

## CHAPTER 3

### THE CATEGORICAL STRUCTURE OF TEACHING

#### A. MOTIVATION FOR THE CATEGORICAL STRUCTURE

As explained earlier about the possibilities for beginning points or approaches to constructing a didactical theory, a fundamental approach to such theory construction is posed as the point of departure within reach of one who wants to know why something is essential to this discipline of pedagogics, but also what is essential to the experiential totality of the phenomenon of teaching within an educative context, to shed light on its commonplaceness, and its significance for intervening, as an everyday form of living within the reality of educating. As a matter of fact, the everyday commonplaceness of teaching for penetrating this aspect of the phenomenon of educating is deceiving.

In a variety of areas outside the activities of educating, teaching is manifested as a didactic matter which cannot be eliminated from a person's usual course of life. Thus, when there is a search for the *fundamentalia* [essences] by which this activity is constituted, understandably, there are a variety of implications a person must also consider in disclosing the essences, which today are generally known as categories. In the most general sense, under no circumstances should a categorical structure of teaching ever allow certain assumptions of the thinker to be left out of the reality to which he/she is attuned. This is of special importance in designing a didactic pedagogical theory. After all, a teaching situation, such as one learns to know in everyday life, is largely an *altered* situation. As a type of situation, its origin certainly is in the reality of educating. This is described fully in the previous chapters, but also in currently well-known publications.

The possibility of a categorical structure is rooted in this original reality of educating. The way in which this reality continually appears as evident is already an alteration and difference with respect to the original reality of educating, in the sense that, e.g., it is formalized anew in an institutional form in the lifeworld so that

anyone who wants to participate in it is compelled to deal with this altered form. Therefore, the reality perceptible in the form of schooling is no longer the original reality. Hence, the didactician must understand that, should he/she direct his/her “fundamental” thinking to the school, he/she involves him/herself with an altered occurrence of the original phenomenon which, *ipso facto*, must lead to his/her pronouncements about such an altered reality not necessarily engaging the essences (categories) of the original phenomenon.

In this way, the thinker cannot possibly arrive at a categorical construction in his/her theoretical descriptions and, often, his/her theory building loses the anticipated appeal because the origins of the experience are not necessarily disclosed in their essences in the situation which he/she has chosen to describe and analyze. This last aspect is extraordinarily important. The altered situation is not an original part of human experience. As an altered situation, it is presented by those who hold it as necessary. The school situation constitutes such an altered slice of reality. Any didactical theory grounded in the school as an institution, necessarily discloses this altered situation as the first essence and, only in so far as the school appears as a categorical construction, can a theory claim the title “categorical structure”.

In this light, the culmination of the motivations for a categorical structure in a theory of teaching in which the following matters are implicated and for which there is no preferred order.

1. Fundamental thinking about “*didaskhein*” presumes a thinker proceeds from the fact that, originally and inevitably, a person is involved with structures and courses of reality. Indeed, there is no distance between person and reality. From the outset, he/she is a participant in a sequence of changing situations and events influencing his/her destination [of adulthood], but his/her attunement also brings about change, creates tensions, decisions, etc. A person is *with* things, he/she actively participates in living life—be it negative or positive, worthy of approval or disapproval.

The dynamics of life, and the demanding character of the situation in which he/she finds him/herself is touching, in a literal sense. This does not mean he/she is delivered to the course of life—he/she continually changes his/her circumstances. But he/she must act, even when sometimes he/she waits for things to happen to him/her. To wait also is a way of acting. Thus, a person also *is with* teaching. Teaching is part of the actualization of everyday life; it belongs to the original form of his/her experiencing—in fact, this is one of the original ways in which a person is involved with reality. To participate in reality means to learn about and from it, to discover its mysteries, but also to be taught about its secrets for the purpose of fulfilling his/her own orientation to reality.

In fact, the experienceable reality is not always harmless, and insight into and control of its structures is not immediately available to a person who participates in it. Within and outside the course of teaching, a person goes to reality; his/her passage through life is a passage through reality – repeating, implementing, integrating, creating, rejecting, initiating. His/her forms of living and lifestyle are interwoven into specific realities, and as he/she becomes older, the more he/she is determined by them.

