

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF A CATEGORICAL STRUCTURE FOR DIDACTIC PEDAGOGICS*

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To reflect on the activity known as "Didaskein" (teaching) in the original experiences of all persons is to reflect on a practice which is carried out daily by everybody. Thus, it is an essential part of living, as people encounter it in the lifeworld. Therefore, such reflecting, contemplating, or reasoning is not primarily the result of any theory, premise, conception, or ideal, but grounds itself in a direct description of the practical, everyday life experience which all persons go through each day, and which, as a matter of course, eventually become integrated into the totality of experiences amassed over time.¹

The usual relation between person and reality, which is necessary, and is built up with increasing intensity, makes possible a reflection on the sense, or original meaning of this aspect of their experiences. Indeed, it is a compelling experience that some teaching is done so inconspicuously that one is inclined to accept it as self-evident, without seeking information about its nature or essence, i.e., about its real structure. The consequence [of this seeming self-evidence] is that, for many centuries, especially in Western-European thought², didactic science seldom, if ever, considered seeking information about the original meaning of this primordial experience we describe as "Didaskein" (teaching), and in what ways, and with what aims it is implicated in educating all children during the years they are allocated to being educated.

Reflecting, from this point of view, also puts the possibility of a didactic perspective on the phenomenon of educating in clear relief, so that this connection [between educating and teaching] is

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unavoidably implicated in the argument. In concluding this matter, teaching which is not attuned to a child's becoming and change is meaningless. At the same time, educating without teaching is impossible because then educating would be stripped of all content. As far as teaching (*Didaskein*) is the obverse side of educating, this means this original experience, or primordial form of living (educating) necessarily includes teaching which, *ipso facto*, compels a pedagogue, from the beginning, to take teaching into consideration when constructing a pedagogical theory. Thus, reflecting fundamentally on educating also includes didactic pronouncements, by which there is a didactic perspective on a scientific-pedagogical level.

If one reflects fundamentally on the activity we know as "Didaskein", this implies that the reflection must reach back to the original experience of educating. On close examination, this "original experience" is a person's primordial involvement with reality. The first, and most obvious, insight to which this approach leads one, is the realization that a person's original involvement with reality is for him/her a matter of meaning. The first ontological category of "being-in-the-world" (Heidegger) implies an activity of giving meaning, which arises from the relationships he/she has established with such a reality. From this it follows that, when a didactic pedagogue reflects on a person's involvement with reality, he/she must accept that this being-in-the-world, just referred to, is for a person a matter of meaning. In other words, the lifeworld would be a meaningless structure for a person if his/her involvement in it were not an issue of meaning. Reflecting on, and systematically ordering his/her experiences (original involvement with reality) would consequently be impossible. As a first ontological category, a person's "being-in-the-world", therefore, implies a meaning-giving activity which expresses the relationship he/she has established with reality.³

However, this first indication of a fundamental reflection on the original experience we know as "Didaskein", necessarily leads to a greater particularization. The activities noted above are nothing more than human activities, because only persons educate and are committed to it. When a didactician constructs a fundamental theory from this, he/she must also see that he/she is continually involved with, and has anthropological categories, i.e., categories concerning the ways a person is involved with reality, by which he/she also is aware of it. The simple justification for this

standpoint is that these anthropological categories must clarify for a didactician, a person's original involvement with reality. After all, these educative actions of a person, in his/her original involvement with reality, are matters of giving form to the first ontological category "person-in-the-world". In other words, person-in-the-world is a dynamic concept indicating that the integrated relationship person-world, acquires form in the original experience, and is available for description and judgment in this way [i.e., categorically].

Thus, a person's involvement with reality takes on a form, as original, simple activities which, separately and together, delimit a person's form of living. Stated differently, the form of a person's involvement with reality is made evident in original, simple activities. So viewed, the form of the original experience then must reveal the specific humanness of his/her ways of acting. The specific human character of his/her forms of experiencing force a didactic pedagogue to postulate the specific human ways of being, by which he/she rejects each naturalistic-evolutionistic anthropology.⁴ They simply do not agree with the fact of a specific human being, as is seen in the original experience. However, one can only postulate this specific way of being if one also realizes that these original actions (experiences) must reveal forms of living as such. In other words, one's original action and, therefore, one's original experience has an essential authority with respect to the form of living which is hereby revealed.

