

## CHAPTER 4

### DIDACTIC-PEDAGOGICAL PERSPECTIVE ON ORIGINAL EXPERIENCING, LIVED EXPERIENCING AND LEARNING

#### A. EXPERIENCING AND LIVED EXPERIENCING: CONSIDERATIONS FOR TEACHING

In the previous chapters, there is repeated reference to the concept “structure” as meaningful for constructing a didactic-pedagogical theory. It is stated that the pedagogical relevance of “structure”, in addition to many others, certainly is that it also is a matter of announcing a problem, in the sense that “structure” as an origin (in this case, of the reality of educating) is necessary for disclosing certain essentials of educating (teaching). From a psychopedagogical side, “*structura*”, as origin, shows various tasks for didactics, including intentionality, learning, experiencing, lived experiencing, all as origins (ways of being in the world). The important coherence of experiencing and learning, as well as experiencing and lived experiencing, are remarked on, and must be considered from a didactical perspective.

If one considers that all the above perspectives focus on one aspect of reality (educating), the problem of lived experiencing for teaching theory is of significance because actualizing it in all its possible respects, meets our expectations, especially in the light of Sonnekus’ contribution to our insights into this aspect of didactical pedagogics.

This didactic-pedagogical significance is mainly that the two concepts “experience” and “lived experience” speak to didactic practice considering psychopedagogical findings by announcing the forms and contents of actualizing these two important pedagogical tendencies. There certainly are different ways to come to terms with a didactic-pedagogical design: Alas, not so much in a methodological sense, as judging exploratory possibilities, but in perspective indications or variations, because the actualization

designs cannot be simple. In dealing with the coherence of original experiencing and learning, the matter once again will become clear. Meanings such as “*pathos*”, “*gnosis*”, “*logos*”, “*ethos*”, beyond any doubt, have relevance when lived experiencing in thinking is disclosed, verbalized, and expressed in the form of fundamental didactical theory. Possibly, it would be meaningful to initially formulate the problem as follows: How does the coherence of experiencing and lived experiencing appear in educative reality as it is realized in teaching and, of what value is the didactic design, i.e.: how do experiencing and lived experiencing figure in didactical theory building? Can didactic practice be anything other than deliberately providing for experiencing and lived experiencing? After all, these are two fundamental aspects of lifestyle, expressions of one’s participation in world and life, which must deliberately be realized (i.e., with pedagogical objectives in mind) in a set series of situations.

The contrary of this view would be that didactical pedagogics could ignore the concepts “experience” and “lived experience” or the didactical pedagogical should or could apply everything written about experience and lived experience. His/her task then would be to seek ways of application to his/her subjects to try to bring to teaching expressions of what currently is known about the two matters. In such a case, theory building would have to reach across psychopedagogics, fundamental pedagogics, as well as sociopedagogics to anthropology. Related fields, such as psychology and biology also should be considered. This would confront didactical pedagogics with some of its oldest problems: as soon as he/she proceeds to seek and apply application trends which he/she him/herself has not set, he/she is in the field of applying what is worth knowing.

The consequences are obvious since he/she cannot interpret these statements accordingly. With this, as often was done in the past, he/she gives up his/her disciplinary autonomy. It is only when didactical pedagogics asks its *own* questions and provides its *own* answers in pedagogical respects (i.e., in accordance with the reality of educating) that it can link up with the other pedagogical disciplines which, in turn, expose the same reality to other

objectives and interpretations in terms of its own criteria. Thus, the pedagogical comes to fullness in pedagogics.

One must understand that didactical pedagogics has a task with respect to the two concepts “experience” and “lived experience” without which a pedagogical perspective is incomplete. In this case, he/she also must, in his/her practice, design forms of actualization according to the original field of knowledge (the reality of educating), choose contents, plan didactic modalities, etc. If experiencing and lived experiencing are not problem areas for didactical thinking, the absence of these two aspects of lifestyle first must be shown in the reality of educating. If practice proves that they appear clearly in the pedagogical tasks, i.e., if the reality of educating discloses itself such that experiencing and lived experiencing have important pedagogical consequences in any other pedagogical discipline, then didactical pedagogics has no doubt that the matter is a task because its actualization *also* is brought into didactic activities.

Similarly, with respect to didactical theory, it must be remembered that these two aspects of a person’s being in the world also will surface in therapeutic pedagogical situations, as revealed in orthopedagogics and in vocational orientation. Thus, this didactic task cannot be eliminated. If experiencing and lived experiencing, in their coherence, cannot arise in didactic designs, they cannot appear in orthopedagogics because then one would have to deny that these concepts have pedagogical connotations.

Let us begin by examining the didactic-pedagogical possibilities for theory building. In the first place, didactical pedagogics can refer to other pedagogical disciplines, and even to other subject matter areas, because the idea of “application” presupposes a wider field than the reality of educating, including anthropology, axiology, psychology, sociology, etc. The aim of such a referring not only would simply be to augment their data, but also to come to an interpretation of them.

Another possibility which can be chosen is to turn to the totality of pedagogical disciplines in their coherent statements and interpretations, and then try to plan the didactic use of this

information for teaching. Obviously, this is a more acceptable approach than the first because it is pedagogically focused. A problem which didactical theory building faces in such a case is that it is fundamentally different from the first possibility but, in principle, they are the same. Namely, he/she can try to acquire other information, insights, and perspectives than his/her own and, in this way, announce his/her own.

Also, there is a third possibility: that didactic-pedagogical issues are formulated in terms of these two concepts from a didactic-pedagogical perspective, and then compiled as didactical questioning a way of reflecting on their implementation so that the other pedagogical disciplines could provide a direct perspective from autonomous questioning. This direct perspective would announce the one important issue, i.e., the actualization of the coherence of “experience” and “lived experience” as a central didactical problem on which the other disciplines could shed light in a progressive sense. But also in a regressive sense, insights and questions about actualizing experiencing and lived experiencing could be asked from a didactic situation. This would make possible joint pedagogical writing as answers to questions.

One must note that. in the first two possibilities, in each case there is a move from a structure to the didactical and, in the latter case, from the didactical problematic in theory building, questions are asked of the other pedagogical disciplines and of other areas of knowledge, where necessary. But also in a regressive sense, insights and questions can be asked about actualizing experiencing and lived experiencing in a didactic situation. This would make possible joint pedagogical writings as answers to questions. This does not imply that a didactic perspective will, should, or can explain the central problematic, but only that its tasks are as unique as especially that of psychopedagogics which, nevertheless, must be questioned largely in terms of the didactic task. The benefits of methodological progressiveness and repressiveness should be clear. Probably the most important thing for didactical theory building is that the details of experiencing and lived experiencing can be considered in terms of the didactic task (actualizing teaching forms).

It would be irresponsible to try to claim that, in this section, the problem of the coherent meaning of experiencing and lived experiencing will be formulated sufficiently from a didactical point of view. In this case, didactical thinking still shows three major shortcomings which would make such a claim false and unscientific.

In the first place, statements about experiencing and lived experiencing in didactical thinking are mostly fragmental and disperse, which makes a synthesis extremely difficult, especially as interpretation. Secondly, from other perspectives on the matter, pronouncements and interpretation still are being made such that details for didacticians are not yet complete and often are incoherent. Finally, thinking about this matter in terms of the reality of educating is quite recent with the result that an overview also is extremely difficult, especially because of the sporadic, incomplete nature of such descriptions.

The integrated magnitude (scope and relief) which should be inherent in the concept “structure” simply is not there yet. Today, however, many definitive questions have come to light in the sense that they are formulated such that a greater synthesis (perspective on essences) has become possible.