2. That a person continually participates with reality shows that this participation is meaningful for him/her, that, in his/her own way, he/she gives meaning to it in accordance with who he/she is. Sometimes a person hesitates about the demands of a situation, sometimes he/she tries to escape, sometimes he/she cries, and sometimes he/she shouts. Whatever determines his/her mood and how his/her destination is seen, this is always a matter of a way in which sense and meaning are given to what is happening to him/her.

It is noted that the various moods which appear in life also occur in a teaching situation. Anxiety, hesitation, jubilation, melancholy, homesickness, hope, etc. are continually realized in what we know as a “teaching situation”. If one includes a person’s involvement with reality, his/her being in the world, as the first, most fundamental category, in an ontological sense, to

also understand, in this light, then the original, fundamental appearance of teaching implies it is a meaning giving activity which expresses the relationship one establishes with this reality.

The fact that a person establishes relationships with reality via his/her being-here [Dasein] speaks for itself. He/she likes some experiences and not others. He/she has preferences for others, he/she likes certain activities, such as being leisurely, etc. In general, he/she establishes very specific relationships which are evidence of the ways he/she gives meaning to the things and people around him/her.

This question of relationships, as a manifestation of giving meaning, is of utmost importance when a didactician wants to reflect fundamentally about his/her practice. A person who thinks, proceeds from the fact that his/her involvement with reality is meaningful to him/her. If his/her going out to reality is not meaningful, thinking about the whole matter would be impossible because then the only act noticeable would be withdrawing. A person does not withdraw him/herself from reality, he/she continually teaches his/her child because his/her child's being-there, and his/her future are matters which are meaningful to him/her. Thus, a person's being in the world implies meaning-giving activities, of which teaching is one of the most important.

3. These activities a person engages in are human acts. In this respect, a didactician must be thoroughly aware that, in his/her theoretical constructions, he/she is dealing with pronouncements about persons after their appearance. Statements pronouncements about human beings are possible only in terms of essential, undeniable facts, i.e., anthropological categories, made possible by a person's being in the world, as one who thinks about being human.

Formally, here we are dealing with anthropological categories which have ontological status, and which illuminate the ground or foundation of a person's ways of engaging with reality by a didactician. A didactician does not design a situation for non-human beings, and he/she cannot penetrate what, in this respect, is

essential for his/her own practice if he/she doesn't take notice of a participating person as he/she is. Today, it is generally accepted that it is people who educate who must do this. To educate is a human act specifically directed to intervening directed to self-awareness. An adult cannot educate with respect to nothing. His/her educating is about "something"— values, norms, codes of behavior, skills, attitudes, etc.

Educating is about contents, life contents which flow directly from a person's life and worldviews. Maintaining life and worldviews is human. They exemplify the meanings a person gives to his/her life and world. But a child is not born with knowledge about life and world, and just as little, with incomplete educating, the first light is not seen. These contents must be made known, they must be presented with repeated emphasis. Regarding the contents, there must be teaching because a child does not know, and he/she can't obey what he/she doesn't know.

To introduce the contents which will guarantee the ultimate form of adulthood, and from the start will establish a lifestyle in accordance with life and worldviews is a specific human act. To teach is a human activity because there are no predisposing instincts which spontaneously guarantee a lifestyle. What are of human worthiness are the themes or contents of educating which are continually actualized in teaching. Without teaching, educating is inconceivable because the meaningful relationship between person (child) and reality must be built into a solid form. The humanness of a person is actualized in teaching, and brings about movement in a creative, constitutive sense. "Didaskein" is fundamentally unique to being human.

4. It is noted that the first ontological category is "being in the world" and has fundamental value for insight into being human itself and, by implication, for didactical theory forming. One of the main motivations is that it provides insight into what original experiencing of teaching means. That is, how the original experiencing of teaching is continually, accumulatively taking form. Thus, teaching contributes formatively to a person's being in the world.

Here it must be well understood that the category “person in the world” as such, is completely original and cannot be redirected or attributed to one or another experience structure. Understandably, a person’s participation with reality has its accent as well as form aspects which are manifested as forms of teaching, i.e., didactic forms, among other ways. A person in the world actualizes his/her participation with reality in the form of the activity of teaching.

