CHAPTER 2

PSYCHOLOGICAL-PEDAGOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE PHENOMENON OF LIVED EXPERIENCE

1. INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS

A psychological-pedagogical (psychology of becoming) orientation regarding child lived experience primarily revolves around the question of how a child lived experiences those moments by which his/her becoming are actualized. Because a child lived experiences these psychic moments of becoming within an adult-child relationship, his/her lived experiencing of moments of becoming is a psychological-pedagogical issue.

According to Langeveld,⁽¹⁾ educating a child is more than "feeding and protecting" if the child ever will flourish in his being human. A child also has need for a certain loving pampering, and if this falls short, then his becoming occurs in unfavorable ways. A child's helplessness is not remedied merely by bodily care. "There is immediately a real need for something other than that, namely, the **lived experience of security**"⁽²⁾ (my emphasis). This lived experience of security is only present when love is shown, called by Nel "loving care" or "humanizing." That a child is not hungry, thirsty, cold or restless are inadequate responses to what he/she needs for his/her becoming, says Langeveld.⁽³⁾

Langeveld⁽⁴⁾ views the following four moments of becoming as essentials or fundamental givens for a child's psychic becoming:

- (a) the biological moment;
- (b) the moment of helplessness;
- (c) the moment of security and safety ("safe secureness");
- (d) the moments of exploration and emancipation.

Briefly, the ways these moments are actualized amount to the following: the biological moment must be "conquered" through adequate loving care (emotionally rich and warm pampering, coddling, caressing, etc.) and, if needed, by helping and supporting him/her to assimilate (digest) and accept his/her biological deficiencies. By supporting a child in loving-caring ways, his/jer helplessness (that he/she lived experiences as a need for loving care) is surmounted, and he/she feels him/herself to be safe and secure. A child who feels secure will explore his/her world to the fullest since he/sje explores from a safe space to which he/she always can return when insecurity threatens him/her. A child's intentionality is reflected in the moments of exploration and through his/her intentional going out to the world, he/she emancipates him/herself to full-fledged, independent adulthood. Emancipation thus means freeing or actualizing one's potentialities.

Next it is shown how the first three moments, namely, the biological, helplessness and security, are clearly lived experienced **pathically/affectively** by a child, although this lived experience also has a knowing aspect. On the other hand, the moments of exploration and emancipation are viewed as moments that, although affective, are preponderantly lived experienced **gnostically/cognitively**.

The biological moment is a moment of bodily lived experience, indeed, a moment of vital-pathic lived experience. The lovingness, the emotional richness and warmth with which the caring of a child is paired are lived experienced by him/her on a vital-pathic level. It is his/her **body** that is cared for, pampered, caressed and coddled, and this is pleasing in a vital-pathic sense (on a vital-pathic level). A child's lived experience of helplessness is also pathic/affective. He/she **feels** helpless. He/she lived experiences this (especially pathic) helplessness as a need for loving care, and thus as a need for emotional support.

When these two moments are conquered, a child feels secure, safe and certain (once again an affective intention), and he/she is ready, especially in an emotional sense, to explore his/her world. Sonnekus⁽⁵⁾ calls this an affective readiness to participate. A child is affectively ready to intelligently go out to and explore his/her world intellectually.⁽⁶⁾ His/her lived experience of a secure space is thus pathically/affectively colored.

When a child explores his/her world, there is a knowing directedness. Although this is an affective activity, a child's exploration of the world is seen as a knowing or intellectual breaking through and thus this is especially lived experienced gnostically/cognitively. Also, his/her emancipation can be viewed in terms of becoming, always as an emancipation to a higher (gnostic/cognitive) level of lived experience. Emancipation, as a freeing and as a child's actualization of his/her potentialities of lived experience also is a unitary event.

The "conquering" of the biological moment and the moment of helplessness by feelings of safety and security and a progression to moments of exploration and emancipation imply a distancing from the pathic/affective to the gnostic/cognitive. In other words, this is a progression from a feeling way of lived experiencing (biological moment, moment of **feeling** helpless, moments of **feeling** safe and secure) to a knowing directedness (exploring the world and emancipating him/herself as knowing on a higher level).

If the first two moments are not overcome, a child will experience extreme helplessness; he/she will lived experience him/herself as insecure and uncertain as well as anxious and tense. This means pathic lived experiences will **overflow** into his/her knowing directedness. Then he/she remains stuck on a vital-pathic level of lived experiencing, and his/her exploration and emancipation stagnate and, consequently, so does his/her total psychic-spiritual becoming. The resulting phenomenon of infantilization indicates that his/her lived experiences appear too childlike (infantile) in comparison with the expected level of pathic/affectivegnostic/cognitive lived experiencing for his/her age, and consequently there is infantile lived experiencing.

The concept of **infantile lived experience** indicates that a child cannot make the leap from emotional lived experience to a gnostic/cognitive directedness, that he/she cannot distance him/herself from a pathic/affective to a gnostic/cognitive level. Infantile lived experience thus indicates a pathic/affective imprisonment or a habitual pathic/affective disposition resulting from needless, excessive feelings of helplessness, insecurity, uncertainty and anxiety.

In the following section, child lived experience, as a concern of a psychology of becoming, will be more closely disclosed.

2. PATHIC/AFFECTIVE AND GNOSTIC/COGNITIVE MOMENTS IN THE EXPERIENTIAL WORLD OF A CHILD

(a) Description of pathic and gnostic

Because this further reflection on a child's lived experiences, experiential world and attunement (taking a pathic, gnostic position) is important to us, we rely on a few authors who have clearly distinguished between pathic and gnostic lived experiencing (see following table); also addressed is the matter of pathic/affective lived experience as a precondition for gnostic/cognitive lived experience and the resulting matter of a distancing by a child from the pathic to the gnostic.

