

## CHAPTER 1

### STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM, AIM AND PLAN OF STUDY

#### 1. INTRODUCTION

In the scientific literature, there are many articles about the child written from many perspectives (psychology, pedagogics, didactics, anthropology, etc.) and that are focused on several aspects of the ways of being-a-child (e.g., the "development" of a child, the learning child, the school-age child, a medical-physiological approach to a child). Further, these descriptions often are applications of other sciences to the pedagogical. They sometimes attest to a child-centered approach (e.g., Dewey, Kirkpatrick), or they emphasize the measurement and testing of psychic functions as a way of learning to know a child. In addition, each of these approaches generally falls into one or another "-ism", e.g., empiricism, behaviorism, naturalism, psychologism.

A pedagogue who wants his /her knowledge of a child to be accountable asks questions such as the following: How accountable are these approaches? What is the point of departure for the advocates of these views? In terms of what categories is being-a-child disclosed?

Various attempts have been made to describe a child and his/her "development" in terms of **experience**, e.g., in pronouncements such as: Through his/her experiencing, a child develops (It is just this pronouncement that we, in the present study, will change to the question: How does a child become through his/her lived experiences?).<sup>(1)</sup> In this way, psychology is reduced to a science of experiences.

In the older as well as contemporary human science literature, there is great confusion regarding the concept "experiencing." The view of empiricism in contrast with that of Husserl clearly shows the extreme confusion and divergent meanings given to the concept of experience.

On the one hand, the empiricist concept of experience has a naturalistic tone. Influenced by Descartes' substantialistic

separation of **res extensa** and **res cogitans**, modern natural science oriented psychology views experience as the result of objective, physical processes within and outside of the body. Experience, in its broadest sense, includes all of a subject's reactions to the stimuli that influence him/her as well as the registration and interpretation of this "objective" reality. Thus, experiencing is interpreted in terms of a stimulus-response scheme.

On the other hand, Husserl's phenomenological view of **primordial experiencing** points to the subject's immediate experiences, to the primordial ways of being involved with the world coupled with his concepts **Lebenswelt** (lifeworld) and **Erlebnis** (lived experience). From this the question arises: is there a new category by which the phenomenon of being-a-child can be responsibly and fruitfully disclosed and described? The answer lies in Husserl's **concept of lived experience** (Erlebnis).

In this study, an attempt is made to answer the question: what is lived experience? It also will be shown how a child's becoming is actualized in terms of his/her lived experiences.

As a justification for choosing the concept of lived experience to disclose the phenomenon of being-a-child, several authors are cited who indicate that psychology is especially concerned with a person's lived experiences. In this light, it is emphasized that a psychology of becoming, as psychological pedagogics, is concerned with a child's lived experiences, lifeworld and experiential world.

Langeveld,<sup>(2)</sup> as well as Kouwer and Linschoten<sup>(3)</sup> define psychology as the science that asks, among other things, about a person's lived experiences, **what** and **how** he/she lived experiences. Then, the task of the psychology of becoming, as psychological pedagogics, is to investigate what and how a child-in-education lived experiences--that is, the modalities or ways of child lived experiencing.

Lersch<sup>(4)</sup> views psychology as the science of the multiplicity of states and occurrences of lived experience: "the object of psychology is all lived experiences initiated by a living being in interaction with his world."<sup>(5)</sup>

According to James,<sup>(6)</sup> in psychology one can arrive at an adequate whole of interrelated findings only if one as frankly as possible tries to capture how things are lived experienced.

Linschoten<sup>(7)</sup> asserts that psychology aims to describe lived experience and behavior in their essences. He also stresses the importance of the question of lived experience.

Kockelmans<sup>(8)</sup> says the task of phenomenological psychology is to systematically investigate the types and forms of intentional lived experience and reduce these structures to a primary intention and in this way to clarify the essence of the psychic and ultimately to be able to understand the unique being of the psyche itself.

In light of the above, according to Kockelmans,<sup>(9)</sup> the development of a phenomenological psychology has to satisfy the following preconditions and demands:

- (i) a description of the essential features of each intentional lived experience;
- (ii) a clarification of the essential features and forms of the different kinds of lived experiences;
- (iii) a clarification of the unique essence of the universal stream of consciousness as a whole;
- (iv) an investigation of the **ego** as the center of all lived experiences and as a pole of all activities and potentialities of consciousness;
- (v) a description of the genesis of the life of the ego with respect to its universal and genetic [developmental] laws (genetic phenomenological psychology).

Consequently, in the present study, the intentional lived experiences and the experiential world of a child-in-education, in his/her various ways of lived experiencing are investigated; in other words, an essential viewing is made of a child as a lived experiencing-I.

## 2. CLARIFICATION OF CONCEPTS

Confusion regarding the concept of experience was mentioned; it was noted that this term often is given unacceptable connotations. Also, there is uncertainty about the concept of **lived experience**. In

contemporary phenomenological literature, these two concepts are even used together, namely, as "lived experienced experience"<sup>(10)</sup> or "lived experience."<sup>(11)</sup> Also, the distinction between **lifeworld** and **lived experienced world**\* (experiential world) is unclear, and the following is an attempt to accurately delimit these four concepts:

### (a) Experience

Didacticians such as Perquin,<sup>(12)</sup> Roth,<sup>(13)</sup> Van der Stoep,<sup>(14)</sup> Van Dyk,<sup>(15)</sup> and Gous<sup>(16)</sup> use the concept experience in the sense of life experiences that one acquires or masters;<sup>(17)</sup> experience is a coming to know something that influences one's ways of behaving.<sup>(18)</sup>