This insight regarding the relation of life form and original experience is interesting to a didactic pedagogue, but it remains merely theory unless he/she also realizes that this form of living has the possibility of creating a structure, in the experiential world, which can be actualized for presenting or making life contents known, and within which the specifically human is manifested in a teaching situation. Still, one's form of living is observable when he/she involves him/herself with life content. This meaningful structure of his/her original experience exists because, in the ways he/she is involved with reality, he/she continually proceeds to give meaning, i.e., content to his/her existence.⁵

An essential aspect of his/her involvement with reality turns on the matter of knowledge: knowledge of his/her origin, being, and destination, his/her command to watch over, and work at what is unique to his/her existence. In summary: the entire constituting of

a unique lifeworld has to do with the fact that what is meaningful for a person, in his/her continuous experiencing, he/she must increasingly realize the meaning of the content which such experiencing has for him/her.

A searcher for fundamental structure in the didactic pedagogic, must recognize that here we have to do with the **relationship** between person and reality. This relationship can only come about insofar as a person's involvement with reality occurs in specific forms of living. These forms of living have their ground, or real sense in the original ways in which he/she, as a person, is involved with the total reality in religious, moral, social, juridical, economic, and every other respect. This original involvement with reality then, understandably, proclaims the forms of his/her involvement with reality or, better, his/her original forms of living. These original forms of living express an unprejudiced view of nothing less than the ways a person originally experiences reality. But, indeed, a person does not experience nothing. In his/her original experiencing, he/she is involved with something—he/she does something, thinks about something, talks about something, etc. And this **something** is not the experience itself but the **content** by which this experiencing of reality takes its course. Therefore, if one talks of “person in world”, one talks about a harmony, a synthesis, and relation of life form and life content, which is visible in a person's original involvement with reality.

The form as well as the content, with which one is busy in the everyday practice of living, must be carefully analyzed and thought about to be able to decide if they are primary or secondary structures. Finally, a person's experiencing shows that he/she continually has to do with practices which are not primary experiences, e.g., the manufactured aspects of his/her occupational life, the transportation systems he/she creates, etc. Fundamental thinking, thus, must carefully distinguish if the experiencing (in this sense, now the relation of form and content) really is a primary matter, i.e., if it is something which has to do with his/her original experiencing, his/her “being in the world” as such [e.g., educating, as upbringing—G.Y.], and if it is something which he/she brought about him/herself over time, as a synthesis of different aspects of his/her involvement with this reality [e.g., schooling—G.Y.]. For a didactic pedagogue, this means that he/she must be prepared to reach back further than the school, since, considering the above, the school's reality cannot be characterized as an original experiencing

of the forms of living. In searching for the possibility of a categorical structure for the didactic pedagogic, going back to the school's situation means to ground it on a second order, contrived matter which, in its **form of appearing** does not implicate the original involvement of a person with reality.

With this, however, it also is acknowledged that the original experiencing is actualizable somewhere in reality. As far as the didactic pedagogic is concerned, if this is not in the school, the course and connected series of situations must be found elsewhere. Here, a didactician-pedagogue is confronted with the question of where, i.e., in what **space** is the original experience actualized. In the foregoing, it is implied that the dynamic, acceleration, course, movement of a consecutive series of situations, as observed in an educative event, which must bring to the surface a connecting factor by which the relation of form and content can appear in harmony precisely because meaning is given to one's own existence in the original experiencing.

It took many years and even centuries for pedagogues to clearly see that the meaning of the original experience of "Didaskein" (Teaching) is found, not in the second order situation of the school, but in the primary family situation. A discussion of this point is unnecessary for the progress of this exposition.⁶ The relation of form and content actualized in a spatial being-there, however, is important because, in this, the accomplished factual connection of life form and life content is observable and, therefore, describable. It is precisely in this space or place (the family) where a coherent, fundamental reflection on "Didaskein" shows that the form and the insights into content are placed in pedagogic harmony. Finally, this especially has to do with the form of **how** there can be teaching, and the content (including principles) regarding **what** teaching ought to be involved. While the form aspect is a universal matter, the content principles are very clearly specific matters. The universal form of the original experience, which is in force for all people, and all times is brought to life, to dynamic movement, to exercising pedagogic intervention by means of particulars, the life and worldviews, and for us, it is the Christian Protestant—more specifically the Calvinist view.