The following table offers a number of contrasting concepts that, in the phenomenological literature, point to the distinction between pathic and gnostic lived experience:

Pathic Attunement ("Moodness," emotionality (primordial	Gnostic) Understanding
Heidegger)	understanding of
Affective (precognitive disposition)	Cognitive
Sensing Subjective Emotional life Only-for-me	Perceiving, knowing Objective Intellectual life Universally valid
(for all) Here-and-now Moment of feeling	Timeless, enduring Moment of knowing (thinking, reflecting, etc.)
Naive lived experiencing exper.	Distanced lived
Unrepeatable Familiarity Primordial, first lived experiencing Undifferentiated (diffuse) Pathic attunement	(stand over against the world*) Repeatable Knowledge Derived lived exper. Differentiated Conscious-intentional attunement (Lersch)
Impressions Self-involvement Appreciative lived experiencing exper.	Thoughts (Linschoten) Impersonal Sober-factual lived

Affectively colored Global attunement Feel Form and structure Analytic attunement Comprehend (re Heidegger)

* Here, **stand over against** must not be viewed as objectivism; it remains objectivity-in-subjectivity (Landman)

Straus⁽⁷⁾ distinguishes between pathic and knowing lived experience by employing the concepts of **sensing** and **perceiving**. He views both sensing and perceiving as different ways of communicating with the world, as a person's ways of being-in-the-world, as ways of lived experiencing.

According to Straus⁽⁸⁾ sensing is sympathetic lived experiencing (a child lived experiences him/herself with and in the world); it is the original, primary or primordial lived experience; it is the subjective (only-for-me, here-and-now), pathic moment of lived experience.

Perceiving is a **distanced**, **knowing and thinking moment**, the **objective** (for everyone), **gnostic moment of lived experience**; it is a search for the **nature** of things, for the enduring, the valid, the timeless, the universal, the truth; it is a search for a grasp of things as they **are.** Perceptions are communicable, able to be objectified, determinable; this calls for a general, objective, systematic, universal medium, namely, **language.**

Knowing assumes a progression from acting to thinking (reflecting), from sensing to perceiving. The first seeing of a thing is sensing-seen-for-me (pathic, subjective); the second seeing is perceiving (gnostic, thinking)--of the universal, the objective.⁽⁹⁾

Sonnekus⁽¹⁰⁾ also refers to the primarily pathic flavor of sensing as a mode of lived experience and the more gnostic nature of perceiving. Linschoten⁽¹¹⁾ reduces the chaotic variability and composition of lived experiencing to two fundamental psychic phenomena, namely, thoughts and feelings. The difference between feeling and knowing is a difference in directedness.⁽¹²⁾

Other distinctions between pathic and gnostic lived experience are those of Lersch⁽¹³⁾ with his view of naive lived experience in contrast to awareness or consciousness (see chapter one) and Werner's⁽¹⁴⁾ contrast between undifferentiated, global, pathic ways of lived

experiencing and differentiated, gnostic lived experiencing. For Werner⁽¹⁵⁾ sensing is not an elementary perceiving through the separate senses but a diffuse state of lived experience. Normally, a mature Western person has reached a more gnostic/cognitive way of lived experiencing. Yet the pathic/affective is not closed off from him/her. More emotional lived experiences merely are of less value in our thinking, actions and gnostic/cognitive understanding. It requires a loosening from our habitual gnostic/cognitive focus to really be able to lived experience in a sensory way, so says Werner.⁽¹⁶⁾

According to Bordwijk⁽¹⁷⁾ we can interpret all human (thus child) action only from the ways in which an adult and child lived experience their world. A child's "emotional" life plays a greater role in his/her lived experiencing than does his/her intellectual life. Also, Nieuwenhuis⁽¹⁸⁾ distinguishes between a child and an adult lived experiencing their world. A child does not lived experience his/her surroundings in a matter-of-fact, sober way but primarily emotionally in connection with his/her own strivings. He/she lived experiences the world as friendly or hostile, as exciting or soothing, as joyful or alarming. All of his/her encounters with the world are thus affectively founded. Nieuwenhuis⁽¹¹⁹⁾ refers to the subjective world-image of a young child, to his/her immediate emotional-boundness with reality.⁽²⁰⁾ He distinguishes between affectively lived experiencing the world and objective perceiving.

A child's intentionalities (e.g., fantasizing, imagining, perceiving) flow into each other; he/she does not yet differentiate him/herself from any one total psychic-spiritual intentionality. Gradually, the self-differentiation between subject and object becomes clearer and the distancing between I and world becomes greater. Then, instead of feeling he/she is part of the world, he/she comes to stand in contrast to the world, says Nieuwenhuis.⁽²¹⁾ He also warns (rightly) that the concepts **subjective** and **objective** must not be viewed as absolute opposites and indicates that at the beginning of psychicspiritual becoming, the subjective strongly dominates, but, in the end, the objective dominates. He says that a requirement for primary school attendance is that a degree of distance from the subjective to the objective must have occurred otherwise a child is not yet ready for school. This also holds true on a somewhat lower level for a toddler.⁽²²⁾ With respect to the theme, "a child lived experiences the world," Nieuwenhuis⁽²³⁾ **distinguishes between** a child's **global attunement** (global, strongly affectively colored attunement where a child is not directed by his/her analyzing, knowing potentialities but rather by his/jer total appreciative [valuative] person) and a mostly **analytic attunement** (where there is a clearly defined inner form and structure). Sonnekus⁽²⁴⁾ offers the following useful and clear summary of this matter: The **pathic moments** are the moments of **subjective, primordial lived experiences as pre-cognitive disposition**; the **gnostic moments** are the moments of **distanced, cognitive lived experience of that which lies in the object** (the objective, knowing moment).

Especially Straus⁽²⁵⁾ and Sonnekus⁽²⁶⁾ view pathic lived experience as the necessary origin, as precondition for gnostic lived experiencing. Just as sensing is the pathic/affective origin of all cognitive ways of being (also for perceiving), it is the precondition for the gnostic/cognitive (perceiving).⁽²⁷⁾ To really know, a child must loosen him/herself from his/her sensing, from the subjective, and distance him/herself to a more gnostic/cognitive level. Naive lived experience is broken through and there is movement to perceiving, reflecting, ordering, thinking, etc.⁽²⁸⁾ Straus⁽²⁹⁾ states it thus: "There is a path leading from sensing to knowing."

Werner⁽³⁰⁾ describes this event as one of becoming: In the course of a child's becoming, the undifferentiated, global, pathic ways of lived experiencing make room for and a greater place for differentiated, gnostic lived experiencing; gnostic lived experiencing arises from pathic lived experiencing.

According to Sonnekus⁽³¹⁾ **self-distancing** means that a child steps out of his/her pathic/affective sphere of lived experience and turns to his/her gnostic/cognitive sphere, e.g., in an act of self-distancing such as asking questions.