Roth<sup>(19)</sup> understands by experience the direct reaction on us of a transaction or event that changes our actions or lived experiences whether the experience was unexpected or the result of tangible efforts. Experience is a learning activity when it puts us in a position to be more "adaptable" and allows progress to occur more meaningfully in future situations. Learning is "making use of" experiences;<sup>(20)</sup> hence, experience is viewed as "impressions" that direct our actions.<sup>(21)</sup>

Gous<sup>(22)</sup> refers to "lived experiencing or experiencing reality" from which it can be deduced that he uses the two terms as synonyms. Entirely acceptable and congruent with the above view is Gous' description of experience as "the fullness of insights that result from the concrete actualization of living."<sup>(23)</sup> Etymologically, experience means "to get experience by traveling around to learn."<sup>(24)</sup> Thus, experiencing involves a shifting of one's horizon of experience as a "knowing what" and a "knowing why."<sup>(26)</sup> To experience (and thus to lived experience reality) means **to be involved with reality.**<sup>(27)</sup>

Although Gous does not clearly differentiate them, "to be involved with reality" is viewed as a mutual moment of lived experiencing and of experiencing reality. This pronouncement is worthy of further consideration.

Also, from a phenomenological-psychological perspective, Linschoten's<sup>(28)</sup> use of experience agrees with the above, namely, in the sense of gaining experience. He explains that the things one

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\* Lived-experienced world is translated as experiential world.

experiences are a correlate of one's history of lived experience.<sup>(29)</sup> "For the experience (of things) changes us and with this the experience of the things is changed. One who has experiences at his disposal has a history behind him that has changed his learning to see, think, **lived experience**."<sup>(30)</sup> (My emphasis).

For Van Dyk<sup>(31)</sup> acquiring experience is a category of learning. Also, according to him, experience is an intervention with reality<sup>(32)</sup> and is the "lasting acquisition"<sup>(33)</sup> that arises from this--that which is retained by a person from what he has undergone.<sup>(34)</sup> The life world becomes structured out of experience.<sup>(35)</sup> Among other things, learning is the broadening of experience.<sup>(36)</sup> Perceiving, lived experiencing and encountering constitute the interconnected structure of the totality of experience.<sup>(37)</sup> Van Dyk<sup>(38)</sup> also says the original meaning of "experience" points to a person's being-there in the world (as event) as well as to the acquisitions attained by him (as available experiential knowledge).

Finally, there is agreement with Sonnekus<sup>(39)</sup> when he indicates that in the current literature, the concept experience is used in very confusing ways and that generally there is no precise indication of what is understood by this concept.

Also, the present study is concerned with viewing experience as lifeworld (Husserl). Further, the concepts **lived experience** and **experiential world**) are chosen to indicate the essentials of what we wish to disclose.

### (b) Lived experience

From a psychological pedagogical perspective, Sonnekus<sup>(40)</sup> recent definition of **lived experiencing** seems to us to be the most acceptable and useful. He offers the following summary: "Lived experience is the intentionally determined, subjective, personal (pathic-normative) **taking a position** (attitude) by a person as a totality-in-function in his communication with reality."

Further, the following four moments unfold in the essence of lived experience:

(i) Lived experience is a human way of being; it is one of the categories of human openness; it is a way of giving meaning to the world;

- (ii) lived experience is actualized on different levels which vary from pathic (affective) to gnostic (cognitive);
- (iii) human corporeality (bodiliness) is the center of lived experience;
- (iv) lived experience has a character of intentionality (it is a way of being directed [to something]) as well as of an act or action (it is an action that is actualized).<sup>(41)</sup> Also, according to Linschoten,<sup>(42)</sup> lived experience is meaningful only to the extent that it shows a **being-directed**.

Because it is necessary to describe this further, a formulation that flows from the above and that is viewed as **the moment of lived experiencing** is the following: it is the moment of a subject's intentional going out to, concerned involvement with, participation in, taking a position toward and giving meaning to a particular reality.

Linschoten<sup>(43)</sup> views **lived experience** as the general term for labeling all states of consciousness irrespective of their particular quality or cognitive function. Thus, e.g., sorrow, a sensation or taste such as sweet, a recollection, a decision, etc. all have something essential in common--they are particularizations of the common **fundamental form: lived experience**. In a lived experience there is someone who can say "I" and something in awareness that he/she can distinguish from him/herself.<sup>(44)</sup> Lived experience should not only be described as **state** or **content** but above all as **activity** and as a flowing stream, namely, the **stream of consciousness** or the **stream of lived experience**.<sup>(45)</sup>

Langeveld<sup>(46)</sup> indicates that with consciousness (lived experience), **attunement**, as a subjective factor, is of great importance (compare Sonnekus' taking a position)--for him, lived experience involves a total, tenacious, directed attunement.

Via the method of intentional analysis, Kockelmans<sup>(47)</sup> wants to investigate the primordial "**Erlebnisse**" (lived experiences) of persons, their modes and functions of consciousness. Thus, he views lived experiences as modes and functions of consciousness. In contrast, Lersch<sup>(48)</sup> does not consider lived experience and consciousness to be identical. Lived experience is a collective concept for everything that can be experienced in our psychic life. Lived experience is not the result of causal-mechanistic influences from the external world but a living behavior, a conversation or

dialogue between the ensouled carrier of life and his/her "surrounding world."<sup>(49)</sup>

