

CHAPTER 8

EXPRESSIVE AND PROJECTIVE TECHNIQUES

1. EXPRESSION AS A PHENOMENON

Gradually, it has become clear that the orthopedagogic evaluator searches for the personal meanings of a child restrained in becoming adult. In addition, it seems that these meanings, as experiential world contents, especially are **feelings** and **thoughts**. By implementing his/her **feelings** and thoughts, another aspect is brought to the fore, i.e., **behaving**. The child's behaving also is observable in particular **movements**.

According to Buytendijk (28, 17), all movements can be subdivided into **expressive movements**, **actions**, and **representative movements**. Expressive movements (e.g., mimicry) are more static in nature (28, 332), actions are more dynamic and goal-directed, and representative movements represent the descriptive, speaking, figurative, and graphic gestures, such as the greeting, the kneel, the kiss (28, 376-377).

The three types of movement never arise in pure form, but there are transitional or mixed forms. Van den Berg (270, 28) says each movement can always be interpreted as an action, an expression, and as a representation. As an example, he refers to a worker inclined to strike, who in his/her manner of working (action), expresses (expression) his/her discontent, and with the mistakes in his/her work, he/she shows his/her passive resistance (representation).

All bodily movements are expressions, and an **isolated expression** no more exists than a pure action, or representation (266, 282). Therefore, one can differentiate as many forms of expression as there are forms of behavior. Langeveld (134, 58 [in Dutch]) says "In his movements, attitudes, facial expressions, in boasting, crying, bellowing, in language, and playing, everywhere a child brings his interiority into view". According to Ten Have (257, 9), it is only

through the phenomenon of expression that one can penetrate the "absolutely individual realm" of another.

In his/her expressions, a person exists authentically through the forms of **expression**, as forms of being, by which he/she communicates with the world and other persons (see 311, 27 and Van Gelder and Van Praag (289, 5)).

Lubbers (150, 12-14) refers to several authors (148, 23-29; 284, 148; 5, 370; 24; 267, 22, 31; 214) who agree that a child also reveals various "problems" through different modes of expression.

According to Helberg (86, 28), expression implies that emotional movement becomes observable, which arises in a person through impressions, representations, intentions, and reasoning, and which are mostly of a fleeting nature. According to Wellek, expression means "the inwardness appears outside" (316 [in English]). Helberg (86, 29) stresses that no "emotional movement" can occur without one or another form of expression. Therefore, expression always exposes something of a person's being directed to his/her world, or landscape (51, 131).

Hence, a child's momentary situation must be looked at in interpreting his/her expressions because their meaning springs from this situation, says Linschoten (142, 110).

According to Van den Berg (270, 428), there are three possible sources from which the sense of expression can spring, i.e., a person's landscape, his/her unique interior, and the look of another.

So far, it seems that a child's expressions can occur in different forms, e.g., through his/her **attitude**. From this attitude, one can infer pride, self-consciousness, readiness to act, candor, brutality, outspokenness, stubbornness, contempt, depression, submission, obedience, meditating, curiosity, distrust, disapproval, etc.

In addition, there are **gestures**, which Fast (60) refers to as "body language"; **facial expressions**; expression by **quickness of breath**, and movements related to sensory perception, such as looking, listening, feeling, tasting; **motor disorganization**, because each motor disorganization refers to an overwhelming feeling, to being pathically (emotionally) flooded; the surrender of one's own body--

as, e.g., in laughing and crying, which are never an expression of one particular emotion, not only of happiness, or sadness. A person can laugh because he/she is amused, irritated, surprised, engrossed, captivated, and cry if he/she is impressed, moved, stirred (see 86, 32-34). In crying and laughing, a child brings his/her interiority into view (311, 35; 134, 58).

Also, a child expresses him/herself through **representations**, e.g., through drawings, because he/she draws what for him/her has an emotional significance, and his/her earlier experiences, present desires, and future expectations are represented in them (311, 35).

According to Lubbers (150, 34; also see 114, 82), "image" signifies the way the world appears in its practical character, and in his/her image, a child gives one another access to his/her personal world (150, 39).

Also, **color** has an emotional value for the child, and he/she chooses a specific color because of his/her lived experiencing, and not necessarily because, e.g., the object is red, green, etc. (see 148, 17).