Given the scope of the issue and the limited space available, I would like to concentrate somewhat on indicating the problem of the coherence between the two matters from a didactic to a psychopedagogical field.

Let us state the problem as follows: Can one possibly not put the question of the value of experiencing and lived experiencing in the clearest relief by asking questions of the psychopedagogical from the perspective of a lesson structure? If one reflects from a lesson structure to psychopedagogics, this reflection is not in the form of an answer but, as far as the didactic is concerned, in the form of questions to which important answers must be provided by a psychopedagogician.

With this, didactical pedagogics does not want to prescribe to psychopedagogics, its area, or draw attention to gaps in its structure. Rather, the intention is to show that the didactical and

the psychopedagogical perspectives are both directed to the same reality (educative reality), that both are pedagogical matters and that pedagogical essences cannot be understood in a didactical sense unless a person also can be understood psychopedagogically.

If we can briefly refer to the synthesis to which didacticians, especially at the University of Pretoria, so far have come with respect to a lesson structure, certainly the following is important. The author began with the matter of a lesson structure in the first semester of 1968. At that time, there was mention of a “lesson analysis” to indicate that a presented lesson lends itself to analyses to highlight its structural aspects, with a view to seeking generally valid form constructions for a lesson, especially in accord with the research on didactic ground-forms completed at the end of 1968.

These first efforts brought forth two important matters or aspects of the task. The first was the design consequences of the didactic ground-forms. At the time, the functional meaning of the ground-form in a lesson structure was indicated in relatively broad strokes, although very many details still needed to be worked out. Moreover, there was a clear relation shown between didactic ground-form and didactic methodology. However, it must be pointed out that these pronouncements were only made in a general didactic sense, and a perspective on the different lesson types was not mentioned.

It was not until the first semester of 1970 that insight and, thus, a perspective emerged with respect to the coherence of ground-forms and teaching methods. Statements relevant to form building and lesson type initially were sporadic and unreasoned and, thus, were dispersed and not integrated insights. All collaborators were aware that form building eventually should make visible the types of lessons, and that the principles of ordering relevant to lesson content should somehow appear somewhere in the structure of functional meaning, i.e., it cannot merely be theory, but implies assignments (tasks) which must be realized somewhere in a lesson. However, this aspect could not be well placed.

Initially, this was linked to teaching methods in accordance with trying to almost get the lesson content in perspective. In fact, the

effect was somewhat obscuring because the approach and hypotheses used were incorrect. Only later was it realized that two issues must be explicated in the context of a lesson structure before related and supplementary views could be brought into perspective. These two matters were “form” and “content” which, jointly, and in their coherence, gave rise to the possibility of a matter such as a lesson structure. Stated differently: Insight into the coherence of lesson form and lesson content is a precondition for the structure of a lesson (as a general didactical theory), and its realization in disclosing (describing) certain lesson types (realizing insight in a practical situation). Thus, the meaning of form and content constitutes an equilibrium in a lesson situation which enables a balanced movement (dynamics) of a lesson as a matter of action. In the last chapter, these orienting remarks are elaborated on in greater detail.

In harmony, the two identities “form” and “content” constitute a lesson structure which is of didactical significance. Therefore, the issue of lesson contents began to gain more prominence in constructing a theory about a lesson structure. The main problem around which much of the thinking revolved was: How does content function in terms of the didactic-pedagogical course [of a lesson]?

While unraveling these problems, it came to light that three aspects of the perspective on content are of significance. Taking a lesson structure into consideration, the first matter is that a presentation in the form of a lesson, in its formalized consequences, is not possible unless such content is reduced to its essences, which must carry a person’s insight. In conjunction with this, and parallel to it, is the formulation of a meaningful problem, which can carry a teaching aim. Thirdly, considering modes of learning relevant to a lesson situation, led to the formulation of an actual learning aim.

These three matters were compiled under the concept “teaching aim”. This aim becomes visible in three aspects (learning aim, teaching aim, content reduction). Next, we also worked through the lesson form. Thus, this lesson form must reveal what ground-form is relevant, as indicated in the previous chapter. The binding factor with respect to lesson form and lesson content at the time was perceived to be the ways of ordering such content, precisely because

it pointed to the beginning of understanding the matter called the lesson sequence. For example, if one should choose a symbiotic ordering of content in accordance with judgments regarding the teaching aim, in principle one already has indicated the beginning point for the lesson sequence.

Thus, in a didactic sense, a presentation using an inductive and/or deductive approach already has been greatly compromised. That is, this compromising necessarily actualizes itself with respect to the possibilities of the ground-form as well as the methodological principles which are viewed as valid. These aspects of a lesson structure, indeed, can be shown, but not separately in constructing a theory.

Here, one is dealing with various shades of color, just as didactic light separates in a prism. One obtains a similar construction in psychopedagogics when psychopedagogicians begin working with the concepts “experience” and “lived experience”. When, then a didactician turns his/her attention to psychopedagogics for an illumination of the matter, he/she also aware tjat here he/she is dealing with a matter of shades which, in many respects, make difficult demands on his/her ability to distinguish.

There are three aspects which, in a didactical sense, are investigated in inquiring about experiencing and lived experiencing tendencies, from knowledge of a lesson structure, which are of significance: the lesson form, the lesson content and the course of a lesson. The latter comes into motion by implementing a teaching method. It has its nodal point in the forms of teaching which are chosen with respect to contents because of which the application of methods can be justified during a lesson. In this way, the highly important aspects of the modes of learning again are considered, which understandably relate to the learning aim aspect of the lesson aim.

It is particularly in the division of a teaching aim into a lesson form and a lesson content, along with the associated modes of learning, which makes the matter of experiencing and lived experiencing didactically meaningful. That is, a didactician faces the question: Is the question of experiencing and lived experiencing a matter of a learning aim, and a way of learning? It must be understood well



that the one especially is prominent in the synthesis regarding the lesson content (the experiencing of a learning person). The other especially is prominent in the synthesis of insight regarding the course of a lesson, i.e., the initiating skill of a teacher with an eye to a teaching effect (the lived experiencing of a learning person).

This parallel separation of the two matters “experience” and lived experience” occurs simply to better put the emphasis and, thus, its didactic meaning, into better perspective. If this reduction seems simplistic, it only was done for the purpose of bringing to the surface the didactic problem in sharper relief. The root of the matter is: the assertion that experiencing and lived experiencing are not meaningful didactical concepts falls away with this. Neither the learning aim nor the modes of learning can be considered as occurring outside experiencing and lived experiencing when constructing a didactical theory.

After all, what is one of the basic pedagogical insights we have, by which to bring the entire person-world relationship to pedagogical interpretation?

A person participates in the world and changes it. Thus, a person learns to know the world and becomes familiar with it. If pedagogics asserts that a person becomes familiar with the world, it also means that eventually he/she makes him/herself at home in the world. In other words, he/she orients him/herself to contents which proclaim world as world. If one now were to proceed to continually replace concepts which also disclose the relevance of “*didaskhein*”, one very quickly would set down a collection of didactical categories. Thus, when one works with the concepts of “experience” and “lived experience”, this means that one is involved with these reciprocal concepts in constructing a didactical theory.

In the present state of pedagogical thinking, specifically at the University of Pretoria,<sup>1</sup> this reciprocal meaning of experiencing and lived experiencing is evident. Also, it is important to note here that the term “reciprocal” does not mean “congruent”. An interdisciplinary interpretation shows clearly that lived experiencing can flow from experiencing, but also it can constitute original experiencing as such – especially in a pathic (affective)

sense. Hence, lived experiencing can refer to experiencing but, on the other hand, it also is clear that experiencing, especially in its acting-choosing-diversity, also can flow from lived experiencing, that lived experiencing, in its motivating power, provides the possibility, and in realizing it, to establish reality from new experiences. If it is true that these two aspects of a lifestyle are of reciprocal significance, a first task for a didactic design is in initiating the reciprocal aspect of the two in a formal situation.