Also for Landman<sup>(50)</sup> lived experience refers to a dialogue that a person carries on with reality. He describes the relation between life and lived experience as follows: the life of a person is disclosed in his lived experiences. The connection between life and lived experience is a direct relation between lived experience and the totality of life. Moments of lived experience thus are moments of life occurrences themselves, because here there is an inner connection and **meaning** that allows life to become tangible in its scope and strength. Because lived experience is embedded in the totality of life, total life also is present in it. What holds as lived experience thus is not something that only momentarily flows past in the stream of consciousness but it is the **meaningful** content experienced by a person that becomes his/her lasting possession. "All lived experience is lived experience of self and this fact contributes to its meaning. Lived experience belongs to the unity of a self and thus is a non-exchangeable and irreplaceable relation to life itself," says Landman.<sup>(51)</sup>


In this connection, Lersch<sup>(52)</sup> views life as a fore-stage of lived experience; each lived experience depends on life as its foundation; life awakens to lived experience. He divides human existence into four steps, namely, life, naive lived experience, awareness, consciousness. The latter three he distinguishes as the actual steps of lived experience:

(i) **Naive lived experience:** it exists in an image-impression and an immediately following action. It is a lived experience before there is any differentiation of content as belonging to I or **not-I**. The potentiality for such a differentiation arises when **language** is acquired. With language, lived experience takes on the form of awareness. Thus, our relationship to the world is largely based on naive lived experience. With the help of language, a child can distance him/herself from this naive lived experiencing. However, one does not become aware of all naive lived experiences;

(ii) **Awareness:** here there is mention of explicitation by which [naive] lived experiencing and the lived experienced awareness are determined to be this or that;

(iii) **Consciousness:** by means of reflective lived experience, the I evaluates his/her lived experiences. Here there is mention of perceiving, thinking, imagining, ordering, reflecting; what is and has been lived experienced are reflected on and evaluated.

Here **distinctions** are only made among these steps that Lersch represents as a pyramid in order to show that each has a broader base than the following one(s) and that each rests on the previous one(s):



Lersch<sup>(53)</sup> distinguishes further between naive lived experiencing as an involuntary, pathic turning to (pathic lived experiencing or sensing), and consciousness as a voluntary, consciously purposeful attentiveness (gnostic/cognitive lived experience or [attending and] perceiving).

Lived experience is not only giving meaning to the world but also it is lived experiencing meaning. According to Sonnekus,<sup>(54)</sup> lived experience is always the lived experience of meaning. Landman<sup>(55)</sup> addresses this matter as follows: The subject's "lived experiences are relationships and appreciative attitudes toward the meaningful and valuable emanating from life reality."

Van Dyk<sup>(56)</sup> puts the concepts of **experience** and **lived experience** in a didactical perspective. He distinguishes between these two concepts and considers the first to be the more comprehensive.<sup>(57)</sup> Lived experience, then, is one of the forms of experience.<sup>(58)</sup> According to him<sup>(59)</sup> all lived experience includes experience but all experience is not necessarily lived experience. In addition, he views lived experience as follows: "For a real idea of lived experience, one must look for connections with actualities that already have emotional meaning for the person or a power of appeal that touches



the affective"<sup>(60)</sup>--thus, what in the present study is referred to as **pathic/affective lived experience** (see the description by Sonnekus). In addition, **experience** refers to an objective attitude toward reality, and when experience takes on a subjective character, there is mention of lived experience.<sup>(61)</sup> Thus, what we generally view as gnostic/cognitive lived experience (see the description by Sonnekus) Van Dyk refers to as **experience**.

In addition, Van Dyk<sup>(62)</sup> sets out two possible fundamental attitudes regarding a person's entry into the surrounding world (concerned involvement with reality):

- (i) A cooler, knowing attitude (gnostic/cognitive); distancing, matter-of-fact and objectifying of the object;
- (ii) a greater self-involvement in reality; i.e., an emotional (pathic/affective) attitude: lived experience.

According to him, even though lived experience and distancing can alternate with each other, lived experience is first mentioned when distancing is discontinued. Van Dyk says that lived experiences are the near-to-world experiences and are strongly emotion-laden views of reality. However, the writer cannot agree with the assertion that lived experience can only occur when distancing ceases. In the act of distancing, as gnostic/cognitive act, there also is mention of pathic/affective lived experience; i.e., a person's distancing also is emotional. (In this connection, read further in Chapter 2). On the other hand, all (pathic/affective) lived experience includes knowing moments. Knowing ("experiencing") does not cease when distancing stops or when lived experience is predominantly pathically/affectively actualized. Also, according to Linschoten<sup>(63)</sup> lived experience (**all** lived experience) is **cognitive**; it has the function of knowing. In addition, Straus<sup>(64)</sup> refers to the fact that there never is only a gnostic or a pathic moment. The pathic/affective is a typical characteristic of primordial experience and cannot be limited to specific stages of experience.<sup>(65)</sup> The gnostic moment unfolds the **what** of the object; the pathic moment unfolds the **how** of the given being, according to Straus.<sup>(66)</sup>

The preceding is summarized by describing lived experience as a person's way of being aware of something, as a stream of consciousness, but then being aware implies the following: being aware of reality that then necessarily means being intentionally

directed to reality, which again, in its turn, includes giving meaning,\* taking a position, lived experiencing meaning; being-aware as state, as content, as activity; lived experience is a concerned involvement with reality; it is contact with, dialogue with, attitude toward, and relationship to reality. Lived experience is being with things. It includes pathic/affective, gnostic/cognitive and normative moments. Thus, it involves a change in the subject from merely being to being-aware, from merely living to lived experiencing.

As a **fundamental form** and **collective concept**, lived experience can briefly be described as **the personal (pathic/affective, gnostic/cognitive, normative), intentional (meaning giving, meaning receiving, taking a position), continuous activity of being-aware of reality.**

Lived experience is **emotional knowing** (with **pathic-agnostic** lived experience, the emphasis is more on the emotional; in moments of **agnostic-pathic** lived experience, knowing is emphasized more). Also, for Langeveld (*Ontwikkelingspsychologie*, p. 59) knowing involves the child's lived experienced relationship with the world. This knowing to a greater or lesser degree has emotional meaning for a child.