Expression in **images** includes **what** a child draws, **with what** he/she draws, the **ways**, e.g., he/she handles a paint brush, draws lines, applies shadings of color. Lubbers (150, 36) says the interpersonal world is there through images, **and** concepts. A person creates this/her world for him/herself because he/she discovers the sense of his/her impressions, and makes what manifests itself to him/her, his/her own; indeed, he/she assimilates it. From what **he/she** is able to understand, he/she also tries to understand his/her fellow persons. This is only possible by reducing the other to what is general in his/her own life and, in this way, he/she does not do justice to the other person's **uniqueness**. However, he/she also can understand him/her by becoming a participant in what the other reveals in his/her images and, thus, sympathize with him/her. Lubbers says, "Although the concept functions as a description of an image, as naming experience, or as reference to whatever, it does not **replace** the image"(150, 36 [in Dutch]).

Thus, the **image** refers to reality-for-me, and therefore, the orthopedagogic evaluator, by participating in the image, can try to understand the meanings the child has attributed to reality.

With respect to attributing meaning, Lubbers (150, 35-37) refers to three forms: the **open**, the **personal**, and the **implicit**. These forms of giving meaning are intermingling, by which, say, the **open** and then the **personal** dominates and, by which the **implicit** also always has a role, and significance. In daily life, attributing open and personal meanings enrich each other. By accepting a new concept (meaning), one's personal life can change, just as can what is given in one's personal life and, thus, also one's objective world image can change. What is acquired through attributing open meaning is something general, and accessible to everyone, but the personal world cannot be "translated" into concepts. If a child presents one with a particular slice of his/her personal world, this can only be done through presenting an **image** of it. The reality of the attribution of personal meaning, as a reality-for-me, is not replaced. However, for a person who understands me, this reality is symbolic of itself, because he/she recognizes in my personal existence, my general humanness from my attributions of open meaning.

In attributing open meaning, the personal must be expressed. To be able to do this, the "I" must give form to itself and, this, can occur only through image-forming, e.g., when, in drawing, a person is tempted to so design him/herself with colors and lines which his/her intentions are seen reflected in his/her work. Such an image can be called a **symbol**, since one takes a symbol as a confirmation of a most adequately expressed not-yet-known connection, where "not-yet-known" means not a conceptual explanation, but rather a conceptual linking up.

However, the symbol especially figures in projection, where the image then is used to bring **what** must not be said into communication (306, 159). Indeed, projection concerns disclosing the deeper aspects of being a person and, by which the child shows **his/her** real world relationships because, then he/she **attributes** his/her true feelings and thoughts to someone or something else.

Lubbers (150, 35) refers to Plokker (196, 117), who discusses a variety of meanings of the term **symbol**, and also cites Rumke, who describes a symbol as " ... a confirmation of a not yet known relationship found in our lived experience, which either descends from the external world, or rises up from the inner world which it expresses in the most adequate way" (196, 118 [in Dutch]). Through a symbol, one can be with another because the other's life

is actualized in symbols. Without symbols, a person's life would be without resonance, says Lubbers (150, 33).

In the practice of orthopedagogic evaluation, use, then, is made of media to let the child express his/her feelings and thoughts. Thus, he/she is given the opportunity to tell, play, draw, paint, mold, model, mimic, etc.

2. CHILD DRAWINGS

Regarding child drawings, as a medium for exploring a child's experiential world, the reader is referred to the works of Goodenough (74), Machover (153), Levy (139), Nel and Esterhuizen (177), Buck (27), Koch (101), Van Lennep (291), and Kinget (98).

By inviting and allowing the child to draw, he/she frequently draws what is getting the best of him/her because, during his/her drawing activities, he/she is also entrusted to an adult who participates in his/her world. The child's unique little world, which he/she draws, in which he/she is imprisoned by his/her unique "problem", is amplified because, via the relationship with the orthopedagogic evaluator, as representative of a "foreign" world, that foreign world is introduced.

By giving the child the opportunity to draw, similarly, the orthopedagogue initiates the **possibility of an encounter** between him/herself and the child restrained in becoming adult.

Montagne (see 5, 370) states that children usually draw spontaneously and, according to Bloom (24), the child finds out that his/her "art" is a painless method for voicing his/her problems. Thus, if he/she should say that he/she can't draw, we can be assured that there are serious problems present regarding his/her becoming adult. In this regard, Lowenfeld (148 [in English]) notes "No Eskimo-child would express such lack of confidence."

