

## CHAPTER 2

### THE PROBLEMATIC OF “DIDASKEIN”

It is logical and realistic to accept that the didactical problematic is related to a manifold of factors of the times. In the previous chapter it is indicated that some didacticians maintain that didactic activity is largely determined by the times and everything related to it. Although this standpoint is not acceptable as a ground for didactical theory, since the event has appeared and still appears everywhere and always between persons, it is a timeless universal on the horizon of human life. Still, it is difficult to refute the fact that didactic emphases, demands, and expectations which must be met change as eras come and go in human history.

The emphases of didactic tasks of a rural-agrarian milieu (Middle Ages) necessarily are different from those of an industrializing large city (Industrial Revolution). How and where these two apparent extremes of “didaskhein” eventually broach each other is treated later. The fact is, the exposition of a general-didactical problematic is correlated with time, while its original, fundamental structure can be shown theoretically to be a universal matter not bound to time.

The consequence is simple: the ways an origin is made visible in a period\* does not mean its original structure has changed, but the practical pattern by an apparently modified emphasis, acquires a different relief which inclines one to think we have to do with a change in structure, while, in fact, it is a question of manifestations in modified or new situations, new tasks which must be implemented, new problems which must be managed.

Now a worldwide deficit is that teachers force a matter which appears to be a modified didactical structure, by hastily implementing undeveloped modes of teaching, to bridge this deficit or to make its effect less tangible. Programmed instruction, the implementation of television and calculators to try to guarantee, to

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\* Visibility is influenced by life circumstances, religious beliefs, economic practices, state and civic organizations, prosperity, social norms and habits, etc.

some extent, the course of the teaching situation are not fundamental interventions, i.e., they are not structural changes of “*didaskhein*”. The same holds for a variety of other aspects, among which are training teaching, as a social auxiliary service, bringing about new types of schools, etc. which really represent branches at the end of the didactic line and are not fundamental regarding the original intervention.

Considering the kaleidoscopic nature of the practical situation, to try to acquire a grasp of this problematic, the theoretical didactician is forced to proceed to order and select, insert, and delete, to verbalize this matter, and to converse with others about it. What follows are some essential aspects of the didactical problematic which I hope lead to *fundamentalia* by attempting, in this way (i.e., from the particular to the general, from practice to the theoretical) to provide an answer to the origin of “*didaskhein*” which everyone must understand wherever and whenever they venture into the practical situation of the teaching event.

#### A. THE TIME-CONCRETE IMPERATIVE

In each era there is a definite relationship between a valid idea or expectation of teaching and a time-concrete imperative which is bound together with the state of educating in a community. The idea of teaching stems from the naïve and spontaneous involvements continually created between themselves and surrounding matters and persons, and which eventually are crystallized into certain expectations and even claims which are transferred from the practice of educating to the teaching situation.

This teaching situation is constituted in a variety of generally recognized practices. The school certainly is the most important, but it is supplemented by matters such as employment training for future trades, conscription in the military sphere, categorical teaching in church and youth organization work. Also, the idea and expectation of teaching strive for completeness in form and contents, and the spontaneous continued participation of youth in the totality of life obligations is sought.

The parents, as natural educators, seldom give a formal, deliberate account of their intentions in this regard because their knowledge is constituted and delimited by their own experiencing. However, they do have an identifiable notion that the eventual adulthood of their children is related to their teaching, broadly speaking, and there is a demand to consider both the parental home and other instances of teaching. This accounting is manifested in the time-concrete imperative of life circumstances and demands which are most clearly expressed in the greater society outside the home.

Irrespective of who the child is and whatever family he comes from, society (including occupation, state, church, association and club life, social conventions) makes demands which are not allowed to be rejected. The harmony usually created in teaching between the expectations fostered in the home and the demands made by the general society represents the state of educating of a community. Thus, the harmony proclaims educating (within which teaching is included) as valid, adequate, and balanced. The more complex the societal situation, the more demands are placed on educating in the home, and the greater the expectations fostered in the home (parents) by community teaching institutions. Therefore, it is not surprising that as teaching is manifested in various aspects in a variety of institutions. it is the fulcrum where society will or will not attain a balance between potential and prognosis. If one would test such an explanation in the practical situation itself, perhaps the extension of formal teaching offers a good example, especially as is shown in past decades. The initial ideal of general formative teaching was limited to the primary school. It was the ideal of each Western nation that every child receive at least 8 years of general formative teaching, by which the time-concrete imperatives of the so-called Second Industrial Revolution could, to some degree, be brought into balance. For many years, this first general expectation was viewed as satisfied and in accord with maintaining the development of the structure of society. With increasing industrialization and the related rise of the large city, a balanced state of educating was brought about. This was the situation until and during World War II. Changes came after this war. Increasing specialization, automatization, new control over reality, changes in lifestyle, first the individual, later the community, and still later the whole nation, necessitated in this period an adjustment of the balance in the state of educating. A consequence is that general

formative teaching was extended. Where previously the primary school was the public school, in the middle of the 1950's and 1960's, the secondary school laid claim to the same title. The entire primary school population was to spend at least three more years in the secondary schools, in accordance with the expectations of teaching held by the home, as well as society in the new situation.

However, relatively quickly, this addition to general formative teaching was inadequate. In contemporary times, in all developed countries there is thorough talk of at least a twelve-year teaching structure following the principle of differentiation and will be compulsory for all pupils because the balance of the state of educating, according to present day expectations and demands, cannot be met without it. Also, there is an attempt to transfer the greatest number of youths from the secondary school for continued instruction in universities and other institutions of higher education, for the simple reason that the secondary school no longer can hold in balance the overflowing tempo and related societal demands.