The implication of the above is summarized as follows: That the form of the experience, as it appears in the original lifeworld, is a universal, generally valid matter, and that this original experience is

known after its form has appeared in the everyday act (which we call giving instruction or “Didaskein”). At the same time, this form is a lifeless theoretical structure, unless it is brought into motion in terms of specific content, e.g., a worldview, with the aim of a child’s eventual adulthood. In his/her fundamental reflecting on the nature and essence of the experience of “Didaskein”, a didactic pedagogue, therefore, expresses him/herself regarding the question of form and content, as they ought to harmonize in the original space (the family home) and, thence, be carried over to the second order functioning school situation, which, in fact, is only an extension of the event which had occurred long before [there were schools], and which still is occurring in the home.

From the above pronouncement, when there is a search for a “categorical structure” for the didactic pedagogic, ostensibly this has to do with the **form** in which this original experience appears, and which obviously ought to be carefully described and interpreted for the sake of establishing a second order structure by which, in a formal way, the original sense of this form of living is integrated into the school situation. And it is only in this way that a didactic pedagogician can justify the practice which he/she describes in its **form**, and [content] in terms of the perspective of his/her life and worldview. With this, a didactic pedagogue cannot disclose a categorical structure for didactic pedagogics from any other subject science, such as biology, sociology, or psychology.

The two important insights to crystallize from the above, and to constantly keep in mind in searching for a categorical structure for didactic pedagogics are the following: First, a thinker must note that if he/she wants to know with what he/she is involved, he/she can do nothing else than candidly concentrate his/her thinking on the **form** of “Didaskein”, as an original way of giving meaning regarding a person’s involvement with reality. The content with which this form is filled, is chosen from, and because of other deliberations, to set the didactic event in motion in the family home, as well as in school. Second, it holds that if “Didaskein” is an original experience (i.e., is an experience without a cause, and which cannot be reduced further), a thinker also must realize that the forms of “Didaskein”, which one learns to know in the lifeworld, are original life forms. And with this, it is now stated that, if the experience which is paired with the educative and, hence, with the teaching event, is original, the form in which it is cast is also life-original, i.e., original as a form of living for a “person-in-the-world”. The scientific sense of a

categorical look at Didaskein must then be seen as disclosing to us the sense of the original experience, also with an eye to the insight which flows from this for the second order, constituted event which we know as schooling. Should a didactic pedagogue come to postulate didactic categories, in his/her viewing and analyzing of the original experience, this means that, in these categories, he/she has, in systematic and orderly ways, disclosed and described the sense of the original experience with the aim of reestablishing a [school] practice, which originally figures as a meaningful matter in the lifeworld. Thus, with the didactic categories, the sense of the original experience of, or ways of being involved in the reality known as “Didaskein”, is interpreted essentially.

The simple implication, therefore, is that one will never arrive at a categorical structure for didactic pedagogics if one refuses to think about “Didaskein” in its form. When a thinker does not take his/her point of departure as the didactic event itself, thus, from the original experience of “to teach”, this means he/she allows him/herself to be pushed out of the original piece of reality, about which. and in terms of which he/she ought to reflect. Therefore, a didactic pedagogue has no other choice than to characterize the original experience, about which he/she expresses him/herself as “Didaskein”. From this “Didaskein”, he/she must reflect on this aspect of the original experience [of reality]; also, insofar as this shows a harmony in form and content, meaning thereby is given to his/her own existence. All other possibilities, such as reflecting on didactic pedagogics from the phenomenon of learning, necessarily, lead to an applied, instead of an original science. One reflects on the didactic from “Didaskein”, in its educative connection, or one does not. This is a logical, as well as ontological deduction.⁷

The last consequence, which is particularly important in the foregoing, to some extent is broached in the very first paragraph, i.e., that the meaning of teaching is closely related to the meaning of educating, for the simple reason that educating without teaching is unthinkable, and that teaching without educating is void of content and, therefore, must be fruitless. However, at this stage, further explication is required because now this converges directly with the line of thinking about the possibility of a categorical view of the didactic pedagogical. The meaning of the one has a complementary relation with the meaning of the other. The meaning of teaching remains hidden if the meaning of educating is not disclosed, but educating is a matter of the original involvement with reality

because it cannot be reduced to an origin or something else. Educating is an event which is given with being human. However, it does not occur outside the framework of reality and, thus, is understood as continually directed to reality. Educating outside a context of reality, in its aspects of form and content, is unthinkable. In this lies the mandate by which the meaning of didactic-pedagogic alwork comes to the fore most clearly. This reality, to which educating (teaching) is directed, is not necessarily obviously available for the one being educated (child). The reality can be absent; it also can be vague; or it can be prospective. The knowledge and meaning of reality, thus, lies within the framework of meaning of the one who educates rather than in the life perspective of the one who is being educated. This implies that a person's original experience appears as a **mandate**—in this case, an educative mandate that reality must be made available to a not-yet adult person. One can formulate this much more strongly: The educative mandate takes the form of an educative imperative, because without the help of an adult, a child will not become grownup by him/herself. An educand's going out to reality without dynamically taking up the educative imperative by means of didactic intervention is unthinkable.