However, it would be incorrect to force a child who will not draw, or to encourage him/her to just produce something. In each case, he/she must be given the opportunity to choose, according to his/her preference of whether he/she wants to play, draw, act, mold, etc. Regarding a younger child, who especially is going to be active, it seems that he/she prefers play, while the older child, who puts greater demands on the end product, prefers to mold and

draw. Also, the orthopedagogic evaluator should not suggest to the child what his/her creation ought to look like, because he/she must represent his/her own feelings and thoughts, and not imitate the investigator's.

The child can be asked to draw freely or draw specific subjects with ordinary or colored pencils. For example, he/she can be asked to draw what he/she thought and how he/she felt during earlier periods (see 277, 83). Also, he/she can be asked to draw a sketch of his/her best and worst feelings (see 35, 145, 150).

In the practice of orthopedagogic evaluation, usually, the child is asked to draw, following his/her own choice, a person, a tree, and a house; then special media are implemented, such as the Wartegg Drawing medium (207).

In this connection, because the child him/herself chooses his/her **image, elements** such as line, color, outline, representation, repetition, contrast, standpoint, aspect, material, handling material, and ways of experimenting (see 289, 68), he/she also must be given the freedom to do so.

Regarding the analysis and evaluation of the child's drawings, the outward appearances are not merely looked at. Van Gelder and Van Praag (289, 4) say, no matter how imperfect his/her drawings might be, the merit of the outward appearance should not be judged, but the investigator must try to understand his/her intentions (see also 311, 19).

Vorsatz (311, 19-20) refers to the phase divisions of Lowenfeld (148) and Leuschner (138), according to which a child between two and four years usually only scribbles, and between four and six makes symbolic representations; a child between six and nine draws more schematically, and between nine and thirteen more realistic representations; and in puberty he/she progresses more to an integration of the image elements.

With reference to Vorsatz (311, 19-20), such criteria must be rejected as primary criteria, as unreliable regarding the child's drawings since they originate from the aspects of becoming adult of a longitudinal perspective. Thus, a four-year-old who draws objects with sharp points, e.g., lived experiences his/her world as threatening, and his/her drawings are a manifestation of his/her

feeling of insecurity, and not of the fact that a child between two and four usually draws sharp-pointed scribbles for no reason (see 311, 19).

Van Gelder and Van Praag refer to the need for valid norms for evaluating the level of a child's drawings, but they emphasize that he/she draws his/her lived experienced relationship to the world. From this, it follows that norms by which his/her becoming adult can be gauged, are located jointly in the child him/herself, the investigator, and the act of drawing. The primary question is how has the drawing, as an expression arisen, and how does the child express him/herself in it; what has he/she lived experience, and how has he/she given form to it? Thus, the meaning lies in the event itself, and not in its outcome.

According to Van Gelder and Van Praag (289, 67), to evaluate child drawings, a phenomenological analysis of their image elements is indispensable.

3. THE ANALYSIS OF IMAGE ELEMENTS

3.1 Introduction

Van Gelder and Van Praag (289, 68) offer the following division of image elements which can be taken as a point of departure in terms of:

a) Fundamental image elements

- i) line;
- ii) color; and
- iii) surface;

b) Combined image elements

Here is a combination of image elements, i.e.:

- iv) giving form;
- v) spatial representation;
- vi) scheme; and
- vii) image;

c) Dependent image elements

- viii) repetition;
- ix) composition;
- x) rhythm;
- xi) contrast;
- xii) standpoint; and

xiii) aspect;

d) **Material image elements**

This is closely related to the material and its use,
namely:

xiv) the material;

xv) the use of the material; and

xvi) experimentation.

Following is a discussion of the possible significance of the mentioned image elements.

3.2 The significance of line use

A secure child begins to scribble from two years (148, 12). Later, he/she names his/her scribbles, and tells a story about them (311, 52). Van Gelder and Van Praag (289, 68) find that the drawn line, either light or dark, flowing, or angular, is a manifestation of **tension** between the child's intention, and the control of expressive possibility. Therefore, already in a scribble, it can be "seen" if he/she explores in a tense or relaxed way.

Feelings of insecurity lead to anxiety and tension, and this leads to **intensified** line use, and also very sketchy lines. Because of his/her insecurity, a child always controls his/her own movements, they are often stiff and spasmodic. However, one must always be sure that there are no organic defects because then this sort of use of line arises (see 311, 54).