Many implicated didactical problems flow from this which, contemporarily, are so actual they implicate the whole of theoretical didactics. This is somewhat understandable: the need brings a pragmatic focus with it, and the pragmatic is not primarily interested in fundamental theoretical questions. Therefore, theoretically, simple slices are made from the actuality of a problem which hides the origins and, thus, the criterion of success is a linear cancer to a didactical utopia comparable to what is created by a large industry. Therefore, didacticians waste away their birthright for a pot of lentil soup which, perhaps, temporarily keeps the wolf from the door, but then the eventuality of their practice is not brought within their field of vision. Programmed instruction, perhaps, is one of the best examples of this.

Hence, it is not surprising that the general-didactical problematic is seen in inquiries about talent, optimal realization of potential, a re-delimiting of learning areas, an increase in testing expectations and standards, research into cybernetics to construct learning models which, in mechanistic and determined ways, will be realizable, the implementing of techniques, refining and bending technological

principles by which “didaskhein” is absorbed, in a comparable way, in the methods of a large industry; all are possible without him/her being conscious of this.

Thus, in the search for the problematic of “didaskhein”, it seems meaningful to return to the coordinated pedagogical disciplines to see what they can offer for disclosing the didactical problematic. This is especially meaningful because the didactician must not unravel problems which, in their foundation, are isolated from his/her pedagogical perspective and, therefore, are not one-sidedly elucidated didactically, and which can be successfully taken up in a practical performance. As a science, the pedagogical is not reducible to didactics and, although many authors have broached this theme in various important respects, in an explication such as this, it cannot be avoided.

## **B. THE OTHER PEDAGOGICAL PERSPECTIVES AND “DIDASKEIN”**

Considerations of the significance of the other pedagogical disciplines for didactical pedagogics especially include two important tasks, in so far as they co-constitute the didactical problematic.

For the student of modern pedagogics, it must be noted there are a variety of perspectives on the educative phenomenon, all of which can contribute to help complete a didactical pedagogical perspective. This does not mean that the didactical problematic is constituted by the totality of problems raised by the other pedagogical disciplines. As does each of the disciplines, didactical pedagogics has its own autonomy, implying that it has a problematic of its own. As a matter of the pedagogical, the relief of the didactical problematic can assume an impossible form, or if the didactician refuses to see the implicit logic of each other perspective, being pedagogical in nature, co-illuminates and, therefore, co-defines the description of his/her problematic.

Under this motivation, one can delimit somewhat the two matters mentioned above to which the didactical pedagogue must attend:

In the first place, there must be an explication of the relevance of another discipline for the development of didactical thinking in designing a didactical theory. Consequently, the didactician must acquire structural clarity about what contributions such a discipline makes to illuminating the didactic event and, thus, to sorting out didactic problems.

In the second place, the didactician must be able to scientifically interpret didactically these insights from other perspectives in terms of his/her own problematic and, in a regressive as well as progressive way, indicate the pedagogical line in his/her theoretical designs. Understandably, this line must eventually result in a teaching practice which, by consistent argument, implies the explications of other pedagogical disciplines have ontological and logical relevance for designing and establishing a didactic practice.

1. ***Fundamental pedagogics:*** The charge of fundamental pedagogics is to scientifically disclose and describe the structure of educating as it appears in the reality of educating and in a philosophy of life. When considered historically, pedagogics is still practiced as a part-discipline of philosophy, understandably, with respect to the scientific character of the matter, this aspect is at least as old as Philosophy itself. The history of philosophy shows that, since Plato and Aristotle, there are regularly philosophical pronouncements and fundamental commentary on the structure of educating. Because this commentary is about an actual practice, a piece of life experience which everywhere and always can be observed with persons, necessarily have implications for that practice with which the pronouncements deal.

Therefore, one should make a comprehensive and in-depth study of these general philosophical explications of educative practice and, on this basis, do relatively accurate research (in a historical sense) on the relevance of such explications for teaching practice. After all, educating is continually realized in teaching, and the meaning of teaching is rooted in educating as such. But this matter is precisely the task of fundamental pedagogics which, without working eclectically, is continually involved in interpreting pedagogically general philosophical explications of an anthropological, axiological,

ethical, ontological, and logical nature, and evaluating their relevance in accordance with reality and a philosophy of life.

Thus, the didactician must evaluate each of the mentioned aspects from fundamental pedagogics, historically, contemporarily, or prospectively, and interpret them for a p practice (teaching). It is not the aim of the didactician to take the tasks of the fundamental pedagogician out of his/her hands and interpret them in an original pedagogical sense.

But this is not what usually happens. The usual course of matters is that didacticians entirely ignore these fundamental pronouncements about the pedagogical phenomenon, as expounded in fundamental pedagogics, and believe these pronouncements illuminate a theory which has little or no relevance for teaching practice and, therefore, do not deserve attention didactically. For the development of the science, and the contributions the didactician must make to that development, such an attitude can have only one consequence: an attenuation of the perspective corresponding to the appraisal of the other pedagogical disciplines. What, in this respect, is valid for fundamental pedagogics is valid for every other discipline with respect to what a didactician can deliberately isolate in developing his/her theory.

The comprehensiveness of considering such an exposition makes it relatively meaningless to try, in an introductory discussion such as this, to discuss the total relevance of the other part-disciplines for designing a didactical theory. Here, justice cannot be done to the scope and depth of the issue. This, however, is a future area of study for the didactician and, therefore, one, perhaps, should acquire an indication of a few matters via examples which can serve as a motivation for the mentioned postulates and standpoints.