Lerch's⁽³²⁾ meaningful exposition is analogous to the above views: naive lived experience is our first relationship with the world (e.g., in the prelinguistic period). With the help of language, a child distances him/herself--naive lived experience proceeds to a "form of awareness" (consciousness, cognition). Here lived experience and what is lived experienced, which originate in naive lived experience as a precondition, become determined via reflection and judgment as gnostic/cognitive activities. Thus, the concepts of **pathic/affective** and of **gnostic/cognitive disposition** need to be more fully described and about which further reflection and research appear profitable.

The concept **disposition** refers to a child's habitual thinking and behaving (Langeveld). Behavior is meant here in a broad sense, so it also includes all psychic-spiritual activities or actions (thus all lived experiencing). Accordingly, **disposition** is described as the **specific ways (levels) of lived experiencing**, as ways of thinking and behaving, typical or **habitual** for a subject, i.e., his/her usual (habitual) attunement or focus.

A **pathic/affective disposition** or **habitual pathic attunement** is a way of lived experiencing; a person is generally subjectivelyaffectively attuned to reality. A **gnostic/cognitive disposition** or **habitual gnostic attunement** is a dominant, cognitively distanced way of lived experiencing, as a way of thinking and behaving. However, once again it is stressed that a pathic disposition always has an aspect of the gnostic or an attunement to knowing and that a gnostic disposition always has an emotional side.

Because the pathic is the first and primordial way of lived experiencing, a small child (infant, toddler) can be expected to have a pathic disposition. With an older child (from approximately nine years), as well as with a child in puberty, and an adult, a gnostic disposition is expected. With serious and chronic affective disturbances and when there is pathic flooding of the gnostic, a child remains held fast to his/her pathic disposition and he/she does not distance him/herself to a gnostic disposition.

Originally, lived experience is pathic, but during moments where there is an appeal to acquire knowledge (e.g., moments of actualizing intelligence), a child has to make a leap from emotional lived experiencing to a knowing attunement; he/she has to be able to distance him/herself from the pathic to the gnostic. Clearly, a child's becoming occurs in terms of moving from a pathic to a gnostic disposition (from a child to an adult way of lived experiencing). Thus, in essence, this move also is a matter for the psychology of becoming.

(b) Pathic/affective and gnostic/cognitive lived experience as a unity


According to the preceding descriptions, it is emphasized that in the experiential world there is no separation between pathic/affective and gnostic/cognitive moments--as if reality could be lived experienced in one moment either only pathically or purely gnostically (compare the empiricist's separation of "thought and "feeling"). The designation of pathic/affective and gnostic/cognitive is only for the sake of scientific clarity. Pathic and gnostic lived experiences as states, as content and as activity form a unity (see section 6).

Sonnekus⁽³³⁾ also emphasizes that both pathic and gnostic moments must be seen as a unity and not as separable: "The pathic and gnostic moments in the life world of a child, and also in his lived experiences, cannot be separated from each other and go hand in hand." He repeatedly indicates "the pathic and gnostic moments of lived experience appear on different levels in a child's becoming, sometimes more pathic, sometimes more gnostic, but never as separate moments of lived experience."⁽³⁴⁾


Linschoten⁽³⁵⁾ compares the stream of lived experience with the life of a bird where flying and landing alternate: the periods of rest are like stable, knowing lived experiences; the periods of flight are like emotional lived experiences. Thus, there is a distinction between the substantive and transitive parts of the stream of lived experience⁽³⁶⁾ that involves not only a polar opposition but an essential difference in direction.⁽³⁷⁾

According to Linschoten⁽³⁸⁾ it can be further clarified that the concern is not with a pathic and gnostic absoluteness but with pathic and gnostic lived experiences in their "graded quality"; i.e., lived experience **always** is both pathic and gnostic (and **not** absolutely pathic or absolutely gnostic), but with differences in degree. This implies that either pathic or gnostic lived experience is dominant.

In the author's judgment, Linschoten uses a weak image that does not illustrate the essentials of lived experience. The image of the bird with periods of flight and rest wrongly creates the impression that periods within lived experience can occur that are purely pathic and periods of gnostic lived experience with a "boundary" somewhere between the two, such that at one moment lived experience can be pathic or gnostic. For example:



Rather, lived experience is a changing, unitary stream that varies between two extreme poles or levels, namely, the pathic/affective and the gnostic/cognitive. In other words, lived experience **always** is both pathic (emotionally colored) and gnostic (directed to knowing). For example:



James⁽³⁹⁾ refers to the unity of all psychic reality (thus also of pathic and gnostic lived experiencing) as follows: "From the cognitive point of view, all mental facts are intellections. From the subjective point of view, all are feelings."

Finally, in this connection, Van Dyk's⁽⁴⁰⁾ reference to the synthesis of the subjective and objective moments by the "fruitful moment" in a teaching event can be mentioned. He views the fruitful moment as a "fusion of pathic and gnostic moments."⁽⁴¹⁾

The concepts **pathic** or **pathic-gnostic lived experience**⁽⁴²⁾ point to moments of lived experience that are predominantly or dominantly pathic but that very decidedly also have a gnostic aspect, however slight this might be. Similarly, the concepts **gnostic** or **gnostic**-

pathic lived experience⁽⁴³⁾ point to lived experience that is predominantly gnostically actualized, but at the same time is also emotional. Sonnekus⁽⁴⁴⁾ indicates that the "ways a child lived experiences ... gradually differ; with the junior primary school child (grades 1-4 in the USA), lived experiencing primarily is pathic in nature...although the gnostic also is present while with the senior group (grades 5-7), lived experiencing gradually shifts to the early gnostic level although the pathic still accompanies it."

In his phenomenological-existential analysis of the irreducible and primordial structures of the openness of Dasein, Heidegger⁽⁴⁵⁾ distinguishes the following three constitutive modalities that, as existentialia (anthropological categories) of openness, form an indivisible unity:

1. Attunement ("moodness") (Heidegger's **Befindlichkeit**) which means you find (and feel) yourself (in the world), an attunement, mood, also called a "fundamental mood" or "affective disposition." Also, **no matter what we do**, we always **find** ourselves already in a certain affective mood. Dasein is already attuned (or emotion). It is this characteristic initiative of Dasein which always informs a person, in one way or another, of his/her position in reality by which a person originally can give an account to him/herself of his/her situation in the world. Thus, this attunement or "moodness" teaches a person something concerning reality;

2. Understanding (Heidegger's **Verstehen**): here is meant primordial understanding. It is this primordial understanding that makes possible all modalities of knowing (thinking, remembering, perceiving, actualizing intellectual potentialities--all as ways of existing⁽⁴⁶⁾);

3. Logos (speech) (Heidegger's Rede): here Heidegger means Dasein's fundamental possibility or potentiality to put in order and classify, to delimit and structure. Without this potentiality, attunement and primordial understanding are not possible.