This is not the only form in which a person’s being in the world is shown. He/she will also pray, trade, judge, play, etc. None of these forms of living are placed ahead of or above another. All are useful forms of manifestation in which and by which experiencing is verbalized based on a meaning-constitution of life contents, i.e., they show a knowable form.

The outcome of the form which a person reveals in the world, this original, simple, and everyday way of *doing* by a person also can be described as the forms of actualizing his/her involvement with reality. In so far as the multiplicity in the life of each person unfolds or is completed regarding its quantity and scope, i.e., to the extent that a person, in his/her ways of participating, does not expand further, there is a closed form of living in inhabiting the world.

It is important to point out that, although a person can make a choice about whether he/she wants to trade something, to get married, etc., in his/her participation in teaching, he/she has no such choice. He/she cannot display the image of being human, he/she cannot remain in life biologically if he/she does not subject him/herself to and participate in the form of living we know as teaching. Thus, teaching belongs to his/her most original experiencing. Where and when the notion of “person in the world” is expressed, necessarily it speaks of his/her participation in teaching [e.g., being taught]. The specific humanness speaks in the form of teaching. And, when here there is reference to a specific human being, a specific way of being human is assumed.

Here it is emphasized that this original experiencing reveals a very definitive and demonstrable voice regarding a

person's forms of living, in general, and specifically. It must be well understood that, in this case, as a form of living, teaching remains static, unmoving with respect to his/her other human activities, **until** it serves as a container for life contents. Thus, this form of living becomes visible when this container is filled with contents which give his/her life meaning. This is an essential insight into the fact that, inevitably, a person participates in living but, especially regarding our fundamental understanding of the matter, "teaching".

In teaching, the content brings the form into motion, and even more, it brings to the surface the varied, fulfilling original experiencing so a description of the didactic is made possible. A person only experiences something rather than nothing. An experience is qualified, named, because of contents which bring it into motion. With this, experiencing includes teaching as an inherent possibility which must be actualized if a situation demands it. Learning to pray, trade, play, or speak correctly essentially are inherent possibilities of these forms of living. The contents speak in these forms of living (teaching), or are brought to expression.

5. To indicate how easy a thinker can lose his/her original trail, I show the understandable, but theoretically unforgivable interchange of primary (given, original) and second order (constructed) structures in designing a scientific theory. This issue is raised in the preceding introduction and, once again, is highlighted here for the sake of completeness because the validity of a scientific construction is entirely dependent on it.

In the preceding section, it is emphasized repeatedly that to penetrate to the fundamentals of the didactic pedagogical, the original experiencing [of teaching] must be sought. To ground a theoretical design on second order structures would have the same implication as trying to isolate the basic elements or raw materials from a finished product. Such a compilation could not, however, be described other than in terms of the separate matters which constitute the completed product.

To understand the form of teaching, there must be a return to its original form (family) in the lifeworld, and not to a second order (school), already refined, combined and formalized structure for the purpose of describing its origins. As far as teaching is concerned, this does not mean the second order school practice cannot contribute to insights and explanations, i.e., to the theoretical designs to which a didactician is headed. But teaching occurred and had form long before schools had existed.

A school is not an essential matter in a child's experiential world; school can be eliminated from a child's life. In fact, setting up schools and organizations of systematic, formal practice is possible because teaching is more original [i.e., older] than schools. One can build upon the experiential totality of teaching as a form of living, carefully refine its form, combine aims, make available physical facilities for the course of action, and set up such a school. A school is the synthesis of a person's involvement with reality and as such, it is not original experiencing [of teaching] itself.

6. Therefore, a didactician must realize that the original sense of the lifeworld act which is known as teaching, also will reveal its original structure in this slice of experiencing as a first, primitive form of a person's being in the world. This original sense, as a manifestation of original structure, speaks to a thinker in this case because the harmony of form and content, as ways of giving meaning, are unique to human existence.