3.3 The significance of color use

According to De Zeeuw (49, 42), because a child turns him/herself in particular ways to a specific relation to color, it is possible to determine what such a child's relationship is to particular relations in human situations.

De Zeeuw (49, 14-15) finds that, at about two years of age, a child chooses red, green, blue and yellow colors; at about five years orange, and green become more prominent, while interest in red, yellow, and blue decrease. From approximately six years of age, color preference seems to show the following order of importance: yellow, red, violet, green, and lastly blue.

Louwenfeld (148, 62) says that the adequately becoming child of approximately seven years, discovers a relationship between color and object.

Vorsatz (311, 55) indicates that, to approximately thirteen years, children's color preferences are determined mainly by their emotional lived experience, and that, during times of feeling happy and secure, they prefer **warm** colors.

If a child feels helpless, insecure and, therefore, tense and anxious, he/she usually turns to **cold** colors, according to Louwenfeld (148, 63, 84, 107).

Van Gelder and Van Praag say that a child who uses only black is affectively disturbed [possibly] because of too strict a father, domineering brothers and sisters, parental discord; for one or another reason, this makes him/her feel impotent to explore (289, 75, 76).

Research has found that children who usually mix colors more freely, express their feelings more, than those who keep colors separate (see 311, 55). Van Gelder and Van Praag find that, if color mixing is extreme, and uneven, such children show decidedly aggressive attitudes toward other children (285, 76).

Van Wyk (304, 18) indicates that each person has his/her own color historicity, which arises from the unique experiences in his/her personal life. Color historicity means the entirety of emotional significances as these have arisen in the past in the form of actual color symbolism, or tradition. This fact must be taken into consideration when the meaning of particular colors are generally taken as ways of understanding a unique child.

With reference to De Zeeuw (49), Van Wyk (304, 18-21) indicates that the following meanings can be attributed to particular colors:

a) Red

This represents **activity**, as action which follows the primary emotions. The character of red is energetic; i.e., an affective stimulation from the vital. Thus, red can be an indication of violent activity, rather than of emotionality. However, in

interpreting red, the person's gender also must be considered. Vorsatz (311, 36) says that, often, red reveals an unrestrained emotionality in the toddler.

b) Green

Green is viewed as a **tranquil** color. According to Kouwer (108, 121), qualities such as tranquility, and harmony can be attributed to blue, green, gray, and white. De Zeeuw (49, 133-164) believes that a clear preference for green is evidence of emotional control regarding its outward expression. Thus, it is possible that a person who prefers green is less spontaneous in his/her emotional expressions as such. Hence, when there is anxiety about excessive self-control, this possibly can be indicated by a person's preference for green.

c) Blue

In the literature in general, a preference for blue is viewed as a favorable sign, although it also can have an unfavorable meaning, especially because it is a substitute for a passive voice. Blue is viewed as a search for unity, security, and safety; it also is an indication of introversion. According to Kouwer (107, 121), children who are affectively neglected and, thus, in need of a mother figure, have a ready preference for blue.

d) Yellow

According to Luscher (152, 109), yellow can indicate a striving for a multiplicity of relationships. Usually, yellow shows a correspondence with red. "Yellow too, is fierce, violent, forceful, energetic, active, emotional, affective, exciting, stimulating, etc. Yellow is also a warm color, although considerably less than red" (152, 109 [in German]). A person who chooses yellow usually shows a more critical and intellectual attunement.

e) White

White is empty or pure, and when it has to do with emotional appreciation, the accent falls primarily on emptiness, and secondarily on purity. Thus, a preference for white possibly can indicate an affective emptiness. A preference for white along with a rejection of red is an indication of pushing vital and sexual feelings aside.

f) Black

Black includes the complete absence of color and, as such, is a complete "blacking out". A person who chooses black usually places him/herself above his/her emotional life in terms of pushing his/her emotions aside. Where one acquires emotional analysis with white, with black, one acquires emotional congestion. Moreover, black implies a choking of the spontaneity of emotional expressions. According to Vorsatz (311, 36), very often with a toddler, black refers to the lived experience of being bad, wicked, sad, or even feeling guilty (see also 134, 63).

Van Wyk (304, 21), stresses that a thorough knowledge of the child's personal structure is necessary before the preference for the "interpretation" of a particular color can be claimed to indicate a particular meaning of an emotion, and that no color preference itself can lay claim to being an evaluative medium.