Attunement and primordial understanding are viewed by Heidegger⁽⁴⁷⁾ as two modalities that embrace each other: primordial understanding is always present in attunement, and all understanding in its turn is continually connected with one or another attunement (mood). In other words, all understanding, in one way or another is bound to attunement, and attunement also is a continual bringing-to-light (disclosing).⁽⁴⁸⁾

In terms of the above reflections on lived experience, Heidegger's exposition can be restated with the following three pronouncements:

(a) Pathic/affective and gnostic/cognitive lived experiencing of reality are two primordial and irreducible modalities (existentialia) which embrace each other in that they always occur together.
Without them Dasein cannot be reflected on or understood. Also, Vliegenthart⁽⁴⁹⁾ makes reference to this intermeshing of a child's pathic and gnostic relationships to the world;

(b) All gnostic lived experiences, all cognitive activities involve, to some extent, the emotional;

(c) Primordial understanding is always present in attunement; i.e., attunement (pathic lived experiencing) is a bringing-to-light (disclosing). The latter two pronouncements briefly are considered more closely below:

(i) The emotionality of all cognitive activities (gnostic/cognitive lived experiences):

Here it is shown that all seemingly pure cognitive occurrences, e.g., thinking, attaining insight, actualizing intelligence, etc. also have an aspect of pathic/affective lived experience (emotionality):

Vliegenthart⁽⁵⁰⁾ says the requirements of learning to speak are predominantly gnostic demands. Accordingly, lived experience must be actualized "on a somewhat less concrete level" and with "a weaker pathic boundness and a more gnostic attunement."⁽⁵¹⁾ This quotation cindicates that the gnostic attunement required in learning to speak includes a pathic being bound, but it is necessary that the latter be of "lesser strength." Consequently, the acquisition of language is a gnostic (distanced) constituting by a child, and although of "lesser strength," pathic lived experiencing also is present. For this reason, the affective (emotional) aspect of language constitution (i.e., discovering and acquiring language for oneself) cannot be denied.

Linschoten⁽⁵²⁾ shows the interwoven nature of pathic and gnostic lived experiencing and indicates that the stream of lived experience

has both a personal (subjective) and a cognitive (knowing) character. From this it is concluded that all knowing lived experiences are person-bound or I-determined, i.e., that gnostic lived experiences are qualified by Dasein's emotionality. In addition, Sonnekus⁽⁵³⁾ indicates that "pathic moments are always present in lived experiencing reality, even when the gnostic is more to the point."

According to Van Hiele,⁽⁵⁴⁾ acquiring insight generally is paired with an "emotion": a child attains a feeling of power because he/she feels (knows) he/she is capable of a number of things of which he/she was previously incapable; he/she also acquires a feeling of security because he/she feels (knows) he/she is capable of fulfilling stipulations. It is precisely these accompanying "emotions" that make this a situation, which originally didn't have the characteristics of one, and which suddenly he/she can now change into a learning situation (Van Hiele). Further, he refers to the joy of knowing something, the feeling of power and security that go along with insight.⁽⁵⁵⁾

Van Hiele reflects further as follows: at the beginning of insight, among other things, a child is captured by the problem. His/her whole personality is directed to this problem."⁽⁵⁶⁾ From Sonnekus'⁽⁵⁷⁾ description of **thinking** as "par excellence, a gnostic way of being" as well as "a search for and acquisition of a grasp on **reality as a problem**" (my emphasis), it is clear that a child, even in his/her act of thinking (as a clearly gnostic way of being and as a seemingly pure cognitive directedness to reality), is affectively captured in his/her intentional directedness to reality. In this light, one cannot agree with the view that pathic lived experiences play no role in the act of thinking itself,⁽⁵⁸⁾ and further, one can question the possibility that a child can completely transcend the pathic/affective to the gnostic/cognitive in the act of thinking.⁽⁵⁹⁾

The following quotation from Van Hiele⁽⁶⁰⁾ underscores the present discussion: "Until insight breaks through, the increase in emotional tension clearly is not constant; on the contrary, it pulsates and probably is even essential for insight to arise. But the highest form of emotion is reached at the moment a child becomes aware of his/her own insight [the aha! moment of a real breakthrough to understanding], and it is precisely the anticipation of this emotion that makes the intellectual tension so attractive." Also, Van Hiele speaks of a desire for insight,⁽⁶¹⁾ and of the "emotions" that

accompany insight;⁽⁶²⁾ in addition, he refers to feelings of discouragement, expectation and the "emotions" of acquiring the insight.⁽⁶³⁾ He comes to the following conclusion: "emotions" are the necessary driving power for learning to occur; the problem must be captivating.⁽⁶⁴⁾

The above aspects of Van Hiele's views concerning "emotion" and insight illustrate the emotionality of an extremely cognitive event or gnostic/cognitive lived experience such as the onset and attainment of insight.

According to Langeveld,⁽⁶⁵⁾ not only is the knowing relationship to the world changed by a child's intellectualizing because when the gnostic-knowing image changes so does the pathic-emotional. When one goes to meet the world cognitively, it looses its feeling of mystery, threat and tenseness and thus a child's affectivity also changes. Further, intellectualizing involves a distancing to an impersonal, gnostic/cognitive viewing of the world; but this distancing to the gnostic clearly is an emotional distancing according to Langeveld.⁽⁶⁶⁾ He⁽⁶⁷⁾ even warns against intellectualizing existing completely pushed away from all "emotional" ways of acting in favor of methodical-impersonal ways of being aware. This would lead to an uprooting of a person him/herself, to a loss of contact with fellow persons, with society and with culture. With the occurrence of intellectualizing, it also is important for Langeveld⁽⁶⁸⁾ that "the education of the emotional life harmonize with the personality."