In connection with Sonnekus<sup>2</sup>, there are four psychopedagogical statements one can make to bring didactical thinking into motion, especially with a view to returning to the field of knowledge mentioned.

1. The stream of lived experiencing varies with respect to its pathic-affective and gnostic-cognitive aspects. If one must interpret this statement didactically in search of the above action-task-character, the following can be said:

In so far as there is experiencing and lived experiencing, in the didactic-pedagogical course of teaching events, one also could speak of post-affective and pre-cognitive aspects in the stream of lived experiencing to disclose distinctions with the aim of a securer design in the lesson structure. One must note this statement directly transfers you to the didactic imperative. The lived experiencing stream *varies* about its two aspects. First and foremost, this variation is not of relevance to a school situation but, indeed, to the primary pedagogical situation, i.e., the original educative reality in which the didactic imperative is embedded – as was shown above.

2. Lived experiencing is a matter of meaning. Is meaning possible without content? The answer is no because meaning cannot be given to nothing. Meaning, as an aspect of a person's "being-in-the-world", only is possible with respect to "something", i.e., content. The stream of lived experiencing is a matter of lived experienceable and meaningful contents. As a matter of content, the above postulate immediately suggests the didactic imperative.

3. The modes of being (modes of learning), as modes of actualizing lived experiencing, imply the didactic imperative. One is unable to learn about nothing. Anyone who learns always learns something. In educating, these learning acts do not always occur spontaneously and without reservation. Often, an educator initiates it. Also, it occurs in a wide variety of situations. Indeed, this is the one important consequence for building a didactical theory which flows from Landman's exposition of the pedagogical sequence structure. In this, a teaching aspect is rooted, as a matter of educating, indeed, as a matter of "engagement".

4. Lived experiencing implies "Verstehen" (Heidegger) and "Befindlichkeit". This means that understanding and existential sensitivity [attunement] must become visible in the reciprocal relation of these two forms of living, and must be manifested in a first, profound power of a person's becoming, i.e., educating. Thus, the actualization of this understanding includes the unlocking of reality. The motivation offered by Sonnekus in this regard is: Lived experiencing also includes learning to know; a search for what is, securing form, and the impact on childlike lived experiences. This "is" (being or ontos) assumes the real, the essentials of living in this, lived experiencing is intercepted by an educator, who not only focuses on what is essential, but also on helping a child learn to know it: thus, the didactic imperative.

In each of the above statements, pedagogics necessarily pushed through to didactic practice. The search for didactical fundamentals takes note of this and tries to overcome the problems of his/her own perspective. In this respect, pedagogical thinking remains essence thinking (Landman). The outcome of didactical theory building is one of the tasks which, in this case, one possibly can summarize as follows: To seek forms, ways, means, practices of actualization to allow the stream of lived experiencing to take its course unhindered, in a constituted situation (in school).

Here "unhindered" implies that formal teaching can block the stream of lived experiencing. On the other hand, "unhindered" does not also mean undirected, where the ordering of reality in a didactic situation is emphasized strongly. Thus, there is a clear task for didactical pedagogics when lived experiencing is stated.

Now, what is the crux of the matter which didactical thinking must penetrate, i.e., what does a didactician not know when he/she approaches his/her problem in relation to the structure of lived experiencing?

1. In the first place, a didactician does not know what the question of “lived experience” means when psychopedagogics postulates it as an area for its own and interdisciplinary research. One must acknowledge the fact that in psychopedagogics, the matter of “lived experience” has not yet received systematic attention regarding its essences in studying the phenomenon of educating. With Sonnekus and Pretorius, for the first time, lived experiencing became an acute topic in pedagogical writings. Just read Kant, Schliermacher, Dilthey, Kohnstamm, Waterink, Langeveld and others. The words “experience” and “lived experience” are often used differently here, also non-pedagogically, because philosophical anthropological concepts often are used as pedagogical statements regarding them.

2. In contrast, in pedagogical writings, experiencing has been used much more extensively in definite educative contexts and with greater attention to details. Thus, a didactician must acquaint him/herself with details if he/she wants to know why it is in his/her perspective on the problem. The concept of experience is a favorite area of philosophical investigation.

Kant’s *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* [*Critique of Pure Reason*] begins with a comment on experience. Experience is the basis for and *origin* of all knowledge. Without experience, knowledge is not possible. From a pedagogical view of the matter, Pestalozzi argues that the acquisition of all knowledge first occurs through experience and then through the word. Thus, experience presumes the didactic word (i.e., teaching). Brenzinka<sup>3</sup> seeks the sense of educating in one’s original experiential involvement with reality. Here one must pay attention to the connotation of the reciprocal meaning already expressed. If the following moments of experience are singled out in ways like what was the case with lived experiencing, then the following appear:

- a) Experiencing has an *a priori* meaning of judgment. This is to say, experiencing makes a judgment possible. In other words, judgment is an inevitable consequence of experiencing. Thus, experiencing presupposes knowledge, in the sense that it brings together knowledge and makes it available to consciousness to form a judgment. Knowledge (as experience) is not always articulate or verbalized. It is not necessarily conveyed in symbolic forms. Therefore, experiencing presupposes a judgment, as a matter of consciousness because, *a priori*, knowledge is conveyed in experience. Hence, experiencing presupposes knowledge in the first place.
- b) *A priori*, experiencing has a meaning of activity. To be experienced means to be able to do, to act in a situation to convert a situation in general to one's own situation. An act which relies on experiencing is not blind, but one which follows the appeal of particulars which speak from a situation. Experience also indicates mastery. Thus, experience is not only a matter of knowledge or verbalizing knowledge in symbolic forms. It also is a matter of doing. Thus, in the second place, experiencing presupposes a justifiable act.
- c) If the above two statements hold water, experiencing also has a transposing meaning. Then experiencing presupposes thinking. Stated formally: *A priori*, experiencing has a thinking meaning because the action of (b) is not described as instinctively determined in a life situation. This action always is

preceded by a judgment. The judgment and action then are grounded in the possibilities of actualizing experiencing and, in real terms, expresses the thinking to which an acting person comes. Then thinking functions to bind ordering and acting situations. By thinking, experiencing is transformed into symbolic form by which science becomes possible. Hence, in the third place, experiencing presupposes thinking.

- d) Thinking is impossible without an experiential base, apart from the synthesis to which it can come and new constructions that can be made because neither of the two (synthesis and construction) can be based on nothing. Experiencing thus predisposes thinking. If so, experiencing, a priori, means learning because thinking without learning at most would represent a one-time occurrence in one's life.
- e) Experiencing cannot be shared *as such*. All that can be shared is the outcome of experiencing. This statement applies equally to lived experiencing. In a didactic sequence one makes experience superfluous. Sharing knowledge, unlocking reality make it unnecessary to undergo again. But it is precisely this entirety of human experiences which is available as cultural goods and science that makes it possible for reality to be unlocked. These experiences are not involved directly in the unlocking, the expertise which are remnants of experiencing.

