

## APPENDIX (ADITIONS BY TRABSLATOR)

### CHAPTER V\* LEARNING AND PERSONAL ACTUALIZATION

#### 1. INTRODUCTION

In the four previous chapters, it is shown how psychopedagogics proceeds from its point of departure in the **reality of educating and** establishes a scientific **structure** in terms of which a child's becoming adult, or **personal actualization** in an educative situation is understood. It is noted that personal actualization occurs because a child is **accompanied** in this by adults, **and** because of his/her unique participation through **self-actualization** by **giving meaning**. With respect to a child's unique participation in his/her becoming adult, it is also indicted that he/she gives meaning through learning and, thus, through actualizing his/her psychic life. Actualizing his/her psychic life is discussed fully in chapter II, and because of its meaningful and inseparable relationship to learning, a brief exposition of it is given there.

Since learning plays such an important role in a child's personal actualization, as well as in a school situation (see chapter VI), a more complete reflection on learning is required.

Indeed, learning is a search for the sense and meaning of the content of reality, and it is how a child's personal exploration, conquest, and mastery of reality by attributing sense and meaning to it occurs (Sonnekus and Ferreira, 1987, p 99 and Landman, 1983, p 17). This is accomplished by means of **different modes of learning**. However, actualizing these modes is a totality-act in that they are inseparable, and a child-as-totality is involved. Thus, learning is not merely an isolated "function" of a person, but it is a way of being human.

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\* The modes of learning were edited slightly and partially rewritten by GDY.

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## 2. A PSYCHOPEDAGOGICAL PERSPECTIVE ON LEARNING

The following discussion is based primarily on Sonnekus and Ferreira (1987) and Sonnekus (1985). According to these authors, the ways in which learning occurs are differentiated into **affective** (sustaining or accompanying) and **cognitive** (knowing) modes as follows:

\* **Affective (sustaining or accompanying) modes:**

\*\* sensing

\*\* attending

\* **Cognitive (knowing) modes:**

\*\* perceiving

\*\* thinking

\*\* imagining and fantasizing

\*\* remembering

### 2.1 Affective (sustaining) modes of learning

#### 2.1.1 Sensing

What is the function or meaning of sensing in human learning? Sensing is the beginning or onset of learning in that it precedes (and sustains/accompanies) the other modes. It is primarily **emotional** and is manifested as a child's "attunement" to the world in and through his/her (bodily) sensing it. This attunement is strongly supported by the seeing-, hearing-, touching-, tasting-, and smelling-images which he/she experiences (Basson, et al., 1983, p 34). Thus, sensing is a child's **first becoming aware of and being involved with** content of reality, and it provides the possibility for him/her to encounter this reality and take the initiative to learn it (Sonnekus, 1973, p 76). However, he/she cannot learn to know, or understand reality only by sensing it. This is because sensing essentially is **foreknowing**; that is, via sensing, a child can only have a vague, inarticulate, and mostly affective "sense" (i.e., feeling) of what the content is about. On this level of learning, explicit (cognitive) knowing or understanding is not yet possible, but it is still intuitive (felt), vague, diffuse, and unstructured (Sonnekus, 1973, p 109), and a child only has a global notion of the content (Basson, et al., 1983, p 34). This implies that, through sensing, he/she cannot yet

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determine **what** the nature of the content is but, at most, he/she can experience that there **is** content (Sonnekus, 1973, pp 130-131).

This onset of learning can arise in two ways. One, it can begin because of an **intention to learn** (Sonnekus and Ferreira, 1987, p 86) when, e.g., a child is motivated to **purposefully search** for content. Two, it can begin more **incidentally** because of the **valence-values** (e.g., attraction or repulsion) of the learning material (Sonnekus and Ferreira, 1987, p 89), or even because of a **physical phenomenon** such as a light, a sound, or a smell rousing a learner's sensing (Nel, Sonnekus and Garbers, 1965, p 182).

On an emotional level, sensing awakens feelings such as **wonder**, **excitement**, **interest**, and **curiosity**, but feelings such as **shock**, **fear**, **anxiety**, and **tension** are also possible. Hence, it is evident that sensing largely determines the **quality** (e.g., **stability**--rest, certainty, security-- or **lability**--anxiety, tension, uncertainty) and **level** (e.g., **pathic** or **affective**) of a child's emotional life at any given moment. Thus, even though sensing does not lead to knowing, it influences a child's emotional life which, in turn, influences whether he/she is willing to **initiate** and **sustain** the further course of learning which **guides** and **accompanies** (i.e., sustains) the cognitive modes of learning until the desired knowledge is achieved. In short, those instances of sensing, which awaken a feeling of **affective stability**, can promote the further course of learning, and elevate its quality. However, when sensing is characterized as **pathically labile**, anxiety, tension, and uncertainty are present, which can block and impede the course of effective learning.

Van Dyk (1973, p 134) indicates that the positive emotional flavor of sensing is best typified as **wondering**. The amount and quality of wondering awakened in a child is an indication of how effective his/her learning will be. The quality of wonder is related directly to sensing a matter as something, e.g., unexpected, unknown, or different (Van Dyk, 1973, p 134). Thus, sensing is the basis for cognitive learning to arise because, in wondering, a child discovers his/her ignorance, and initiates (motivates) his/her desire to **want to know**, or to search for knowledge. In agreement, Straus (1963, p 316) says, "The first step to knowledge is the awareness of not knowing". [As is discussed later, and explicitly in chapter VI, in a lesson situation, wondering can be purposefully initiated by a good question, or a challenging problem]. This **wanting to know** sustains

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and guides the cognitive modes of learning until the content is unlocked by a teacher and made accessible to a child in such a way that he/she experiences **satisfaction** with the meaning **he/she attributes** to this content Sonnekus, 1973, p 77(). As he/she gradually acquires greater control of and insight into the lesson content, he/she lived experiences even more affective stability (and confidence), and this promotes the further course of his/her cognitive learning.

