, teaching announces itself as a trend in actualization.

Thus, one can state that teaching recapitulates original experiencing and incorporates its forms of manifestation into a systematic learning to know reality. This systematic learning to know reality proclaims the didactic imperative: The *actual* matter of teaching is educating. This actual reality of a person in the reality of educating is seen as a dynamic coherence of learning (self-actualization) and letting learn, or teaching (guided actualization) of lived experienced meaning.<sup>6</sup>

2. The meaning of teaching that in its essence has been described as realizing educating surely is in its pedagogic intervention in a child's situation with respect to his way through the world. Thus, "didaskhein" makes a special contribution to shaping a child's original experiencing in that it creates a climate and space for actualizing possibilities such that a child's original being-there show itself and can become visible in effective learning. As such, teaching also is a field of realizing future expectations that in a pedagogical sense always are addressed. In the last consequence, teaching also

is about fulfilling future expectations if one speaks about the course of time.

So: Teaching is the realization of future aim-, relationship-, and sequence-tendencies as found in pedagogic events. If this is acceptable, one can make two inferences, taking the entirety of the preceding argument:

a) Teaching gives form to the profound intervention of an educator. This intervention previously was described as accompanying actions of the task of actualizing “being in the world.

b) Teaching gives form to the participation in the lifeworld that a child simply must embody, the entry into reality as a self-guiding activity of the task of actualizing “being in the world”.

It is important to note that these two action tendencies largely constitute the reality of educating. Original experiencing (education) speaks strongly to the form that “letting learn” and “learning” take. A didactician creates a situation (guided actualization) in which a child can act (self-actualization) such that increasingly he can display the image of a person (formal and lived experienced image). This formal and substantive [content] intervention links up with a person’s (original life forms in which “being in the world” is made visible, with the aim of providing the opportunity for becoming – in fact, accelerating it – the pedagogical “engagement”).

The last realization that a didactic act strives for is to give form to a child’s original, created way of being in the world. After all, a didactician cannot hope that something else will help give form to it because there is nothing else that can do so. The way this occurs is by learning, particularly the modes of learning. Thus, actually a parent or teacher lets a child loose in reality; by presenting a “provisional”, harmless reality. Now he has the opportunity to actualize being, human ways of being by learning. On the other hand, teaching also provides original points of fixation with regard to which a learned person comes to both a spontaneous and a formal ordering of the lifeworld.

Whenever there is teaching, it is inconceivable that all of reality suddenly can pass in front of a child. Hence, an educator chooses certain points of fixation from the original lifeworld with respect to which an ordering of the lifeworld by a learned person emerges. This ordering of the lifeworld to a “world for me” can be described didactically as the first evidence of a learning effect, the first and most important step in mastering life reality. The ordering presented by an educator (if effective) leads to one’s *own* ordering and thus to emancipation. Certainly, the significance of this is that an experienced person now has the opportunity to bring the everyday interferences with reality to a state of coagulation that, as a lived experienced learning effect, is available for constituting a new reality in the sense of one’s “own world” (Eigenwelt).

The interacting coherence of the two moments “teaching” and “learning” makes possible a meaningful and feasible continuation of didactic practice in a school. The connection a teacher establishes in his didactic designs regarding teaching and learning ensures that an adult can keep a child with him until he himself *wants to* leave -- that a child will not be driven away in an untimely way into a reality where he cannot find himself as a person. *On the level of teaching, adults make their final loosening from the next generation.*

The image that has been constructed so far (now in a didactical sense) presents a new, although particular problem for creating a didactical theory: Is *all* experiencing (entering into, undergoing, participating in reality) an issue of learning? Is all childlike self-actualization worthy of the guidance of an adult? When a child is offered unconditional freedom on both a pathic and cognitive level, there can be no question of pedagogic-didactic intervention through guidance.

I believe the problem of didactical theory building currently is highlighted very clearly from Psychopedagogics where the relief, at least as a didactical silhouette, becomes very clear in the sense that the perspective on the problem becomes clear.<sup>7</sup> This unraveling perhaps will be clearer to a reader on the basis of two hypotheses that will give him the opportunity to conceive [the problem] further, also, and especially, in psychopedagogical terms.

The first hypothesis is: Although all experiencing does not make visible a *conscious* act of learning as such, learning (as fundamental) necessarily appears whenever experiencing comes to light. For a good understanding, this can be compared to Langeveld's well-known exposition of a pedagogically preformed field as it becomes evident in a relationship between educator and child. This association is not educating as such, but it includes all possible preconditions whether in agreeing or intervening (Landman) [with a child]. For example, lived experiencing joy, as an experiential diversity, based on a particular experience in itself has all conditions for the act of learning; the act of learning will be carried out in such situations.