In the pedagogical literature, the extent to which the concepts of experiencing, lived experiencing, knowing, knowledge, and skills are used in congruent and complementary ways is conspicuous. As far as didactics is concerned, the meaning of these concepts blur into congruent and complementary terms of use to such an extent that their meaning (nomenclature and descriptive value) becomes largely meaningless. From didactic judgment, experiencing then is equal to lived experiencing, to knowledge, etc. while each of the facets of the lifeworld in a didactic design, nevertheless, impose variations which must be made visible in a lesson form, lesson content, and course of a lesson.

What must be considered in didactical theory building in this regard, is that these modes of being (experiencing, lived experiencing, acting, etc.) continually intersect in one's lifestyle, and they are distinguished insufficiently in pedagogical terms by description with a view to making it didactic in the designs. When it is said that a situation of experiencing is created for a child, all the above complementary aspects are included. Didactics simply does not do this.

It should be clear from the foregoing that a seeker of fundamental didactical theory, in relation to the issues of experiencing and lived experiencing, in many respects, goes back to psychopedagogics because the essences of pedagogical reality must be highlighted there to be able to carefully describe the form, content, and course of teaching for implementation in practice. The following matters currently appear to be problematic for didactical pedagogics because they are related most closely to the lesson structure and lesson types which form the endpoint of didactical thinking.

The root word of experience in the German is "fahren" meaning "to go". When there is mention of "experience" [*erfahren*] the prefix gives it the meaning: to undergo. When reality is experienced, it implies that a person undergoes the totality of such reality. The root word for lived experience is "living" (life). Thus, in its usual sense, it means a person is here, present in a situation, that he/she is there where things are. In contemporary expositions, didacticians merely identify experiencing with knowing and lived experiencing with sensing, i.e., with an affective, pathic awareness of something.

The question is whether these interpretations represent a correct structure – so correct that they can be accepted fundamentally as structural pronouncements when a lesson structure eventually is considered. If, in theory building, one cannot evaluate concepts like these in their own terms and identity, how can they be interpreted meaningfully and convincingly with respect to the didactic imperative? In such vagueness, how can didactical theory provide an image, relief, and outline of its ultimate task? With respect to so much vagueness, is a didactic relief possible? Can such hazy explanations lay claim to be labeled as constructions? And isn't the one important problem for teaching theory also that, by virtue of such fogginess, he/she vaguely, gropingly searches him/herself in his/her practice because he/she doesn't know exactly what he/she is looking for?

There is little doubt that a didactician cannot give a complete answer to this question. If one encounters the problem of integrating the form, content, and course of a lesson structure, necessarily, one lands in a type of lesson which formally can bring into motion a teaching aim. These lesson types make claim of the lesson types based on the actualization-tendencies which are assumed in all three aspects of a lesson structure, in accordance with the lesson types, the nature of the motion (the course of teaching and of learning) being expedited.

This certainly is the case in some lesson structures of appreciation, e.g., in literature, music, and art. This appreciating certainly is a matter of contents which speak in the "getting to know" value judgment and, thus, presupposes experience of dealing with such contents. Thus, in this case, a learning aim is linked to a reduction of content and the problem which has been formulated.

The foundation of this is [a learner's] becoming as a lived experienced aspect which makes possible the formulation of a learning aim. This wondering does not necessarily have to be the ultimate aim; it, also can be an intermediate one. The fact is that, in the successive constitutions, didactic situations, becoming proceeds to appreciating, i.e., it includes a value judgment as a teaching



effect. Without the “Befindlichkeit” [emotionality] previously referred to, the didactic course simply does not get on track.

Thus, a teacher focuses on this sensitivity. Sonnekus argues that this “Befindlichkeit” becomes visible in a stream of lived experiencing. Now, as a didactician, one knows that intentionality is present in the flow of lived experiencing; that intentionality flows into this affective stratum. This is so, in the sense that actualizing intentionality and lived experiencing seem to be coherent: Affects, intentionalities, lived experiences. A child’s focus on reality has everything to do with this.

For example, take fantasy, described by Sonnekus as one of the modes of actualizing lived experiencing [learning]. If one accepts this, fantasy is related directly to affects, intentionality, and lived experiencing. Therefore, it also is in direct relationship to learning and the modes of learning; hence, it must be considered in disclosing the didactic task in a lesson structure. After all, breaking through the affective to the cognitive must be realized in the teaching. This has to do with the didactical category “achievement” becoming visible. If the mode of the stream of lived experiencing creates a barrier or resistance during teaching, it reduces the teaching effect. Ultimately, here lived experiencing must proceed to a cognitive directedness (a value judgment) by which a moment, such as a pathic-directed fantasy, must be broken through.

A second problem which presents itself here for didactical thinking is that of knowledge, now as valid knowledge which must be verbalized. Is knowledge a higher level of lived experiencing? In the currently available literature, it is assumed that knowledge is the highest level of experiencing because, in this way (the thinking), a deliberate control of reality based on experiencing becomes possible. During a life situation, the effect of experiencing actually is invisible until it is transformed into a deliberate lifestyle, i.e., in verbalizing knowledge as judgments, masteries, and later skills. In short, experiencing must lead to achievement. Why else does a didactician create a situation in which experiencing must occur in its original forms? Is this then about experiencing as experiencing? Nevertheless, he/she intends to raise the level, such that knowledge must come from experiencing, and must be visible in achievement.

This achievement is evaluated in terms of a purer emancipation, clearer perspective, tighter objectification, etc. At the same time, is the knowledge, which is the central theme of the preceding statements, also a higher level of lived experiencing? And if so, does this mean that the cognitive proclaims a higher level than the affective? Is this not just about the diversity and differentness of lived experiencing? Here, is a didactician not on a one-sided track which ultimately results only in educative incompleteness regarding both form and content? How is this related to curriculum theory in this respect? Once again, is the flow of the stream of lived experiencing from the affective to the cognitive an elevation of the level of lived experiencing? If so, this constitutes a didactic ideal.

Here, the didactic imperative must seek its tasks: The ways of actualization to lead the pathic-affective stream of lived experiencing to the gnostic-cognitive level. In this, achievement will show itself. The first didactical problem with such an action is that lived experiencing, as a way of being, does not allow itself to be manipulated in such a way in a child's life. Also, with this, part of a lesson structure falls away. The unique nature of a lesson structure in accordance with a teaching aim (including an appreciation lesson) no longer corresponds with original experiencing as one has come to know it in the lifeworld. In an appreciation lesson, as a type of lesson, the judgment to which a child comes, is no more than the pure enjoyment of the contents made available, and that pedagogically is as justifiable as any learning aim. After all, a child's forming is not reducible to the knowledge he/she ultimately must possess. His/her participation in the world and life is not in all respects a matter of quantitative accounting, but also of qualitative surrender. A return to pathic lived experiencing also is an eventuality of appreciation. Does this mean that the cognitive is a higher form of lived experiencing? Or does the cognitive fall back to the level of the affective to complete the cycle of appreciation? Does the evidence show that gnostic affects can be stirred up, which then makes the surrender to life contents superfluous?

Probably it is fair to put the following question to didactical theory: How (i.e., by what means) will lived experiencing be actualized in teaching? How imperfect are didactical insights into the modes of

lived experiencing when an answer to this question must be provided? If the modes of learning imply the modes of actualizing lived experiencing, here a didactician faces a diverse task which he/she cannot justify in his/her possible designs. His/her lesson structure becomes haphazard regarding these matters; merely compare the issues of learning aim, reduction of content, and formulating [lesson] problems.