3.4 The significance of surface use

How a child fills a surface is a very clear indication of how his/her gnostic/cognitive and pathic/affective lived experiences are integrated into each other. Filling surfaces with fine, decorative lines of varying nuances often indicate a strong sensitivity, and fine attunement, but it also indicates that a child with this temperament exercises a strong intellectual control of his/her very deeply experienced emotions.

3.5 The significance of giving form

According to Langeveld (134, 23-25), from approximately six years, a child purposefully tries to give form to his/her drawings. However, because he/she draws what he/she experiences, the functions of objects and persons speak clearly to his/her feelings that such objects and persons assume (289, 80-82). For example, often a person writing with a pencil is given a very insignificant form in a young child's drawing of a human figure, while the pencil is drawn disproportionately large. Also, it often is found that if he/she draws one parental figure larger and with better form than the other one, this can indicate that he/she feels more safe and secure with the one drawn with good form.

Transparent human figures sometimes are drawn by children who very strongly lived experience an organic defect. Van Gelder and Van Praag (289, 86) also indicate that a child who lived experiences disparities in his/her family often draws little persons in a transparent house. Van Lennep (291, 131) says, if a child, e.g., draws objects on a tree, this can indicate inner unrest and a strong need for safety from an unstable and emotionally impoverished educating.

3.6 The significance of spatial representation

Vorsatz (311, 57) refers to Van Gelder and Van Praag (289, 29-30), who find that when a little girl must draw a doll, she tries to represent the emotional relationship between her and her doll, without any relationship between objects as such. Especially beginning at approximately nine years, a child discovers horizontal and depth perspective (148, 79, 80). Thus, e.g., if the drawing of a little tree is in the upper left corner of a large sheet of drawing paper, then this indicates a strong lived experience of feeling like withdrawing from his/her milieu; that he/she even restricts his/her drawing space, and the entire drawing space is not filled with a large tree means he/she does not adequately explore is Van Lennep's opinion (291, 134-135).

3.7 The significance of scheme

According to Louwenfeld (148, 38), it is especially the body scheme in a child's drawing which shows most clearly how he/she lived experiences persons in his/her relationships with them, and what physical and personal life needs he/she has him/herself. Thus, e.g., the omission of arms by a twelve-year-old child points to despondency, and an unwillingness to explore.

With epileptic children, and those with brain damage, it usually is found that the head is drawn disproportionately large, in relation to the rest of the body. According to Van Gelder and Van Praag (289, 106), a child usually chooses a scheme which corresponds to his/her emotional lived experiences.

3.8 The significance of image

What the child lived experiences and tries to represent is determined by the image elements (composition, line, color use, or

giving form) he/she uses to attain his/her aim. For example, according to Van Gelder and Van Praag (289, 112), the use of miscellaneous mixed colors to represent, for an eleven-year-old, a march where such a child lived experiences the crowd moving around chaotically, and on this basis, he/she represents the march as chaotic.

3.9 The significance of repetition

The affectively labile child cannot proceed to explore adequately. Then, in his/her drawings he/she repeats only dashes, dots, and circles which really show nothing of his/her inner life.

3.10 The significance of composition

The composition of a child's drawings should improve as he/she gets older, otherwise this is evidence of infantilism, and a pathic attunement.

3.11 The significance of rhythm

Suppleness in the child's drawings is evidence of adequate becoming. The tense child cannot adequately control his/her motor movements, and the drawings also readily show a defect in rhythm. Naturally, here it also must be made certain that he/she is not burdened by organic defects.

3.12 The significance of contrast

This has to do with the differentiation of foreground and background. When this is weak, there is a possibility of restrained becoming. Sometimes the use of lines is hidden under an excessive use of color instead of creating color contrast (289, 132-133).

3.13 The significance of standpoint

Here, one gets an indication of how the child distances him/herself from his/her world (289, 133). The place where he/she puts particular objects in his/her drawing, and the size of such objects and their perspective to each other are indications of how he/she lived experiences his/her world with respect to the represented objects. Thus, e.g., in his/her drawing, he/she can place a child far away from his/her parents.

3.14 The significance of aspect

Very often it is found that a child will draw what he/she has perhaps experienced the same day at school. He/she dramatizes his/her experiences in his drawings, e.g., a story he/she has heard irrespective of whether what he/she draws corresponds to the content of the real story he/she has heard.