Thus, in this respect, experiencing is a preformed field for the act of learning and, as a way of being, it already appears, albeit pathically, as a real constituent of the anticipated teaching. As a preformed field for the act of learning, experiencing therefore is a design task for didactical theory, especially in light of (1) above.

A second hypothesis is the following: The didactical is not attuned entirely to conscious learning and cannot claim the designation "design" if the situation created also does not make provision for an experiential-pathic preformed field with a view to a learning effect. One also speaks of such planning as creating a favorable learning climate. This includes among others the tasks of safety (security) and accepting [a child] by showing respect for dignity. Currently, it is evident beyond any doubt that both in general psychology and psychopedagogy that learning is actualized on both a pathic as well as cognitive level as well as in a non-conscious and conscious sense.<sup>8</sup>

Statements about perceiving, remembering, thinking, etc. confirm these judgments. If a didactician stares blindly at conscious, cognitive learning in building his theory, his view of his problem becomes one-sided and rigid. The shortcomings of his insights regarding his analysis of intentionality, i.e., will have lamentable value in his ultimate designs. This problem has been considered fully in the above reasoning.

Theses and antitheses that flow from the hypotheses stated above necessarily lead to a synthesis showing that indeed teaching provides a thorough and broad line for experiencing, *as such*. The only conclusion possible for didactical theory building is that original experiencing necessarily is actualized in an act of learning, even when it is not consciously, concretely visible in a learning result because a learning effect is not traceable only to intellectual achievement and because achieving does not imply only the intellectual.

From a didactical perspective, this does not imply that “original experiencing” and “learning” are complementary concepts: Indeed, they presume each other and in no theory building can be thought of as separate from each other. Original experiencing, whatever its nature, continually manifests itself or appears in particular learning moments, also in aspects that one would not normally describe as learning because in the learning world sometimes they are referred to as *affective* and, as such, are thought of apart from learning situations in order to get hold of them from other perspectives.<sup>9</sup>

Therefore, any teaching is based on experiencing, also in the sense that pathic structures can block the effectiveness of its course because some children find a breakthrough from the pathic to the gnostic difficult and here teaching must function as providing help. Fear, dismay, despondency, lethargy all are everyday experiential dispositions that speak decisively in a classroom regarding the teaching effect for which a didactician strives. A learning act already appears here, among other ways, as broken intention [to learn] destroys a didactic design that does not take this into account.

A teacher’s overpowering disappointment in such situations probably is the best evidence of this also because his (a teacher’s) original teaching tendency “being in the world” can be destroyed momentarily, while his own dismay easily blocks further insight and a renewed teaching intention. A pathic experiential context is a prelude for all people, especially children. As a prelude to actualizing original experiencing in teaching situations, it is of



fundamental significance and therefore also of fundamental importance in constructing a didactical theory.

The effect of a teaching situation on these matters ultimately is found in giving meaning rather than in cognitive achievement. This argument is closely related to the argument that the act of learning is a way of being. Because here we are dealing with a way of being, we also are involved in possibilities for implementing teaching. In fact, acquiring or attaining a learning effect thereby becomes an implementation task even when certain aspects of original experiencing are not referred to as learning acts and learning effects, as such. The consequence for didactical insight is that a teaching effect cannot be measured only by cognitive learning achievement.

The importance of a gnostic breakthrough is on the level of accounting. Particular experiencing now remains in its framework of meaning (point of departure): I am placed in the world. It is in this respect that in today's didactical theory the didactic obligation is raised: To move a child to delimit his being here (being in the world) and ultimately to verbalize it. The incomplete composition of didactical theory with respect to the entirety of the above-mentioned matters is striking to anyone familiar with it.

The details of this and of the preceding paragraph confront didactical theory with real attuned tasks in order also to account in its reducing a teaching effect, in light of the stated problems, with the aim of designing effective teaching and learning, respectively. "Entering reality" certainly acquires new points of view in light of this. And because reductions necessarily must verbalize reality, if also this is a matter of concepts that really need to have pedagogical relevance.

So far, didactical reductions probably have stripped away any superfluous aspects of experiencing that do not contribute to insight into its problems. On the other hand, it is equally striking that particular essences remain in effect with reductions, thereby lessening the structures of didactical theory becoming impoverished and obscured or narrowed in its scope. In this regard, one must understand well that psychopedagogical categories of learning must

be fulfilled so that they function in a constituted situation without violating original experiencing, as such, through teaching.

Didacticians will have to realize that their task primarily is not to support a particular point of view or put a particular structure into practice in such a way that they are made absolute and become a system. Searching for one's own perspective implies much more than this: With respect to a teaching and learning effect, a theory must lead to one's own field of vision with its own relief. As consequences for didactical theory building, the following matters can be deduced from the foregoing, especially with an eye to further research and thought.