From the fundamental pronouncements of South African thinkers such as Oberholzer, Landman, Van Zyl, Kilian, Roos, Gunter, and Liebenberg, ontologically a categorical structure of educating as a phenomenon is possible because these categories disclose the essences of the experiencing as it arises in the lifeworld. These categories, then, are illuminative means of thinking by which the phenomenon of educating appears as what it really and essentially

is. Each ontological grounding claims to agree with reality, in this case the reality of educating. The extent to which fundamental pedagogics makes grounded pronouncements is shown to be beyond any doubt by Landman and Liebenberg, among others.

Here, perhaps, it serves as sufficient motivation to indicate that one cannot educate with respect to nothing; that the “something” in educating is contents; thus, educating is actualized in teaching contents with the consequence that fundamental pronouncements about educating necessarily have relevance for the teaching event. It is factually impossible for the didactician to deny this relationship, i.e., that these fundamental –pedagogical pronouncements have didactical significance and ought to be interpreted didactically in designing a didactical theory because they have relevance for practice (teaching).

But also, in the following respect, Landman, in his fundamental exposition, has already written pronouncements which, perhaps, one day when a historical perspective on such things arises, can be of great value. He indicates, e.g., in the unfolding educative event, there are aim-, relationship- and sequence-structures.

This pronouncement strikes like the blow of a hammer in designing a didactical theory. Perhaps this is explained in terms of two accepted didactical categories, i.e., “relationality” and “constituting”. The teaching event, even as such, cannot be imagined without a definite aim, relationship, and sequence. For example, where a relationship is lacking between teacher and pupil, teaching simply will not occur because authority will be absent. Where authority is lacking in teaching knowledge (which, indeed, is a matter of authority) will not be put in relief. With this, the trust between teacher and pupil, and the learning aim will remain out of reach. Thus, the pedagogical guarantee of the sequence [course] of the situation deteriorates. Then, teaching has not been actualized.

Landman’s fundamental-pedagogical description of the relationship-structures as relationships of authority, understanding, and trust cannot be thought away from the event we know as “*didaskhein*”. If one should think this away, teaching in its essence also is thought away. Now, the didactician considers the theoretical unfolding of a

matter such as the lesson structure, and the same holds precisely for the fundamental-pedagogical sequence structure.

In the sequence structure of the event of educating, Landman as well as Kilian disclose the following pedagogical moments: association, encounter, taking responsibility for relationships (engagement), and intervention.

Without lessening the significance of the other moments, I specifically refer to engagement and its didactical significance, with the expectation that the motivation mentioned above will come clearly to the fore. Directly from the French language, the word “engagement”, in English, literally means “to assume your obligation”.

At this stage, unlocking reality and stepping up to reality, as two basic didactical matters, cannot be gone into fully without the idea of engagement. Where children are involved in a lesson situation, pedagogical engagement does not speak alone during the educative event, but it also greatly determines the sequence [course] of the situation itself. The sense of the lesson structure, and everything accompanying it, are largely made visible through the quality of the engagement; for example, the readiness of the teacher to assume his/her obligation as a teacher in a true sense.

The same holds for the child him/herself giving meaning in the learning activity, i.e., in his/her stepping up to reality. Through the interconnected sequence offered by engagement, with respect to unlocking reality and stepping up to reality, one notices the constituting, as a matter of judging and a learning effect in the sequence of the didactic situation. The theoretical consequence for didactics is obvious: This averts all haphazard, non-aim directed, not responsible participation in a teaching practice, particularly concerning the adult. The didactic-pedagogical appeal is a matter of engagement and brings the didactic event into motion. It offers a didactic course [sequence].

To deny the relevance of fundamental pedagogics for designing a didactical theory, and for illuminating the didactical problematic

really means to try to think away the reality of teaching, specifically its educative connotations.

**2. *Psychopedagogics*:** The exposition regarding the significance of fundamental pedagogics for unfolding and understanding the didactical problematic is offered by way of examples introducing a few categories and criteria. In the same way, one should disclose the significance of psychopedagogics for unfolding and understanding the didactical problematic in terms of, among others, the category “stepping up to reality” (learning), and the criterion “perspectivity”.

In an eventually comprehensive exposition of the relevance of a psychopedagogical perspective for didactical theory construction, such an approach should be indispensable. After all, the connection of “learning” and “letting learn” with the resulting expected change (as acquiring perspective) is obvious, and a denial of such a connection is difficult, however categorical this postulation might sound.

When, at this stage, I do not choose such an approach for the explication, it is not because it is less important or not of as much relevance as another approach. I have indicated that a meaningful possibility for settling these relations lies in an exemplary approach which, as a matter of fact, to some extent is an indication of the fundamentals and, *ipso facto*, ought to have an equal relevance as an approach in the case of the psychopedagogical.

To broaden the perspective, I choose another way to show the extent of the relationship in this regard, and possible accusations of ambiguity regarding intercepting and putting aside categories and criteria. Thus, I proceed from the lesson structure to show, from another angle, how meaningful psychopedagogical research and pronouncements are manifested in the search for the “didactic” of didactical pedagogics.

In more than one respect, the lesson structure is the result, eventuality of a didactical theory. The use of the concept “structure”, with respect to a lesson, indicates the didactician must make an accountable pronouncement about what a lesson is, based

on his/her findings, because the lesson structure makes the perspective of his/her theory not only observable but also realizable. To the extent that didactical theory is a reflection about a practice, with the aim of actualizing a practice, the responsibility contained in the concept “lesson structure” must literally arise in the course of activity of the teaching situation.

Thus viewed, the question of a lesson structure is not a matter of expectation, but one of actualization. However, to understand the significance of psychopedagogics for unfolding a lesson structure, there are a few matters essentially entwined in constructing a didactical theory which must be touched upon, so the perspective of the didactical pedagogue is allowed to be unhindered, as far as possible, in his/her search for *fundamentalia*.

