

## CHAPTER 1

# POINTS OF DEPARTURE FOR CONSTRUCTING A DIDACTICAL THEORY

### A. INTRODUCTION

From the extensive pedagogical literature available today, any science and, therefore, didactic pedagogics, must take its beginning point from somewhere in developing and formulating a theory. To deny this is to introduce an illogical consequence into the theory's design, such that thinking about or describing it begins from nowhere. This implies beginning with nothing, and designing such a theory is impossible to explicate, and writing it is intellectually impossible.

The origins of each theory should be contestable in the writings of a science. That is, different interpretations of such a theory can exist about what really presents itself as the point of departure for designing and writing such a theory. This does not challenge the fact that each theory has an origin or point of departure.

Also, it is obvious that there are differences in points of departure regarding the same phenomenon, or slice of experience, or aspect of reality and, especially, the study of didactic pedagogics creates confusion about the interpretation of what is essential to the aspect of human experiencing we know as "teaching".

After all, it is the aim of the descriptions of each theory to offer the essentials of that area of knowledge by disclosing, illuminating, and systematizing them, and by casting them in a firm, knowable and, ultimately, an evaluatable form. This is especially important in the so-called "experiential sciences", i.e., those sciences which are involved with describing and elucidating persons' experiential totalities with respect to their daily involvement with the world and life.

Therefore, it is also understandable that the method or methods the researcher or thinker uses are of decisive importance in designing

his/her theory. Here no pronouncements need to be made about the various methods, their modes of application, their advantages and disadvantages, their attunement to different areas of knowledge, etc. For each student, there is a vast literature which considers scientific methods from which he/she can orient him/herself about the contributions each can make to an eventual scientific outcome.

What must be emphasized is that an interpretation, and eventual evaluation of a point of departure in designing a didactic theory really is an impossible matter because the student also must ascertain for him/herself the method an author used in constructing his/her view of this slice of human experiencing—in our case, teaching. Here it is repeated and emphasized that any method presumes specific procedures by which the results of thinking and research are made available in specific ways and, therefore, they ought to be examined accordingly in evaluating the theoretical construction.

In fact, it is not possible to evaluate the contributions of a thinker's or researcher's constructing a theoretical structure without also considering these matters. But then the student must also remember that many parts or aspects of research and thinking are carried out in definite or even small parts of the area of knowledge. Especially modern research, in this respect, is inclined to be a refined specialization which, because of the lack of a comprehensive overview of an area of knowledge, it sometimes is difficult to interpret research results and discover the point of departure underlying the theory.

The research is so specialized that it reflects little of its general-theoretical background and really presents itself for a free interpretation with respect to the whole—but then, only according to the general-scientific forming the student has undergone, and which ought to enable him/her to interpret specialized results of small aspects of a large area of knowledge against a wider background and, with his/her knowledge of the whole, to integrate them. In studying didactics, this is a significant matter because the didactic continually looks to an eventual practice.

A risk is running away with little details, however valuable they appear to be, and generalizing from small aspects or facets of the experiential totality which arise, and which do not justify an

exemplary interpretation. In designing a didactical theory, a small aspect of the totality of the experiencing might not be substantial enough to do this and, therefore, the finding might not be transferable to the whole for which the true theoretician is still searching. In such a case, to be able to make a precise pronouncement about the point of departure or origin preceding the detailed research, is of essential significance for one to claim didactics is a science.

At this stage, it is equally important to note that, in the currently available literature on didactical standpoints, biases and opinions are often confused with origins or points of departure, and that what they are and how they are interpreted unquestionably influence the development of the theory, and contribute to what ultimately emerges as essentials of teaching in the form of findings, postulations, laws, etc.

For the seeker of authentic, unbiased truth in his/her view of origins and points of departure, this is often a comprehensive and far-reaching problem. The reason is that the form and contents in didactic acts are so profoundly intertwined that often it is difficult to differentiate them and sort the data regarding both components of a didactical theory. The student of didactics must understand well that, in this case, we are concerned with a parallel which places high demands on his/her interpretations. In designing a theory, these standpoints, biases, and opinions regarding the origin or point of departure must be neutralized [bracketed] in designing a theory.

The criteria for differentiating form and contents are not systematically and validly described in didactics as a science. The consequence is that, at present, our judgment about what a standpoint and point of departure really imply are relatively vague and decidedly subjective. As a science, the didactical is still too little involved with a strict theory of science by which definitive criteria can be designed, and by which these two aspects of theory forming can be clearly held separate and, accordingly, their separate contributions to designing a theory can be judged.

Perhaps one of the greatest shortcomings is that didactics, as a science, still has a strong practical-prescriptive tendency without being able to justify how, why, and with respect to what specific prescriptions one can and ought to make for practice. Didacticians are involved in finding out what can be implemented functionally in

the practical situation to clarify and test the functional nature of the series of situations as “successful teaching”.

The confusion of origins or points of departure presents this task with extraordinary problems when there is a search for a definite understanding of the didactic task as it is manifested in the [teaching] situation. On the other hand, this leads the didactician to carefully draw the form and contents apart from each other and, in its turn, to design criteria for evaluating each of these matters for what they are.

If one considers form to be the universally valid and, therefore, the describable, i.e., that it represents a theoretically accountable structure of teaching, then this places very definite expectations, even demands, on the student regarding his/her ability to make distinctions in interpreting the theoretical design regarding the form as well as the contents, but also regarding bias and point of departure.

Before considering the synthesis, which is contained in this latter position, it is noted that the distinction between the form and the contents during teaching is one of the aspects which makes possible a precise description of the human activity “teaching”. When a student remains stuck in his/her inability to differentiate these aspects of the event, this simply means he/she can arbitrarily alternate his/her standpoint and point of departure without establishing a valid theory which accounts for the origin of teaching, as well as its practice.

A deficient differentiation between form and contents implies intermingling the particular and the general, which often appears to be true and valid, and it is difficult to make strictly factual pronouncements about the theoretical design flowing from this intermingling.

Thus, the following four coherently related matters make demands on didactic analyzing and synthesizing: (1) standpoints, prejudgments, and opinions; (2) origins or points of departure; (3) the didactic forms; and (4) the didactic contents. No didactical theory can claim the name “theory” if the coherent entwinements, changes, overlaps, influences, etc. of these four matters are not differentiated, and even set apart by careful and strict analysis.

The aim of the above is the development of a theoretical construction by sorting out and by keeping together what belongs. By implication, this points to a distinctive task in designing a didactical theory: suddenly, there is clearly a science of teaching, which ought to have general relevance, and of a theory of teaching grounded in that science, with practical relevance in any period, milieu, cultural situation, etc.

For the student, it must be evident that if there are prejudgments regarding the experiential totality which are subsumable under the concept “*didaskhein*”, these prejudgments will be manifested with respect to the origins of the thinking and the form of the practice, but especially with respect to the contents from which there is teaching. On the other hand, with a theoretical design, if there is original thinking regarding the point of departure, this also influences the explicative aspect of the didactic form and contents accordingly. With this, in studying texts, the student of didactics is confronted with the task of differentiating ways of knowing and expository ways, but also in the explications he/she arrives at when he/she engages in formal research and writing.