The following is a schematic synthesis of the previous line of thought regarding the concept of lived experience:

**Phenomenological category structure:  
psychic life, fundamental psychic phenomena and  
fundamental psychic form**

**All states of consciousness, all psychic life, all conscious life, all mental facts** (for example, sorrow, sense of taste such as sweet, a remembrance, a decision, an impression, images, choice, judgment, knowing, learning, etc.)

**are reduced to**

two fundamental psychic phenomena, fundamental relationships, fundamental positions, fundamental directedness, namely, **feelings**

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\* Compare Husserl's pronouncement: Intentionality is essentially an act of giving meaning.

(pathic/affective lived experience) and **thoughts** (gnostic/cognitive lived experience)

**are reduced to**

a general term, collective concept, collective fundamental form, namely, **lived experience** state, content, (activity), (awareness), (consciousness), (emotional knowing), (conscious living through).

**Lived experience** = the main theme of psychology.

**Lived experience of the child-in-education** = the main theme of psychological pedagogics.

**Lived experience** = the fundamental intentionality, the primary intention.

**The concept lived experience** = fundamental category.

**(c) Life world:**

In terms of Husserl's description of his concept "**Lebenswelt**," there is clarity in the phenomenological literature about what this concept means. The lifeworld is the open, wider-encircling, ever moving **horizon** or **landscape** of knowledge, familiarity, certainty and constancy; it is the primordial ground for one's own life.

Heidegger<sup>(67)</sup> views the lifeworld as the **horizon of intelligibility**.

Sonnekus<sup>(68)</sup> description points to the ways the lifeworld is established: the lifeworld is "the world that is intentionally established and constituted by each subject."

A person's lifeworld arises through his/her lived experience of reality, now viewed as lived experienced or experiential world (see further on). In this connection, Landman<sup>(69)</sup> describes the lifeworld as potential experiential world.

**(d) Experiential world**

The author adds the following to Sonnekus<sup>(70)</sup> pronouncement: At the moment of lived experience, as a moment of giving meaning and taking a position, there is involvement with the experiential world--the total lifeworld can never be lived experienced all at once. Thus, the experiential world is a **momentary landscape**. Lived experience is lived experiencing something<sup>(71)</sup> and this **something** is the experiential world, or, in other words, **the larger or smaller slice of reality that I lived experience as an indeterminate magnitude**,<sup>(72)</sup>

thus, it is that to which I take a position and to which I give meaning. It is the total unity of lived experienced state, content and activity. The experiential world is the "essence of a child's **lived experiences** or, in other words ... the ways a child gives meaning to his/her life world."<sup>(73)</sup>

Sonnekus<sup>(74)</sup> states it as follows: "By giving and lived experiencing meaning, a child creates an experiential world as a momentary slice of his lifeworld that always must be viewed as potential experiential world."

Where the lifeworld is the horizon of familiarity, we can describe the **experiential world as the continually changing, continuous, total reality that a person (I-unity) in a particular moment (as lived experienced moment) is intentionally involved (as lived experienced reality), to which he/she gives meaning within this horizon.** For example, if a child lived experiences a difficult learning task, then this learning task (learning world) is an experiential world; that is, it is a reality in which he/she **feels** like a misfit (pathic/affective lived experience) and in which he/she is **aware of his/her impotence** (gnostic/cognitive lived experience). Bodily lived experiencing, e.g., of a child's physical handicap, means: the body is an experiential world, it is a reality about which he/she **feels** rejection and **knows** his/her own defect.

Thus, an experiential world is a momentarily lived experienced world, what in contemporary psychology is called the field of awareness,<sup>(75)</sup> or, according to Linschoten:<sup>(76)</sup> The experiential world is that reality which is reflected in the person at the moment of lived experiencing. Consequently, an experiential world is the object of lived experiencing. It is the continuous structurings actualized by the stream of lived experience.<sup>(77)</sup> The experiential world is what is offered to him/her as a world lived-through, namely, the situation (as an order of meanings), or more accurately expressed it is the lived experienced aspect of the situation that we **are in**, not as this objectively is (as quantifiable) but as it is lived. Namely, the situation is constituted by activity, by the intentional giving of meaning; this intentional giving of meaning, as taking a position, is lived experience.

Finally, an experiential world can be described as the complex structure of moments of lived experience that embraces other moments such as sensing, perceiving, feeling and bodily lived experiences.

### 3. THE LIFEWORLD AND EXPERIENTIAL WORLD AS POINTS OF DEPARTURE FOR EXPLORING A CHILD

In the following, reference is made to the close connection, to the dialectic relationship between the world of our lived experiences (experiential world) and the lived experiencing person (child). There is no experiential world without a subject and no subject without an experiential world. Being human is consciousness (lived experience) and, therefore, is not to be thought of apart from the experiential world. Lived experience (consciousness-of-something) is our directedness to the world. Lived experience is existence, and consciousness (as lived experience) is being-directed-to-something (intentionality).

From a phenomenological point of view, it is the personal, unique world, as lifeworld and as experiential world, that must be explored if we are to disclose the phenomenon of child-being-in-the-world. Because of the inner mystery<sup>(78)</sup> of child existence, we cannot completely learn to know a child in his/her uniqueness and totality. Thus, our exploration results only in a partial and always provisional disclosure.