Now, when an adult will make the content of reality available, to which he/she directs a child, he/she cannot avoid the original activity of "Didaskein". He/she makes reality available precisely through the activity of "Didaskein". He/she makes reality known. The organization of the practice for which he/she aims has a two-fold character, i.e., its form aspect, which describes the nature of his/her activity, and the content aspect, which, as far as possible, must guarantee the orientation of a child with reality.

To be able to work with content, he/she must be able to justify to him/herself the form, otherwise he/she runs the risk of being unaccountable. With this, a connotation regarding the relation between "Didaskein" and "Dasein" is postulated. Interrelatedness which expresses "Mit-Dasein" (being with), as an ontological postulate, equally expresses the activity "Didaskein". Hereby "Dasein" acquires an imperative character of "**being-there**", which immediately refers to the mandate "Didaskein," in the sense that: If you will be-there, you must give instruction. So viewed, the meaning of our being-there as adults, and the intersubjective relation with our children's being-there, is a matter which

“Didaskein” spontaneously elicits as an original way of giving help with respect to the task of “being-there”.

For a Christian educator, this pronouncement simply means that he/she has come to stand before the paradise mandate, and can do nothing other than be unconditionally obedient to it but, at the same time, in his/her scientific intervention, to show his/her readiness to take responsibility for nature, or ought to assume, form the execution of this mandate. And, to attend to and give an account of the meaning of this activity (Didaskein), a didactic pedagogic arrives at a categorical structure which describes and systematizes the essence of the original experience for one who, in formal, second order ways, is involved in teaching to bring up children.

It is stated previously as a task, that a categorical structure for describing and systematizing practice, then, must disclose the meaning of “Didaskein”. By implication, in the above pronouncement, there are various categories which cannot be dealt with here,⁸ but are systematized and, indeed, which disclose the meaning of this original experience in the lifeworld of persons.

- a) **Unlocking reality:** This means that it is an essential of the activity of teaching that an aspect, or aspects of reality is thrown open by one who knows, for someone who doesn't know.
- b) **Entering reality (learning):** Unlocking reality would be a meaningless activity if there were not also an entering reality. Understandably, this entering can assume a wide variation of forms, although the most general and best known is found in the activity of learning. During an educative (teaching) event, a child's eventual becoming adult is unthinkable, if he/she doesn't show a continued readiness to enter the reality which was unlocked by an adult.
- c) **Forming:** Each teaching activity, in logical ways, is attuned to change, in the sense of an improvement; an amplification of participating in life; the broadening and deepening of a unique lifestyle; the attainment of one's own destiny [adulthood]. This new, comprehensive interiority is essentially unique, to a greater or lesser extent, depending on the successful course of each teaching event and, therefore, is formative in nature.

- d) **Orientation:** The fact that a child is born into a world which for him/her is a totally strange landscape, implies that, at some time or another, and in diverse ways, he/she must become oriented in this life reality. When a child does not eventually discover his/her own place and position within reality and is ready to account for him/herself in this regard, he/she runs the risk of eventually becoming a grown up, this doesn't necessarily mean he/she has become an adult. In this course of orienting activities, teaching not only plays a far-reaching, but also a decisive role.
- e) **Accompaniment:** The reality in which a child, as a person, must orient him/herself, is not harmless. In addition, no child can become an adult without the help, protection, and care of adults. This help, protection, and care are characterized as an accompanied participation of an adult in the life of a child on his/her way through the world. To teach without providing protection, care, and help would mean to pursue something which cannot occur. At its best, this something should be described as brutalizing.
- f) **Objectification (Distantiation):** To satisfy the demands of adulthood, also interpreted in terms of the above categories, a child must acquire an image of reality. The expression, "acquire an image of reality", refers to the fact that each child must obtain a distance between him/herself and reality, which places judging, critiquing, designing, relating, and similar factors within reality in relief. This relief refers to an objective attitude by a child and, as such, is essentially peculiar to the intervention taken, particularly by a teacher with a child.
- g) **Imperativity:** It is peculiar to teaching that it has a strong character of progression. Demands are continually placed on a child which he/she must satisfy to a greater or lesser degree, and without which the character of achievement of a didactic event will be lost. When this does not occur, i.e., when an adult does not impose demands, teaching, as such, fails because, by this the conversation between adult and child draws to a close.
- h) **Anticipation:** Each form of teaching, at home or in school, is and always was directed to intercepting the future, in the sense that an adult, along with a child, contributes to the future. Teaching is always characterized by anticipating the future, otherwise it is not teaching.