With this, the problem of the point of departure in designing a didactical theory is not yet stated clearly. Indeed, I assert that contemporary didacticians have not properly examined and described the significance of this aspect of theory forming. Still, in examining each didactical theory, it certainly is reasonable to pose the question: Is this a particularization of a theoretical explication? However, the fact is, this is not a fundamental-didactical question.

To particularize a theoretical explication, it is implicit that the fundamentals of such a theory are accepted as valid (true) and generally or particularly, their consequences are elaborated on. It is more fundamental to ask: What **ought** the origin of thinking be in designing a didactical theory? If criteria for this can be made visible, ask further: How do this theory and its facts which cannot be thought away (essences) originally arise (a return to the origins)?

An example of the reasonableness of these two questions is: In the contemporary descriptions of a fundamental pedagogical nature, which now are available in South Africa (here I refer especially to the works of W. A. Landman, S. J. Gous, and C. J. G. Kilian), it is very clear that the pedagogical situation has a three-fold structure which ought to be noted if one penetrates to the essence of the

pedagogical, i.e., the aim, the relationship, and the sequence structures.

For example, if a didactician searches for the origins of the didactic pedagogical in the pedagogical situation and, from his/her perspective, describes “didaskhein” in its appearance in this primordial situation, certainly it is expected of him/her to indicate why, where, and how the pedagogical aim, relationship, and sequence structures figure in the pedagogical unfolding of the didactic act. It also is expected he/she will interpret didactically these three structures in terms of their fundamental significance for insight into the structure of the original experiencing [of teaching], and the origin of his/her thinking, to indicate and evaluate their contributory importance. Without such fundamental questions, his/her exposition of the concept “didactic sequence” will not disclose it in its pedagogical connotations, i.e., insofar as adults give children purposeful, meaningful, and formative instruction.

Given the few problems indicated, perhaps it is meaningful to examine a few points of departure for designing a didactical theory to see their contributions and deficiencies in a didactic-theoretical design, and to orient oneself accordingly.

## B. SOME POINTS OF DEPARTURE FOR DESIGNING A DIDACTICAL THEORY

**1. Anthropology\*:** When a didactician takes his/her point of departure from anthropology, he/she searches for the origins of his/her practice in a theory of being human. The concept “anthropology” (“anthropos”, in Greek means, “man” [human being], and, “Logos,” refers to theory or thought) can, in its didactic connotations for and use in designing a didactical theory, bring forth an image of being human. Although this attitude of thought (i.e., that “anthropology” represents a specific human image) appears quite generally, it is not a necessary, inevitable way of practicing anthropology as a scientific discipline. For example, among others, the following didactically oriented interpretations, e.g., didactic-pedagogical thinking, which **begin with** anthropological pronouncements, show that there are regressive as well as progressive proposals and interpretations.

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\* Anthropology in this context includes images of being human found in the social science of that name as well as works in philosophical anthropology. G.D.Y.

The didactician who critically distinguish between thinking and applying thought, must be sure of the theoretical implications of the definite and indefinite article, as they arise in the following two views: **the** image of man is an image which speaks of a structural finality (in the sense that the human image [as described] appears as permanent, complete). Conspicuous in this pronouncement is the assumption of definiteness, being closed, which is more prescriptive than descriptive. The implications for interpretations of the involvement of persons with reality are equally clear.

One frequently finds such interpretations of anthropology in pedagogical writings because, in them, an educative aim (which, after all, is determined by matters such as time, culture, life circumstances, life views, etc.), a course of educating and an educative relationship are expressed. It is not the intention to indicate this image of man is incorrect, unscientific, or worthless. It is only to illustrate to what degree **the** image of man can influence the design of a didactical theory.

On the other hand, however, one finds anthropological expositions where there is **an** image of man. In the light of this indefinite meaning of the article, in this regard, it is important that anthropological explications of this nature are much more open, i.e., descriptive-indefinite, in the sense that they are directed to the dynamic progression and becoming of a person in a changing world, as a theme in search of a universal, uniform interpretation of the concept “man”, and makes other subject sciences concerned with man in his/her forms of appearing available for interpretation.

The one explication is not “better” than the other. They differ simply regarding the interpretation of the anthropological task.

Pedagogics also knows other anthropological approaches related to the two concepts “anthropological pedagogy” and “pedagogical anthropology”. To differentiate between these two concepts, in the one case there is reflecting from man about educating while, in the other case, there is reflecting from educating about man.

Understandably, the explication of these two concepts is not our task here. Even so, it is indicated that, when these two points of departure are placed against each other in all anthropological respects, this necessarily leads to pedagogical pronouncements

which sometimes converge but, in other respects, diverge, simply because, in one case, man is central in the theory forming and, in the other, the reality of educating is central. That such views of this nature result in designing a didactical theory is seen very clearly in the didactically directed writings of Andreas Flitner, M. J. Langeveld, and Heinrich Roth, to mention a few.

In the evaluation of a didactic-theoretical structure, the didactician, therefore, is compelled to examine the anthropological origins, prejudgments, standpoints, and views in relation with, and corresponding to the point of departure (anthropology) to really grasp the results, i.e., didactical pronouncements which such writers make, and securely place them in the unique synoptic view of the total experiencing which is understood as “*didaskhein*”.

The concepts “human image”, “anthropology”, “pedagogical anthropology” and “anthropological pedagogy” are put in quotation marks simply to show that any specific anthropological approach holds very definite consequences for the eventual structure of general-pedagogical, as well as didactic-pedagogical theory forming. But perhaps the didactician best knows the consequences in the rather generally used concept “pedocentric”.

If “pedo” means child, as indeed is the case, and “centric” means in the middle, as is generally accepted, then the concept “pedocentric” means that in the pedagogical argument, the child is placed at the center. This is an anthropological approach which, especially from the Anglo-American side, has exercised an overpowering influence on teaching theory. And this is not only a question of the democratization of the teaching, activity-forms in teaching, and other principle- and practice-pronouncements becoming connected with pedocentrism.

In designing a didactical theory, the concept pedocentrism implies an imminent, implicit design in which the child is the measuring stick for structuring and justifying a didactic theme. It is to understand that the design of a didactic theory with the child at the center does not leave room for anything else at the center. It is not only A. S. Neill and John Dewey who give evidence in their design of didactical theory that this very specific anthropological conception constitutes the origin of their thinking. One notices, in many respects, the same thoughts with Pestalozzi and Rousseau, in



addition to contemporary Dutch didacticians, such as Van Gelder and Brus.

For designing a theory, the implications are obvious: The didactic form and contents are described and, as regards the practical situation, are prescribed in accordance with all judgments (including prejudgments) regarding the child. Anyone who knows didactical history, as well as controversies in modern practice, cannot deny the contributions made over a long period of time and, in the present, to the transformation and reform of the school's teaching situation.