3.15 The significance of material

Usually, a child uses a pencil, colored pencil, pastels, or watercolors. Van Gelder and Van Praag (289, 140) emphasize that he/she be offered a large assortment of materials to choose from, otherwise their expressive value is biased. Specific material lends itself to particular expressive qualities. Thus, e.g., a pencil lends itself better to drawing lines, colored pencils to the decorative filling in of a colored surface, etc. (see 289, 142).

3.16 The significance of the use of the material

Regarding this matter, particular attention is given to whether the child handles the material in accordance with his/her level of becoming.

3.17 The significance of experimentation

The degree to which a child tests out the possibilities the various materials offer also is looked at, and if signs of creativity are manifested or not.

In his/her unique manner, in his/her drawings the child gives expression to his/her lived experiences through drawing lines, coloring, reducing, enlarging, etc. The course of executing the drawing task, the means used, his/her bodily attitude and gestures, his/her facial expressions and his/her conversation during the execution of the task show the observing investigator particular aspects of his/her personal structure. This amounts to the fact that an image of the child's world must be acquired, and then compared with his/her world image, according to Dumont (56, 47-48).

Implementing drawings as a medium also includes advantages, such as the following (see 177, 26):

No complicated apparatus is required; the assignment is initiated with a few words, after which the researcher remains in the background without disturbing the child; it can be repeated often without influencing the results too much; it is very suitable with respect to a child who is unwilling to talk; it eliminates language problems where this can restrain the communication between the investigator and the child; and it can be used by children of all ages.

4. PROJECTION AS A PHENOMENON

4.1 Introduction

In the literature, the concepts **expression** and **projection** often are used as synonyms (see 114, 73; 177, 3), or there is only reference to **projection**. However, because a clear distinction between the two concepts can be made, [and since expression is considered above], attention now is given to projection.

Etymologically, the word **projection** has its origin in the Latin. **proicere**, which means "to throw forward" (see 140, 3).

Although the word **projection** was used in the seventeenth century (140, 3), the current **concept of projection** springs from the psychoanalysis of Sigmund Freud, who uses it in 1894 in connection with his research on paranoia and hysteria (see 112, 18; 177, 11; 306, 149). He describes projection as a "process", which implies a "psychological discharge" by which a person is freed of his/her anxiety, among other things.

Bellak (14) substitutes the concept projection with **apperception**, and describes it as the dynamic, meaningful interpretation of a perception by an individual.

According to the Anglo-American view, all expressions of "personality" are **projections** (see 204; 174, 3; 150, 41; 297, 149). Van Lennep (292, 9 [in English]) points out the error of this view, and limits projection to "the phenomenon where someone attributes characteristics to one or more persons, which rather are applicable to the judging person than to the judged person or persons".

The purpose is not in any sense to go into the phenomenon of projection, as it is discussed in the literature, but only to more clearly explicate those matters which are important for an orthopedagogic evaluative investigation.

For a lonely person, a solitary camel thorn tree, with its curved and outstretched branches, can be a symbol expressive of his/her loneliness. According to Jaspers (see 297, 152), a symbol is "an analogic view" and, with reference to Heidegger, Van Lennep (294, 257) believes that our view of things is never free from our mood/attunement. According to Heidegger, attunement is "essentially already being-in-the-world" (see 294, 257). This world boundness also must be essentially distinguished from the use one makes of particular aspects of the world to adhere to or project one's desires and moods (see 86, 20). According to Van Lennep (294, 257), this implies that only those objects can serve as a symbolic core of projection which, to a degree, are also objective regarding an individual's project of being in the outer world. However, later he asserts that "It seems to me that the most promising way of theorizing on the concept of projection is to start from the affective relationship between the subject and his world. A too intellectual cleavage between subject and object, a heritage from Descartes, conceals the fundamental connection which always exists between both terms" (295 [in English]).

Aspects of even the most personal "world" are always defined by the world itself, and even in the most "objective" and theoretical constructions, there always is a **personal** meaning. For this reason, it is not possible to determine precisely the part played by the subject and that by the object.