- i) **Formalizing:** It is further peculiar to a teaching event that it essentially is attuned to creating a mobility in a child regarding aspects of reality. This mobility guarantees his/her security in later adulthood, also in material, as well as spiritual ways, because he/she unconditionally acknowledges, and obeys the norms and values, and their interconnections. When formalized, an adult creates specific and planned situations (teaching situations) to try to guarantee this mobility.
- j) **Socializing:** A person's involvement with reality is always an involvement by and with other persons. In religious, societal, juridical, economic, and every other respect, a child must learn to live with other persons in a proper way—or be ostracized by them. Teaching which, in one way or another, is not socializing in nature, cannot be described as teaching, because without socializing, a child cannot find his/her way through the world.

These are a few examples of categories, but they must be fully explicated and interpreted. This applies to the clarification as well as to the scope, or number of categories mentioned: there are more. However, what must be emphasized is that the meaning or essence of the activity which, in everyday experience we know as “Didaskein”, cannot be made visible without actualizing these categories separately and together.

References

¹ The significance of such a description in which the original experience of persons is sought, as a point of departure, is in the fact that the reality is stripped of its idea-garb, which was drawn over it for so many years, to disclose its essentials or fundamentals with the aim of systematically describing and evaluating it. In all his/her publications, but especially in his **Ideen zu einer reine Phaenomenologie**, Edmund Husserl indicates that science often obscures, rather than clarifies reality. In the didactic publications of the past, pedagogues were compelled to turn their thinking back to the original experience of educating, because without teaching, educating is unthinkable. In this connection, see the following: J. Bijl: **Inleiding tot de algemene didactiek van het basisonderwijs** (Wolters, Groningen, 1960); W. Klafki: **Das paedagogische Problem des Elementaren und die Theorie der kategorialen Bildung** (Beltz, Weinheim, 1959); G. Buck: **Lernen und Erfahrung** (Kohlhammer,

Stuttgart, 1967); F. van der Stoep: **Didaktiese Grondvorme** (Akademika, Pretoria, 1969); S. J. Gous: **Verantwoording van die didakties-pedagogiese** (Unpublished D. Ed. dissertation, University of Pretoria, 1969).

² The contributions made by Pestalozzi, in this regard, can scarcely be overestimated. His writings and formal pronouncements throughout, have a practical aim, and concepts such as “elemental” and “categorical” flow mainly from his views. It should catch the reader’s attention that, in the first place, Pestalozzi had not aimed at a **systematic** thinking through from “Didaskein” but, indeed, from meaningful activity structures which would make “new” practice possible, i.e., a practice which, in the sense of a child’s participation, would bring into the foreground for him, the strange and characteristic value of life reality. See W. Klafki, op cit., pp. 13-82.

³ With this, a didactic pedagogue is clearly faced with far-reaching epistemological, as well as ontological problems. This has to do with the question a present focus has on a broader reality, which Martin Heidegger treats in a fundamental ontological connection (**Sein und Zeit** p. 190 et seq. and 315 et seq.), and by which anticipating the future acquires pedagogical significance. The meaningful connections of reality imply the possibility that they can be penetrated and clarified, and that, finally, they constitute the ground conditions for any educative (teaching) activity. On the other hand, this has to do directly with the question of intentionality, by which a pedagogue is compelled, not only to search for the life dynamic of a child, but also to inspire it with respect to the world relationships he/she has established. The problem of constitution, therefore, is entwined with this.

Understandably, with this, a didactic pedagogue proceeds to penetrate such relations as space and time (see Langeveld, M. J.: **Die Schule als Weg des Kindes**) but also the relation of form and content, by which one’s life and worldview come prominently into the foreground. With this, for the reader, there are a few implications of anticipated results which must still follow. In connection with the problem mentioned, first see: A. Kockelmans: **Martin Heidegger** p. 76 et seq. (Lanoo, The Hague, 1962); K. Kanthack: **Das Denken Martin Heideggers** (De Gruyter, Berlin, 1959).