In the third place, if we accept that a child's world has a pathic-affective emphasis (as currently is the case), does this mean that a rational approach to reality qualitatively enhances the life essence "lived experience"? What is structurally valid for the equilibrium of this matter? In what way can the hypothetical validity of this be researched with respect to effective teaching? Would a tighter, more objective rational approach to reality increase the formative quality in the sense of lived experiencing? In some school subjects, this matter is extremely topical in teaching. After all, they lend themselves so superbly to rational constructions of reality. If the hypothesis stated above could be proved to be true, the curriculum equilibrium for these areas of learning will need to be revised radically.

Also, there are other facets of the problem which arise in considering the matter. Must a lesson designer also ultimately be attuned to the formulation of lived experiencing, i.e., transposing lived experiencing, as a mode of being, to the level of language, especially to that of a symbolic form? Can one transpose lived experiencing in such a way that becoming aware of reality is captured in symbolic form? There are obvious boundaries in this matter, and now: to what extent does a didactic design respect these boundaries or break through them? In a general sense, can it be said of didactical aims that the formulation of lived experiencing is not regarded in its coherence with the preceding two aspects, i.e., lived experiencing as knowledge and lived experiencing as being rational (especially in the sense of ordering life)? In this broad context, what is the relationship between transposing (transferring to a world of symbols) and lived experiencing as such?

The problem of experiencing today is much more transparent to a didactician than lived experiencing. Didacticians know too little

about lived experiencing to formulate and justify didactical judgments. If here lived experiencing also assumes a child's attitude (evidence of his participation in educating), a childlike attribution of meaning to reality also cannot appear on the horizon. Should this aspect be a matter of haphazard communication, assistance provided by an adult to a child to change to a state of adulthood should show a dangerous trend towards the haphazard. Beyond the stream of lived experiencing there can be no realization of forming, and no emancipation. From this, it follows that the self-knowledge to which a child must be able to work through to continues to fail, and, in its turn, this means that educating, in the true sense of the word, cannot occur.

Therefore, one must recognize that for a didactician there is a definite distinction regarding experiencing and lived experiencing, even if this is merely with respect to the extent of his expertise. He/she can primarily make direct experiencing superfluous in a didactic situation. However, considering existing insights, this does not apply to lived experiencing. A breakthrough from the pathic to the gnostic, as far as the stream of lived experiencing is concerned, must continually be shaped anew by each child. Certainly, this is a didactic task. The coherence of the pathic and the gnostic is fragile; it is violated easily. In addition, provision must be made for a return to the pathic as an eventuality of lived experiencing.

From this, there are various difficult matters for consideration in a lesson structure. What claim is there to completeness in so far as the modes of lived experiencing now are indicated cognitively? This matter of modes of lived experiencing is an important problem for didactical theory building. Can one claim that a mode only is visible to the extent that it is actualized cognitively?

Currently, didactic practice shows itself in such a way that an affirmative answer is given to the last question asked. Cognitive modes of manifestation are elevated to criteria for judging lived experiencing in a didactic situation, i.e., to the extent that lived experiencing is present in the didactical designs. Many aspects of designs are attuned to lived experiencing without really being familiar with a child. Will the pathic way (mode) be the same as the

gnostic modes? For a didactician, this seems unlikely, and he/she turns his/her questioning eyes to psychopedagogics.

If one were to postulate that lived experiencing implies didactical aims, which pathic re-lived experiencing is necessary for breaking through to the gnostic, also that a didactic situation quickens the stream of lived experiencing and makes it acute in the attitude (attunement), one has a didactic problem. Quite generally, it is stated that (in a didactic sense) the most important criterion for the knowable is that it can be repeated. Thus, usually the sediment of knowledge in teaching, which is an expression of the experience of people, is available to a pedagogician for judgment in teaching: That this knowledge is repeatable, practical and, thus, obtainable.

Does this pronouncement apply to lived experiencing? Are there such lived experiential examples available for teaching which can guarantee the effectiveness of the stream of lived experiencing? Because the physical, chemical, biological, etc. can show definite repeatable trends (electrical current, the effect of acids on metal, osmosis) while the essence of the content remains the same and is repeatable, experiencing is called the basis of teaching.

Does this hold for lived experiencing? Is not a child's involvement in such a reality unique? The generalizations which direct the didactic in its situated progression are more vague, and their contrasts more vaguely nuanced. Certainly, a teaching effect need not be inferior, but it will look different. If there is exercising and memorizing in lived experiencing, as modes of learning, this would directly influence the lesson structure. For example, in the pure design of an appreciation lesson, apparently there is no room for making the stream of lived experiencing visible, as precisely can be given to the content in a gnostic account, e.g., with a literary or musical genre. Then, the exemplary as a ground-form [of teaching] strongly comes into the foreground.

But even more: Is the concept lived experience informative in a didactical exposition? Almost no details are available on this. Can a didactician isolate objective and informative moments in a stream of lived experiencing and, on that basis, distinguish between lived experiencing and experiencing? This question clearly affects the

ability to describe lived experiencing and, thus, its didactical evaluation. For example, if each lived experiencing is a unique matter because it has been determined by content, how does a didactician arrive at a generally valid structure for which he/she must provide in a constitutive sense?

Considering the above, his/her distinctions become a difficult matter. Continually, he/she is tempted to declare that, as far as a didactical perspective is concerned, lived experiencing has an experiential quality. Somewhere in a lesson structure, all the problems mentioned are embedded in didactical concepts consciously or unconsciously, explicitly, or implicitly. The literature shows this clearly: note Klafki's exposition of the fundamental and the elemental in constructing a didactical theory. Long before him, Pestalozzi risked doing this, while Froebel's entire system of educating small children relies on this—although unconsciously.

The above problems are not mentioned to indicate, didactical pedagogical [problems] to psychopedagogics its area of study. This would be presumptuous and unjustified. However, this radical thinking through of "didaskhein", as it appears in educating, compels a teaching doctrine to ask psychopedagogicians questions which didactical pedagogics cannot answer adequately. These matters always become acute in a lesson structure. On closer inspection, both perspectives [didactical pedagogical and psychopedagogical] of the pedagogical are focused on disclosing the reality of educating and, in some way, they are involved in trying to bring the same phenomenon to light.

## **B. TEACHING EFFECT: LEARNING AS A FORM IN WHICH ORIGINAL EXPERIENCING IS EXPRESSED**

From the foregoing, one can state that original experiencing announces the one important source of knowledge where a theoretical didactician must look for the origins of the practice he/she wants to describe. Understandably, another source of knowledge is the contents which arise with teaching, where an educator's life and worldview figure in a primary way. With this, in constructing a didactical theory, two parallel lines are drawn which should serve as a path for the structure, i.e., the didactical theory.<sup>4</sup>

Thus, it seems that the equilibrium and relevance of a didactical theory also largely depend on whether a thinker can create a harmonious unity among the contributions which these two sources of knowledge make to his/her structure in his/her descriptions and interpretations.

Here it is important to emphasize, again, that when a person considers the meaning of contents, ultimately this is a private matter, a specific interpretation of the coherence of contents and the course of one's participation in the reality of educating. The entirety of experiencing offers itself to the study of form, as it appears universally among persons, for a reduction to essences (categories) by which they can appear on the life horizon of a learning person. Therefore, form is a matter of original structures for implementation which arises from the lifeworld which includes the reality of educating.

This form gives the first indications, the first possibilities of the expectation that didactic practice can be established in situations other than the original one of educating. This insight into the coherence of original or primary (family) and second order practice (the school) is a precondition for constructing a didactical theory which, as a theory, clings to reality. Understanding of and designing for a second order practice are not possible unless the original practice is viewed and understood in its essences. Therefore, a didactical theory for the ground-forms of teaching must return to the original reality of teaching with an attempt to view it for the purpose of establishing a second order practice.