But this is not the question with which we are involved here. The question which must be answered, and was repeated in the above discussion, is if one can really describe the essences, the absolute essentials of teaching from such a point of departure and, especially, validly describe its forms. It cannot be denied that virtually all the literature brings to the area such confused thinking regarding the origins of teaching.

One of the greatest problems for the student of didactics, who must interpret these particulars in his/her search for the origin of the thinking, which is of anthropological origin, which is manifested in the design of didactical theory, certainly lies in a firm postulate, which so regularly and sometimes so naively is taken up in the theoretical constructions. This occurs so often in didactical explications which really are anthropological assumptions recuing second-handedly, as it were, in didactic-theoretical designs—especially via biology, psychology, sociology, history, and even theology. Such pronouncements then give the impression of anthropological thinking which forms the beginning of didactical pronouncements, while, in essence and by careful research, they only **appear** to provide an anthropological conception or conceptions which are broached in the practical-didactic situation via the biological, psychological, sociological, historical, and theological in their possibilities for application.

After all, here the didactician is dealing with anthropological concepts which are applied to specific subject sciences which then, according to traditional belief, have transfer possibility for designing a didactical theory. This transfer possibility is pretty much taken up hard and fast in the didactical theory under the banner that it is real. The actualization of the practical question or

problem, then, justifies this way of dealing with the theory. It is obvious that this way of theory forming cannot be worthless.

The actuality of an issue and the transfer of anthropological conceptions via other subject sciences to the didactical, however, do not necessarily illuminate the origins of practice, which ultimately is the first task for a didactical theory. It is an open question if ways of acting in a didactic practice can be purely actualized without insight into the original structure in which they function, or with respect to which particularities are brought about.

Differential didactical thinking is not necessarily original. As a matter of fact, the concept “anthropology” can serve here as a collective noun for ways of viewing (opinions, pre-judgments, and standpoints) original experiencing, i.e., “person in the world”, but the anthropological ought only to be seen in a secondary connection, if the structure by which the didactical functions (in a theoretical respect) is not merely turned on its head and, therefore, made known through a perspective which is upside-down.

Everything considered, the problem of an anthropological beginning to constructing a theoretical-didactical structure turns on the question of anthropological categories; also when, as Kilian explains, they are invested with ontological status, they have **direct** and **immediate** relevance for the total experiencing of “didaskhein”.<sup>1</sup> Thus, if the ways of being, which are at the ground, root, or origin of the pedagogical criteria, and which are bound in the closest relevance to anthropological-pedagogical categories, immediately and clearly describe teaching.<sup>2</sup>

Any pedagogue certainly will affirmatively and immediately answer: But only insofar as he/she is aware that educating is continually realized in teaching practice, and the meaning of teaching practice is sought in the educative ideal, as well as in the reality of educating. By taking note of anthropological categories with pedagogical relevance, the didactician assures him/herself that the meaning of “didaskhein” is a matter which only appears between and among persons.

The meaning of such activity certainly shows that there is a structure for such activity somewhere in the lifeworld and, therefore, can be made observable. However, the structure is not disclosed, described, or made knowable in this way, by which a

person can really state what is essentially known as “didaskēin” in its essences or essentiality in these anthropological categories made available for formal-scientific cognizance and, therefore, for fundamental didactical theory forming.

Again, I emphasize that these anthropological categories are not meaningless delusions for didactical theory. The fact that they search for their origin in the first ontological pronouncement, i.e., “person in the world”, makes such a conclusion simply meaningless.

An anthropological category, such as “temporality,” directs an appeal, yet more: imperatives appeal to those who teach and to a child’s projection of a future in a didactically oriented situation to give him/her a personal, constitutive perspective. In this connection, the teaching establishes a conceptual unity for a child with respect to the past, present, and future, just because it is in the form and contents (without which teaching is not conceivable) which the now existing situation is illuminated in the light of the past, as well as the anticipated future to which the participating person (child) will proceed to change his/her own situatedness.

The new relation with reality the learning person enters during a series of learning situations, in its turn, is a didactic criterion which refers to the didactical categories of forming, orientating, and reducing.<sup>3</sup> These anthropological categories certainly are relevant for the didactical theoretical constructions, in that they expose the pedagogical sense of “didaskēin” but do not describe its sequence structures.

Therefore, it seems as if fundamental-didactical thinking regarding this aspect cannot find its structure in anthropological pronouncements, and it is not possible to take anthropology as the point of departure for designing a didactical theory.

**2. The pedagogical norm:** That pedagogics is a normative science is certainly beyond doubt these days. Even if it were necessary, one could make a long list of impressive names from other countries and domestically who, in many publications, describe and corroborate the normative character of the pedagogical. Therefore, it is not strange that, in didactical theory forming, many serious attempts also have been made to find a grounding by seeking its origin and point of departure for didactical theory in the normative

nature of educative activities. After all, the question of norms is essential when thinking about educating and, thus, of teaching with the result that, it is not entirely illogical to look for the origin of didactic activities in the normative nature, even more, in the ranking and describing of differential didactic-pedagogical norms.

If one assumes that accepted and valid norms constitute the warp and woof of all educative interventions, and cannot be thought away from the didactic activities, just because, as explained above, educating is continually actualized in teaching and the meaning of teaching has its origin in educating. Further, considering together the denotable relations of family and school, parent and teacher, life and learning, etc., deserve careful examination, such as a theoretical didactician's thorough analysis to achieve clarity about whether the normative nature of educative interventions, especially considering the sense of education, constitutes the ground of didactical work.

But there is more to this matter. The didactic or teaching activity, in its spontaneous (family home) as well as formal (school) course has very clear prognostic and guiding functions which are essentially normative matters. The prognostic values of the particulars which speak during teaching, with each breakthrough of insight, practice, of skills, measurement of achievement, and promotion to a subsequent class or grade level also foreshadow an eventuality and, thus, eventual formedness, and in these ways expose a future. The didactic prognosis intercepts or anticipates, in a factual, literal sense, the future and foreshadows, with remarkable accuracy, possibility and actuality as future relations.

At the same time, this is not an obvious matter which one can describe as an essential matter of "didaskhein" which, during a series of situations, norms appear as accompanying (in the total meaning of the word) teaching. Neither prognosis nor accompaniment fall outside a norm structure; what is more, it is possible to apply specific norms in the didactic situation. Indeed, to a large degree, both speak of and relate to what ought to be, and of the change by which there is forming.

Of the various explanations which a person could summarize under this heading as beginnings for constructing a didactical theory, that of Bokelmann, following his logic, offers a good explanation for discussion in the light of our stated problem.<sup>4</sup> In his explication, he indicates that, in the norm structure of educating, as well as

teaching, there are two aspects noted which allow the event to be realized.