Van den Berg's<sup>(79)</sup> striking pronouncement serves as an essential point of departure for us: "Who wants to become acquainted with a person should listen to the language spoken by the things in his existence. Who wants to describe a person should analyze the 'landscape' within which he demonstrates, explains and reveals himself." In the present reflection, **landscape** is viewed as the intentionally structured totality of the personal world of a child that, on the one hand, is viewed as the **horizon of certainties** (lifeworld) and, on the other hand, as a **momentary landscape** (experiential world). It is this total personal landscape that is the basis for exploring a child. In other words, we disclose the essentials of that reality with which a child continually enters into dialogue and which he/she then lived experiences as an encountered reality.

### 4. LIVED EXPERIENCE AS FUNDAMENTAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL CATEGORY IN THE LIFEWORLD OF A CHILD

#### (a) Lived experience as anthropological category

It was indicated that lived experience means being-conscious of something as the intentional taking a position toward reality--in addition, it was noted that lived experience is a way of giving and lived experiencing meaning, all of which are actualized on different levels or moments (pathic/affective, gnostic/cognitive, normative).

When **lived experience** is described as an anthropological **category** in the lifeworld of a child, this means: Lived experience is an expressing or verbalizing by which some essentials of the lifeworld become manifest; i.e., without lived experience [as a category], the lifeworld is not possible or understandable; without lived experience, the lifeworld cannot be thought. It is through a child's innumerable lived experiences of reality (experiential world) that his/her own, unique lifeworld arises. A disclosure of a child's experiential world, therefore, implies a coming to know **what** he/she lived experiences and **how** he/she lived experiences his/her world.

#### **(b) Lived experience as becoming**

Lived experience also is a category of becoming; i.e., it is a term [category] that discloses something essential of child becoming. A child's becoming is not possible without lived experiencing. Each moment of lived experiencing is a moment of becoming; i.e., each moment of adopting a meaning-giving position shifts a child's horizon of familiarity; for a child, each moment of lived experience is a becoming different and self-becoming; no moment of lived experience leaves a child untouched; in fact, a child is someone who him/herself wants to lived experience.

Sonnekus<sup>(80)</sup> refers to child lived experiences as the ways in which his/her becoming flourishes. Because a child actively and lived experientially goes out to the world, he/she contributes to his/her own becoming: "A child is actively and lived experientially busy becoming in the direction of the adults to whom he/she turns for support. It also follows that in becoming, a child's activities and lived experiences, as participation in being and meaning, are the essential foundation for his/her going out to the world as a learning child," says Sonnekus.<sup>(81)</sup>

Child openness and incompleteness make his/her becoming possible, but they also place him/her in a position for continually new lived experiences. Thus, lived experience also is a way of being that is given with being a person.

In terms of Landman's<sup>(82)</sup> exposition, it also is said that lived experience means an elevation in the form of a child's dialogue as an elevation in level. Just as dialogue elevation--continually on another level--implies that a particular level of dialogue is reached, is then mastered and proceeds to a new, different level of dialogue,<sup>(83)</sup> such that in the course of a child's becoming, the level of lived experience continually is raised to a higher level; a specific level of taking a position is reached and then mastered in order to proceed to a new, different level of lived experience. That is, a child's intentional taking a (meaning giving) position occurs on continually higher levels and, with this, his/her understanding of reality is qualitatively broadened and elevated. Landman<sup>(84)</sup> describes this as "a continual becoming of new meaningful possibilities, of new value-actualizing-tasks."

Just as a child participates in reality by giving meaning, by acquiring different possibilities of dialogue (with reality), and by constituting new possibilities of becoming, so each lived experience creates the possibility for new and different lived experiences. A child's lived experiencing (taking a position) occurs mainly in terms of the sense and meaning he/she has already given to his/her world.

If a child's becoming is described in terms of the actualization of potentialities, and if lived experience is a category of becoming, lived experience is now viewed in terms of **actualizing or freeing a child's potentialities of lived experience**. Each potentiality of lived experience that is actualized again creates new possibilities that, in their turn, can and must be actualized. A child's "lived experiences move him and create new possibilities for future lived experiences," says Landman.<sup>(85)</sup>

Thus, a child must actualize his/her potentialities in order to distance him/herself from pathic/affective to gnostic/cognitive lived experiencing; here actualizing intelligence especially means lived experiencing on a gnostic/cognitive level (thinking, systematizing, structuring, etc.). Also, for Sonnekus<sup>(86)</sup> this involves the actualization of a child's becoming in terms of different lived experiences.

Lived experience, becoming, dialogue elevation and actualization of potentialities of lived experience should be viewed as a unitary event in a child's flourishing.

### (c) Anthropological categories of becoming in the experiential world of a child

The concern here is with four irreducible fundamental phenomena of being-a-child, namely, bodiliness, sensory lived experiences, lived-movement and lived-spatiality. In the following sections, these four categories are viewed as anthropological categories of becoming, and it is indicated how a child's becoming is actualized, among other ways, on the basis of these four modes of lived experience:

#### (i) Bodiliness as center of lived experience

The assertion that bodiliness (corporeality) is the center of all lived experience is one of the most essential pronouncements that can be made regarding the human body. In this connection, the present reflection occurs in light of the expositions of De Waelhens<sup>(87)</sup>, Sonnekus<sup>(88)</sup> and Linschoten.<sup>(89)</sup>

Foremost is the fact that the human body is a **medium of existence**. In addition, it is shown that, on the one hand, **the body is the center of lived experience (bodiliness as the center of lived experienced reality)** and, on the other hand, that the body is **experienced bodiliness or corporeality (bodiliness is the center of reality that I lived experience)**, that is, viewing the **body itself as lived experienced reality**, after which there is brief reference to the concept of **bodily lived experience**.