It is well to note that, although the form experienced is of a general nature, the contents have specific significance in terms of factors determined by the contents, including the ways in which a person transcends reality by transforming it into a reality for him/herself in a milieu, period, etc. When a didactician then reflects on the practice he/she wishes to describe in the light of its original sense, as manifested in its original structure (the reality of educating), teaching gives form to this original sense of a person's presence in the world and, therefore, teaching, as a tendency of the reality of educating, makes its (educating) original sense visible again in an activity (teaching) which creates the opportunity to interpret it.



As far as contents are concerned, the **fact of contents** is general, but the **nature of the contents** is specific. Indeed, this cannot be otherwise. In his/her first disclosure of the real, undeniable essences of the slice of reality we know as teaching, a didactician must concentrate his/her thinking on its form rather than on the original sense-giving of a person's presence in the world.

Form is a matter of universal truth which is not limited to time or space other than being earthbound, and which has occurred and will occur among persons of all eras. On the other hand, content varies as persons participate in the world. Content is a variable aspect of teaching which every adult generation decides for itself and with respect to educating those for whom they are responsible. Form carries the possibility of content. One also could say form is pregnant with content because a life practice which is without it cannot be actualized. Thus, when there is mention of didactical categories, they must take the form of original experiencing (the reality of educating), after their original sense are disclosed to be labeled as categories. In other words, if they can be eliminated from the lifeworld as not necessary, they forfeit any claim to categorical status.

The didactical categories, therefore, disclose the meaning or sense of original experiencing known as teaching. This implies that categories must be sought in the essences of teaching and not from another way of being, e.g., learning. Teaching and learning are not complementary concepts, although one assumes the origin of the other, and the sense of the activity. In this regard, in his/her theory forming, a didactician should note the following:

a) The original meaning of teaching is closely related to the original meaning of educating. Educating is a matter which is always directed to reality. However, reality is not self-evident beforehand for those who are dependent on being educated. Therefore, reality must be made accessible. To make it accessible necessarily leads to didactic action in two respects: Firstly, there are contents in terms of which an educand's becoming must occur, and, secondly, there are forms which make an educand's involvement with reality possible.

b) In this light, teaching leads to helping one person by another because a person's being in the world calls him/her to give meaning to his/her being-there. The meaning of a person's being in the world as an adult, and the intersubjective relation with his/her child's being-there, solicit teaching as an original, spontaneous way of giving help. The being-there of the other demands that the contents coupled with his/her being-there must be unlocked for him/her – otherwise, his/her own being-there will make no, little, or haphazard sense. Thus, the act of teaching is directly related to a person's own being in the world. Formally stated, Dasein, as an ontological structure, proclaims “didaskhein” as a way of being involved or becoming involved with things of reality because of the interpretation things demand as they appear in each other's landscapes.

c) Things, including people, objects, events, experiences, etc., are contents for a person by which there also is or can be reality in general. Without these contents, a person's presence in the world is not possible, unthinkable, because their coherence is manifested in these contents. Reality speaks to a person through contents. His/her experiences are linked inextricably to that with which he/she is involved, and which direct an appeal to him/her which he/she must answer. A person must address the one he/she is intervening with and necessarily act.

d) From the above, there are two forms of relation. Firstly, a person's relation with reality shows that he/she relates intersubjectively—person to person, and person to God. In addition, there are matter of fact relationships which a person must establish. Here, it is emphasized that these relationships are accomplished with respect to contents which presumably speak from his/her being-  
here (being in the world).

The consequence is which teaching (e.g., bringing clarity to the world, putting in perspective, introducing meaningful matters, unlocking, and providing access to contents of reality) and a person's “being in the world” are complementary, in the sense that the latter includes the former, so “being in the world”, as a human matter, cannot be conceived if the teaching of it were eliminated. For a person whose presence in the world is without teaching, there will be no evidence of intentional input.

The consequence is far-reaching. Where there is no intentionality, there can be no question of a person establishing a relationship with all aspects of reality, i.e., he/she cannot live in directedness to and openness for reality.

e) One must accept that the statement “being attuned to the world” also establishes the meaningful possibility of “being attuned to reality”. The ways in which reality discloses itself in a person’s original experiencing, thus, assumes teaching as a way of becoming acquainted with reality in its original sense.