In the development of didactical thinking, one can assert that constructing a lesson structure only in terms of lesson contents is not well-founded didactically. Any pronouncement about learning contents, in its didactic connotation, shows that they are not an unchangeable aspect of didactic practice. History shows that as a person, as well as time proceeds, the beacons shift. The fact of contents refers to an essential matter of the experiential totality we know as “teaching”.

The question about **what** contents does not show the unchangeable which serves as a precondition for a theoretical design. The form, on the other hand, is a constant, in so far as the experience of “teaching” always occurs among and between persons. Without intensively discussing this at this stage, I simply refer to the question of the ground forms which always and in all cultures, and with respect to each and any view of life, undeniably are present in the experiential whole and, therefore, can be described as structural regarding it.

A conversation about contents is essential, in so far as it has to do with the form of “didaskhein”. Therefore, it is a structural matter of teaching and, as such, also refers to the eventual, very individual lesson situation. The implication is that lesson contents vary according to cultural-, temporal- and worldview, while form is shown to be exactly constant in the history of didactics. From this,

one possibly should easily infer that the lesson contents cannot be of fundamental significance for an exposition of the lesson structure, and there is only “structure” in so far as the lesson form makes this structure identifiable and describable.

Such a statement is partly true. But: in the unfolding of a lesson structure, the form, as such, is cold and dead, i.e., didactically immobile and barren until specific contents arise by which the form comes into motion and becomes a dynamic construction which eventually can be described pedagogically as a teaching effect. “Didaskein” is a matter of an orderly, systematic, accountable way of acting. There is form in which the contents must be offered.

The harmony between form and contents is the only didactic guarantee that the change aimed for will occur. In this equilibrium of form and contents in the lesson structure, psychopedagogics speaks so strongly that the candid didactical pedagogician sometimes is very surprised.

In the actual lesson structure, there is a lesson aim. This lesson aim is a core matter in the lesson structure in two respects: in the first place, it delimits the activity character of the lesson, in the sense that it marks off a balance between form and contents. In the second place, it directs the activities of the participants in their teaching and learning aspects. It follows that the question of “teaching” and “learning”, in form as well as contents, must be understood as implicit in the concept “lesson aim”.

Considering that teaching is attuned to learning, and that learning as such, is motivated by teaching, among other things, the lesson aim necessarily includes the learning aim. If one now considers that the human activity we know as “learning” presumes a way of being, the taking up of and planning for the ways of learning in the lesson structure are a logical consequence of the above statement. Also, this represents a breakthrough in perspective of unusual scope which psychopedagogics has brought about for didactical pedagogics.

This pronouncement not only is a matter of fundamental insight and, especially of a functional realization in of the dynamic which the concept “lesson structure” presumes for it to be. The modes of learning presume taking the above into consideration, the actualization of the learning activity with respect to specific learning contents i.e., planned, initiated, didactic courses. This planning which is the warp and woof of “didaskhein” also implies planning for the modes of learning. I mention a few aspects, during a lesson where, in its planning and actualization, the question of modes of learning undeniably and essentially constitutes part of the didactic activity.

To plan for the modes of learning, in a didactic respect, means to give structure to the course of a lesson in accordance with the nature of the learning contents in which modes of learning can be actualized to attain the greatest possible teaching effect. This pronouncement has at least two important consequences for studying the didactical problematic: in the first place, it proclaims the psychopedagogue as a conversational partner in the construction of the lesson structure because (in the second place) the didactician, in designing his/her lesson structure, must not leave the course of learning to chance.

Here it must clearly be stated that the concepts “course of a lesson” and “course of learning” are not used in a complementary way, but in a coordinate, meaningful connection which carries the actualization of “didaskhein” in the lesson situation.

To return to the remarks regarding categories made at the beginning of this section: unlocking reality and stepping up to reality (teaching and learning) are manifested because the teacher, in accordance with the unique nature of the learning contents, so expresses his/her presentation that the modes of learning, which he/she also must consider in the achieving course of consciousness are proclaimed in the lesson situation.

A precise unfolding of the lesson structure shows, among other things, the following firm points of this pronouncement. In each lesson structure, there is a reduction of the learning contents to their essentials, in terms of which formulating a lesson problem is

possible. Understandably, this reduction of learning contents and the related formulation of the lesson problem are matters of an insight into the learning activity which must be brought into the foreground for the effective forming of concepts, as a new, greater mobility of the pupils. This is accomplished in the actualization of the pupil's foreknowledge, and the integration of the new contents with it, by which the eventual exercise of the insight itself, as well as its possible didactic application, are carried out. Without considering the modes of learning (e.g, experiencing, lived experiencing, observing, abstracting), the actualization of the course of the lesson simply is not possible didactically. Understandably, the learning activity is left to chance if the didactician does not take this up purposefully in his/her anticipations of the course of the lesson.

Now, if one also considers that the ways the contents are ordered, and the form is chosen (including the methods which are going to be followed) ought to be in direct correspondence with the mode or modes of learning planned for, one can very confidently pronounce didactically that the actualization of the learning event in the lesson situation is not only meaningless without the co-consideration of the modes of learning, but also appears to be impossible.

Obviously, here it is not the case that psychopedagogics prescribes to didactical pedagogics to which it then must conform by applying. On the contrary, the didactical pedagogician questions psychopedagogics to keep in view the general pedagogical course of matters in its embracing, comprehensive, overarching whole. Also, this questioning of psychopedagogics is done to try to guarantee that the child's way through the world, to the extent that teaching is involved in it, not only will be meaningful but, in a concrete sense, also will lead to greater adulthood.