He views the first aspect of the norm structure, as norms **for** educating, and calls them **meaning norms**. These meaning norms flow directly from a life and worldview, and for educating and teaching they mean that the sense of a person's existence, the whole of *existentialia*, are considered, put in relief, and set the act of educating in motion. Thus, there is no doubt that the meaning norms, following this interpretation, give contents to educating—also in the sense that they steer educating in directions to attain aims.

The other aspect is described as norms **of** educating, i.e., norms which continually place the denotable of the events of educating and teaching in the foreground, and which Bokelmann calls issue norms because they must make the issue-like nature of the event visible. In this connection, one also should be able to talk of the issue norms as formative norms (and in consideration of the corresponding functions of the issue norms with didactical categories). From the issue or formative norms, Bokelmann proceeds to infer some didactical norms which then must be judged to be the essential course of teaching, under which are the relations among learning contents, the act of learning, and the presenting itself.

These issue or formative norms are further supported and complemented by what he calls legal and economic norms. The first must give evidence that a formal policy of teaching is tied to its political-legal connection, while the latter especially is attuned to the aspect of providing organized teaching. The didactical, legal, and economic norms which are included in what Bokelmann calls ascetic norms in which the boundaries of educating and teaching, but especially the formability of the learning person, are explained and made accessible for practice.

Bokelmann's explication is not simply preposterous for anyone who knows contemporary pedagogics and didactics. Indeed, in most respects, it is an entirely acceptable theoretical explanation with respect to which one, in various respects, can make available with impressive justification. In our search for the origin or point of departure for constructing a didactical theory, we also must thoroughly consider a few aspects, in this regard, which create very

definite problems in the formal deliberation of an explication such as this (proceeding from the norm structure).

There is no doubt that teaching belongs to the most original (primordial) experiencing at one's disposal. In the same way, it certainly is the case that the norm structure held by humans belongs to the most original life contents which they apply in their development of existence, and which they use as beacons on their way through the world. But it is precisely in this relation of form and contents where our problem lies in deliberating on a formally construed didactical theory.

From the view that the concept "norm" explains essential contents and form is an active, experiential tendency to act, which shows itself as a matter of human being in the world, it would be very difficult to justify, on a theoretical level, that contents and form, in this case, represent an identical structure. No one doubts that the sense of existence is to be found in the norm structure contents, and continually leads back to it. But the norm structure is specific with respect to time, culture, space (place), religion, life and worldview, etc. The norm structure continually provides evidence of **what** and **why** the act of educating is a meaningful matter. But **how** this educative event (teaching event) must be put in motion does not lie within the area the norm structure addresses.

The normative character of educating and teaching has little to do with its form. The result is that, in designing a didactical theory from the normative structure, as explained above, the problem is that the meaning norms indeed constitute a solid ground for educating and teaching but without providing an inferential basis for the meaning norms (didactic, conditional, and ascetic norms). This necessarily poses a gap in the theory's development because the **contents** which arise with educating are thoroughly accepted in the activity and with authority, while the form cannot be directly inferred from this.

To speak of didactical norms really means to explain didactic propriety. It is understandable that didactic propriety is revealed in the contents of the meaning norms. The didactic meaning of norms, in line with Bokelmann's reasoning, place many direct demands on the didactic course, as far as the choice of teaching contents is concerned. The name "issue norms" implies the businesslike, the

matter itself, reality. But unlike the contents, reality is not particular in character.

The reality is reality by virtue of its universal and generally accepted appearances. Teaching, thus, is businesslike, in the sense that any contents, also specific contents, can be taught in specific ways: Roman Catholic and Protestant, Christian and Mohammedan, democratic and despotic.

Essentially, teaching cannot be taken up as anything other than the original, the essence of “*didaskhein*”, however incomplete and unsatisfactory this might appear to be. Teaching cannot exceed original experiencing and is itself knowable in specific norms manifested, i.e., didactic norms. Also, issue-didactic norms are not required in the theoretical construction, as the additional terrain of criteria. This must imply opinions instead of descriptions.

In its essence, teaching is not inferred from contents or standpoints. Teaching **is!** Indeed, it is one of the greatest problems of teaching through all the centuries that, if the content aspect is found in order, there is little attention paid to form, in the sense that it is built into an accountable structure and is described. The consequence is that, where content is clearly formulated, the form always has taken a secondary place, while form description constitutes exactly the task for designing an accountable didactical structure (theory). “*Didaskhein*” is an ontological matter in its form and is only meaning-normatively defined re content: criterially definable by issue norms.

However extensive the contributions from a norm structure to our didactic insight might be, it seems to not be possible to arrive at the origin of “*didaskhein*” via didactic-pedagogical norms.

**3. Didactic history:** Teaching is as old as humans for the simple reason that no one is born with knowledge of what occurs or must occur in this world. The acquisition of knowledge, which is the eventual aim of all teaching in each person’s life, seems to be a personal, unique acquisition and integration of insights, skills, etc. No one is born with this because it is not part of any child’s inheritance.

Therefore, teaching has a history in two respects: a history in so far as teaching has developed in a chronological sense with world

history and, in many respects, has co-determined world history. But, in the second place, it has a history in the life of each person, which determines the scope and quality of his/her participation with reality. Without teaching, no one becomes someone. With a deficiency in adequate teaching, the world comes to a standstill. As a matter of fact, the present is understood in terms of the past, while our knowledge of what has already occurred, to a large degree, enables us to know what more ought to happen. Human historicity allows one to anticipate futurity and prepare one for it via teaching.

Therefore, it is not surprising that various didacticians have searched for the origin or ground of didactic work in its history. Didactic history is infinitely rich and varied: Plato's **Republic**, Augustine's **Confessions**, Comenius' **Great Didactic**, Rousseau's **Emile** are writings of phenomenal expressive power. Also, didactics cannot renounce its history, and, after all, it is what it is mostly by virtue of its development. And why should the origin of didactical thinking then not also exhibit the origin of didactic activities?

Moller<sup>5</sup> indicates that, in fact, the didactic is its underlying history. With this pronouncement, he really means that one is concerned with an overpowering, far-reaching power, not at the disposal of the present, but what, over time, is sedimented in what now is only history. History is what remains of a past which was present, and which we now know and describe as teaching, is only knowable and describable because of what always occurs and has brought the present about. Therefore, outside history, the present is not to be described, judged, or implemented. Hence, history provides answers to the questions asked about the present situatedness of persons.

Accordingly, the situatedness of persons is a historical situatedness, i.e., it is the conglomerate of determinations, motives, necessities, and matters about which persons in a specific period pay for dearly. Persons belong to these historically developed forms and to reality. A person's historical definition draws for him/her the horizon of his/her possibilities as boundaries within which he/she can, to some degree, freely design him/herself, and his/her existence, but from which he/she also cannot escape.

Then, it is within this historically defined horizon which a didactical theory provides answers about the decisions which persons make regarding what they confront here and now as reality. But the



human judgments which they necessarily and understandably make by virtue of their historicity, also are their becoming, by which their possibilities (as taken up in the didactic practice) eventually become observable. This, then, is what is meant by the claim that a person cannot escape his/her history: he/she is not delivered to his/her history, but his/her lifeworld is historically defined.