Hence, sensing is a precondition for learning to occur. To repeat, sensing is an accompanying or sustaining mode of learning since, on the one hand, it provides the **emotional base** on which all learning rests and, on the other hand, it **sustains** and "**directs**" the cognitive modes of learning until the desired knowledge is achieved.

From the above, the **functions** (sometimes called **modalities**) of sensing in human learning are: it initiates all learning, and it is the foundation of the other modes (and, thus, always sustains or accompanies cognitive learning); qualitatively, sensing is affective, pre-cognitive, and subjective in nature.

### 2.1.2 Attending

The emotional foundation provided by sensing influences the degree to which a child **wants** (is willing) **to learn**. This degree of willingness then modifies whether he/she **attends** further to the content. If he/she does attend further, his/her **becoming aware**, and **concerned involvement**, via sensing, lead to him/her **remaining actively aware and involved** with the content (Sonnekus, 1973, p 80). Since attending is preceded by a definite choice, it is an activity of deliberately **remaining by** the content (Van Niekerk, 1971, p 21). From this, a stable sensing promotes a child's willingness to know, and this motivates him/her to attend. If he/she is willing, or motivated to attend, there arises **an intention to learn**, or to become **directed** to the specific learning content. The original learning intention, on the level of sensing, now is **sharpened** because of a child's willingness to master the content. Attending, as a mode of **willing**, takes up and makes explicit the "direction" implicit in the original sensing. For this reason, attending does not occur automatically, but is always preceded by a willful choice. Thus, it is not a **reaction** or **response** to an external **stimulus**. By attending, a child not only directs him/herself to the content but, in doing so, he/she **unlocks or opens** him/herself to this content to

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make it his/her own by learning it and, thus, incorporating it into his/her possessed experience.

Of course, **attending cannot be actualized apart from the other modes of learning** because the moment a child begins to attend to what he/she is sensing, the cognitive modes of learning become **directed** to that content. Thus, in attending, something specific becomes a child's **point of focus**, and surrounding data temporarily recede into the background (Sonnekus and Ferreira, 1987, p 114). In other words, attending is a **selective** activity because a child chooses to "focus" on something in his/her total situation, and all other particulars are left "out of focus". Because the modes of learning are directed to what is being attended to, he/she can learn it. In this connection, Behr (1980, p 65) says, "The act of attention requires the selection or singling out of certain stimuli in the environment, to the exclusion of the others. As a result of such selection, the situation...becomes clearer in definition or contour". Attending means that, from the total data in a situation, only specific content is **selected, delimited**, and placed at the **focal point** of his/her involvement in a situation. That which is selected now becomes the central point of his/her interest (Sonnekus and Ferreira, 1987, p 114), and is at his/her disposal for further exploration by means of the cognitive modes of learning. "Attentive performance means a convergence instead of a scattering of mental energies" (Behr, 1980, p 406). In this way, it is now possible for a child to learn to know the learning content, since moments such as **identifying, delimiting, analyzing, comparing, ordering, and integrating** are put into play (Sonnekus and Ferreira, 1987, p 114). Although attending alone cannot be viewed as learning, it is how a child knowingly participates in the content, and eventually learns it.

The cognitive modes of learning, i.e., **perceiving, thinking, imagining and fantasizing, and remembering** are actualized and sustained by **attending** (as well as **sensing**).

Attending means that a child **remains aware** of the content, and this allows him/her to stay cognitively involved with it. However, with diminished attending, there is also a reduction in the quality of a child's cognitive modes (Sonnekus and Ferreira, 1987, p 113).

In summary, the **functions** (or **modalities**) of attending are: it is a **sharpened intention** to learn; it is **selective** of content; it, along

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with sensing, **supports and sustains** the cognitive modes of learning.

### 2.1.3 Actualizing the affective modes of learning in the classroom

As affective or sustaining modes of learning, sensing, and attending are the **foundation** for an adequate course of cognitive learning. That is, these **affective** modes are basic to **effective** learning.

For the **effective** actualization of learning in a classroom, it is **necessary** that a teacher makes sure that sensing and attending are adequately actualized. The question, however, is how?

Since **wondering** is an essential (Van Dyk, 1973, p 134) characteristic of sensing, a teacher should try to point out to a child what, e.g., is strange, odd, different, surprising about the content. A child can be **stimulated** by this and, by wondering, a stabilized emotional stratum for adequate cognitive learning is created (Van Dyk, 1973, p 135).

In this way, a teacher awakens a child's **willingness** to learn, and guides him/her to an intensification of his/her intention to learn. By **pointing out**, e.g., the strange and the odd, a teacher has already **selected** certain learning content for a child. Hence, he/she guides and facilitates a child's selection of content, and he/she tries to ensure that his/her attending is directed to the **relevant** content. In other words, for adequately actualizing cognitive learning, a teacher, in designing his/her lesson, must consider the **functions** (modalities) fulfilled by the modes of learning he/she wants to be actualized.