The body as medium of existence means my permanent possibility of going out toward objects.<sup>(90)</sup> Giving meaning (as an existential act) in a particular direction is pre-determined by the inescapable reality of the body. Bodily reality is primordial reality.<sup>(91)</sup> A person is bodily, corporeal presence in the world. Inhabiting, contacting, lived experiencing (thus existing) occur via the body.<sup>(92)</sup> Also, the pronouncement of bodiliness as openness, as intentionality, as subject (body-subject) and as existence holds for a becoming child.<sup>(93)</sup>

Concerning bodiliness as center of lived experience, De Waelhens<sup>(94)</sup> holds the following view: For each person, on all levels of lived experience, it is impossible to escape the necessity of a perspective. This perspective is a person's engaged subjectivity, his/her body. Being-in-the-world (Dasein, being a person) implies that everything



existing is viewed from a primordial and irreducible point of view or absolute center of global reference--my body. Even two activities that can be distinguished from each other, such as looking and touching, refer to a shared point of origin--my body. The body is "the system of systems."<sup>(95)</sup> We can be engaged in the world only through the perspective of our own body, so says De Waelhens.<sup>(96)</sup>

According to Linschoten<sup>(97)</sup> reality for us is that with which our bodies are involved; our own reality, the feeling of our own life and existence coincide with the experience of our own bodiliness. When consciousness is directed to objects (lived experienced objects), then intentionality is founded in bodiliness.<sup>(98)</sup> Lived experience does not refer beyond itself to a transcendental subject or a substantial soul; lived experience refers back to the body.<sup>(99)</sup> The core of lived experience thus is one's own body. Our body is always at the center of our lived experienced world--at the center of seeing, of acting, of interests. "Here" is where the body is; "now" is when the body acts; "this" is what the body handles.<sup>(100)</sup> Reality becomes ordered with reference to a center of activity and interest that resides in the body; thus, the body is the core of a situation, it is the center of ordering and acting, according to Linschoten.<sup>(101)</sup>

The following statement by Sonnekus<sup>(102)</sup> adequately summarizes this aspect: Human bodiliness is the center out of which the different modes of being (of lived experiences) flow; it is the center of acts of sensing, perceiving, imagining, thinking, etc.--thus, it is the center of a person's entire affective-cognitive going out to the world.

Third, bodiliness involves bodily lived experiencing, viewing the body as a lived-reality. Linschoten<sup>(103)</sup> asks in this connection: "But what is this unique reality other than our bodiliness?" For Linschoten, there is an essential connection between "life" (lewe) and "body" (lyf): he views the lifeworld as that world, that order of reality in which we live through our bodies.<sup>(104)</sup> Further, our existence is the bodily existence of a vulnerable person bound to space and time.<sup>(105)</sup>

Also, Straus<sup>(106)</sup> refers to the I-totality that is experienced as body, and he shows further that the "I" of the awake, active person is located between the **eyes**. He also emphasizes the fact of both pathic/affective and gnostic/cognitive moments in lived experiencing the body.<sup>(107)</sup>

Further, in Sonnekus'<sup>(108)</sup> view, understanding a person as a body-subject also means that he/she does not merely **have** a body; he/she **is** body. The body as lived-bodiliness is always an intentional subject; i.e., bodily participation in reality is always intentionally directed (my participation). It can be added that your lived experience of your body is your lived experience of yourself and vice versa.

A child's existence via the body as medium, his/her lived experiences of reality from the body as center, as well as bodily lived experience all are anthropological categories of becoming; i.e., through these occurrences, a child's becoming is actualized. Bodiliness, then, can also be viewed as the center of becoming, as a medium for becoming. Without being bodily present in the world, a person cannot become.

### (ii) Sensory lived experience

From a biological perspective, sensory experience certainly can be described in terms of physiological and physical processes, e.g., the sense of sight where this involves the lens of the eye, wave lengths, images on the retina, the optic nerve, visual impressions, etc. A child's defective sensory "abilities" can be described in terms of the above-mentioned terminology. This, however, merely considers the sense organs and not with "acquiring experience"; through the sensory life we come into contact with the world around us:<sup>(109)</sup>

"according to our frame of mind, the world seems different to us. Our lived experience remains, as it were, in the world around us, and it is through our sense organs that we are able to lived experience. Our sense organs are **means of communicating** with our world."<sup>(110)</sup>

From a phenomenological-pedagogic perspective, sensory lived experience is viewed as an anthropological category of becoming. Through the sense organs, a child is able to lived experience his/her world, to communicate with reality by which his/her becoming is actualized; this involves sensory lived experiences as "modes of being in the experiential world of the child;"<sup>(111)</sup> also, sensory lived experiences are ways in which a child's becoming flourishes.<sup>(112)</sup>

Thus, "impressions" acquired by the senses are not emphasized here: seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, kinesthetic sensing, sensing equilibrium, sensing muscles (sensory organs of moving, behaving), sensing vibrations. In our reflection, sensory lived experiences are viewed as personal, intentional (thus also meaning giving), position taking acts of becoming or ways of being, namely, seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling, touching, seizing, reaching, pointing, lived experiences of equilibrium, of moving (see below), of behaving, of vibrating. The question then also is how a child lived experiences the reality with which he/she comes into contact via the senses.<sup>(113)</sup>

According to Bigot<sup>(114)</sup> this reality is **translated** by a child's psyche (Different from Linschoten's<sup>(115)</sup> "translation" of reality). We view this translation as an event where a position is taken toward reality as it is; i.e., by giving sense and meaning, reality is changed into lived-reality or an experiential world; being is translated into sense and meaning, reality is changed into lived-reality or an experiential world; the world is translated into an experiential world; being is translated into meaning. In this sense, **translation** also is a category of becoming.