In Van Dyk's⁽⁶⁹⁾ exposition, there also are moments when emotionality is evident in cognitive events (specific teaching events). He clarifies: Because objects in a child's surrounding world not only appeal to his/her knowing life but also to his/her emotional life, he/she is required to answer this appeal in his/her totality.⁽⁷⁰⁾ Elsewhere, he mentions that each lived experience (thus also the gnostic/cognitive) lays a claim on a child's emotional life,⁽⁷¹⁾ and he refers to the intense subjectivity that can arise in a teaching/learning situation (as a clearly cognitive activity); (pathic/affective) lived experience is thus a moment that is influenced by the course of a lesson^{®72)} "Along with the breakthrough of insight and the solution of an actual problem, in the fruitful moment one feels a strong affective lived experience and claim on consciousness" (Van Dyk).⁽⁷³⁾

In addition, Van Dyk points to the following feelings that are related to the occurrences of thinking and learning: self-confidence, selfassurance, confusion;⁽⁷⁴⁾ feelings of perplexity and desperation, unconcerned attitude, impulsive behavior, doubt, boldness, straining of attention,⁽⁷⁵⁾ arousal of moments of tension,⁽⁷⁶⁾ astonishment and wonder.⁽⁷⁷⁾ It is further indicated that "In the search for a solution (thinking), the tension increases the longer the solution stays away."⁽⁷⁸⁾ Also: "Along with the mastery of reality, each person lived experiences pleasant moments such as achievements in the fruitful moment as well as alternating moments of errors and failures."⁽⁷⁹⁾ And: "The strong subjective lived experience of the event and the intellectual directedness to achieving a solution."⁽⁸⁰⁾ Also, this involves the easing of tension, the joyful,⁽⁸¹⁾ the pleasure or dissatisfaction which a solution holds for a child;⁽⁸²⁾ affective moments of the unlocking of reality are referred to;⁽⁸³⁾ a child experiences a degree of "thrill" (affective moment) in a favorable learning climate.⁽⁸⁴⁾

The final quotation from Van Dyk⁽⁸⁵⁾ in this regard speaks for itself. In the teaching situation, a pupil undergoes contrasting lived experiences: "First he finds himself in a situation of increasing unrest and growing tension but the fruitful moment makes a place for feelings of joy, happiness and self-satisfaction on the basis of the surprising breakthrough of insight. This gives the event a strong emotionally loaded character whose formative value clearly cannot be doubted."

For this pathic/affective lived experience of the cognitive activity, Bigot⁽⁸⁶⁾ as well as Garbers⁽⁸⁷⁾ use the concept **intellectual feeling** which is described as follows: **intellectual feeling** is the feeling we experience when we understand something, recognize something as true, or the contrary of these. Thus, it is the feeling that is lived experienced with the solution of a problem, with the attainment of insight into a theory, where feelings of doubt, confusion and obscurity pass over to feelings of security. It is the joy of knowing and coming to know, or the discord of not knowing and not being able to know. Related feelings are curiosity, eagerness to learn, a thirst for knowledge, the anticipation or tension before a result, the disillusionment or disappointment if the unexpected occurs or the expected fails to materialize, the delight of the truth, the despair of doubt. The feeling of the sudden breakthrough of insight is called the "Aha-experience" by Buhler, according to Bigot. In addition, Kruger⁽⁸⁸⁾ also refers to the **universality of emotions**, which means that in **all** behaving and lived experiencing the emotional moment is present and colors them. Everything a person does is accompanied by one or another emotional quality. Emotions, thus, are universal in the sense that they accompany all "behavior." Any mode of behavior can be analyzed and an emotional moment will be discovered in it.

Finally, Nel⁽⁸⁹⁾ indicates the emotionality of cognitive acts when he refers to "the affect-laden character of the phenomenon learning... On whatever cognitive level a child goes out to the world (either by perceiving, thinking, fantasizing, etc.), it always remains an affect-laden going out to the world."

The preceding detailed discussion points to the pathic aspect or emotionality of all cognitive activities or gnostic/cognitive lived experiences of which special attention was devoted to the following: learning to speak, knowing lived experiencing, insight, thinking, the learning situation (also the teaching situation), intellectualizing and the fruitful moment.

(ii) The disclosive character of all pathic/affective lived experience

Here it is briefly indicated how each pathic/affective lived experience, however clearly emotional or "purely" affect-laden it might appear, has a gnostic or cognitive aspect; i.e., in this moment, a child is also knowingly aware of reality; he/she comes to one or another realization or knowing of something; all pathic/affective lived experience is disclosive; it manifests, unveils, discovers something for a child, however slight. Even with preponderantly pathic/affective lived experiencing there thus is a distanced side, however slight and on whatever level the matter of concern might appear.

Also, via seemingly pure pathic/affective lived experiencing, a pupil acquires insight, i.e., to act adequately in new situations.⁽⁹⁰⁾ In each pathic/affective lived experience one or more of the following gnostic/cognitive moments can be found: knowing, understanding, being aware, remembering interpreting, problem solving, globalizing, analyzing, synthesizing, transferring, etc. Thus, pathic/affective lived experience influences the occurrence of intellectualizing, forming, teaching and cognitive orientation.

"Each (pathic) lived experience contributes to what it is that one learns from the object compelled by his wondering, " writes Van Dyk.⁽⁹¹⁾ The same reality which entices a child to lived experience it pathically/affectively, in the same moment allows him/her to take a gnostic/cognitive position toward it within which are laid moments of determining, learning, knowing, ordering, etc.

Even a child's being aware of the fact that he/she lived experiences reality pathically/affectively means a knowing about his/her own going out to reality. Even in the cognitive lived experienced vagueness of a strongly affect-laden attunement (anxiety, insecurity, uncertainty, discouragement, failure) toward one's own intellectual deficiencies, there is a knowing awareness of one's own impotence and ignorance.

Finally, Sonnekus⁽⁹²⁾ indicates that even when "lived experience is primarily more pathic in nature, the gnostic also is present."

More than any other category (e.g., consciousness) the concept of lived experience points to the unity of pathic/affective and gnostic/cognitive directedness, i.e., to the fact that all gnostic/cognitive directedness has an emotional aspect and that all pathic/affective direction is disclosive to some extent.