The task of a didactical theory, in this specific connection, then, must be to provide a response to the appeal of the contemporary situation as presented by history—a response which is not possible unless it is provided in terms of the historical situatedness of persons.

Indeed, we must realize that such a way of viewing proclaims a relatively unambiguous relation between reality and possibility. It is unambiguous in that the constituents of the present situation are nothing more than historically defined, and which the action possibilities correspond to historical limits because history, in this respect, demarcates the life horizon. In his/her search for the origin of didactical theory, the thinker must make a pronouncement about whether the constituents of the situation, and whether the choosing, acting, changing constituted person brought about these situational givens by what he/she chose and did in specific relations, perspectives and, eventually, in giving new meaning. That historicity undoubtedly hones the human spirit is disputed by no one; whether one's historicity determines his/her going out to reality is another problem.

The historically defined situation, however far-reaching a view it can provide, and for designing a didactical theory, is not the most important question which one encounters here. If one accepts that what **is** knowable and describable, after it comes to the surface of what was, this also implicitly means there is a corresponding structure regarding what was and what is. Thus, the present cannot be viewed other than in the light of the past.

In other words, if there were no correspondence between the present and historical situation, the present would not be knowable in terms of the historical. The contemporary didactic situation, then, would not be describable as a type of situation in terms of past situations **as such**. Hence, the present and past must manifest themselves in the light of this comparable structure, which means that their correspondence must be looked for.

Understandably, this correspondence is not absolute. Changes in time and place give rise to variations. However, these variations are not the structure itself, but they are possible variations because there **is** a structure. At this stage, it seems as if the past is not determined as much as the present, in a historical sense, but that it repeats itself in the present. What the superceded situation has constituted, therefore, also constitutes the correspondence, and the replaced identity of the present and superceded situation are related to one's insight into the constituents which correspond in the past as well as present, as the past is observed, separated, and described.

The differentness of the present situation is a variant of these constituents, otherwise, the present situation would not be knowable in terms of the superceded situation. After all, the present situation is not the superceded one because this is impossible according to the reality categories of time and space. Therefore, the superceded situation does not have more identity than the present one, or the reverse: both are interpretations of human situatedness after time and space appear.

Regarding the search for the origins of didactic practice in history, this pronouncement is of extraordinary importance. As a situation-type, the didactic situation, thus, is not in time, and not bound to history, otherwise its structure would change from time to time and, in this light, the presence of the superceded would not have been repeatable.

A pronouncement, such as Moller's that didactics provides a response to the situation which history presents, and, especially regarding the historical situatedness of persons, is quite correct. But this is irrelevant for understanding the origins, the ground or structure of the didactic course. Therefore, this also has no relevance when an analysis is performed to disclose what is essential to "didaskhein". When the present, as well as the superceded situation, reveals the essence of teaching, this means that the historical does not predispose the presently recognizable structure, or that the historical course now presents to us something recognizably other than this general structure, as already **described** in the past.

This does not mean that didactic history does not or cannot contribute to our understanding of what teaching essentially is. Didactic problems are formulated in a historical sense and provide evidence that, in many respects, in principle, try to fundamentally disclose and clarify essences. To mention only one example, historical didactics provides insight into what, over many centuries, was formulated as the didactical ideal. As history progressed, it was possible to judge the actualization of the ideal in the practical situation because time is one of the most important factors which puts a distance between a person and his/her lived situation and which, in this way, enables him/her to arrive at a distanced, objective view. In this way, the historical allows us in didactics to keep fancy and reality separated and, on this basis, to anticipate and intercept future didactic dilemmas. To the extent that there is an original structure, it must be manifested in the contemporary situation, just as in the past, otherwise there can be no mention of a structure as such, i.e., of an origin.

**4. The school:** For many years, and often with good reasons, the school has served as a point of departure for designing didactical theory. Above, it is noted that a didactical theory which has nothing or little to say to practice cannot rightly claim to be a "theory". Now, it is precisely the school which offers the ultimate juncture and final touchstone for didactical theory. It is especially here that the didactical perspective must be realized, and where "didaskhein" must be dealt with in organized ways. The school is a formal, businesslike, and organized institution which, in all respects, can claim that it is a far-reaching didactic-pedagogical matter in each child's life.

As an educative institution, the school necessarily lies on each child's path (Langeveld) and, therefore, it is a way toward designing a world (Gaus) for everyone who wants to become adult, will know something, wants to achieve independently, and take his/her place in the world as a person. A school is a place where the future is made, where the last emancipation occurs, where becoming evolves provisionally and is consolidated in most aspects of learning. The school is a matter of "didaskhein", while still far from providing the final answer regarding the state of child becoming, why shouldn't it also be the first, primary structure made available for describing, as well as evaluating child becoming?

When the school is chosen as the point of departure for building a didactical theory, didacticians make use of a variety of analytic perspectives in trying to make clear the origins of teaching. As far as the school is concerned, it is noted that it is a societal institution. Thus, it shows all the essential constituents of the greater, comprehensive structure of society, and the meaning of its activities (teaching) lies in the tense relationships existing between school and society. The school is a preparatory or orienting community from which a child, in formal ways, joins the world of adults.

The emancipation-expectation fostered by the school constitutes the central theme in the search for didactic origins in the school. After all, society expects of a child who leaves school, a somewhat emancipated lifestyle which offers some guarantee of his/her transition to occupational work, sound social relationships, socially accountable trustworthiness with the cultural and religious norms.

As far as society, in general, is concerned, the school has a two-fold task which largely determines its place in and meaning for society. On the one hand, it has a preparatory task, in the sense that it makes selected knowledge and skills available for which a field of practice is created for a child to give him/her the opportunity to orient him/herself to societal matters (including work, the social, justice, moral-religious issues, economics, etc.) which are valid, in a provisional sense, in the broader sphere of society. Thus, the school weaves a basic network of relationships, in a preparatory sense, which realizes the original educative aim, and in which the origin of "didaskein" is then sought.

In a pedagogical perspective (i.e., regarding its contribution to realizing the educative ideal--adulthood), the school is not the only approach available when there is a search for the origins of didactical theory. As is nowadays generally accepted, pedagogically, the school has a far-reaching and finishing educative task and, as an institution, it is not an inevitable part of a person's lifeworld. It is formal and purposive in each facet of its organized activities, and in such a way that an account of the activities can be given to the whole of society (state, church, family, etc.).

Schooling implies a special way of acting. Understandably, this character of activity centers on teaching because teaching represents the directed initiative of the school. When there is no teaching in an institution, calling it a school is to transfer the

initiative of its action to another domain than teaching. Teaching is a cardinal and decisive factor in characterizing an institution as a "school".