⁴ Each naturalistic-evolutionistic anthropology has an inherent defect in postulates, of necessity, the most important of which is that a person is delivered defenseless to the world, and is doomed to patterns of behavior, unless he/she can “adapt” him/herself to this reality. These “adaptations”, then, constitute his/her forms of living and, understandably, constitute the aims of his/her educating. The

educating (intervening), then results in the conditioning of reflexes (stimulus-response) which, understandably, cannot pass the test of reality. In this connection, see:

J. Dewey: **Democracy and Education** p 28 et seq. (Macmillan, New York, 1935) and **The School and Society** p 877 et seq. (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, no date); E. L. Thorndike: **Educational Psychology** p 14 et seq. (Kegan Paul, London, 1927). Nel, B. F.: **Fundamentele orientering in die psigologiese pedagogiek** (University Publishers and Booksellers, Stellenbosch, 1968); Sonnekus, M. C. H.: **Die leerwereld van die kind as beleweniswereld** (University Publishers and Booksellers, Stellenbosch, 1969) p 51 et seq.

⁵ For a more comprehensive explication of how forms of living in the original experience influence the practice of “Didaskein”, the reader is referred to F. van der Stoep: **Didaktiese Grondvorme** p 13 et seq. As an example, the question of play is used here merely for orientation. To play is fundamentally peculiar to the form and style of living of people. A person [teacher] implements this form in a variety of educative activities, but especially in his/her teaching beginners, where playing to, and imitating in play, is a basic form of his/her practice of teaching, which especially is brought about with a young child. See, e.g., H. Scheuerl: **Das Spiel** (Beltz, Weinheim, 1968) p 124 et seq.; p 138 et seq.

⁶ Reference has been made to the pronouncements of Bijl. However, in this regard, also see: W. Brezinka: **Erziehung als Lebenshilfe** (Klett, Stuttgart, 4th edition, 1965) p 165 et seq.; H. Roth: **Paedagogische Anthropologie** (Schroedel, Hannover, 1966) p 71 et seq.; Dahmer and Klafki: **Geisteswissenschaftliche Paedagogik am Ausgang ihrer Epoche—Erich Weniger** (Beltz, Weinheim, 1968) p 35 et seq.; Oberholzer, C. K.: **Prolegomena van ‘n prinsipiele pedagogiek** (HAUM, Cape Town, 1968) p 62 et seq.; Landman and Gous: **Inleiding tot die fundamentele pedagogiek** (Afrikaans Press, Johannesburg, 1969) p 51 et seq.

⁷ In its history, didactic theory forming shows a variety of points of departure in this respect that, although all contribute to insights and understanding, create confusion regarding the essential and non-essential, in terms of what the original experience indicates, in this connection. Examples are points of departure from formative theory, the psychology of learning, schooling, the learning content as such, and more, by which the fundamentals of “Didaskein” are illuminated and reasoned about only partially, or one-sidedly. In this connection see: H. Nohl: **Paedagogik aus dreizig Jahren** (Schulte-Buhnke, Frankfurt, 1949); H. Rohrs: **Die Schule und ihre Reform in**

der gegenwertigen Gesellschaft (Quelle & Meyer, Heidelberg, 1967);
W. Guyer: **Wie wir lernen** (Rentsch, Stuttgart, 1960).

⁸ See F. van der Stoep: **Didaktiese Grondvorme** p 24 et seq. and S. J. Gous: **Verantwoording van die didakties-pedagogiese** pp 24-77.

APPENDIX

This appendix is added by George Yonge, and did not appear in the original work. The following descriptions of some of the didactic categories are taken from F. van der Stoep and W. J. Louw, **Didactics**, pp 47-52 (Pretoria: Academica, 1984) and they are edited slightly. They represent a more detailed and further developed description of these didactic categories. The additional categories of “demarcation”, “reduction”, “achievement”, and “progression” are described in this book.

1. Unlocking reality

Unlocking reality implies that a person who knows and commands certain contents of the lifeworld unlocks or unfolds them for the benefit of one who does not know and does not yet command them. This activity underlies the teaching involvement between adults and children. The aim is to help a child acquire a sure grasp of reality and, thus, provide him/her with the necessary security to explore reality on his/her own.