## 2.2 Cognitive (knowing) modes of learning

Although the nature of each of the cognitive modes is considered next, it should be remembered that the course of learning is a unity, and the individual modes and their modalities are intertwined.

### 2.2.1 Perceiving

The emotional impact which sensing has on a child is extremely important, since it influences his/her **willingness** to **attend** which, in turn, allows him/her to become involved with the learning content on a **cognitive** level. Here there is a move from a subjective and

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preponderantly emotional sensing of the content to a more **objective** and **distanced perceiving** of it. (Sonnekus and Ferreira, 1987, p 115). Indeed, a stable sensing and a sharpened attending are preconditions for adequate or effective perceiving. After a more **casual** first becoming aware of the content via sensing, which often is a consequence of **external factors**, perceiving is a **purposive** activity where a child **directs him/herself** to the content of reality which speaks to him/her.

The initially vague nature of the learning object experienced by seeing, touching, smelling, hearing, and tasting, on the level of **sensing**, is now, via **attending**, experienced by looking, feeling, sniffing, listening, and savoring, on the more active, explicit (cognitive) level of perceiving.

In perceiving, real knowledge can be attained since now **meaning** is given to the content of reality on a **cognitive** or knowing level. Behr (1980, p 61) says that perceiving allows a person to give **meaning**, and to **interpret**. According to Ferreira (Sonnekus and Ferreira, 1987, p 115) and, in agreement with Straus (1963), perceiving, in comparison with sensing, establishes a more distanced and objective relationship to reality. That is, perceiving is directed to and grasps reality "as a moment in a universal, general chain of events" (p 317). It involves the **universal** and the **objective** as they are found, e.g., in the matter, the learning material, the object itself. [As we know from Goldstein's (1940) classic research, grasping is to sensing as pointing is to perceiving; this analogy is understood as follows: grasping constitutes a subjective, concrete, immediate field of "sense", while pointing gives rise to and requires an abstract, cognitive, objective field of meaning. To paraphrase Sonnekus (1974), although pointing is pathically (affectively) rooted in grasping, in fact, it is a cognitive act. The essential difference between grasping and pointing is the objective space required to point, which is constituted by attending. Temporally, grasping has to do with the present, and pointing with the future. That is, I can grasp what I want which is present, but I can only point to what I want to get [in the future]. But let's move on. The vagueness, lack of clarity, and lack of structure still existing in the **sensed** content, are reduced considerably during perceiving, and the **essentials** of a matter itself are brought to the fore (Sonnekus and Ferreira, 1987, p 115).

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It is important to keep in mind that the different functions or modalities of perceiving are actualized as a **unity** and presuppose each other. Knowing by means of perceiving is possible only when the initial global identification of the perceived object is filled in by analyzing, synthesizing, and ordering. In this way, a child **gives** cognitive **meaning** to what he/she perceives and, thus, learns to know it.

What are the functions (modalities) required for perceiving to occur? Or, what learning functions are fulfilled by perceiving? When a child perceives, he/she is directed to reality itself. Through attending, his/her perceiving is directed to something specific, and he/she determines its **identity**. Thus, in a geography class, when a map is shown to him/her, it is immediately identified in its **totality** as a map of the world. Only later will he/she distinguish the continents, islands, etc. Thus, at first perceiving is directed to the **whole** with the sole function of determining its **identity**. This function of perceiving is called **global identification**.

To perceptually identify an object, matter, or learning content, it must be placed in the **foreground** (by attending), while all other data in the situation temporarily recede into the background. This figure-ground dialectic is an essential structure of perceiving (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p 13). Already, with this first **global identification**, a child is reducing the vagueness and lack of structure of his/her sensing, and he/she begins to order and structure the perceived content so he/she can learn to know it. [This function of perceiving is a good example of the fact that the distinguishable modes of learning are actualized as an inseparable unity. That is, **global identification**, the beginning of perceiving, still has a strong character of **sensing**; however, it is more than sensing--it is perceiving--because of **attending**].


To learn about a matter, mere global identification, or recognition is not sufficient. **Analyzing** is an additional and necessary function of perceiving. According to Ferreira (Sonnekus and Ferreira, 1987, p 116-117), the object of learning is stripped of its global quality during analysis by decontextualizing it. Paradoxically, analysis allows a child to perceive the details or finer particularities by ignoring the whole and, thus, strengthen his/her grasp of the larger whole. The "solution" to this seeming paradox is this: although analysis is directed to **detail**, at the same time, by this focus, the **structure of the whole** becomes clearer and understandable



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(Sonnekus and Ferreira, 1987, p 117). That is, through analysis the **essential** characteristics of the learning material are disclosed and, therefore, a better insight into and understanding of the whole is acquired. However, these first two functions of perceiving are not actualized separately. During analyzing, **identification** occurs again but on a different, more cognitive level. For example, when a child perceives a table, first he/she **globally identifies** it as a "table" and then by **analysis** he/she **identifies** a base or legs and a surface as characteristics of a table.

The following exemplifies the different and unique functions which globalizing and analyzing fulfill as modalities of perceiving:



(Behr, 1980, p. 64)

If someone asks about the relative lengths of lines **a** and **b**, at first glance (**global identification**) it appears that line **a** is longer than line **b**, but with a more discerning look (**analysis**) it seems that they are of equal length. Clearly, analyzing presupposes an explicitly focused **attending** to details or parts. Indeed, there is a sense in which analyzing decontextualizes the details on which it is focused; lines **a** and **b** are measurably equal only in an abstract non-perceptual space. That is, in their embeddedness in concrete perceptual space, the two lines are neither equal nor unequal. They simply are what they are, and the question of length does not arise there (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p 6).