Now, if one brings together for consideration the above pronouncements about the pedagogical aim, relationship, and sequence structures with the modes of learning, it is evident that these three sub-disciplines of pedagogics (fundamental, didactical and psychopedagogical) figure equally in the lesson situation, and jointly carry educating in accordance with the reality to which it ought to be faithful. This faithfulness to reality, as well as nearness

to life, are reasonable demands which can be imposed on educating. This especially is a demand which, from a sociopedagogical perspective, fosters expectations of didactics. Therefore, it should be meaningful to focus on the matter of possible integration from a sociopedagogical perspective, as well as the relevance of sociopedagogics for an investigation of the didactic problematic.

3. *Sociopedagogics*: One can describe the reality-involvement of teaching, which is an activity among and between persons, i.e., an activity which also is socially determined, in especially two historical-social respects. Both views are popular in the history of didactical thinking, and both have and still do influence formulating didactical theorems. Both views, over time, and especially because of their generally accepted popularity, appear didactically as demands.

Although no one denies the sound principle enclosed in them, they thereby are elevated to the rank of norms, in so far as they concern didactic practice. If this ought to be so now is not directly to the point.

The question we now attend to and discuss is whether these two principles, as well as didactic norms, indeed, do form a connection between didactic-pedagogical theorems and a sociopedagogical perspective by which the relevance of sociopedagogics is particularly significant for unraveling and constituting a didactic practice.

The two matters referred to are the following: In the first place, it is continually stated as a principle and/or demand that teaching must be near to life, be anchored in the soil of life, and ought to be interpreted with respect to the life cultural climate and, in doing so, it can take up a life-authentic course of educating and futurity which can qualify as “near to life”.

I mean that the “Heimatprinzip” (principle of local lore), which is so popular in Central Europe, offers a good frame of reference for this matter.

The second aspect continually referred to, and which equally often functions as a demand for didactical theorems, is that teaching ought to be near to educating, i.e., that, in its formalization [in school], it must not be foreign to the practice of educating [at home] and decidedly show a continuity between home and school. The often-existing distance or even gap between home educating and school teaching is the central target of focus in expositions of this nature and in all their variations. Also, here we have a sociopedagogical calling, which undeniably is heard in didactical theory, and cannot merely be ignored in the search for essential didactical problems. In familiar publications, Spranger, Peters, and Hahn are important exponents of such a view and, also in modern pedagogics, this way of being stands on its own, and inescapably is compelled to be a pronouncement of didactical theory.

Here we have to do with two important concepts: nearness to living and nearness to educating. Superficially, this seems to be a complementary, even a tautological formulation. The one cannot be thought of without the other.

By careful analysis, one must indicate that a near to life teaching, although it does not ignore form, still in the now existing pronouncements of Weniger, among others, and the recent past of Klafki, is qualified as content defining. The second, although it does not ignore content, is all the same, a matter which, in its pronouncements and claims, again focuses on form in its argument, so the concept “supplementary” has more relevance, in the light of the problem, than “complementary”, and a tautological interpretation, in its totally, falls away.

According to the ideal consequence, one should be able to assert, regarding these two matters, in its formal styling, in an educative connection, the school must be pedagogically acceptable (accountable)—and, in the light of this pedagogical acceptability, it must concentrate on near to life contents by which the spirit of the age, and the state of the culture, the situatedness of the youth and the moral-religious ordering of society must be considered—to only mention a few forms of manifestation of such demands.

If one now considers the above, he/she should assume that teaching, also in its educative connection, does not progress in a vacuum but in a social, interhuman situation and, therefore, it is a social matter, the question of the relevance of sociopedagogics for the didactical pedagogical acquires significance. The consequence is easy to formulate: It always was, and will remain that life form or lifestyle, and educative form (thus, also teaching form) are always fundamentally dependent on each other because the educative structure even determines the scope of society generationally.

However, it must be equally clear that the concepts “near to life” and “true to educating” cannot be of a constant nature regarding content because the societal situation is flowing, changing and, thus, is metastable. This metastability of content contributes understandably to bringing about a changing emphasis on form so that the uninitiated easily contends that the form changes in accordance with the contents.

The didactician should take such an assertion as meaning that the changing societal situation will and can *essentially* influence the didactic form. The fact is that the theoretical didactician understandably refers to the didactic form in its experiential state, as it is observed in the reality between and among persons, as a universally valid matter, but he/she cannot deny the changing emphasis, and also cannot deny that, even today, aspects of form are hypostatized such that it dominates the total practice and conceals, in such a way that the whole in its scope, dwindles under the grotesque emphasis of a part.

This skewed image was repeatedly run across in didactic practice in the past, and still is today, cannot be charged to the social purview and the resulting sociopedagogical pronouncements. After all, the reality with which sociopedagogics is involved is one of change, even very fast change. War and peace, prosperity and poverty, industry and agriculture necessarily influence aspects such as the scope of teaching, the length of the school year, the facilities which can be made available, the contents which are concentrated on, etc.

For didactical theory, however, contradistinctions arise here which bring about contrasts, some of which can be very difficult to

accommodate didactically, and never are justified via thinking, e.g., a stand for near to life (content) in contrast to the universal, true to reality in contrast to the ideal-historical, etc. The oscillating effect for disclosing a didactical theory is one of identifiable confusion in thinking, in favor of a so-called situational and zeitgeist “applied” practice. The present destructive pragmatism and formula didactics are good examples of the effect sociopedagogical views arising from societal tendencies can have on didactic constructions.

In a situation such as this, if sociopedagogics is silent or worse, allows its voice to be heard wrongly (judging from the reality structure of educating), the effect (however small) must show itself as a garbling of didactical theory forming. For example, in its last entrenchment, it can have the effect of bringing forth the destructive complaint which, where educative and teaching intervention are life alienating, in its essence it is meaningless and, thus, does not contribute to life realization at all. Is this not the complaint which today repeatedly is made about theoretical discussions of pedagogical questions?