3. THE NATURE OF THE STREAM OF LIVED EXPERIENCE

Linschoten⁽⁹³⁾ postulates the following six essential characteristics of the stream of lived experience:

(a) The streaming (continuous) character of lived experience:

The stream of lived experience is characterized by an experienced continuity. Lived experience goes or flows forth; it has the character of a stream. However, it must not be compared with a chain or a train that is divided into links or coupled units but with a stream or river that flows uninterrupted. In this connection, James refers to the continuity of the stream of consciousness. Thus, states of consciousness continually follow each other without interruption. When lived experience apparently is interrupted (e.g., by sleep, fainting, a coma, an epileptic condition), the interrupted. The I

is a common whole that lived experiences itself in an unbroken progression, e.g., before and after sleep;

(b) The integral character of lived experience:

This concerns the integrity (James) or unity (Brentano) of the stream of consciousness and connected with this is the unity of the I that lived experiences. Lived experience possesses a unitary character of content, form and duration. The unity of consciousness exists in that all psychic phenomena appear simultaneously (e.g., seeing, hearing, imagining, judging, choosing, loving, hating, desiring, evading), each as a part phenomenon, belong to a real unity.⁽⁹⁴⁾

Lived experience, then, is not actualized via specific sense organs. One does not differentiate among what one hears, sees, tastes or smells. Different sensory data and acts originally are an undifferentiated, unitary lived experience. In lived experience, we always have to do with a totality and not with disconnected lived experiences. Even sensing is the (pathic) lived experiencing of totalities, of forms.⁽⁹⁵⁾

Further, lived experience is an overarching unity of actuality (the actually given **present**), of retentions (**past**) and of protentions (**future**);

(c) The personal character of lived experience

Each lived experience is part of a personal consciousness, is thus person-bound, is **I-determined**; each lived experience is "my lived experience." "My consciousness" refers to an owner or I-pole of each state of consciousness. Lived experience is bound to a unity through a self. It belongs to someone and constitutes part of someone;

(d) The knowing character of lived experience

Lived experience also is cognitive or has the function of knowing. The stream of lived experience has two functions: it leads to knowledge and it leads to activity. This involves a knowing involvement or directedness of lived experience with things. Thus, it always is a lived experience of something, and this leads to knowing that something;

(e) The selective character of lived experience

Lived experience is selected, the stream of lived experience is chosen. Forms of this, e.g., are attending to, taking an interest in, being directed to something, consciously willing. This choice is an activity that reveals intentionality. The stream of lived experience is a directed stream and in choosing, it becomes structured. This choosing amounts to drawing thematic boundaries within the field of lived experience. Selecting is an activity of thematizing. Linschoten⁽⁹⁶⁾ speaks of a continuous selective structuring or of selective interest;

(f) The changing character of lived experience

Lived experience changes incessantly and is characterized as continuous change, flow and transformation. However, this is not to say that there is any lived experience without duration. No lived experience returns to what it was earlier. The lived experience of a thing (the same thing) continually changes. No lived experience ever repeats itself. Linschoten⁽⁹⁷⁾ calls this the continually changing total status of consciousness.

Lived experiencing the same thing each time is characterized by a different context, a different relation, a different meaning. Thus, lived experience is becoming (changing), and the history of one's becoming also is one's historicity. Our historicity allows us to continually lived experience differently.⁽⁹⁸⁾

4. LIVED-EXPERIENCE AND LANGUAGE


Linschoten⁽⁹⁹⁾ refers to the intimate relations and mutual dependencies among language, lived experience and reality. Lived experience refers to reality with language as the **medium**. With **language as medium, I verbalize** (mean, put into language) the **reality** (lived experienced content) that I **lived experience**. Languaging (verbalizing) is naming lived experienced reality; thus, human reality is a **verbalized** reality. This is stated thus: verbalizing is one's own and is connected with one's lived experiences, with one's lived experienced reality. Human reality is not only a verbalized reality, it also is a reality of "speaking" and of meaningful things that "speak" and that constitute a world through their meaningful connections.⁽¹⁰⁰⁾ The following statement also is important: Our language, ordinary speech, does not speak about a reality free and independent of all human viewing; rather it speaks of a meaningful world-for-us, of the experiential world, and this is pervaded with human subjectivity.⁽¹⁰¹⁾ Consequently, language is a creative moment in the constitution of reality. Through verbalization reality becomes enriched, extended, named, known. Only when the content of lived experience is put into words (literally), does lived experience become verbally manageable.⁽¹⁰²⁾ A person's lived experiencing itself becomes co-characterized by what is brought to the fore in the verbalization; also, language is constitutive of lived experience and through words lived experiences become communicable, and thus gaugable for us.⁽¹⁰³⁾

Further, lived experience compels formulation in language; lived experienced meanings are cast in the form of language, the meanings thus become embodied and acquire a form in something perceptible. One's lived experienced interiority acquires its reality through the word and thus becomes accessible to others (and to oneself). A common lived experienced reality is brought about by language. The word expresses what is there (for us): human reality.⁽¹⁰⁴⁾

The stream of lived experience, that is so changing, flowing and formless becomes a structured and differentiated stream, a graspable firmness through its expressibility; in other words, verbalizing is the way in which forms originate and are anchored in lived experience. As a consequence, lived experience becomes namable, classifiable, communicable, understandable and definable. Reality for us is not the unutterable, inexpressible but rather the said, the spoken; for us it is the discussible and namable. Language forms and transforms the changeable stream of lived experience into an expressed, pregnant, articulated form. Thus, human reality is an expressed reality and lived experience already is aimed at language (Linschoten).⁽¹⁰⁵⁾

5. THE FIELD OF LIVED EXPERIENCE

In accordance with James, Linschoten⁽¹⁰⁶⁾ describes the field of lived experience as follows:



There is a distinction between **marginal** and **thematic lived experience**. The margin is the horizon of the theme, and the theme is the topic or center of one's lived experience. It is focused at the center while marginal lived experience is vague. Marginal lived experience stands in a certain relation to the theme; it is its context, and it has a constitutive significance for the theme. Theme and field are continuous; the theme is the thematization of a field within a field; thus, thematizing delimits the essentials with regard to the non-essentials in the filed of lived experience. The differentiation of a theme within the field of lived experience is a necessary, general form of organization of this field. On all levels of lived experience, there is a theme and a field, a core and a surrounding.