In perceiving, **synthesizing** is closely related to the initial global identifying, and the subsequent analyzing. Synthesizing puts the crown on what a child globally identifies and analyzes during perceiving. Through synthesizing, the different parts of the greater whole, disclosed by analysis, again are united into a whole, but now

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this whole is more than the mere sum of its parts (Sonnekus and Ferreira, 1987, p 117). Thus, synthesizing accomplishes a better understanding of the whole of the matter which was **not** explicitly present in the initial globalizing because now the relationships of the separate parts to each other **and** to the whole are explicitly understood. Thus, synthesizing is not merely the **re-uniting** of separate parts. Since the separate parts are related to each other via the whole, qualities now arise which were not initially evident in each part analyzed, and as a result, the whole, through synthesis, is experienced as **more** than the sum of its parts.

The functions or modalities of perceiving described above as **global identification, analysis, and synthesis** must be fulfilled for something to be perceived. But perceiving also involves an **ordering** function.

By perceiving something, a person also orders it. For example, by **naming it** (descriptive language), what is perceived no longer is limited to the data surrounding it, but an explicit identity of it is disclosed from a point of view. Thus, in calling "X" an ashtray, I am ordering (contextualizing) reality in a different way than if I call "X" a paperweight. Thus, perceiving is a way of ordering in and through descriptive language (Sonnekus). However, this descriptive language, on the level of perception, is concrete, in the sense that the "name" of the object is barely more than a sound which belongs to this object, as does its shape, for example. In other words, descriptive naming (and ordering) on the level of perceiving, is **not necessarily** conceptual naming [Goldstein (1940) refers to this as pseudo-naming, in contrast to a more conceptual "real" naming].

In fact, most of the time in daily life, when we use words, they are concretely descriptive and not conceptual. For example, when we go to a supermarket and ask the clerk, "where are your apples?", we do not mean the concept "apples," under which any apple whatsoever can be subsumed, but rather the word "apples" is used to indicate "those tangible, round, red, juicy things which we want to buy and eat". The point is that descriptive naming on the level of perceiving is a different mode of ordering than naming on the level of thinking (i.e., the conceptual level).

By naming an object or matter, a person also orders reality for him/herself. In naming, **meaning is given** to reality and that aspect of reality, as abstracted by language, also becomes ordered within a

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learner's possessed experience. In addition, on a perceptual level, one can order physical objects (e.g., blocks) in terms, say, of height as viewed within a concrete perceptual relationship (attitude) to them. That is, one **sees** in a concrete, immediate way that block **b** is tallest, block **a** is shortest, and block **c** is middle-sized. And they can be **ordered** from tallest to shortest based on these **perceived** differences. As is noted below, ordering on the level of thinking is based on a different directedness to reality, i.e., an abstract/conceptual one.

### 2.2.2 Thinking\*

Thinking is an activity which involves a **total** person and is actualized in accordance with the **relationship** he/she establishes with his/her world. In this light, Sonnekus (1974, p 68) states that thinking is a **goal-directed** activity which is a child's **answer** to an appeal arising from **reality as a problem**. This problem is experienced, e.g., as an obstacle, a resistance, or a challenge. A person responds to this situation by thinking (Sonnekus, 1974, pp 68-69). However, thinking also is motivated by wondering about

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\* In the past a great deal of research has been done on thinking, most notably by the so-called German Psychology of Thought and by Gestalt Psychology. For example, the Cologne School distinguished three layers or levels of thinking (see Nel et al., 1965, pp 249-250):

- \*The level of individual images;
- \*the level of schematic images;
- \*the level of abstract concepts.

Regarding their contents, the level of **individual images** is based on individual images experienced directly from sensory perception. This is the level of concrete experience. On this level there is no notion of the abstract, conceptual or of relationships. [I have an image of my friend's face]. On the **schematic** level, the original images of sensory perception are elaborated into more general or schematic images. On this level connections among things are noticed; the original images themselves are classified, schematized, systematized and ordered into more meaningful relationships that are **preparatory** for abstract thinking. [I take my image of my friend's face as similar to my other friend's]. On the **abstract** or imageless level, thinking functions mainly by explicitly using concepts and categories for ordering and this involves relationships such as cause-effect, similarity-difference, means-end. On this level, the perceptual images are absent and there is only imageless knowing. [I am thinking of my friend as an example of the concept "friendship"]. (See Nel et al., 1965, pp 249-250).

Otto Selz (see Nel et al., 1965, p 252) of the Wurzburg School of Thinking elaborated on the imageless nature of thinking and particularly emphasized its **directed** and **ordered** character. Since it is not the aim here to present an historical review of the research on thinking, these few comments will suffice.

However, to understand thinking as a human way of being, it has to be viewed as a phenomenon within the relationship of a person to his world. Although the German schools of thinking mentioned above have contributed greatly to the study of thinking, especially as an isolated **cognitive function**, it seldom has been studied within the **comprehensive relationship** of person and world.

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something which is not a solution to any practical problem. Thinking as contemplation [conceptualization] is discussed below.

As mentioned, the different modes of learning are not brought into play separately but as a unity. Hence, thinking, to a large degree, is usually an extension of perceiving. This is because it is through perceiving that the problematic aspects of the content of reality are often **discovered**, demand a solution and, thus, motivate thinking.