1. The act known as teaching continually is repeated. This does not apply to a situation *as* situation, also not to contents as contents. The latter always is involved because the act, as it is evident in original experiencing is knowable and describable. Outside of the view that provides original experiencing there is no teaching effect because events do not occur other than in accordance with original [experiencing].
2. A situation within which the act occurs always is unique and thus is unrepeatable. In according with this *type*, it can be repeated for the sake of actualizing a learning intention such that there is a didactical view of a stream of actualization.
3. A situational stream originates in the spontaneous, naïve mobility of as person in reality as actualizing original experiencing in the act of learning, by which especially the sense of formal teaching can be postulated. Teaching strives for greater mobility, i.e., original experiencing as a learning effect is considered is judged to be incomplete in educating that is radical. By teaching, spontaneous, existential mobility thus is brought to the surface faster and more securely for the sake of wider scope and (qualitatively speaking) greater security in life. This applies both to pathic and gnostic facets of experiencing.
4. A didactical perspective on the act of learning, as actualizing original experiencing, is not possible unless the following matters are carefully taken into account:

a) *Intentionality and actualizing an intention to learn.* In this, a learning person becomes aware of the things surrounding him and a didactician is called to design accountably. Here “becoming aware” must be interpreted as a complex, existing being rather than as an intellectual, intellectualized or intellectualizing being. Thus, the visibility of a learning act as a new realization of original experiencing thus is not reducible to a purely intellectual achievement. In a didactic situation, primarily we are dealing with an existing person who is presumed to be more than a “knowing person”. Still, life achievement remains the last effect that is sought both in the teaching and learning aspects of educating. One finds the highest effect of learning in a person’s disclosure of the coherences with all of the matters to which an experienced person arrives. This reflects the learning nature of experiencing.

b) *Coherence.* A learning person must come to a certain ordering with respect to the coherences of contents that loom in the lifeworld and actualize them as a life form of original experiencing. Thus, by giving meaning to reality, a person’s intentionality becomes inspired. No child can evade this task because he cannot evade reality. Therefore, learning means an actualization of the original (one’s own) life form that is made explicit in formal teaching.

c) *Contrasting.* A learning child’s approach to reality is possible because of contrasts, the dissimilar, the odd, the contrasting and differentiated image that reality presents. Herein lies a field of actualization (in contrast to self actualizing) with respect to which a learning act, as a way of being, can be actualized in both guided-actualizing and self-actualizing ways. In other words, intentionalities and coherences are available for disclosing and unlocking [reality] so that an educative aim is able to be formulated.

With regard to theory building, this paves the way to address more closely the problem of unlocking reality (the task of teaching) from the perspective of a lesson structure.

<sup>1</sup> Oberholzer, Landman, Gouws, Roos, Kilian, Sonnekus, Pretorius, Van Dyk, to mention only a few.

<sup>2</sup> *Die Verhoudingstrukture van die Pedagogiese Situatie in Psigopedagogiese Perpectief*. (U.P. Publikasiereeks No. 59, 1971).

<sup>3</sup> Brenzinka, W.: *Erziehung als Lebenshilfe*.

<sup>4</sup> In this connection, see the statements of W. A. Landman: *Die Onderwyser as Begryper van Opvoeding*. Presentation delivered at the Pretoria Teachers College. Sept. 1971.

<sup>5</sup> There are such people but society views them as a remediation task. A Didactical theory for such persons lies outside of the possible conditions for a strictly normal pedagogical approach.

<sup>6</sup> These formulations are from Prof. M. C. H. Sonnekus, University of Pretoria. The author believes that thereby he has struck a major blow to the traditional separation of psycho- and didactic-pedagogical perspectives on the phenomenon of learning.

<sup>7</sup> The author wants to give special recognition to his colleagues in psychopedagogics, Prof. M. C. H. Sonnekus and his collaborators who made their own preliminary research insights freely available in this regard. Discussions on this theme shed much light on general and particular structures that are of great importance to didactical theory building.

<sup>8</sup> In this regard, compare the included literature with the following names in the bibliography: Van Parerren, Langeveld, Sonnekus, Eigler, Strunz, Binswanger, , Van den Berg, Buytendijk, Pretorius, Gous, Heidegger, Klafki, A. Flitner, Schiefele. Their explanations are of explicit or implicit relevance.

<sup>9</sup> Compare *The Affective Contact* (International Congress for Psychotherapy, Leiden, 1951). Particularly the contributions of Rumke, Brenkmann, Netzger, Frankl.