7. From the above, there is an undeniable relation between person and reality which is in and established by teaching. This meaningful relationship is one of the imperatives of original experiencing through which teaching becomes necessary for bringing a person (child) to others and things. A person’s original involvement with reality, thus, announces teaching as an implicit matter of this experiencing because teaching involves disclosing the meaning of being. Thus, teaching, as a categorical matter of being involved with reality, cannot be eliminated from the original experiencing because it constitutes a person’s participation in the world and life in a fundamental way and, hence, it is inextricably embedded in the changing relationship between person and world. In didactical theory building, the following considerations are of importance:

a) Since the sense of the original experiencing (a person’s being by others and things) assumes knowledge of things, a didactician must realize that the original way of learning to know and interpret contents also constitutes the didactical categories. The point of intersection of the parallel activities of “teaching” and “learning,” implied by the foregoing, is that the original meaning of both is that they set and attune a person’s orientation to reality.

In this light, then, the original meaning of teaching is formulated as follows: An adult teaches under the assumption that he/she helps someone (a child) establish relationships with others and things (contents) which loom on a person’s learning horizon. In a child’s course through the world, these contents do not always

appear systematically, and at a tempo an educator desires and deems appropriate. Thus, he/she does things which *allow* the things (contents) to appear before a child. In this way, he/she builds an identifiable harmony between life forms and life contents in accordance with an anticipated future which constitutes the warp and woof of a person's participation with reality.

b) Therefore, the categories of teaching should be pointed out properly where, in the original experiencing [of teaching], one person allows things (contents) to appear for another because, as possessed experience, they must figure as meaningful contents in the lifeworld. Thus, these contents are assumed in constituting didactical categories but are not incorporated or described as such in theory building because of their specific time- and culture-bound nature.

c) In looking for a didactical categorical structure, it is accepted that the totality of reality is unknown to a person who has come into the world. This does not imply that the contents are meaningless. The unknown is a task which presumes there is meaning. This meaning must be made manifest in a becoming person's learning activity, and it is assumed that, as his/her becoming progresses, he/she can gain knowledge of it by:

- i) directly participating in it, and
- ii) in his/her participation, it first is interpreted; i.e., being oriented to these contents beforehand.

d) Therefore, a didactician can rightly ask where this original experiencing ("letting reality disclose itself before anyone else has") show itself in its being, as a truism, in its undeniable essences. The answer should address the categorical structure of teaching. The significance of such a structure is that a category is an illuminative way of thinking (Landman) in terms of which the undeniable essences of teaching, as a matter of original experiencing and original participating with reality can be verbalized so those who must take responsibility for teaching in face-to-face educative situations as they appear in school can do so in systematic and orderly ways.

This confronts a didactical theory with one of its most important tasks, as well as one of its most important insights, i.e., that teaching, as a matter of experiencing, cannot be separated from the life course of any human being. As a matter of a person orienting him/herself to the sense and being of reality, teaching necessarily and undeniably lies on the path of life of each person.

Teaching is a *didactical imperative* which also is a life perspective. Each child must be taught and each adult, by the being-there of his/her child, is called to teach.

In this didactical imperative, the original sense of educating is realized apart from the contents involved.

## **B. THE CATEGORICAL STRUCTURE AND DIDACTIC PRACTICE**

A categorical view of teaching is not the result of mere thought constructions or theoretical concepts which serve a didactician. There are only categories in so far as, in his/her theory building, a didactician reflects on the activity which appears in the original experiencing of all persons as teaching and, thus, he/she reflects on a practice carried out everyday by people. Such a reflecting, viewing, reasoning, under no circumstances, can be the result of a theory, assumption, view, or ideal, but must be grounded in this reality itself, i.e., in teaching practice as an everyday life experience, and in accordance with its essences, as ways in which the totality-experience of the greater whole of educating, can be compiled and described.