It is only logical that, first and foremost, a didactician must consider the form which original experiencing shows before working through to selecting and structuring complexes of contents which must be mastered by learning persons, even in a broader context, and in terms of his/her life and worldview. His/her findings regarding the issue of content eventually come to fruition mainly through his/her curriculum theory, the compilation of curricula and later a teacher's lesson plan as part of a plan of work. Thus, ultimately a curriculum includes religious views, as a person's most valuable heritage, but also cultural goods, skills, etc. as contents in terms of which educative aims must be realized. [Also, it is understandable that

Afrikaners jealously protect their Christian-Protestant heritage, their language treasure, their historical development as pronounced Western people—their identity.]

But these views do not apply to form because a didactical form appears as a *universal* human way of being in the world, of participating in human events, realizing educative aims, actualizing a teaching intention to determine (through contents) a *specific* relationship with the whole of reality (God, man, culture, civilization, techniques, etc.). Thus, in the history of educating, there is a continual interpretation of content which then must be realized in a (sometimes) one-sided emphasis of form (school system). This [kind of] formal explication constitutes the greatest part of the history of didactical pedagogics.

In descriptions, form is conspicuously directed to the *ways* in which a person inhabits the world, while the content aspects establish *beacons* in terms of which a person makes a dwelling on earth. Any didactical theory, thus, searches for equilibrium between these two matters in establishing a practice as a matter of making a future. Any didactical theory is a thinking ahead to or anticipating a practice. As far as the Republic of South Africa and its scientific practice, its teacher preparation, and its universities and schools are concerned, I believe this relationship of form and content is an important matter precisely because it makes possible a theoretical interception of currently urgent practical issues.

If one now were to proceed to study didactic ground-forms in a specific practice, this means that the search for *fundamentalia* [essences] cannot avoid the task of saying something about one or another learning phenomenon from his/her perspective on the reality of educating. Thus, a didactician does not write a theory about the phenomenon of learning as such, but interprets and integrates insights from each of the other disciplines into his/her own problem (e.g., from psychopedagogics). Hence, a didactician does not write a theory about the possibility of the phenomenon of learning in pedagogical terms.

The origin of his/her questions and interpretations is the original reality (*didaskhein*) to which he/she directs him/herself such that



his/her perspective on learning is his/her own. After all, the effect of his/her practice must be visible mainly in the act of learning. With respect to his/her conclusions about form and content, his/her practice is attuned to learning as a way of being human, especially becoming adult. Teaching is a matter of letting [someone] learn, of calling someone to open him/herself to reality, i.e., to the contents of a lifeworld. Thus, the act of learning is a precondition for the possibility for teaching practice, it announces the meaning of teaching (educating) *as such*, and it establishes the never ending becoming of a person's participation in the world. Unlocking reality only makes sense if entry into that reality is possible.

It would be difficult to deny that learning is an original way of being in the world of a knowing person. Whatever statements psychologists also can present about learning, their views always and in all respects are predisposed by the fact that learning is a way of being. Whoever wants to eradicate these boundaries in a layered or regional ontology, this fundamental statement presents insurmountable problems, precisely because the distinction between consciousness and self-consciousness in human learning becomes most evident as a way of participating in the world.

This issue is not relevant here, except in the sense that, as a way of being in the world and becoming aware of oneself, it has the following important didactical consequence: to establish the extent to which learning is an expression of original experiencing, so designing a practice can include it for the sake of the highest possible (aspirational) effect of teaching.

I do not believe it is irresponsible to claim that when a didactician expresses him/herself about learning, this is not a completely foreign field to him/her. The phenomenon of learning (here the fact that a child learns) is an area of knowledge which, in terms of didactical categories and criteria, also partly belongs to didactics. In his/her theory building, a didactician has the task of drawing conclusions about this matter from his/her perspective without which he/she cannot fulfill his/her practice. Undoubtedly, in a general sense, the phenomenon of learning is a task of educating and, thus, also an area of study for pedagogics.

As far as didactical theory is concerned, therefore, it is not contentious content because educating cannot be realized without teaching. If a didactician wanted to consciously express him/herself about entering reality, or a “let learn” perspective of his/her field, and ultimately wanted to make designs for this, he/she could not and should not avoid the theme “learning”. The fact that here psychopedagogics works side by side and together with didactics, both in orienting and accompanying ways, is fruitful and fertilizing for both a theoretical approach and a practical realization of the didactic profession.

The meaning of a didactician’s inquiry into learning, as an expression of original experiencing, must be understood to be able to give an account of the category “opening oneself to reality”, i.e., entering reality, an appeal to learn, an anticipatory design of situations in which an intention to learn can be realized as optimally as possible in all its diversity.

If one looks strictly from formal didactical thinking to the phenomenon of learning, as a form of manifesting original experiencing, as a matter of opening oneself to reality, one sees that its meaning is sought in the fact that a learning person is continually placed in a successive series of situations. This statement applies to the reality of educating as a primary source of knowledge imitated formally in a school situation. The pedagogical meaning of these series of situations, nevertheless, lies in accelerating an entry into reality (learning) by consistently calling for it. Thus, a child is placed in a series of situations by which educating, in effect, has surpassed the structure of the original lifeworld.

Thus, a *situation* has been established which assumes that the sense of reality is inherent in an *interpretation* of it by an adult. In this way, the coherence of forms and content during this series of situations is accepted experientially. Undoubtedly, in the reality of educating, one assumes a meaningful reality which is disclosed for someone who must learn it. In fact, this is the reason he/she was put in this situation. If this seems like a simplistic explanation of the reality of educating, one must consider its consequences before drawing conclusions.

To be placed in a situation also means there must be action, i.e., demands are made in terms of which the series of situations take their course. Thus, a situation does not only appeal to or address; it is so constituted that it makes demands of a child. Now, one knows that, in the ordinary course of living (which also is nothing but a series of situations), a child also is seized, e.g., in a play situation, even to such an extent that he/she forgets everything else and doesn't notice when they move past him/her. The details of the situation are what is central. His/her interest, attending, thinking, perceiving, etc. are fixated in an absolute sense: he/she is so with things that they become part of him/her. In a formal series of situations, an adult tries to imitate this condition; to make contents of learning, as an expression of original experiencing, so available that a child will assimilate them into him/herself.

Therefore, an adult literally expects a pupil to grasp a piece of reality which seldom, if ever, can be presented in its demanding *sense*. Also, it is important to note that an adult should be aware that a situation, as a *type* in the lifeworld, will come to light, especially in accordance with the contents of a child's original experiencing. This typology of a series of situations is so close to the didactic ground-forms that it should not be overlooked. A teacher cannot help but be aware that a situation (as such), which has appeared in original experiencing, is unrepeatable. The reconstitution, i.e., its imitation, is a *new* situation with a new task, especially a learning task, and a teacher looks for an act of learning as the realization of new experiencing analogous to the *ways* in which learning was actualized in original experiencing. How then could the problem of modes of learning be ignored in writing a didactical theory?

Since any situation is unrepeatable, necessarily, every situation in which a pupil is consciously placed must be new. The demand made is that he/she will properly participate in it. Thus, if one says that a child must enter the piece of reality offered, learning becomes an imperative matter. A child *can* and *must (should)* [enter it and learn]. The moment one perceives this imperative as real (essential) and takes up forming a theory, this means that an adult throws overboard the issue of the propriety of human learning. In doing

so, the act of learning is interpreted from the world of educating and, in theory forming, it is proclaimed to be a pedagogical matter.