Consciousness does not consist only of distinct, clearly defined ideas, thoughts and concepts, and lived experienced reality is not only that which occurs with clarity. Our consciousness is not limited to what we know, and it cannot be defined only by its focus.

In each moment of lived experience, there exists a field that is a complex structure of pathic, gnostic and conative (efforts of willing, striving, etc.) moments. Such moments in the field of lived experience are organized around a core (theme). This organization continually changes, sometimes quickly, sometimes slowly and sometimes the theme undergoes only slight changes while the margin changes quickly. Sometimes the theme and margin change places and sometimes the whole field suddenly changes. In thinking, the thought is in the center of the field while other moments are then in the margin (Linschoten).⁽¹⁰⁷⁾

Depending on a person's intentionality, either a primarily pathic or a gnostic moment will be in the focus of lived experience. If the gnostic becomes flooded by the pathic, then there is mention of confused, weak or labile intentionality, and a pathic moment will be in the focus of lived experience and the gnostic moment will be in the margin.

The following three pronouncements previously dealt with are considered again:

(i) the unity of pathic and gnostic lived experience; they are interwoven, they embrace each other, and they are always found together;

(ii) all gnostic/cognitive lived experience is emotional;

(iii) pathic lived experience is disclosive (gnostic).

In terms of the field of lived experience, the following statements are made:

(i) in the field of lived experience both pathic and gnostic moments always are present;

(ii) if a gnostic moment (e.g., thinking, ordering, knowing, structuring, perceiving) is present in the focus of the field, a pathic moment (e.g., joy, discouragement, anxiety) is present in the margin;

(iii) if a pathic moment is present in the focus of the field, a gnostic moment is present in the margin.

An inability to distance from a pathic lived experience to a gnostic directedness is, in terms of the field of lived experience, an inability to focus on a gnostic moment and to distance the pathic moment from the focus to the margin.

6. MODALITIES OF LIVED EXPERIENCE

Since in this study lived experience is viewed primarily as a matter of the psychology of becoming and also of psychological pedagogics, it is important to take note of the modalities of lived experience. More specifically, a pedagogue will come to know:

that a child lived experiences: lived experience as activity (belewe);

what a child lived experiences: lived experience as content

(beleefde); **how** a child lived experiences: lived experience as **states** (belewingswyses).

(a) Lived experience as activity

In a phenomenological disclosure, this does not involve the view that a person **has** a lived experience but rather that he/she **lived experiences**. Lived experience is never passive, and Linschoten,⁽¹⁰⁸⁾ Sonnekus,⁽¹⁰⁹⁾ Lersch⁽¹¹⁰⁾ and Landman⁽¹¹¹⁾ vigorously emphasize the activity character of lived experience. Clearly, it should be viewed as activity and, as such, the following are distinguished:

intentional act (act of directedness) (Brentano); act of taking a position towards (Sonnekus); act of giving meaning (Husserl); dialectic act (Lersch, Landman); act of changing (Bigot); act of constituting (Langeveld); act of consciousness (Kockelmans); act of knowing (Linschoten); act of actualization (Sonnekus); act of participating; act of signifying (Linschoten); act of selecting (Linschoten).

In addition, gnostic lived experience, e.g., is an act of distancing, objectification, differentiation, thinking, ordering, knowing, understanding, ascertaining, analyzing.

Two modalities of being-in-the-world (Dasein) of the lived experiencing I are that he/she **feels** (and finds) him/herself in the world (**Befindlichkeit** or **pathic**-gnostic lived experience) and that he/she **understands** the world (**Verstehen** or **gnostic**-pathic lived experience). Thus, to lived experience is to feel and understand. A closer look at the categories of feeling and understanding lead to the conclusion that the **activity** character of lived experience lies primarily in the gnostic/cognitive moment rather than in the pathic/affective, which again points to the fact that a subject feels (finds) him/herself in a situation. Of feeling and understanding, the latter modality carries the activity moment. Also, in the following corresponding pairs of categories, it is especially those with a gnostic/cognitive connotation that continually point to the character of activity:

sensing	-	perceiving
emotionality	-	knowing
affectively colored	-	structuring
involvement	-	matter of fact
diffuseness	-	differentiation
primordial lived exp.	-	derived (cognitive)
familiarity	-	knowing, thinking, etc.
naive lived exp.	-	distancing
being with and in the	-	standing over against the
world		world (understanding
		the world)
pathic is noticeable	-	conscious-purposeful is
		noticeable

From this, the view arises that the demand for gnostic/cognitive lived experience (gnostic directedness, gnostic focus, being matter of fact, distancing, objectifying, differentiating) is a demand for psychic-spiritual activity, conduct and exertion. Pathic lived experience as primordial lived experience is given with child-beingin-the-world; originally a child finds him/herself involved in, acquainted with and in the world in affectively colored, emotional ways. Distancing and differentiating to understand, to know, to think, to order, to structure, to analyze, etc. are **activities** by which a child, as initiator of gnostic/cognitive relations, actualizes his/her becoming.

(b) Lived experience as content

Each moment of lived experience implies a lived experienced totality (as a unity) of many feelings, thoughts, remembrances, impressions, ideas, meanings, contents, decisions, choices, judgments, etc. This unity is the **content** of lived experience or of consciousness.

According to Brentano⁽¹¹²⁾ each psychic act is concerned with **something** (intentionally directed), and the following theses are postulated:

Consciousness is always being-conscious of something;

Lived experience is always lived experience of something; thinking is always thinking about something; etc.

This **something** to which lived experience is directed is the content or the object of lived experience; it is the momentary slice of reality that is lived experienced and, therefore, as content, it is viewed as the experiential world.

(c) Lived experience as state

The states of lived experience are the ways of being of a lived experiencing **I**, also called modes of consciousness or ways of being aware. They are a person's ways of taking a position toward, of being directed to reality, of giving and experiencing meaning; they are his/her ways of conducting a dialogue with reality. Lived experience as state concerns the **ways of lived experiencing**.⁽¹¹³⁾

According to Sonnekus⁽¹¹⁴⁾ the following are posited as ways of lived experiencing (in the form of modes of learning):

sensing: a pathic directedness to reality; perceiving: a gnostic directedness to reality; imagining and fantasizing: directedness to an irreal reality; thinking: directedness to reality as a problem; remembering: directedness (in the present) to reality as past; language: directed verbalization of reality; actualization of intelligence: directed to break through situations in reality.