Most of the time, thinking is directed to **ordering, understanding, and achieving solutions**. Then it is initiated by a problem, and this confrontation with the problematic compels a child to search for solutions by means of activities such as planning, analyzing, comparing, and ordering (Sonnekus and Ferreira, 1987, p 119). Behr (1980, p 78) also mentions that "thinking involves reasoning, judging, conceiving and problem solving". Thus, thinking has a character of **breaking through** (Sonnekus, 1974, p 69) whereby reality, as a problem, is **transformed to understand and control** it (Sonnekus, 1973, p 85). In this activity of breaking through, thinking does not stand alone as a mode of learning. All modes of learning are at the service of thinking; for example, in thinking, "use" is made of perceiving, remembering, or imagining and fantasizing in the search for a solution.

It is relevant to mention that there is a close and indissoluble relationship between **thought** and **language**. For example, Nel refers to the "developmental parallelism" which exists between language and thought (Sonnekus, 1974, p 69). According to Sonnekus (Nel, Sonnekus and Garbers, 1965, p 254), "language development" is not identical with "thought development", but they are closely related, and especially in the way language "develops" from more **perceptual** forms of (descriptive) language to more **abstract** symbols and **concepts**. In addition, language is the **medium** within and by which a person usually thinks (Swan-Liat, 1966, p 28). In this context, language supports thinking and is the footing, or bedrock on which it rests (Nel). In this regard, the importance of language is not in its system of sounds, but rather in its system of symbols. Language is also an abstract symbol system by which a person, by thinking, can **abstract** from and **order** reality (see Nel, Sonnekus and Garbers, 1965, p 254). There is also a relationship between language and intelligence, as well as between language and concept formation such that language, thought,

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intelligence, and concept formation constitute a unity without which a child's effective learning would be unlikely.

[At this point, thinking, as **contemplation [conceptualization]** is considered to circumvent the possibility of a too instrumentalist/pragmatic view of thinking, which can easily result from an over emphasis on it as a continuation of perceiving which, very often it is, and on it as an activity exclusively directed to solving a practical problem. That is, thinking, as contemplation may occur in the absence of experiencing a *practical* problem to be solved. Above, it is noted that wonder can arise because of some "surprise" in the ordinary course of things but wonder also can arise out of a theoretical interest in something for the very sake of pursuing that interest, and not to find a solution to a practical problem. In other words, as Dreyfus (1991, p 253) writes regarding Heidegger: "Unlike the pragmatists, Heidegger accepts the Greek view that human beings are capable of getting in the mood of pure equanimity and wonder, in which they can form theories (**i.e., think about things**, my addition--G.Y.) that do not have any necessary relation to their needs and purposes". Straus (1966, p 173) also agrees with this position when he writes "...the essential point for an understanding of human inquisitiveness is that man (sic) is able to suspend all direct action toward his environment..."]

[A final point about the above comments on **contemplation [conceptualization]** is that it is on a different level than the functions of thinking considered below. That is, it is concerned more with the **motivation** for thinking than with the functions of thinking itself. In other words, the functions of thinking discussed next also are relevant to contemplative [conceptual] thinking, say, as the pursuit of "theoretical" problems, some, but not all of which may, indeed, be motivated by perceptual experiences.]

A person is continually in contact with concrete reality. To command this reality, he/she must learn to know it, and this is furthered by the **abstracting/conceptualizing** function of thinking. What is available during perceiving can become abstracted to symbols by thinking. During thinking, the concrete is exceeded and dealt with in terms of symbols, concepts, or thoughts. Thinking "elevates" perceivable objects to the world of concepts, and this means abstracting them from reality. The act of thinking, thus, involves reconstructing, transforming, and symbolizing some

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content of reality into a symbol-image, or "irreal" reality (Nel, Sonnekus and Garbers, 1965, pp 260-261).

Abstracting is also essentially distancing. That is, in his/her thinking, a child loosens him/herself from the concrete, but continues to relate to it in terms of symbols, or thoughts (Sonnekus and Ferreira, 1987, pp 120-121). Through this abstracting, distancing, and objectifying, there is a progression to a **conceptual** level. According to Van Parreren (Nel, Sonnekus and Garbers, 1965, p 255), concept formation always presupposes a degree of abstraction. Thinking transforms the concrete-perceptual world into a world of concepts which involves an abstracting and ordering of reality. Thus, in thinking, a child deals with reality on a conceptual level (Sonnekus and Ferreira, 1987, p 121).

**Ordering** is also one of the functions, or modalities of perceiving. According to Ferreira (Sonnekus and Ferreira, 1987, p 121), it is also an inherent function of thinking, not only because perceiving often is the beginning of thinking, but because thinking itself involves ordering.

Thinking is a more distanced, decontextualized mode of learning than it is in perceiving, and it requires an abstract/conceptual relationship with reality. When discussing perceptual ordering above, it is noted that, in purchasing apples in a supermarket, ordinarily the apples are related to in a concrete visual way by focusing on their singular characteristics (e.g., size) and not on their "apple-ness". However, in thinking, our interest changes from the singular to the category, or concept of apples as such. This shift is an intellectual feat whose importance should not be underestimated, because without it, conceptualizing would not occur. This **ordering** of a multiplicity to a unity is mentioned again below. In addition, on the level of thinking, ordering can be accomplished symbolically. For example, return to the three blocks of differing heights. Perceptually, one can order these items only if they are present. Their differences in height must be seen. By means of symbolic thinking, these blocks can be ordered without their physical presence. If one understands the symbols involved, then if it is indicated that  $a < b$ ,  $a < c$ , and  $b > c$ , one can, by thinking, order the blocks from tallest to shortest by means of the symbols representing their perceived relationships.