Van Lennep (296, 10-12) makes five distinctions regarding the act of projection, i.e.:

a) Projection as perceiving

In this case, there actually is talk of ordinary sensory **perception** as projection. Accordingly, the perception of something in the external world gives rise to the creation of an emotional lived experience. In this regard, for Freud (see 127, 17) this means that, when the need for love is not filled, it is turned into hate, or paranoia, which is directed from the outside to the person.

b) Projection as hallucinating, and related phenomena

In this regard, Van Lennep (296, 10) refers to Carp, for whom

a

projection occurs in a perception, where there is the projection of a **thought-image** into a **perception-image**.

c) Projection as transferring, or displacing

The concept **displacement** also has its origin with Freud and Baldwin (see 77, 66). Here, there is mention of a feeling being directed to an object other than the one which initiated it, and the new object comes into play as a substitute for the old one (See 296, 10; 5, XII).

d) Projection as organizing, or structuring the perceptual field

According to this, projection is when someone organizes and structures his/her perceptual field partly in terms of affective principles. According to Carp (see 5, XIII-XIV), each person perceives the world in his/her own way. This implies that a person organizes his/her perceptual field according to his/her own emotional life.

e) Projection as attribution

This meaning of the concept **projection**, today, is endorsed by most authors (see 296, 10; 181, 15; 287, 18; 110, 22; 306, 150), and implies **attributing** feelings, thoughts, strivings, etc. to another. Even so, there are a variety of trends, depending on the particular personal vision which the interpreter holds about this.

4.2 Projection as attribution

From these few thoughts, it is evident that a clear distinction can be made between **projection** and **expression**, and that **expression** has a broader meaning, in the sense that it refers to all **modes of expression** of a person, e.g., gestures, footsteps, voice, play, drawings. Thus, expression includes **projection**. For example, if a child says that the figure he/she has drawn resembles an anxious person, he/she has projected his/her own lived experience of anxiety into the image he/she has drawn. When, e.g., he/she gives expression to his/her happiness by drawing a bouquet of flowers, this is **expression**, but if he/she ascribes to the expressive material a

form which he/she him/herself is, but which he/she cannot accept, this is **projection**, according to Lubbers (150, 42).

A phenomenological analysis of **projection** also has revealed that it should be viewed as an inseparable part of human existence (177, 15), as a form of "giving personal meaning", which refers to the world, but also to the ego which, in giving meaning, it constitutes, according to Langeveld (136, 169).

Van Lennep emphasizes the difference between **projection** and **expression**, and notes "For every projection is, indeed, utterance, but each utterance is certainly not a projection, and, particularly, not that which is called a person's expression". He says that the unique nature of projection is nowhere more clearly illustrated than in its contrast with real self-expression (294, 255 [in English]).

In expression, a person communicates "consciously" or "unconsciously" with another, and, according to Van Lennep (294, 255), expression is only meaningful as a **communicative** activity.

Among other things, in projection, there also is mention of a truly emotional expression, by which a person attributes to another that which is applicable to him/herself. Van Lennep (294, 250) says that our affects, especially if they are strong, transform the external world so the affect can find a correlate there. For example, when someone describes another's face as anxious, his/her own feeling afraid creates its correlate in the external world. Then, the **other** carries the describer's own emotion; then, the other is entirely divested of his/her own, for us, unpredictable, subjectivity, and is used as an object, "as a peg on which to hang our own desires and thoughts" (294, 256). For these reasons, Van Lennep (296) describes projection as a **doubling of the I-in-affect**, and he distinguishes three aspects in this regard:

- i) One's own emotional structure is attributed to the other without the other being involved with the person (who is projecting);
- ii) when there is a relationship between the projector and the one projected on--e.g., by attributing an unacceptable deed to the other—then, the one projecting easily reads what is disapproved in the other's looks; and

iii) the emotional state is projected on the other, but implicates him/herself. For example, a person loves his therapist but, by means of projection, he thinks his therapist is in love with him.

Consequently, it seems that, by doubling the structure, the I, who is emotionally burdened, is involved with the other, without the other him/herself being involved.

Lubbers (150, 78) uses the image of a **third** person. There is the investigator, the child, and **yet** another, and the child ascribes his/her own emotions to this third person. In this way, he/she has the opportunity to blame the other, and not him/herself and, thus, attributes to the other his/her own anxiety, uncertainty, aggression, sorrow, hate, etc. Then Lubbers also refers to the child restrained in becoming adult, who must contend with affective problems. Via projection, this child sees in the other what he/she cannot accept in him/herself. He/she lets the impersonal third person undergo that from, which he/she him/herself recoils and, in this way, he/she defends him/herself against confronting what is threatening to him/her. In this regard, Kwakkel-Scheffer notes, "Thus, he is **not** in communication with this 'third' person" (114, 84-85[in Dutch]).