Bigot<sup>(116)</sup> also gives helpful examples of such moments of translation: a path walked for the first time is lived experienced as longer, a building entered for the first time is lived experienced as larger. The same street, house, etc. will be lived experienced by a child as longer, larger, etc. compared with an adult's lived experiences of them. The same geometric figure, influenced by different adjacent figures, will be perceived (lived experienced) differently.

Although sensory lived experience can occur in a moment via several sense organs, attention is called to the unity of all sensory lived experience, to the "teamwork"<sup>(117)</sup> of the different sense organs. Evidence of this, for example, is the fact that in hearing sounds, one sometimes also lived experiences visual impressions.

The following can also be stated with respect to Bigot's<sup>(118)</sup> exposition: **Seeing** is primarily a lived experiencing-in-space; **hearing** (e.g., a melody, a conversation) is predominantly a lived experience-in-time. **Hearing** is more disposed to pathic/affective lived experiencing; e.g., music is arousing or tranquil, a murmuring, a cheerful voice, a gloomy sound. Also, according to Straus<sup>(119)</sup> the pathic is dominant in **hearing**; with **perceiving**, the gnostic is dominant; and with **touch**, the pathic; Sonnekus<sup>(120)</sup> adds that

because **hearing** means a lived experience-in-time, it also is a lived experience-in-history. Hearing refers to the past and also to the future. Bollinger<sup>(121)</sup> refers especially to the fact that because hearing is a lived experience-in-time, it is a basic foundation of **becoming** since becoming means becoming-in-time.

In summary, the moments of perceiving, hearing, tasting, smelling, etc., as sensory moments of lived experience, also can be considered to be moments of becoming.

### (iii) Movement and lived experience

Instead of the view that human movement is a reaction to stimuli (compare classical behaviorism), or a "process" in the "body machine" (Descartes<sup>(122)</sup>), in a phenomenological disclosure, the concern is with lived experienced or lived-movement as a way of being,<sup>(123)</sup> and with a view of movement as a spiritually activated, goal-directed activity.

In reflecting on lived experienced movement, the close connection among lived-bodiliness, sensory lived experience, lived-space, lived experienced movement and lived experienced time becomes clear (which will not be considered in detail). Lived-movement is always movement of the body,<sup>(124)</sup> a mode of being where both are actualized in space and time.<sup>(125)</sup> Thus, the body is the center of the sensory lived experience of movement, of lived-movement and of lived-space. Through his/her sensory lived experiences, a child becomes spatially oriented (see below). Sonnekus<sup>(126)</sup> stresses this connectedness when he states that the categories of lived-bodiliness, lived-movement, lived-space and temporality must not be viewed apart from each other but rather as categories forming a unity: "The child is thus, in his **bodily** movements, his lived experienced spatiality and temporality, involved in the world. Also, he distances and differentiates himself as a totality-in-communication by means of his lived-bodiliness, lived-movements, lived-spatiality and lived-time in his becoming in the world," thus says Sonnekus.<sup>(127)</sup>

Straus<sup>(128)</sup> provides an outstanding discussion of the idea of lived-movement as an anthropological category of becoming. According to him, lived-movement in itself is change, i.e., becoming. Through movement, a child changes, he **becomes** different. A child is someone who wants to be someone himself,<sup>(129)</sup> but he also is

someone willing to move himself. "Willing to move oneself" is possible only for a becoming subject.<sup>(130)</sup> We transform ourselves from one moment to another, we move from one place to another in the continuity of becoming. In this way the fulfillment and completion that we always need, as an incomplete totality, occur. The subject of lived-movement is a subject in continual becoming, says Straus.<sup>(131)</sup>

In his phenomenological disclosure of spontaneous movement, Minkowski<sup>(132)</sup> distinguishes the following: lived, spontaneous movement begins by itself; it is addressed directly to the other; it goes from an interiority to the other. Freely willed (purposeful) movement, in contrast, has its origin in an act of willing. A child's becoming cannot occur without the other; also this spontaneous, lived-movement, as a directed going to the other is an anthropological category of becoming.

Also, Sonnekus<sup>(133)</sup> describes lived-movement as a way of becoming and his view is summarized as follows: Lived-movement stands "in the closest relation...to child **becoming**. The child **becomes** because his own lived-movement changes, and all movement finds the child becoming both temporally and spatially."<sup>(134)</sup>

#### (iv) Spatiality

Here the concern is with lived-space<sup>(135)</sup> "in contrast to mathematical or geometric space."<sup>(136)</sup>

Straus<sup>(137)</sup> asks whether spatiality differs with respect to different sensory lived experiences, e.g., the optical and acoustic, and if there are corresponding differences in motor activity and perceiving. He concludes that the lived experience of space does not occur merely via specific sense organs; e.g., spatiality appears to us in different modes.