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Thought activities such as analyzing, schematizing, synthesizing, comparing, and generalizing also are ways of ordering (Sonnekus and Ferreira, 1987, p 121). Because of this **ordering character** of thinking, a child continually explores and discovers reality, and orders [organizes] it from a **multiplicity** (e.g., triangles, squares, rectangles) to a **unity** (e.g., geometric figures). Ordering reality from a multiplicity to a unity means that, by thinking, one arrives at a more cognitive understanding of it (Nel, Sonnekus and Garbers, 1965, pp 260-261).

Thus, thinking is directed to a possible order which reality itself allows. However, a child must disclose and order this reality **him/herself** to truly understand it. Without such ordering, he/she will very likely stagnate on a visual and concrete level, and the abstract, conceptual, or symbolic will remain relatively inaccessible (Sonnekus and Ferreira, 1987, p 122).

Some of the most important functions or modalities of thinking (Sonnekus and Ferreira, 1987, p 120-122) are **abstracting/ conceptualizing, ordering, and solving problems**.

### 2.2.3 Imagining and fantasizing

As modes of learning, the difference between imagining and fantasizing is one of degree. For the sake of clarity, they are treated separately, but the relationship between them remains clear. The following elaboration relies greatly on Sonnekus and Ferreira (1987, pp 122-126).

To understand **imagining** as a cognitive mode of learning, it is helpful to indicate the difference and connection between imagining and perceiving. Perceiving is a way a person directs him/herself to the **real** world. A perceived object is itself present and directs an appeal to a perceiving person. Regarding imagining, its object is not present, but by an act of imagining, it is **represented**. Perceiving is an involvement with the real world, while imagining constitutes an **irreal [i.e., imaginary, fictive]** world (Swan-Liat, 1966, p 200). In an imaginary world, a person experiences an object in another mode or way of being. Compared with the perceived, the imagined is an irreal, fictive image; it is less clear, not sharply defined, less stable, not clearly localizable, and has no unique size. In addition, a person is free to transform or change the image by a spontaneous act of imagining. Thus, the acts of perceiving and imagining embody two

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different relationships to reality (Nel, Sonnekus and Garbers, 1965, p 200).

On the other hand, no matter how "irreal" an imagined something might be, it is necessarily connected to previous perception, since it is a person who imagines something him/herself, and this imagining has its origin in what he/she has found (experienced) in surrounding reality. This implies that what is imagined, in one way or another, leads to reality. This does not mean that imagining is always "reproductive", because it can contain creative moments (aspects). In this respect, imagining can **exceed** the data of perceiving by adding something new or additional to the original perception. However, it is possible that imagining can be true to or foreign to reality. Whether it is faithful to reality depends, among other things, on previous perceptions and the sense and meaning which have been attributed to them. That is, the quality of a child's possessed experience is a decisive factor in whether imagining is faithful to reality.

**Fantasizing**, in comparison with imagining, is an even more distanced relationship with reality. Fantasy exceeds the limits of reality and is a creative activity by which a person enters a fantasy world. (Compare, e.g., a child's fantasy play). Thus, fantasizing is an activity by which a child can "escape" reality, and "lose" him/herself in a world where feelings, wishes, and desires are rampant. On the other hand, it also embraces the possibility of proceeding to a cognitive level on which to think and live creatively.

Although imagining and fantasizing have a strong emotional side, while learning, both are primarily directed to activities such as knowing, planning, and creating.

Thus, the following functions or modalities are distinguished (Sonnekus and Ferreira, 1987, pp 125-126): imagining and fantasizing make it possible to go beyond or **exceed** reality; imagining is an activity by which reality can be **represented**; and imagining and fantasizing both contain a **creative** aspect.

#### 2.2.4 Remembering

As with every mode of learning, remembering is actualized within a person's relationship to his/her world. Therefore, it is not merely registering, storing, and retrieving information (Sonnekus, 1974, pp



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80-83). Remembering is a conscious activity, and demands personal effort; therefore, effective remembering requires an **intention to learn** (Nel, Sonnekus and Garbers, 1965, p 294).

First, remembering is being-conscious of the past, and this implies **recalling** the past in the **present**. Things, events, or persons from the past which are recalled are not necessarily present but, by the act of remembering, they are placed in the present (Sonnekus, 1977, p 47). Thus, it is an activity by which "the effects of past learning manifest themselves in the present" (Behr, 1980, p 70). Previously learned content which has been given **sense and meaning** in the past is made present by remembering it (Behr, 1980, p 127). In this way, already acquired content is "stimulated", and a child then can relate this possessed content to new content. The quality of recalling is largely determined by a child's current emotional condition, as well as by the quality of past learning. As a first function of remembering, recall is a precondition for the second, i.e., integration.

Remembering is not only an act by which a child recalls existing possessed experience, it also is an activity by which new content is **integrated** with his/her possessed experience. In this way, a child's possessed experience, or stock of knowledge is continually expanded, broadened, and deepened. Thus, the two functions or modalities of remembering are to **recall in the present some past content** and then to **integrate** new learning content with this recalled past content [or to integrate the new with the old].

In the context of the above explication of learning, it is a unitary event which occurs within a child-world relationship. Although learning is actualized via several modes and their modalities, they cannot be actualized apart from each other. During learning, each of the modes has its contribution to make, and this can be only executed within the interdependent and close relationships which exist among them.