The directed intention and initiating power, also in so far as schooling and educating are directly related, are found in the teaching itself. But the teaching is not self-evident. This means that teaching is not automatically observable in school as an initiative of relationships. That is, school teaching follows certain paths, it is seen in specific modes which are available to those who must teach so that the activity character of the organized (school) situation results in teaching effects.

Now, everyone rightly alleges that the quality and scope of the teaching effect is directly related to the quality and scope of the modes of teaching used in the school situation. The modes, ways, or methods of teaching appear to be of decisive significance for grasping the origin of teaching, as this is observable in the teaching effect.

A claim of this nature has two kinds of pronouncements to make of a fundamental nature regarding the origin of didactical theory: In the first place, the [difference between] "didactical theory" and "methodology" is leveled down; methodology is equated with didactical theory. It follows from this that the origin of "didaskhein" also must be sought in the origin of methodology, and that the essentials of the didactic will manifest themselves in the modes of teaching. In this way, it is postulated by some that the school, in general, and teaching methods, specifically, ought to provide the first, primary, practical ground in terms of which teaching can then be essentially grasped, described, and interpreted.

Regarding the search for didactic origins in the school, there is a third popular perspective which is taken as a point of departure and built on with the aim of establishing an accountable didactical theory. It is contended that the school has a mediating character. Therefore, in the school, this involves building a bridge to the future. This bridge is only possible if the pupils proceed in systematic ways to acquire and master contents by which their future situatedness in the world of adulthood is placed within their grasp. Therefore, schools are involved with contents: cultural things, forms of cultural systems, experiential contents relative to

living, to mention only a few of the terms generally used for learning contents.

To the extent that the teaching contents in the situation are transferred to or actualized in the pupil's command of them, there is then mention of teaching: the theoretical meaning of the activity itself is identified with the meaning of the contents, while the school, as an institution, has the task of selecting, ordering, and offering these contents in such a way that their imminent sense, figuratively speaking, will make visible the change striven for by teaching.

All other aspects of teaching are coordinated and concentrated on the original sense of the contents by which they are proclaimed to be the central source of knowledge of "didaskhein". Where the relation between the school's and the home's educating are described, it is argued that home educating is seen as also dealing with norms, i.e., with contents which inherently carry the origin of teaching within themselves.

It is not difficult to establish that many of the arguments and views which regard the school as the place, event, or theme which indicates the origin of "didaskhein" contradict and even exclude each other. By carefully considering all these perspectives and their contributions to establishing a grounded didactical theory, it also is appropriate to understand them well. No one contends that schooling does not make an extensive and far-reaching contribution to the educating and eventual adulthood of its pupils. When it is contended that a future is made in school, that the school prepares and perfects its pupils regarding their future work situation, that its successes and failures are often attributable to methodological approaches, that the contents serve to manifest the deepest sense of being a person, as this is interpreted by a society—all these have didactic-pedagogical validity.

Whether such pronouncements are valid is not the problem with which we are concerned. The problem is designing a didactical theory to disclose its ground, its origin and, if any of the above perspectives on the school situation dealt with, and many others which are possible but were not given prominent expression, are able to disclose the origin of teaching.

It is noted that, as an institution, the school is not an original aspect of the human lifeworld. A school is a societal institution with a formal, mediating character aimed at realizing aims established and varied by persons, and it is kept going at the expense of society as a totality. After all, history shows that a school has not been viewed everywhere and always as a necessary institution for the good and perfecting educative structure of children. Also, a study of societal knowledge indicates schools of special types form a discontinuous rather than continuous line in educating.

Whether a school comes into being depends on the complexity of the lifestyle, according to societal tendencies, its prosperity, and the political weight of the corresponding educative ideals. The more persons move away from the original, natural ways of being in the world, the more necessary and more differentiated the school is as an institution on the life horizon. In some respects, the lifestyle must expand on the family as the original educative milieu and institution, and even be partly replaced by an institution which formally and systematically can effectively take over educating.

The school is much more a matter of a human institution, in contrast to reality, than it is an original situatedness in the lifeworld. When parents become aware of deficiencies in their fundamental, primary educative intervention with their children, they establish a school to fill or, if possible, even eradicate the felt deficiencies.

Therefore, a school interprets a person's original situatedness, it apes it well, in the sense that it brings it about again. Its activities, aims, modes, and contents are already in a child's lifeworld before he/she reaches school age. The school's structure has a second-order character and, however accurately an analysis of it can be, and no matter how illuminating and orienting the findings regarding the structure of its activities might appear, the origin of "didaskhein" cannot be indicated by this because "didaskhein" existed before there were schools. Therefore, the school's situation can be understood from "didaskhein"; however, "didaskhein" does not arise from the school.

**5. The psychology of learning:** Learning is inseparably connected to teaching. Setting aims, selecting methods, and contents, choosing learning and teaching aids, practicing the new contents, testing, and examining, as well as promoting a child are inherent aspects of

teaching which are only meaningful and only occur in practice because it is assumed that learning is possible. Therefore, it is not strange that, for a long time and based on extensive research and systematic reflection, didacticians have sought the origin or foundation of teaching in the knowledge amassed about learning.

In the volumes of literature on this topic, which are available for consultation and for possible application to a didactic situation, learning is expounded in comprehensive ways and is interpreted with conviction with respect to the origin and course of the didactic situation. It makes little sense to give, in a few paragraphs, an overview of the historical and contemporary perspectives which are prominent. The fact is, this ought to be familiar terrain for all didacticians, and many didacticians, in one or more respects, have adopted perspectives on learning while omitting the issue of a "didactical theory".

It is not possible to explain this approach as grounding for didactical theory without investigating, to some degree, the possibility of this grounding and without thinking about it in terms of our problem. If the didactician, in exploring the terrain of the psychology of learning, can penetrate to the essentials of the learning activity itself, he/she should consider whether these disclosed essentials of the phenomenon of learning, directly or by implication, provide the ground for the didactic activity he/she is looking for in his/her theory forming.

Various scientists, at different times, and in different ways, and by emphasizing different aspects of the so-called components of the learning activity, have tried to describe them in their essentials. Among others, these essentials are described as a cognitive process, as a breakthrough of insight, as the acquisition of proficiencies for manipulating the surrounding milieu, as a stimulus-response mechanism, as a person's reaction to stimuli from outside, as the externalization of human interiority, as the implementation of intelligence, as a lived experience of situatedness, and the related participation in the world and life.

Although the merits of the various perspectives are not discussed here, they all have one common factor to offer which is relevant didactically, and which makes possible and worthwhile a consideration of the insights of learning psychology as a foundation of didactic activities. Not one of the perspectives denies that a



person can learn. To state this positively, there **is** a learning phenomenon, the learning activity necessarily is actualized in the life of each person, irrespective of the differences about what learning essentially is.