Unfolding reality is an essential characteristic of the original relationship between adults and children. The fact that an adult unlocks and unfolds reality for the educative benefit of a child cannot be explained on other grounds or reduced to other reasons than that adults involve themselves educatively with children. The theory of categorical forming also states that a child must open him/herself to the reality an adult unfolds. This means a child must be receptive to the formative possibilities an adult unlocks or unfolds. To be able to do this, a didactician must know a child thoroughly; he/she must know how he/she learns, as well as the influence a child's prior knowledge will have on creating his/her personal relationship to the world. This means a teacher must be able to account for the content, form, and aim of his/her teaching. He/she also must be able to account for how he/she will lead a child to expose him/herself to reality. A teacher's accountability extends even further: he/she must also account for the nature and quality of a child's access to reality, as well as for the interpretation of the content to ensure that he/she will experience the content as

meaningful and, in doing so, transform it so it becomes an authentic part of him/herself.

2. Learning

A teacher's major role in a teaching situation is unlocking or unfolding reality for a child. However, if a child does not learn, an adult's contribution to a child's change of his/her relationship to reality will be meaningless. When the original didactic situation is examined, it is striking that a parent only confronts his/her child with content which he/she can understand, and for which he/she is receptive.

As a didactic category, "learning" primarily is not focused on *how* a child learns, but on the fact that he/she *does* learn. The learning activity is of primary importance in a teaching situation and, as such, it is a category of the teaching structure. A child learns because he/she is a human being, and because the learning activity is one of his/her spontaneous ways of being. This is why it is meaningful for an adult to direct a child's spontaneous learning activities by guiding and directing them, with the aim that he/she eventually will realize independence, and adulthood. The involvement of a parent and a teacher, therefore, is not an attempt to create a circumstance which does not exist. The fact is, a child also learns outside situations of teaching and educating and, therefore, they are not conditions for a child to learn. (But learning is a condition for educating and teaching to occur). The learning intention is given as an original aspect of human existence. An adult uses a child's learning as an opportunity for a child to achieve greater independence and adulthood.

To realize this category systematically, a teacher must unlock reality in such a way that it will evoke a child's spontaneous learning intention.

3. Forming

Unlocking or unfolding reality comprises the help and aid an adult offers a child, with the eventual aim that he/she will become an adult. By its nature, teaching is formative in its effect for the following reasons: the aid given by an adult to a child displaces a child's hesitation and reserve concerning a given aspect of reality. The effect of forming — formedness — means that a child is emancipated concerning an aspect of reality, and he/she is capable of determining his/her own position in relation to it.

Furthermore, forming has the added effect of enriching a child's inner life, as is evident in his/her broader and deeper experiencing.

A didactic situation, therefore, offers a child an opportunity to extend his/her experiences qualitatively and quantitatively. These two aspects of the category “forming” increase, and progressively realize a child’s potential to become intimately acquainted with a larger and more sophisticated reality. As a child is formed in a didactic situation, so his/her relationship to reality changes. This change is evident in a broader (more encompassing) and deeper relationship to reality. Therefore, one could also say that forming, by means of teaching, has the effect of creating a more adequate relationship between child and reality.

4. Orientation

It is realistic to expect a child to orient him/herself in relation to the unlocked reality. It is self-evident that an adult cannot expose aspects of the broad and encompassing reality, if a child does not possess fixed points in terms of which he/she can determine his/her position in the new reality. Therefore, a didactic meaning of orientation is that a child must determine his/her own position, with the help of the known and fixed points which teaching provides for this purpose. Normally, these fixed points are the learning content. In his/her unfolding of reality, a didactician enables a child not only to understand the content, but also to use the insights to extend and enlarge his/her relationship to reality. In this sense, contents are the means of orientation. Orientation provides a child with an opportunity to enhance and enlarge his/her mobility and familiarity with reality. Without this orientation, reality remains undifferentiated, chaotic, and unattractive for a child.

5. Accompaniment

During a teaching and learning activity, an adult does not leave a child to his/her own devices. An adult is continually involved with a child; he/she indicates direction, controls mistakes, tests insight, repeats certain aspects of a lesson, lets a child exercise certain activity, etc. He/she does all this to ensure that a child is steadily improving. Accompaniment is central to the progress of didactic activities because it emphasizes the fact that an adult is continually trying to meet a child’s situation. A teaching activity does not appear as such if the category of accompaniment is absent.