The different modes of learning--sensing, attending, perceiving, thinking, and imagining and fantasizing [let's "forget" remembering for the moment] --are different ways of relating to reality. Sensing as the beginning of learning is our first "seeing" something. Attending allows us to break out of our sensory horizon of **how** things appear here-and-now to **what** it is that appears. That is, attending allows us to distance ourselves from our pathic/gnostic

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sensing to an affective/cognitive level of knowing; here, for example, hearing via attending becomes listening, seeing becomes looking, touching becomes feeling; thus, Straus (1963, p 317) calls perceiving the “second seeing”, in that it is a more distanced, cognitive relationship to the world than is sensing, “the first seeing”. Thinking is an even more distanced relationship than perceiving because one can only perceive what is present, but one can think about what is absent as well as what is present. Imagining and fantasizing are modes of learning by which a learner becomes even more distanced from reality because they allow one to push and exceed the limits of reality in creative ways. Finally, remembering is the crowning of learning in that it makes our past learning present so newly learned content can be integrated with the old. Unless there is remembering, learning is not possible.

### 2.2.5 Actualizing the cognitive modes of learning in a classroom

To adequately actualize the cognitive modes of learning in a classroom, it is necessary that they be supported by a stable sensing, and a sharpened intention to learn (attending). Although the modes of learning function as a unity, at times, some modes are more prominent than others. For this reason, it is necessary that a teacher have a thorough knowledge of the functions fulfilled by the different modes of learning and that he/she link his/her teaching with these different modalities or functions which he/she wants a learner to actualize. Thus, a teacher should first determine which modes of learning are to be actualized at which phase of a lesson, and then plan his/her teaching activities accordingly (see chapter VI).

Regarding the actualization of the cognitive modes of learning, when **perceiving** is actualized, a teacher should provide for **global identifying, analyzing, synthesizing, and ordering**. For example, a thing, model, or theme might first be presented to a pupil in its **totality**, and then **details**, or essentials can be shown, and finally be **synthesized**, or re-unified into a whole. By means of linguistic expression and naming, **ordering** occurs. For example, a poem might first be read, or recited to the pupils as a totality, until it is formally dissected, or **analyzed**. When all facets of the poem are clear to the pupils, and the relationships are shown, it can again be read as a whole to them because, only then will there be an understanding and appreciation of the whole. Ordering continually occurs by means of language. According to Basson et al. (1983, p

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34), the purposive implementation of teaching aids in conjunction with perceiving is particularly important. A meaningfully ordered chalkboard scheme, visual model, real example, etc. can be used so relationships and concepts are clearly perceived.

**Thinking** will most naturally arise when a child's perceptions confront him/her with a **problem**. This implies that a teacher must make the pupils aware of a problem, or problems in the learning content if he/she aims to stimulate thinking. This can be done by asking purposeful, and clearly formulated **questions**. These questions should be **real** for the pupils, and they must recognize that answering them is **meaningful** to them/her. In answering a question, a teacher must guide a pupil in his/her thinking and take care that it does not stagnate on a concrete-perceptual level, but that it proceeds to an **abstract** level of thinking. In this connection, language provides the **concepts** for **ordering** and **abstracting** the contents.

With respect to **imagining and fantasizing**, a teacher should provide the pupils with an opportunity for **creativity**. From what is known of a specific child, assignments can be formulated so he/she can exceed reality, and design, or create "new" realities. Here one thinks of free assignments in art, essays, and science projects.

Also, regarding **remembering**, a teacher has the task of helping the pupils. He/she cannot merely assume that the pupils can **remember** a matter, circumstance, or content; therefore, he/she should stimulate and illustrate their existing possessed experience. He/she also must guide them to **integrate** the new content with their already existing possessed experience. Pupils are not always able to do this themselves and, therefore, a teacher should help them establish relationships, and point out interconnections between the old and the new content. With respect to remembering, two important aims are distinguished. First, there is **practice** of an earlier achievement, skill, technique, or mental representation by often **repeating** the subject content. Second, the subject content must be deepened by joining together loose and disconnected aspects with a meaningfully integrated whole (Basson et al., 1983, p 35).

For effective learning in a classroom, it is extremely important that a teacher continually supports the pupils' learning, and that he/she does this by directing his/her teaching to the modes of learning and

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their modalities. Thus, a teacher should plan his/her lesson so that **learning activities** are in **harmony** with **teaching activities**, and that they are both directed to achieving the lesson's **learning aims**. This matter is treated more comprehensively in chapter VI.

### 3. LEARNING AND CURRICULUM PLANNING

**Curriculum planning** involves **selecting, ordering, and evaluating** learning content for a didactic-pedagogic situation to reach specific aims (See Hill, 1975, pp 17 and 22).


During curriculum planning, selecting, and ordering content are closely related to the specific aims to be achieved. Within an educative perspective, the eventual aim of curriculum planning is a child's **proper adulthood**. The content **representative** of adulthood must be selected and ordered by curriculum planning in such a way that a child can attain a better understanding of it. This eventual aim usually is kept clearly in mind. However, a **child** for whom a curriculum is designed is not always kept in mind. Sometimes curriculum planning merely involves selecting and reducing existing subject matter content, and then ordering it from "easy" to "difficult". Whether a child, as one who is becoming adult, can achieve a better grasp of **reality** from this, and can learn to maintain him/herself adequately in this reality is totally irrelevant. Such curriculum planning, where a child is not considered thoroughly is untenable. The fact is that proper adulthood can only be attained in terms of adequate **personal actualization** by a child **giving meaning** to the curriculum content. Thus, it is not the curriculum itself which leads a child to adulthood, but the ways he/she gives **sense and meaning** to it.