Thus, the one conclusion a didactician can make with certainty, and which is of fundamental importance for his/her argument about the grounding of the didactic event, is that learning is given with being human; thus, being human cannot be imagined without it, that it is a way of being human which cannot be thought away. To be a person means to be able to learn, to become adult; [for an adult] it means to have to learn and be an educator, to help those dependent on educating to necessarily engage in acts of learning. There is no doubt that the learning activity, as a way of being a person, also belongs to the most primary experience available to a person. And just as teaching is actualized by each person, in some way, to the end of his/her life, the learning activity is a faithful companion in which and by which the effect of teaching is largely observable.

Teaching certainly could find its origin in the learning activity if "teaching" and "learning" were identical concepts. However, it has been indicated that, especially as far as the formal didactic course is concerned, learning appears as the teaching effect. One could also say that the act of teaching is manifested in the learning activity. Learning is the result, dividend of teaching but, at the same time, it is not the only teaching dividend. The change, which is continually noticed with a learning person, embraces a much broader, more comprehensive terrain than that of learning results. Changing dispositions, to mention only one example, is not necessarily a result of teaching. At the same time, the learning activity covers a much broader terrain than that of a teaching effect. Each person also learns in situations and from experiences, observations, and feelings which have nothing to do with "didaskhein" (teaching).

In summary: Teaching is much broader than a mere learning effect, and the learning activity covers a more extensive terrain than merely teaching. The commonality, or the overlap between teaching and learning, therefore, is not absolute. Also, teaching is not learning, and learning is not teaching. Hence, the didactician is involved here with two forms of experiencing, two ways of being in the world, each with their own identity, because the manifestation of one does not presume only the other in an absolute sense. And

incidentally, to again look at the school, all a child's learning activities are not only a matter of the school's teaching intervention.

Analogously, learning is describable as a way of being which can be an effect of teaching. Also, the appearance of this effect is not necessarily determined or inevitable. Often, even frequently, there is teaching of persons individually, as well as in groups, without clearly recognizable learning effects in the form of learning achievements. The performing consciousness of a person allows him/her not to be limited to the purely cognitively calculable or perceivable. Lived experiencing, sensing, in other words the affective, are just as much a matter of learning and of the performing consciousness of a person as are the clearly recognizable, even legible learning achievements from which there mainly is mention of teaching.

If there is a difference in identity between teaching and learning, the argument that the foundation of teaching is in the activity of learning falls in the terrain of the impossible and unthinkable. This not only implies that learning is more than teaching and that, conversely, teaching is more than only learning, but especially that teaching is **essentially** different from the learning activity itself. The common factor which teaching and learning **share** doesn't warrant postulating that teaching can find its origin in the phenomenon of learning. It merely indicates that both, investigated in their appearance to a person in his/her original situatedness, can be described as separate ways of being in the world without isolating them to confirm the identity of each. That learning is often an aim of teaching does not proclaim that this aim has the identical structure as the teaching itself.

Also, regarding attempts to ground "didaskhein" in the psychology of learning, it appears that a didactician must take a negative attitude because what is essential to teaching cannot be expressed in terms of the activity of learning.

**6. Hypostatizing categories:** To complement the theoretical decisions made in the above sections, it is fitting and timely to warn those who search for a theoretical mastery of didactic activity against categorical hypostatizing, which necessarily leads to a one-sided and, therefore, incomplete and unaccountable theoretical structure. With the pronouncements about the phenomenon of learning as a possible ground for a didactical theory, many potholes

appeared into which a thinker can fall. There is little doubt that learning functions categorically with respect to “didaskhein” (i.e., is an essence of it).

In other words, the act of learning cannot be thought away and is undeniably entwined with the concept which is implied by “didaskhein”.

The didactic event remains impenetrable for a theoretical didactician when he/she refuses to consider the act of learning and interprets it deliberately and correctly with respect to the structure he/she is building. A category represents, brings to the fore, or makes visible what is essential, necessary to a phenomenon. By hypostatizing, one understands that a matter or principle is interpreted as fundamental to or foundational of a phenomenon. When a theorist, then, is guilty of categorical hypostatizing, this means that a category is interpreted as an absolute ground of such a phenomenon, by which the thinker is enabled to reduce all other aspects, perspectives to this fundamental category, and interpret the entire phenomenon in its light.

When, in a didactical theory, there is a move to categorical hypostatizing, this implies that the theoretician accepts or proclaims a category as the absolute foundational category for disclosing the essence of that phenomenon (in this case teaching), and that all other essential aspects are referred to this fundamental category and are interpreted in terms of it. A didactical theory which is constructed in this way can be nothing more than one-sided and incomplete.

Some of the effects of such reasoning have been encountered in views of the total course of teaching which reduce it to the learning phenomenon and/or interpret the entirety of the change, which forms the warp and woof of teaching, as learning effects, or learning dividends. To explicate further, the meaning of categorical hypostatizing, and its dangers for constructing a didactical theory, it certainly is meaningful to focus on and discuss such a possibility (i.e., apart from the learning phenomenon) and briefly discuss it, especially with the aim of unraveling, in finer detail, its effect on constructing a didactical grounding.

It is difficult for any didactician to deny that German psychology of thinking, over a long period, and as manifested in a multitude of

writings, has contributed, and still does, to our insight into what truly is essential regarding the teaching event. In the light of the age-old German philosophical tradition, and considering that, historically the pedagogical, up to and including the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century, was taken up in philosophy as a discipline, one can understand that thinkers of the stature of Kant, Hegel, Fichte, Herbart, Schleiermacher, Litt, Spranger and Bollnow (to mention only a few) necessarily had discussed teaching in its pedagogical connection and, by virtue of the nature of their philosophies, freely delved into and sought the *fundamentalia* on which an accountable structure would be possible in their theory forming.

The particulars of their views are not relevant here. What one finds conspicuous in studying their views is that, especially concerning the didactic, the argument continually refers to a central concept which fundamentally establishes the foundation for their views: forming (*Bildung*).

The implication is that a theory of teaching is or can be reduced to a theory of forming by which forming, certainly an essential category of “*didaskhein*”, reaches a state of being hypostatized. Although one is aware that the word “*Bildung*,” in German, has a very special and extensive meaning, and which the totality of the teaching event often is summarized with this concept, it is conspicuous that there is little or no theoretical objection raised when this totality is so rigidly and radically reduced to one concept. Theory forming, as well as skill formulating, is permeated with concepts such as formative ideal, formative politics, formative economics, formative content, formative plan, formative knowledge, etc.

Therefore, it also is not surprising that didactical theory, in its most comprehensive (most general) sense, but also in a particular sense, is reduced to a theory of forming. At this stage, I do not go into an amplification of the entire problem of forming—in the following chapters we treat this aspect of the didactic structure in a comprehensive and interpretive sense. The problem which we have in focus compels a short explanation, using the category of forming, as an example, without which the question of categorical hypostatizing cannot be viewed appropriately.