In other words, the *fundamentalia* which are brought to expression in designing a didactical theory have no relevance because the societal framework denies the essence of “didaskhein”, i.e., its original structure, and unashamedly postulates a time-bound situation (content over its generally valid form) as a priority. The collapse in insight about what is essential for practice is obvious, irrespective of the content which is relevant.

Societal censorship, or lack thereof, separate form and content by wrongly neglecting to emphasize the harmony which necessarily must exist between them. In this respect, neither political science nor cultural philosophy, or even different variants of pragmatic thinking can take the place of sociopedagogics.

The concepts “person” and “world” proclaim the right of sociopedagogics to exist. But they proclaim its relevance for fundamental thinking about “didaskhein”. “Person” and “world” presume a dynamic, cumulative relationship brought about structurally by teaching-directed intervention and interference.

How and where should a person then still claim sociopedagogics builds up its structure separately and apart from didactical pedagogics, and that this structure has no significance for a science of teaching, except for a few aspects of social relations, which often are indicated as the connection between the two?

No one denies this connection, but if this implies it is the only or last pronouncement sociopedagogics offers didactical pedagogics, then there is an impoverishment in both these part-disciplines which, from a didactical point of view, is seen as welcome.

4. *Historical Pedagogics:* As with any other science, pedagogics also has its history. On its surface, this looks like a relatively simple, obvious statement with little consequence for unraveling the pedagogical, and, in this case, the didactical problematic. Nevertheless, with this a course of progression has been raised which not only reveals a wealth of facts, in an encyclopedic sense, but also which brings pedagogical essences to the surface.

Judged differently, historical pedagogics is no pedagogics. By implication, this means that pedagogics, as does any science, also has its history which includes the fact that this historical perspective brings forth pedagogical essences and, thus, engages in essence-thinking from a particular point of view, i.e., forces the historical view on us. After all, historical pedagogics, in its pedagogical tendency, cannot really involve itself with any reality other than the reality of educating as it has been revealed over the centuries. If, in its own literature, historical pedagogics sometimes creates the impression that it constitutes a chronological compilation, and if over the course of time, this compilation points to gaps in the settled pronouncements of historical pedagogics, it would be difficult to account for such a gap and view it as a matter of historical pedagogics.

For each distinguished pedagogician, indeed it is clear that there are many noticeable ways to practice historical pedagogics. And in this country, certainly it is especially Potgieter who imported a new way of practicing this pedagogical discipline by which a fresh, thematic approach largely replaced a precise chronological one. If a historical pedagogician should decide to work by chronologically

compiling, in either case, he is not forced to do this at all. Whatever the method might be, his/her pronouncements (if pedagogically couched) can have nothing else than the phenomenon of educating as a central theme. If so, the historical pedagogical view must be considered to have value for didactical pedagogics.

It certainly is an understandable claim in the contemporary practice of didactics that this is original. The word “origin” (verb “arise”), which is the root word of “original”, etymologically is interesting. Viewed etymologically, “origin” refers to beginning, starting, arising—stated in general: what has proceeded from something. Original thinking, insights, pronouncements, etc.; i.e., this would imply thinking, insights, pronouncements, i.e., a first, beginning coming forth and seeing of a particular practice, isolated by thinking and verbalized in a pronouncement. Thus, original thinking implies origins, i.e., what always was so.

But now it is evident that the practice didactics is concerned with is not that of today or yesterday. This practice is as old as being human itself so that the history of didactics also implies (to some degree) the history of being human and the converse.

Thus, one also could say the essences of the pedagogical which now are present were already there. Hence, original pedagogical thinking is not possible without also considering the origins of the pedagogical as explicated by historical pedagogics. Therefore, it also would be possible to unravel each facet of the didactical problematic in its historical sense and the progression of its course of development as one now knows it after its historical sense, i.e., its origins are researched and interpreted for contemporary times. Stated still further: a contemporary interpretation by which *all* pedagogical perspectives concerning the didactic would be ignored simply is not possible.

The didactician would not have had anything to do with “origin” in a comparative sense. After all, the concept “reality” also includes historical reality—and especially in the sense that what *is* actual *has become*. The contemporary has meaning because of the past; the past has become the present; the immediate problem has a past. Giving meaning outside the past is unthinkable. Now precisely it is

this moment of giving meaning by teaching which I have chosen here as an example for interpretation in a didactic-pedagogical respect to indicate the value of historical pedagogics for forming a didactical theory to any degree.

As far as a study of teaching is concerned, one could interpret the question of giving meaning in both a general, or particular respect. In a general respect, there would be mention of the meaning of the form of the didactical by which the *fundamentals* are brought to the fore, while there is a particular meaning of the contents by which the idea of the *elementals* calls for a didactical interpretation.

Thus, we have two concepts which make a cardinal contribution to a contemporary theoretical structure, while also disclosing the meaning of historical pedagogics for the study of didactics. In a historical didactical respect, without interpreting Pestalozzi, Herbart, Schleiemacher, Willmann, and many others, a contemporary formulation of the fundamentals and the elementals in didactics would not be possible. Without going into detail, the modern formulation of these two concepts especially amounts to making fundamental the ground-experiencing and ground-lived experiencing of a learning child with respect to representing and verbalizing reality.

Obviously, the matter of the fundamental, thus, is the didactic plan to prepare for ways of learning which must realize these basic experiences and lived experiences in a situation which is established most artificially.

On the other hand, it is the task of a didactician, by presenting learning contents, to ensure that the elemental, i.e., the simplest essentials of the learning contents through which the matter and coherence of the concerned problem or theme can arise so they can be reduced and ordered such that they can be made accessible to the learning person.

Meaningful learning and meaningful teaching thus encounter each other in the concepts “fundamental” and “elemental” because the coherence of form and content are expressed essentially by these two concepts.