Sonnekus<sup>(138)</sup> reflects on space as an anthropological category of becoming in terms of the principle of security (Langeveld); for him, this has to do with a secure space. He indicates that the lived experience of space can occur on pathic/affective and gnostic/cognitive levels. A person designs a life space for himself in intentional ways as an ever moving spatial horizon; as a place of protection, security, peace--thus, a secure living space or secure space as a pathic/affective matter. Depending on a child's pathic

emotionality, life space can change, e.g., to an insecure, tense space or a threatening space full of anxiety. It is precisely in his secure lived experience of spatiality that a child distances himself from the pathic/affective to the gnostic/cognitive. Therefore, a child has a need for a secure space, according to Sonnekus.<sup>(139)</sup>

Van Weelden's<sup>(140)</sup> views regarding the lived experience of space also are noted here. According to him, a person's space receptors put him in a position to lived experience spatial relationships in reality. From these space receptors, the sense organs pass on "information" to the person with the highest gnostic/cognitive meaning--gnostic/cognitive lived experience, (we have already indicated that **seeing** primarily is a lived experience-in-space, and that with **looking**, the gnostic/cognitive is dominant). In addition, a person lives space not as something that lies outside of him but rather as possibility of movement. For a person, space is lived experientiable through the presence of things and through movement or the possibilities of moving his body. Through the space a person occupies regarding things and that things occupy with reference to each other, there arises a structure by which a person can orient and move himself in space. It is the things and one's own movement that space "signifies" to a person. i.e., that gives him spatially oriented being. As little as a person can lived experience empty space--thus a space without objects--just as little can one lived experience space without movement. It is only in moving that a person changes, "gauges," and lived experiences space, says Van Weelden.<sup>(141)</sup>

Regarding life- or lived-space as an anthropological category of becoming, Sonnekus<sup>(142)</sup> indicates that "life-space as lived-space has an invaluable significance for the child in his becoming."

#### (d) The experiential world of a child

##### (i) Phenomenological problematic

Against the above background, this section is concerned with a clarification of the situatedness of a **child who lived experiences**, as he shows himself to us ontologically (in reality), and the problematic of disclosing a child in his full totality of lived experienced human existence, in his situatedness, as a child in relation to the world. The phenomenologist must learn to know the **essentials** of a child's **lived experiences**, i.e., a child's **experiential**

**world: what** he lived experiences (gnostic/cognitive); and **how** he lived experiences this (pathic/affective). In addition, the aim is to uncover and unveil child lived experiences as modes and categories of becoming; more specifically: how a child's becoming is actualized via bodily, sensory, pathic/affective, gnostic/cognitive lived experiences, the lived experience of movement, of space and of the normative. Also, we want to know if there are deficient lived experiences and thus a restrained becoming.

What is viewed as problematic in the lifeworld and experiential world of a child will be a pedagogue's specific problematic and task regarding a child. More clearly stated:

(ii) **Psychological-pedagogical problematic**

If we are not to misunderstand a child in his/her child-being and educability, we must put our task with respect to a child, his/her lived experiences and becoming in a psychological pedagogical perspective.

A child finds him/herself in a pedagogical situation as a child-adult relationship and as an existential-human relationship. This is the problematic for a pedagogue that is brought about by this pedagogical situatedness as well as by a child's unique lifeworld and experiential world--thus, the concern is with the **destination** (adulthood) a child must attain via lived experiences in the course of his/her becoming.

According to Landman<sup>(143)</sup> this can be formulated as the following pedagogical question: **How must an understanding educator**, as authoritative, trusting person and representative of the norm-image of adulthood, by his/her associations and encounters with an authority-questioning child who is potentiality-in-becoming someone who him/herself ought to be, and to whom an educator is committed, **support him/her in his/her lived experiences and experiential world** so that he/she progressively can be judged as an adult?

In addition, an answer must be sought for the following question: What is the pedagogical meaning and implication of child lived experience as a category of becoming? Because an open person image of a child is held, rather than a search for a final answer to

the above question, a child-image and lived experience-image obtained from a child are always viewed as provisional.

Because the psychic-spiritual becoming of a child cannot occur without pedagogical intervention, the concern here is with a psychological-pedagogical (or a psychology of becoming) orientation. Knowledge of a child's lived experiences and experiential world are of great importance to a pedagogue.

A psychology of becoming orientation implies that a pedagogue will determine his/her own pedagogic tasks with respect to a becoming child. This means reflecting on and investigating the psychic phenomena for the purpose of contributing to a better **understanding** of the entire child-image. That is, orientation is a search for knowledge about a child as becoming-adult, a study of the realities regarding a child and his/her growing up, and thus also about his/her lived experiences and experiential world. It is concerned with the event of becoming and, more specifically, the psychic aspects of this event, or, in other words, **lived experienced moments as psychic moments in a pedagogical situation**. Thus, a child's experiential world is viewed from a psychological pedagogic or psychology of becoming perspective in terms of possibilities of applying such perspectives to a child's pedagogical situation. This requires a scientific interpretation and description of the dialogue a child carries on with his/her world based on a phenomenological psychology of becoming; more specifically, this requires a disclosure of the **phenomenon of lived experience**.

The psychology of becoming is that psychology which discloses the categories of a child's becoming and which also includes the psychology of movement,<sup>(144)</sup> of lived experienced bodiliness, of spatiality, of sensory lived experience, etc.

## 5. THE AIM OF THE STUDY

The aim of this study is to disclose the phenomenon of child lived experience from a psychological pedagogical perspective. More specifically, it is the author's aim to investigate and describe some essential aspects of lived experience as a category of becoming, the matter of pathic/affective, gnostic/cognitive and normative moments of lived experience, the nature of the stream of lived experience, modalities of lived experience and the criteria for evaluating child lived experience. Finally, the author will place the



matter of child lived experience in a pedagogical, psychological pedagogical, orthopedagogical, didactical and orthodidactical perspective.

## 6. PROGRAM OF THE STUDY

The remaining parts of this study are:

In chapter 2 some psychological pedagogical aspects of the phenomenon of lived experience are reflected on;

Chapter 3 offers a sketch, organization and elaboration of some psychological pedagogical criteria for evaluating a child's lived experiences;

In chapter 4, some examples of aspects of child lived experiences are described;

Finally, chapter 5 offers a review of and perspective on the psychological pedagogical, pedagogical, orthopedagogical, didactical and orthodidactical implications stemming from the present study.

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