Because the above pronouncements can imply that the concepts “*didaskhein*” and “forming” are synonyms, one must indicate that the German word “*Bildung*” (“forming”) has its own significance. On

the one hand, the concept “Bildung” refers to an inner change, i.e., a generally human change which occurs from the orienting and attuning power emanating from historically and culturally acknowledged contents. These formative contents are the contents which are raised or should be broached by teaching, and by which a person’s encounter with his/her spiritual heritage of reality can be brought about. Thus, in this case, “Bildung” refers to an **event**, a course of becoming which especially is actualized during the school years, but whose effects are lifelong, i.e., last through the whole course of life.

However, this last pronouncement refers to a second, different side or meaning of the concept, i.e., that it also refers to a **state** of inner, attuned change which is shown in the way one participates in surrounding reality and life. This inner, attuned change cannot occur without a minimum of knowledge and experience of the formative contents. Accordingly, the task of teaching is to bring about the **event** or the change (“forming”) via the formative contents with the aim of reaching a **state** of inner disposition or attunement by which accountable and extensive participation in the highly valuable on the human horizon can be accomplished. This participation, motivated by an inner disposition, constitutes the formative ideal which, at the same time, is elevated to a didactic aim.

The question which now arises is: can the whole of the didactic event essentially be reducible to the category of forming; or, conversely, can the whole of the teaching activity be described and explicated from the category of forming?

The problem is more difficult than it seems. Forming is described as an event *and* as a state. The event called forming is not an obvious matter (in either case, not in the didactic situation) because the intended activity is not in the situation itself but in the plan of the adult (teacher). Forming, as a state which a pupil arrives at, is conspicuously a matter of learning effect, in the sense of commanding, acquiring and even manipulating reality.

Thus, here one is concerned with three aspects peculiar to the course of didactic activity: a purposive presentation corresponding to the formative value of contents, an anticipated effective learning activity, and an event of changing, which indicates that the aim has wholly or partly been attained (i.e., state).

Would these three matters, in their clearly manifest coherence, disclose the origin of “didaskein”?

Here it is appropriate to indicate that the validity of the pronouncements, as taken up in the above discussion, cannot be placed in question or disputed to any degree. One must still note that, while the concept “Bildung” presumes an extensive disposition to participate in life and world, the word itself does not imply presenting or learning in any obvious sense. Forming involves changing, deepening, flourishing human participation in surrounding reality. No one doubts that this forming can occur, be brought about, or accomplished. It is equally certain that, in neither of its two meanings, does it automatically acquire pedagogically qualitative shape in the life of a person. For example (and merely hypothetically), should nothing happen with a person, forming also would not occur.

Viewed from another angle, one must also note that forming is not only a result or dividend of the teaching, and, hence, learning activity in one’s life. I accept this last statement as trite, as far as the course of the didactic situation is concerned. Forming cannot be limited to an interconnected course of didactic situations. One does not learn merely in successively organized didactic courses. One learns a great deal outside any teaching intervention by interpreting, experiencing, perceiving, sensing, etc. The change which is considered in forming theory, and which unquestionably is observable in the life of each person, cannot be limited to the dividend of didactic intervention. Teaching is but one of the factors, although an extremely important one, which eventually contribute to the state of formedness attained.

In searching for the didactical *fundamentalia* here, one is faced with two deficiencies: in the first place, the change discussed in forming does not **necessarily** presume teaching, and not **necessarily** learning. In the second place, forming, in its meaning as an event as well as a state, cannot be limited to the didactic situation, so teaching and forming (i.e., a theory of teaching and of forming) cannot be interpreted as identical concepts or identical meanings. The concept “forming” covers a noticeably much broader field than “forming by teaching”; as a teaching dividend, the word forming means that the change produced by the didactic situation presumes an activity which precedes the forming. This activity is shown by

the adult as well as the child, i.e., in presenting and in learning contents. Teaching is something other than the change, although it can predispose one to change—but change occurs in a person's life irrespective of whether there is teaching.

Conspicuously, our problem is one of relief and perspective. When an essential aspect of teaching, such as the expected change, is taken out of its proper perspective and is so overwhelmingly placed in the foreground, the rest of the course of teaching, in its essences, is partly or entirely obscured, the only possible result for the search for the grounding of “didaskēin” is a one-sided, incomplete perspective. The relief the theory presupposes, in an exact sense, shows a clear deficiency in dimensional relation, according to the whole of experience regarding this, and which is available in the lifeworld.

Categorical hypostatizing is, for the theoretical didactician, an attractive and tempting fork in the road because, in its everydayness, it appears so true, so realistic, and even so practical. It is not possible to reduce “didaskēin” to one, fundamental category which can make visible its total structure, other than “being in the world”. What was previously explicated regarding forming holds for each of the other categories which arise in designing such a theory. The student of didactics must know that, to hypostatize in designing a theory, is a hazardous practice which seriously jeopardizes the validity of seemingly pure theory construction.

### C. CONCLUSION

The search for a point of departure for constructing or designing a didactical theory in terms of the above pronouncements, cuts to a comprehensive and varied problem. The answers to questions of essential significance for such a design are not in the superficialities of everyday experiences circulating for compilation. It also seems that an eclectic approach to designing such a theory, although not without value, does not penetrate to the origins sought. If this is the case regarding the above six possibilities or starting points for designing a didactical theory, one must arrive at a structural whole which provides answers to the fundamental questions.

In each of the above analyses, we note that, as far as they involve structure, they neither have, nor can they, assimilated the meaning

of "didaskein". To think that deliberately chosen syntheses of fundamentals which arise and which have brought to light the origin, can serve as the basis for such theory forming would be dangerous science.

Everyone who works scientifically today is thoroughly aware that the whole is more than the sum of its parts. Therefore, it seems that a more accurate explication of the didactic problem, in a general sense, and as far as it is now available to us, must be done before beginning a search for the origin of "didaskein" and, therefore, broached again is the point of departure for designing a didactical theory. The problem is so varied, and, in modern times, some aspects are so actual, that didacticians can be forgiven for often taking a part for the whole, interchanging theory for practice, techniques for principles, and interchanging results with origins.

Without closely delimiting the didactic problem, one necessarily is inclined to make categorical explications about matters, myopically to describe and prescribe to practice, without knowing how such practice is seen through these categories, or what generally is possible. Also, a thorough explication of the didactic problem of "didaskein" should be viewed and actualized in its experiential context which, after all, is the only way the original practice can be described.

<sup>1</sup> See Killian, C. J. G.: **"Die Verbesondering van pedagogiese Kriteria met ontologies-antropologiese Status"** (Unpublished D. Ed. dissertation, U. P. 1970).

<sup>2</sup> See Landman, W. A. and Gouws, S. J.: **Inleiding tot die Fundamentele Pedagogiek**. Pp 54 et seq.

<sup>3</sup> See Van der Stoep, F.: **Didaktiese Grondvorme**. P 21 et seq. English translation: georgeyonge.net

<sup>4</sup> Bokelmann, H.: **Masstaebe paedagogischen Handelns**. P 32 et seq.

<sup>5</sup> See Moller: **Was ist Didaktik?** P 36 et seq.