Educative curriculum planning is a matter of a child attributing sense and meaning to content. In this connection, Sonnekus (Sonnekus and Crous, 1981, p 10) says that. as far as a child is concerned, a curriculum planner must consider the **preconditions** set by the nature of a learner him/herself regarding the **sense and meaning** the curriculum content can have for him/her. Because of the sense and meaning he/she has attributed to the learning content of a curriculum, a core question for curriculum design and development is how a learner attributes sense and meaning to this piece of the curriculum, irrespective of the level on which or the situation in which he/she finds him/herself. More simply, the

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curriculum content must be of such a nature that a child is able to learn it in a **meaningful** way.

Actualizing a child's learning is a comprehensive matter and has far-reaching implications for curriculum planning. The curriculum is not a goal itself but is aimed at a child's eventual proper adulthood. Thus, one must guard against a curriculum which merely makes subject matter content available which has been arranged from "easy" to "difficult". In fact, a curriculum aims at a child having subject knowledge at his/her disposal without which he/she could not enter the lifeworld of an adult. The systematic subject content is a **means** for unlocking reality for a child in ordered ways. Subject or **learning content** is **content of life** for a child if he/she experiences it as **meaningful**. Thus, curriculum planning is viewed as falling within the scope of learning and personal actualization. Schematically, this matter is represented as follows:



<p style="text-align: center;"><b>CURRICULUM PLANNING</b></p>
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From these remarks, curriculum planning is a **matter of a child giving sense and meaning** to content (Sonnekus and Crous, 1981, p 10). Hence, the ways a child gives meaning, as well as the ways he/she learns, and actualizes his/her psychic life in each period of life (see chapter VII) must be continually kept in view. Therefore, a curriculum must be planned so that it promotes **effective learning**, and the **adequate actualization of his/her psychic life**, in each period of his/her life. In addition, some of the conclusions drawn by Hill (1975, p 232) with respect to influencing a child in a teaching situation are indicated:

- \* For optimal learning in the curriculum, an opportunity must be offered for a differentiated encounter with the content, i.e., an encounter within which different psychic moments, modes of learning and becoming can be optimally actualized;
- \* meaningful curriculum planning can only occur if the pupils' level of development (becoming) is taken into account;
- \* the acquisition and command of language must be emphasized across the entire spectrum of the curriculum.

Hill (1975, p 203) also indicates that **curriculum planning** provides the **content for teaching**, and together they lead to **learning**. Thus, teaching and curriculum planning jointly lead to a child's effective learning.

Van der Stoep (1972, p 116) indicates that the only appropriate **point of departure** for formulating a theory of teaching is the original experience of teaching, as it is embodied in the reality of educating (upbringing), the aim of which is a child's adulthood. Thus, curriculum planning also must take a child in his/her original educative situation as its point of departure. In this original situation, there are educating and teaching; obviously, neither can occur without content. This implies that a parent, as educator in this primary [i.e., home] situation, must **select** and **order** content, i.e., he/she must **plan a “curriculum”**. The question is what criteria does he/she use to do this? Indeed, his/her curriculum planning is

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on a different level than that of a schoolteachers or curriculum expert. The fact is, he/she does not plan a curriculum, or use specific criteria. His/her planning occurs more intuitively and, therefore, he/she is not guided by scientifically established criteria, but rather more by the **needs** and **characteristics** his/her child shows at a given age. In this regard, Hill (1977, p 142) indicates that it is a parent or educator who notices a child's needs, and then selects and orders content to meet them. An example is how a parent guides his/her child when he/she learns to walk or talk. He/she doesn't harass his/her child with norms about an outlook on life when he/she is learning to walk, but takes him/her by the hand and helps him/her step by step. Also, he/she doesn't present an eighth-grade mathematics curriculum to his/her child when he/she learns to say "mama" and "papa" but helps him/her word by word. Although mainly intuitive, a parent selects content which is appropriate for his/her child's **needs for becoming**. Within the primary educative situation (at home), the nature of the content, and the ways it is presented are extremely important for personal actualization.

These original ways of planning a curriculum also hold for a secondary educative situation (at school), in the sense that there must be an attempt to select content in keeping with a child's **level of becoming** within a **period of life**.

In the preprimary school, the levels of becoming and characteristics of a toddler are thoroughly considered in "curriculum planning". Special attention is given to physical and creative activities, as well as to play, and language development--all matters which are characteristic of toddlers and which, therefore, will be **meaningful** to him/her. This matter is closely related to a child becoming ready for school.

Curriculum planning for the primary and secondary levels of schooling also must consider the needs and characteristics of each age group of children. A child's desire to learn to read and write, his/her attunement to reality, sexual development, religious preferences, forming gangs, involvement with the opposite gender, vocational interests, etc. (see chapter VII) are a few of the topics which must be addressed during curriculum planning.

#### 4. SUMMARY

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Adult accompaniment, and personal actualization in a classroom occur in terms of content made available by means of curriculum planning. However, the preconditions are that this content is such that an adult (teacher) can order it effectively, and that a child can learn it as something meaningful to him/herself. This is possible only if a child's level of becoming (development), with all that this includes, and as this appears in each of the periods of life, is thoroughly considered during curriculum planning.

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