Lubbers (150, 78-79) refers to these "unacceptable" meanings as **averted** meanings and because of this, **projection** also is a **defense**. Since the orthopedagogic evaluator is in search of those meanings in the child's experiential world which are **threatening** to him/her, he/she acquires, by means of a child's projections, an image of the **averted**, since it is manifested through its "safe" projection in a meaning-structure acceptable for the child.

According to Van Lennep (296), the act of projecting can be grouped into a scheme which, in a simplified form, can be divided into two principles with four subparts:

- i) The world is divided into human beings and things; and
- ii) the world is experienced as either in harmony with a subject's feelings and emotions, or as a menacing co-partner.

Within this scheme, he then differentiates four different types of projection:

a) **Objects, things, landscapes, which either are or are not in harmony with a person's feelings and emotions.** For example, someone feels despondent, and walks on the beach on a dreary day. He/she accepts the landscape as also sad and tiresome; or he/she feels despondent, and the day is sunny and cheerful, but he/she accepts it as too bright and unpleasant. In everyday life, this type of projection does not arise as readily as it does during the use of a particular projective medium (see 86, 21);

b) **human intentions are attributed to the inanimate world.** Thus, in retaliation, a child strikes a table because it hurt him/her. Here, the landscape and objects are participants in the child's moods. Of course, everyday objects do not have subjectivity in the true sense of the word. On the other hand, one person cannot "organize" another person into his/her world without making him/her into an object. This type of projection arises mainly in everyday life, but sometimes also on the Rorschach and thematic projective procedures (see 86, 22).

c) **where other human and humanized beings are experienced in harmony with someone's moods;** for example, a person who is frightened, or angry accepts that the other also is afraid or angry. This type of projection often arises in everyday life, but also with thematic projective media (see 86, 22).

d) **human beings are accepted as co-participants in a person's own needs, feelings, and aspirations.** For example, someone feels guilty, and then accepts that another person judges him/her. This type of projection arises mainly in everyday life (see 86, 22).

4.3 The interpretation of projections

With respect to interpreting a person's projections, this does not concern the factual contents as such, but rather the **theme** which, through the quality of the person's lived experience, "has acquired a unique appearance, or physiognomy" (306, 156). Vermeer (306, 161) indicates that, rendering the value of a behavior, such as **projecting**, in terms of a number (i.e., quantifying it--G.Y.), is objectionable because the behavior expresses polyvalent, or complex meanings, and the concern is precisely with these meanings (and not with reducing it to a numerical value--G.Y.).

If one isolates only particular elements then, at the same time, one destroys the **coherence of meanings**. By isolating elements, analogic reasoning also is meaningless because the elements themselves also function within a meaningful structure, or coherence of meanings, according to Vermeer (306, 161).

The orthopedagogic evaluator must "translate" the projections of the child restrained in becoming adult, via his/her analogic lived experiences, by **analogic reasoning**, to be able to find correspondences in the subjective meanings of parents and child, with regard to the reality of educating. Vermeer (306, 160) says, not only progressive but also regressive meanings which are brought to light by projection, can be placed in the perspective of the educative reality to be able to abolish the "short-circuits".

What must be elucidated is the symbolic language of the projections. With reference to Gusdorf (80, 491), Vermeer (306, 162 [in Dutch]) says "Therefore, we must take note that the world to which the child has attributed meaning is a **coherence** of meanings". She indicates (306, 159), also that symbolic meanings, moreover, can be ambiguous, and they cannot be correlated because that which is said, and that which is kept silent in the sum of projections, is not in harmony with the lucid language of numbers. Projections not only are polyvalent through their lived experienced themes, but also can be ambiguous because they express meanings which, at the same time, include a defense, which will not tolerate the disillusionment, or the clarification of the use of language which, by logical abstraction, is attempted to be made harmonious and objective.

Concepts, such as **emancipation** and **domination**, thus, do not say much in a personal description, if they cannot be viewed in relationship to the child's reality. It is only on the level of a shared context of speaking and listening that the ambiguities can be overcome, says Vermeer (306, 164) with reference to Guepin (79).

In the following chapters, there are synoptic discussions of the analysis and interpretation of a few drawing tasks, with which the child can be confronted, and in terms of which his/her expressions and/or projections can be gauged.