In the historical analysis and evaluation of the above-mentioned educationists to which Klafki has come, it seems very clear that the didactical structure, in general, but the lesson structure, in particular, without [acquiring] basic insights into these two matters is not really correct. Because of the incorrect interpretation of Herbart's views, so strictly followed by his pupils and followers, which develop into a very definitive lesson phase-structure, and which progresses in a mechanistic, determined way, cannot give an account of the fundamentals such that the elementals necessarily acquire a skewed appearance. Fundamental experiencing and lived experiencing, as constituted in the simplest, most representative content, imply that the sense of a particular aspect of reality must be made visible in the relationship and coherence of a matter. When this does not happen, it simply means that essentially a child does not enter reality in the sense that he/she does not discover the essence of that reality. And it is from this coherence or interaction of the fundamentals and the elementals in a lesson structure such that any phraseology didactics is unacceptable and, therefore, with good reason can be placed under question marks with correct theory forming.

Until [didactical] criteria are designed in this context, historical pedagogics provides didactic study with a source of rich, varied, and comparable data. In fact, the establishment of criteria related to the accumulation of didactical theories through the ages would not only be impossible but also senseless without a study of historical pedagogics.

The transcendent always offers the didactic a play image of the practice which is rejected and which changes, and which, in a positive or negative aspect of the concepts, speaks to modern times. The structuring of a didactically accountable theory is impossible in any way to construct a didactical pedagogical theory without choosing to study historical pedagogics.

The origins (fundamentalia/essences) of "didaskhein" have been discussed and their possibilities for beginning or approaching the construction of a didactical science, as well as their significance for a new discipline, have been considered and have raised the

inevitable matter of the didactic problematic. It has been shown that a point of view does not necessarily force to the surface essences which actually are the experiential totality of teaching as such; i.e., a bringing to light a phenomenon which is among and between persons. On close examination, it also is the case that teaching reveals itself in many situations which usually are part of a person's forms of living and, thus, primarily has nothing to do with schooling.

These pronouncements force a didactician to distinguish between didactical pedagogics and didactics. In the first case, there is a conspicuous educative course which is actualized in and by teaching. On the other hand, there is teaching which need not have anything to do with educating because the meaning of teaching in such a broad spectrum does not have a pupil's becoming adult as an aim and, thus, need not be considered further in a pedagogical connection by one who teaches.

Above it is indicated that, in so far as a child is dependent on educating to be adult, teaching cannot be thought away from this course of educating. Briefly, the argument comes down to the following: Educating is an aim-directed, profound activity which an adult carries out in his/her being with a child with the aim that, as time goes by, he/she will move from a state of non-adulthood to a state of being adult. This adulthood is a matter of responsibility and, therefore, also a matter of life choices and an unfolding involvement in life. Life contents in all their variations thus are always themes of educating. After all, an educator does not educate in terms of nothing. He/she always educates with respect to "something".

This "something" which then is proclaimed as contents, simultaneously assumes that there is teaching. This means that the contents introduced to a child as human matters are unlocked and he/she is continually called to deal responsibly with them and, as life contents, to appropriate them for him/herself to acquire independence, which is synonymous with adulthood.

One also could say that educating is always accomplished by teaching and in so far as teaching is concerned with educating, the

meaning of this teaching is found in educating and in its aim. In so far as there is mention of a course of teaching in a child's becoming adult, and which is an inevitable part of the entire event, this makes teaching a part of educating. After all, if teaching is studied in this context, then this study is a discipline of a greater pedagogical investigation and there is the discipline "didactical pedagogics".

But as indicated, all matters of teaching are not limited to an educative situation. It also occurs daily among adults in a myriad of variations by which teaching acquires a life of its own which cannot be reduced to educating but where "didaskhein" will suffice. In these situations, teaching also is studied by those who are interested in it. This type of study simply should be called didactics without any reference to educating.

Indeed, because of these facets of the study of teaching have a common basis, that experience which we know as teaching belongs to the most original experiencing of human beings. Whatever the nature and scope of later training, independent scientific study, detailed research, etc., one fact cannot be ignored: no educating is actualized without teaching and, thus, all intense, real, scientific, practical, skills-based teaching and training a person was already preceded by a primary educative teaching and, in the most direct, most obvious sense of the word, is a continuation of it.

The autonomous structure of "didactics" undoubtedly has its origin in an educative situation when a pupil or student or worker is not seen primarily as such but as a not-yet-adult on the way to adulthood. To gain fundamental insight into the course of the didactic without considering this fact is to deny the first beginning of the course of thinking, i.e., to think of reality as being different from how it is. The search for the origins or *fundamentalia* of "didaskhein" implies taking different origins in approaching it if one wishes to arrive at its real essences.

So far, the issue of essences has been discussed repeatedly and dealt with in various ways. Also, various points of view of the origins and their coherence for accountably building a theory of teaching have been indicated. If one would see that any theory construction, after all, is a search for the possibility of knowing an aspect of reality,

certainly at this stage it is meaningful to be able to formulate and, in the light of known epistemological statements, to arrive at a more extensive formulation. In didactical theory forming, such statements are not epistemological but rather an interpretation of such views as far as they have relevance for a researcher in constructing didactical theory. The following aspects certainly are of particular importance:

1. If a didactician in any way tries to progressively acquire a definite course in constructing his/her theory, he/she cannot but choose experience as the point of departure for his/her exposition. Experiencing is reality, i.e., it *is*, and it is given with being human. In its entirety, it covers the whole of human involvement with reality. Thus, a person's involvement in the reality of teaching lies within the spectrum of his/her experiences, and beyond any doubt, his/her constructions imply a matter of perceiving in a rationally penetrative way to the essences of such reality. As a thinker, he/she cannot avoid working through his/her analyses of categories as illuminative ways of thinking, which must describe the essences of experiencing (everyday practice) to disclose the essentials of teaching.