6. Objectification

Unfolding reality, learning, forming, orienting, and accompanying imply that there is a certain distance or objectivity between child

and reality during teaching. Without distance or objectivity, one cannot adequately gain any perspective on reality. As an adult, a teacher has already established a certain standpoint or conception concerning reality. This means that he/she must distance him/herself from reality to the extent that he/she can view it objectively. Objectification of reality is essential and, thus, a prerequisite for a child to be adequately taught about reality. The aim is that a child must attain the same level of objectivity in his/her relationship to reality as a teacher. Objectification of reality by a child is of cardinal importance for a teacher because it is a precondition for a child's eventual impartial judgment of reality. The aim here is not objectivism which, as an ideology, can never be a pedagogically accountable didactic aim. Objectification essentially means that a child is removed from the immediacy of the content in such a way that he/she can identify the essences of the content, as well as their interrelationships. The aim is to enable a child to make sound judgments in terms of which he/she can evaluate the content, accept it, or even discard it. In this sense, objectification is not only confined to educating, because it also imparts quality to one's lifestyle. If objectification does not appear in a didactic situation, a child is lost in reality, in that he/she is not able to order the content in a comprehensive way, or make decisions about it.

7. Imperativity

It is characteristic of teaching that it is always concerned with development, or improvement. Certain demands are made of a child in a teaching situation which he/she cannot ignore or avoid. This does not mean that a child always adequately meets them and, if he/she doesn't, this cannot be ignored. If a child's achievements, or performances are not at the desired level, an adult repeats the situation until the demand is satisfied. The unlocking of reality is never diffuse or uncertain, but rather it is specific, and direct. In this respect, a teacher makes specific demands of a child, and expects him/her to improve the way he/she accepts them. All the previous categories are meaningless if the imperative character of the situation is not fully realized. Even where a child is learning by him/herself (for example when doing homework), imperativity retains its authority as a didactic category. This is because auto-didactic situations cannot be authentically realized if a child does not attempt to meet the demands the content make on him/her.

8. Anticipation

The future is continually realized in a teaching situation. It is a human involvement always directed to the future. If the future must be actualized in the present, anticipation always necessarily is present in a teaching situation. In this sense, the relationship between the categories “anticipation” and “imperativity” is clear. The demands made of a child in a didactic situation have a strong bearing on a child’s future activities with respect to reality. Where a teacher anticipates a child’s future, from within a classroom, the implication is that he/she has an idea of a child’s future which he/she (a teacher) considers to be important.

Where there is no anticipation, it means that a teacher teaches contents which have no consequences for a child’s future. The basic structure of the curriculum is that it clearly spells out what a child must do now to enable him/her to eventually master certain reality. Anticipation does not mean a teacher must be a futurologist. It means that he/she must anticipate a child’s course of life to prepare him/her for the life reality he/she will encounter one day.

9. Formalizing

Didactic activity is aimed at the realization of certain skills, and to aid a child to acquire a certain mobility regarding specific aspects of reality. Skills and mobility culminate in better understanding, greater efficiency, and more independence. However, these qualities of a child’s learning are not necessarily achieved at a first teaching attempt. Therefore, a teacher must repeat a didactic situation to present the essences of the learning content again. This means he/she restructures a certain didactic situation to enable a child to prove his/her ability, to exercise certain skills, or to have another opportunity to master certain contents.

To repeat a teaching situation, a teacher must formalize it. It is important to differentiate between formalizing and formalism in this context. Formalism implies that a teacher constructs his/her lessons in only one form. This often leads to a rigid application of a teaching recipe, and this is totally unacceptable didactically.

As a didactic category, formalizing stresses the immediate, as well as the mediate character of teaching. A teacher must consciously construct a situation which can function in two ways: first, to offer an opportunity for a more effective orientation to reality; and second, to offer an opportunity for a more authentic acceptance of reality as part of a child’s lifeworld. Formalizing enables a teacher to present a child once again with contents previously exposed. Formalizing and accompaniment, as didactic categories, are closely

associated in that formalizing provides a didactic structure within which accompaniment is achieved.

10. Socializing

A didactic situation is essentially a social situation. It is eminently a situation of interpersonal relationships of a social nature. There is always a social relationship between adults and children in a teaching situation. The learning activity of a child progresses in a social climate where certain norms and codes of behavior are set, and this, in turn, determines the quality of the activities and behaviors.

The didactic category of socialization describes certain aims while teaching by bringing the interpersonal structure of teaching to the fore. It is simply true that a child cannot find his/her own way through reality without the help and aid of an adult, and still emerge without being hurt. That is, reality is only meaningful to a child, insofar as it is a human reality. A child experiences reality as meaningful to the extent that he/she identifies him/herself with the person of the adult, and that he/she can form a positive relationship with him/her. Identifying with and relating to an adult, are how a child experiences the surrounding world as meaningful. The involvement of teacher and child has a clearly socializing tendency.