The implication for didactic-pedagogical theory building is obvious. This is summarized as follows: Given the imperative character of human situatedness and the continual placement of a child in a series of new situations, the pedagogical meaning of learning, or entering reality, or opening oneself to reality is a task for didactical theory by which it becomes a matter of propriety, in an educative sense, and must be realized in a teaching situation.

The issue of learning cannot be left out of any pedagogical discipline without doing violence to the reality of educating. Actualizing “being in the world” certainly is an educative task, first and foremost. Such actualization is not possible without the act of learning, so such an act demands to be considered in each perspective on the phenomenon of learning. Thus, didactic-pedagogical theory forming must be aware that the totality of these insights into a practice in which all the facets assumed in didactic preparation are actualized as optimally as possible.

Thus, this issue directs an appeal to didactical theory building. The following matters are of importance if one wants to put learning, as a form of expression of a child’s original “being in the world” into didactic perspective. Reflecting on the original experiencing of a child in terms of the first ontological category of “being in the world” assumes that this involvement of a child with reality is a meaningful matter. Reflecting on meaninglessness predisposes the idea of leaving this world as soon as possible.<sup>5</sup>

This meaningful participation with reality speaks strongly to the fundamental pedagogical category of futurity and future expectation. This future expectation manifests itself as the event of “educating”, as giving meaning to a piece of human experiencing which we refer to as educating. With this, the original sense of teaching is relevant *ipso facto*. No one can educate about nothing and as soon as something (the content of educating) comes to light, teaching announces itself as a trend in actualization.

Thus, one can state that teaching recapitulates original experiencing, and incorporates its forms into a systematic learning to know reality. This systematic learning to know reality proclaims the didactic imperative: The *actual* matter of teaching is educating. This actual reality of a person in the reality of educating is seen as a dynamic coherence of learning (self-actualization) and letting learn, or teaching (guided actualization) of lived experienced meaning.<sup>6</sup>

2. The meaning of teaching which, in its essence, has been described as realizing educating, surely is in its pedagogic intervention in a child's situation with respect to his/her way through the world. Thus, "didaskhein" makes a special contribution to shaping a child's original experiencing in that it creates a climate and space for actualizing potentialities such that a child's original being-there shows itself and can become visible in effective learning. As such, teaching also is a field of realizing future expectations which, in a pedagogical sense, always are addressed. In the last consequence, teaching also is about fulfilling future expectations, if one speaks about the course of time.

Hence, teaching is the realization of future aim-, relationship-, and sequence-tendencies, as found in pedagogic events. If this is accepted, one can make two inferences, taking the entirety of the preceding argument:

a) Teaching gives form to the profound intervention of an educator. This intervention previously was described as accompanying actions of the task of actualizing "being in the world".

b) Teaching gives form to the participation in the lifeworld which a child simply must embody, the entry into reality as a self-guiding activity of the task of actualizing "being in the world".

It is important to note that these two action tendencies largely constitute the reality of educating. Original experiencing (education) speaks strongly to the form which "letting learn" and "learning" take. A didactician creates a situation (guided actualization) in which a child can act (self-actualization) such that, increasingly, he/she can display the image of a person (formal and lived experienced image). This formal and substantive [content]

intervention links up with a person's original life forms in which "being in the world" is made visible, with the aim of providing the opportunity for becoming – in fact, accelerating it – the pedagogical "engagement").

The last realization which a didactic act strives for is to give form to a child's original, created way of being in the world. After all, a didactician cannot hope that something else will help give form to it, because there is nothing else which can do so. The way this occurs is by the modes of learning. Thus, a parent or teacher lets a child loose into reality by presenting a "provisional", harmless reality. Now, he/she can actualize human ways of being by learning. On the other hand, teaching also provides original points of fixation by which a learned person comes to both a spontaneous and a formal ordering of the lifeworld.

Whenever there is teaching, it is inconceivable that all of reality suddenly can pass in front of a child. Hence, an educator chooses certain points of fixation from the original lifeworld with respect to which an ordering of the lifeworld by a learned person emerges. This ordering of the lifeworld to a "world for me" can be described didactically as the first evidence of a learning effect, the first and most important step in mastering life reality. The ordering presented by an educator (if effective) leads to one's *own* ordering and, thus, to emancipation. Certainly, the significance of this is that an experienced person now can bring the everyday interferences with reality to a state of coagulation which, as a lived experienced learning effect, is available for constituting a new reality, in the sense of one's "own world" (Eigenwelt).

The coherent interacting of the two moments "teaching" and "learning" makes possible a meaningful and feasible continuation of didactic practice in a school. The connection a teacher establishes in his/her didactic designs regarding teaching and learning, ensures that an adult can keep a child with him/her until he/she him/herself *wants to* leave -- that a child will not be driven away in an untimely way into a reality where he/she cannot find him/herself as a person. *On the level of teaching, adults make their final loosening from the next generation.*

The image which has been constructed so far (now, in a didactical sense) presents a new, although specific problem for creating a didactical theory: Is *all* experiencing (going into, undergoing, participating in reality) an issue of learning? Is all childlike self-actualization worthy of the guidance of an adult? When a child is offered unconditional freedom on both a pathic and cognitive level, there can be no question of pedagogic-didactic intervention through guidance.

I believe the problem of didactical theory building currently is highlighted very clearly from psychopedagogics, where the relief, at least as a didactical silhouette, becomes very clear, in the sense that the perspective on the problem becomes clear.<sup>7</sup> This unraveling perhaps will be clearer to a reader by two hypotheses which will give him/her the opportunity to conceive [the problem] further and, especially in psychopedagogical terms.

The first hypothesis is: Although all experiencing does not make visible a *conscious* act of learning as such, learning (as fundamental) necessarily appears whenever experiencing comes to light. For a good understanding, this can be compared to Langeveld's well-known exposition of a pedagogically preformed field, as it becomes evident in a relationship between educator and child. This association is not educating as such, but it includes all possible preconditions, whether in agreeing or intervening (Landman) [with a child]. For example, lived experiencing joy, as an experiential diversity, based on an experience, has all conditions for the act of learning; the act of learning will be carried out in such situations.

Thus, in this respect, experiencing is a preformed field for the act of learning and, as a way of being, it already appears, although pathically, as a constituent of the anticipated teaching. As a preformed field for the act of learning, experiencing, therefore, is a design task for didactical theory, especially considering (1) above.

A second hypothesis is the following: The didactical is not attuned entirely to conscious learning and cannot claim the designation

“design” if the situation created also does not provide for an experiential-pathic preformed field with a view to a learning effect. One also speaks of such planning as creating a favorable learning climate. This includes the tasks of safety (security) and accepting [a child] by showing respect for dignity. Currently, it is evident beyond any doubt that both in general psychology and psychopedagogics that learning is actualized on both a pathic as well as cognitive level, as well as in a nonconscious and conscious sense.<sup>8</sup>

Statements about perceiving, remembering, thinking, etc. confirm these judgments. If a didactician stares blindly at conscious, cognitive learning in building his/her theory, his/her view of his/her problem becomes one-sided and rigid. The shortcomings of his/her insights regarding his/her analysis of intentionality, i.e., will have lamentable value in his/her ultimate designs. This problem has been considered fully in the above reasoning.

Theses and antitheses which flow from the above hypotheses necessarily lead to a synthesis showing that, indeed, teaching provides a thorough and broad line for experiencing *as such*. The only conclusion possible for didactical theory building is that original experiencing necessarily is actualized in an act of learning, even when it is not consciously, concretely visible in a learning result, because a learning effect is not traceable only to intellectual achievement, and because achieving does imply only the intellectual.