These categories are verbalizations of essences of experience, i.e., of practice as they manifest themselves to the thinker. It is well understood that in verbalizing these essences, thinkers can and do differ.

However, these verbalizations of experience do not change it. No one who describes an experience can avoid its essences in the descriptions such that the categories, whether they are considered as such, must be visible in each. The visibility of categories also is a matter of the coherent parts or aspects which must display a whole (the experience).

In the light of the diversity of experience, it is unimaginable that it will show itself only in one category, i.e., it will be simple (uni-faceted). After all, life is multi-faceted. Hence, the coherence of the categories provides a structure, a scheme, a conceivable, understandable exposition of a slice of reality as it is.

At all costs, a seeker of fundamental theory must avoid letting his/her pursuit of categories allow experience itself from excluding reality or be deceived by aspects which are not essential constituents or by matters which are not essential constituent of the experience. The way he/she reduces an experience to its essences, or strips away everything which is superfluous for gaining insight, and which does not contribute to a viewing of the essences of such an experience is of fundamental importance for the quality of a theory to which he/she is involved in giving structure.

2. There is no doubt that there is only a reality for a person, to the extent that he/she is aware of it. Therefore, a thought Construction necessarily is bound in some way to experience, i.e., it stems from the fact that a person participates with reality and, thus, is aware of it. That such thought constructions can be seen as wrong, unbalanced, incoherent, idealized, etc., does not strip them of any connection with reality.

Therefore, it is difficult to see that a theoretical construction in didactical pedagogics has no connection with reality and has nothing to do with it. The problem with such theoretical Development is usually that an aspect of experience is posited as a category and everything else simply is diverted in a dialectical and/or hermeneutic way.

3. The origin of a slice of experience is knowable in its essences only in terms of itself. Thus, experiencing is no thought construction, but provides the possibility or soil for thinking, in the same way that the ground offers possibility for a tiller.

The danger to which a fundamental investigator must pay attention is that experience, as it appears, often remains covered by already known preconditions for the possibility that a slice of it will be actualized in a person's life. Thus, the didactician, in constructing his/her theory, searches for the meaning and ground of the experience as it appears in the human lifeworld.

Therefore, the connection with other thought constructions must comply with the important criterion that a theorist, in his/her expositions of reality itself, must disclose it as it really *is* via methods which can penetrate the unique nature of that experience and disclose its essences.

Undoubtedly, it is possible for a thinker to cover over the experience in his/her explications instead of disclosing it.

4. As such, experience is unformulated. It is not verbalized. Also, experience does not speak for itself. In a scientific sense, this experience must be verbalized in terms of the scope and quality of the investigator's penetration of it, and his/her ability to interpret and formulate it scientifically. A description in terms of categories without interpretation is logically not possible. Although there is this subjective aspect in theory building, hopefully it is not the accompanying factor for thinking, because, without it, thinking is not possible. Continually, it is *someone* who thinks about *something*.

Phenomena as such are there to be thought about, but do not themselves think. Absolute objectivity in constructing a didactical theory is not possible. The phenomenon of educating (teaching), thus, is nothing other than the structure of Dasein itself, in the light of which each concept taken up in the theory as a construction must show a coherence with existing and being.<sup>???</sup>

5. The fact that a person is in the world, participates in it, anticipates the reality in which he/she is involved, and designs it according to his/her expectations, all make possible a discipline such as didactical pedagogics. On closer examination, teaching certainly is one of the purest examples of human intentionality, which is actualized in his/her involvement with reality.

For a builder of didactical theory, this matter is of fundamental importance, and it certainly deserves a brief explication to give some indication of its significance for a theoretical design. The actualization of intentionalities is a

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<sup>???</sup> Questionable translation of: Die verskynsel van die opvoeding (onderrig) is derhalwe niks anders nie as die struktuur van Dasein self in die lig waarvan elke begrip wat in die teorie opgeneem word, 'n samehang moet toon van syn en synde as konstruksie.

meaningful aspect of theory forming in didactical pedagogics which, perhaps, can best be illuminated if one realizes that, in actualizing intentionalities, it is not so much that a person turns to reality but, necessarily, he/she proceeds to establish a *relationship* with it.

Strictly speaking, this means you turn yourself to reality, you turn your face to reality. This matter of turning yourself to reality implies this is a matter of preparatory or ongoing action which is not necessarily a constitutive relationship aspect which the concept “intention” carries. The fact that a person is placed in a situation, that he/she must deal with the appeal emanating from it, so that he/she must act by teaching, makes the relationship (actualizing intentionalities) a fundamentally meaningful matter for constructing a didactical theory.

Being in the world means actualizing intentionalities, and actualizing intentionalities which have an effect, i.e., which means having to teach. It is this actualization of intentionalities by teaching which the meaning of reality, the meaning of a person’s being involved with and participation in a common human experience-structure which has important theoretical-didactical consequences.

The reason lies in the fact that what constitutes reality, in a sense-giving way, is indicated as an immanent meaning, and, indeed, makes the act of teaching meaningful within the course of educating. Teaching implies the actualization of intentionalities within the totality of his/her experiences such that it is a fulfillment of intentionality by a person in the world.

One certainly would be able to compile a wide range of conclusions of this nature as fundamental insights in constructing a didactical theory. For this chapter, however, I think it suffices, not because these five conclusions are comprehensive and complete, but possibly to offer a student who immerses him/herself in didactical theory an opportunity to him/herself search, to think, to formulate and to test his/her conclusions on arguments which follow in the remaining chapters.

An important issue absent in the above five conclusions is the coherence of form and content, as a matter of didactical theory building but, since this is a theme in the next chapter, it is omitted here.