7 NORMATIVE MOMENTS OF THE EXPERIENTIAL WORLD OF A CHILD^*

As an occurrence of intentionality, all giving of sense and meaning, the lived experience of sense, taking a position and changing the world to a world-for-me take place in terms of specific **norms** and **values**. Each moment of lived experience, therefore, also is an existential or an **axiological moment**. Each lived experience of something simultaneously is a lived experience of values. Scheler⁽¹¹⁵⁾ views human being primarily as a being who lived experiences values and whose intentional feelings are directed to

^{*} This section is translated as it appears in the text (it is incomplete and inconsistent).

values. The concern here is with the sense and meanings that a child's lived experiencing has for him/her; the question regards his/her lived experience of sense, meaning and values.⁽¹¹⁶⁾ Thus, his/her experiential world must be viewed as a world of sense, meaning and values.

Landman⁽¹¹⁷⁾ refers to the inner connection and meaning of moments of lived experience as the occurrence of moments of life itself. For him, lived experience "is not something which momentarily flows past in the stream of conscious life, but rather is the **meaningful** content that a person experiences and that becomes a lasting possession."⁽¹¹⁸⁾ A child's lived experiences are "lived experiencable relations and valuative attitudes in the face of the meaningful and valuable that radiate from lived-reality," writes Landman.⁽¹¹⁹⁾

In addition, the unity of pathic/affective and gnostic/cognitive lived experiencing with the normative cannot be emphasized enough. Sonnekus⁽¹²⁰⁾ refers to the fact that normative lived experience of sense is pathically founded and speaks through the pathic and that it also is gnostic in nature. The pathic and gnostic ways of lived experiencing, then, are the ways a child attributes sense and meaning to his/her world.⁽¹²¹⁾ A small child is more disposed to give sense and meaning more pathically and an older child more gnostically.⁽¹²²⁾

The knowing moment of lived experience is also a knowledge of, a knowing of values and norms and cognitive judgments are made in terms of these known values. Thus, here the concern is with the normative moment in a child's cognitive lived experiences. According to Scheler⁽¹²³⁾ we **know** immediately which values we give preference to and which not. This **knowing** clearly is also a gnostic lived experience. A child's knowing life is so closely interwoven with his/her normative lived experiences that, according to Sonnekus⁽¹²⁴⁾ a child is directly dependent on the existential-normative for the actualization of his/her cognitive potentialities.

Further, the lived experience of norms, values and meanings also is a pathic matter. The theme of **values and feelings** is expounded in a meritorious way by Max Scheler,⁽¹²⁵⁾ a phenomenologist of lived experience.⁽¹²⁶⁾ Scheler's⁽¹²⁷⁾ view in this connection runs as follows: **values** are given to us in **feelings**. Thus, there is a connection between the essence of the object (its value for a person) and the essence of intentional lived experience. Values, in their essence, must appear in a feeling consciousness (pathic lived experience), and thus values and feelings are dependent on each other as correlates. Values are founded in feelings, but values also are objective and thus also gnostic lived experiences.

Scheler⁽¹²⁸⁾ further differentiates four "levels of feeling" that correspond to the structure of our total human existence:

(a) Sensory feelings solely have a relation to the body and can be localized at specific places in the body;

(b) Vital feelings also have a relation to the body but belong to the whole bodily "organism." Fundamentally, they differ from sensory feelings in that they carry a functional and intentional character. The values of our world (nature) are given in the vital feelings. Thus, there are feelings of what is good or bad for life;

[(c) Psychic feelings have a bearing on the person as a person and they are independent of the body—this type of feeling was omitted from the text--G.Y.]

(d) Spiritual feelings (also called metaphysical or religious) are the highest feelings and are those of a person. In feelings such as bliss, despair and peace, the person is touched in his absoluteness. They form the core of our spiritual acts, and they reach the core of our personal existence. These are the fundamental attunements (moods) or existential modes that permeate our total being.

Scheler⁽¹²⁹⁾ then presents the following corresponding hierarchy of values or value-modalities:

(a) The values of sensory feelings: the pleasant, the unpleasant, the useful--thus the ways of gratification or suffering (sensory hedonism or pain);

(b) The values of vital feelings: the noble, the common; also values of well-being such as feeling healthy, sick, vital, aged, tired;

[The values of psychic or mental feelings were omitted by the author--G.Y.]

(c) The spiritual values: They are independent of the body and environment. Beauty and ugliness, the divine, just, unjust, knowledge of pure truth, spiritual sympathy;

(d) The values of the holy and unholy: This means the highest feelings: bliss, despair, faith, disbelief, dread, adoration. These necessarily are personal values.

The above pronouncements lead to the conclusion that in correspondence with the different levels of the hierarchy of normative, pathic and gnostic lived experiences also are actualized on different levels. That is, pathic-gnostic lived experiences are closely intertwined with normative lived experiences of meaning.

8. SYNTHESIS

In this chapter, several important aspects of the phenomenon of lived experience are presented. First, it was necessary to distinguish in detail between pathic/affective and gnostic/cognitive moments in a child's experiential world, and then to indicate that the former is the origin or precondition for a knowing relation with reality. The unity of pathic and gnostic lived experiencing, however, cannot be stressed strongly enough. According to Heidegger, **Befindlichkeit** and **Verstehen** are two modalities that embrace each other and without which Dasein cannot be contemplated. It has been shown in detail that all gnostic lived experience is emotional and all pathic lived experience is disclosive.

In addition, the following characteristics of the stream of lived experience were briefly indicated: its streaming, integral, personal, knowing, selective and changing character.

Language was disclosed as a medium for expressing the reality we lived experience. The most important pronouncement here is that all human lived experience compels formulation in language.

Also, the field of lived experience was described and there is a distinction between marginal and thematic lived experiencing.

After that, the fact **that** a child lived experiences, the question of **what** he/she lived experiences and **how** he/she lived experiences were dealt with. Through these modalities, lived experience as activity, as content and as state were considered. It was indicated

that lived experience clearly bears the character of activity, that content is considered to be identical with the experiential world and that state refers to the subject's modes of being directed to reality.

Finally, it was noted that on all levels of lived experience, the question of giving sense and meaning as well as of meaning and values arose. All lived experience possesses a normative moment.

In the following chapter, a number of psychopedagogical criteria for evaluating a child's lived experiences are sketched and explained.

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