From a didactical perspective, this does not imply that “original experiencing” and “learning” are complementary concepts: Indeed, they presume each other, and no theory building can be thought of as separate from each other. Original experiencing, whatever its nature, continually manifests itself or appears in learning moments, also in aspects which one would not normally describe as learning because, in the learning world, sometimes they are referred to as *affective* and as such, are thought of apart from learning situations to get hold of them from other perspectives.<sup>9</sup>

Therefore, any teaching is based on experiencing, also in the sense that pathic structures can block the effectiveness of its course



because some children find a breakthrough from the pathic to the gnostic difficult and, here teaching must function as providing help. Fear, dismay, despondency, lethargy all are everyday experiential dispositions which speak decisively in a classroom regarding the teaching effect for which a didactician strives. A learning act already appears here, among other ways, as broken intention [to learn] destroys a didactic design which does not consider this.

A teacher's overpowering disappointment in such situations probably is the best evidence of this, also because his/her (a teacher's) original teaching tendency "being in the world" can be destroyed momentarily, while his/her own dismay easily blocks further insight, and a renewed teaching intention. A pathic experiential context is a prelude for all people, especially children. As a prelude to actualizing original experiencing in teaching situations, it is of fundamental significance and, therefore, also of fundamental importance in constructing a didactical theory.

The effect of a teaching situation on these matters ultimately is found in giving meaning, rather than in cognitive achievement. This argument is closely related to the argument that the act of learning is a way of being. Because here we are dealing with a way of being, we also are involved in possibilities for implementing teaching. In fact, acquiring or attaining a learning effect thereby becomes an implementation task, even when certain aspects of original experiencing are not referred to as learning acts and learning effects as such. The consequence for didactical insight is that a teaching effect cannot be measured only by cognitive learning achievement.

The importance of a gnostic breakthrough is on the level of accounting. Experiencing now remains in its framework of meaning (point of departure): I am placed in the world. It is in this respect that, in today's didactical theory, the didactic obligation is raised: To move a child to delimit his/her being-there (being in the world) and, ultimately to verbalize it. The incomplete composition of didactical theory, with respect to the entirety of the above-mentioned matters, is striking to anyone familiar with it.

The details of this and of the preceding paragraph confront didactical theory with real attuned tasks to also account, in its reducing, a teaching effect, in view of the stated problems, with the aim of designing effective teaching and learning, respectively. “Entering reality” certainly acquires new points of view in terms of this. And because reductions necessarily must verbalize reality, if this also is a matter of concepts which must have pedagogical relevance.

So far, didactical reductions probably have stripped away any superfluous aspects of experiencing which do not contribute to insight into its problems. On the other hand, it is equally striking that some essences remain in effect with reductions, thereby lessening the structures of didactical theory becoming impoverished and obscured or narrowed in its scope. In this regard, one must understand well that psychopedagogical categories of learning must be fulfilled so that they function in a constituted situation without violating original experiencing as such, through teaching.

Didacticians will have to realize that their task primarily is not to support a point of view or put a structure into practice in such a way that they are made absolute and become a system. Searching for one’s own perspective implies much more than this: With respect to a teaching and learning effect, a theory must lead to one’s own field of vision with its own relief. As consequences for didactical theory building, the following matters are deduced from the foregoing, especially with an eye to further research and thought.

1. The act known as teaching is continually repeated. This does not apply to a situation *as* situation, also not to contents as contents. The latter always is involved because the act, as it is evident in original experiencing is knowable and describable. Outside the view which provides original experiencing there is no teaching effect because events do not occur other than in accordance with original [experiencing].
2. A situation within which the act occurs is always unique and, thus, is unrepeatable. In accordance with this *type*, it is repeated

for the sake of actualizing a learning intention such that there is a didactical view of a stream of actualization.

3. A situational stream originates in the spontaneous, naïve mobility of a person in educating as actualizing original experiencing in the act of learning, by which especially the sense of formal teaching can be postulated. Teaching strives for greater mobility, i.e., original experiencing as a learning effect is judged to be incomplete in educating which is radical. By teaching, spontaneous, existential mobility, thus, is brought to the surface faster and more securely for the sake of wider scope and (qualitatively speaking) greater security in life. This applies both to pathic and gnostic facets of experiencing.

4. A didactical perspective on the act of learning, as actualizing original experiencing, is not possible unless the following matters are carefully considered:

a) *Intentionality and actualizing an intention to learn.* In this, a learning person becomes aware of the things surrounding him and a didactician is called to design accountably. Here “becoming aware” must be interpreted as a complex, existing being rather than as an intellectual, intellectualized, or intellectualizing being. Thus, the visibility of a learning act as a new realization of original experiencing thus is not reducible to a purely intellectual achievement. In a didactic situation, primarily we are dealing with an existing person who is presumed to be more than a “knowing person”. Still, life achievement remains the last effect which is sought both in the teaching and learning aspects of educating. One finds the highest effect of learning in a person’s disclosure of the coherence of all the matters to which an experienced person arrives. This reflects the learning nature of experiencing.

b) *Coherence.* A learning person must come to a certain ordering with respect to the coherence of contents which loom in the lifeworld and actualize them as a life form of original experiencing. Thus, by giving meaning to reality, a person’s intentionality becomes inspired. No child can evade this task because he cannot evade reality. Therefore, learning means an actualization of the

original (one's own) life form which is made explicit in formal teaching.

c) *Contrasting*. A learning child's approach to reality is possible because of contrasts, the dissimilar, the odd, the contrasting, and differentiated image which reality presents. Herein lies a field of actualization (in contrast to self-actualizing) with respect to which a learning act, as a way of being, can be actualized in both guided-actualizing and self-actualizing ways. In other words, intentionalities, and coherences are available for disclosing and unlocking [reality] so that an educative aim can be formulated.

Regarding theory building, this paves the way to address more closely the problem of unlocking reality (the task of teaching) from the perspective of a lesson structure.

<sup>1</sup> Oberholzer, Landman, Gouws, Roos, Kilian, Sonnekus, Pretorius, Van Dyk, to mention only a few.

<sup>2</sup> *Die Verhoudingstrukture van die Pedagogiese Situasië in Psigopedagogiese Perspektief*. (U.P. Publikasiereeks No. 59, 1971).

<sup>3</sup> Brenzinka, W.: *Erziehung als Lebenshilfe*.

<sup>4</sup> In this connection, see the statements of W. A. Landman: *Die Onderwyser as Begryper van Opvoeding*. Presentation delivered at the Pretoria Teachers College. Sept. 1971.

<sup>5</sup> There are such people but society views them as a remediation task. A Didactical theory for such persons lies outside of the possible conditions for a strictly normal pedagogical approach.

<sup>6</sup> These formulations are from Prof. M. C. H. Sonnekus, University of Pretoria. The author believes that thereby he has struck a major blow to the traditional separation of psycho- and didactic-pedagogical perspectives on the phenomenon of learning.

<sup>7</sup> The author wants to give special recognition to his colleagues in psychopedagogics, Prof. M. C. H. Sonnekus and his collaborators who made their own preliminary research insights freely available in this regard. Discussions on this theme shed much light on general and particular structures that are of great importance to didactical theory building.

<sup>8</sup> In this regard, compare the included literature with the following names in the bibliography: Van Parerren, Langeveld, Sonnekus, Eigler, Strunz, Binswanger, , Van den Berg, Buytendijk, Pretorius, Gous, Heidegger, Klafki, A. Flitner, Schiefele. Their explanations are of explicit or implicit relevance.

<sup>9</sup> Compare *The Affective Contact* (International Congress for Psychotherapy, Leiden, 1951). Particularly the contributions of Rumke, Brenkmann, Netzger, Frankl.