Categorical penetrative thinking assumes a penetrative viewing of the reality of teaching, thus, a decision by a didactician to allow the reality of teaching to speak to him/her, and then to verbalize it as a theoretical construction or description. This matter is of extreme importance because the issue of the act of teaching is so unobtrusive in its nature and essence in human involvement in the world, its presence is accepted as self-evident, and insights into its practice in the explication of educating are simply assumed. Contemporary, as

well as historical Western European thinking in pedagogy, is a good example of this.

In the past few centuries of Western European thought on this matter, there has been an attempt to answer the question: What is teaching in its essence? How should one establish a practice or plan a system to achieve the educative aims of teaching? There are no adequate answers to the question: What fundamentally is meant by the act of teaching?

In the past few centuries, seldom have the results of Western European thought been focused on trying to answer the questions: What is teaching in its essence? How would one establish practice, plan a system to accomplish educative aims by teaching? There is no adequate answer to the question: Fundamentally, what is an act of teaching?

If we summarize the details mentioned in the preceding chapters and, especially in the above section of this chapter, as an introduction to the reasoning behind the above-mentioned problem, the following is of essential significance: Thinking about educating necessarily presumes thinking about teaching. After all, any educative action is not realizable without teaching because contents serve as the basic means by which a child participating with reality, becomes and changes. Any teaching not attuned to this becoming and changing is meaningless. Educating without teaching is an existential impossibility because this would strip educating of all contents.

In so far as teaching is the other side of educating, this means that original experiencing or the primordial life form “educating” necessarily includes teaching, and compels a pedagogician to consider teaching, from the start, in constructing a pedagogical theory. Thus, all fundamental pedagogical thinking also necessarily includes statements about teaching, as well as a categorical didactical structure, which must withstand the same test of essence thinking as the pedagogical does.

It is indicated that, in constructing such a theory, a thinker must reflect fundamentally about the activity known as teaching, and this

reflection must reach to a person's original ways of participating in surrounding reality. One of the most important and conspicuous insights into this approach is that a person's original involvement with reality is a meaningful matter to him/her. The ontological category "person-in-the-world" (Heidegger) implies an act of giving meaning which emanates from the relationships one establishes with such a reality. After all, no one is indifferent to or turns away from the world, and from this, it follows that, in his/her reflecting on one's involvement with reality, a didactic pedagogician must accept that this "being in the world" just referred to, although compelling giving meaning, does not announce its meaning as self-evident. To the extent that a person acquires a grasp of reality, he/she also gives meaning to that reality, and establishes his/her own lifeworld, i.e., he/she creates a world in which he/she can dwell.

His/her own involvement with this world is a meaningful matter for him/her. However, this meaning is not static but dynamic, so giving meaning implies an **increasing** attribution of meaning (Landman) by which the didactic task becomes visible. Giving meaning does not speak for itself. The world is a matter of hidden meaning. Also, [for a believer] God remains hidden, unless one accepts and sees that Jesus reveals Himself in nature and Scripture.

What does an adult do? In educating, he/she discloses, in systematic and orderly ways, the coherent nature of reality, for his/her child, in the expectation that his/her child, as time progresses, will him/herself increasingly give meaning to this reality. This meaning acquires its form in terms of contents, but these contents do not announce the form of the help given to the child.

The distinction made here by a didactician is between life form and life content, which, in educating, i.e., teaching, must be synthesized harmoniously. Thus, didactical thinking is systematic and radical on how the ordering of a person's involvement with reality (life form) and the matters with which he/she becomes involved (life content), which are consistently implementable to balance the change in a child's participation in these things. The result of these interactions is identifiable in a person's relating to everything which

emerges from reality, i.e., in his/her displaying the image of a person as an educative ideal, if this intervention is to have validity.

Hence, this is not about theory, as theory, or theory for the sake of theory. Fundamental reflection on the experience of “teaching”, necessarily leads to a practice and, therefore, to a greater particularization to establish an accountable practice. These activities in such a practice are nothing other than human actions because only people are educated and committed to educating (thus, also to teaching).

To put it another way: The category “person in the world” points to the dynamic intentional relationship person-world in original experiencing, which acquires form in teaching, and the description of it must be made available for evaluation. Thus, it is noted that a person’s involvement with reality takes form as original, simple acts which, individually and collectively, draw a line for a person’s form of living. This form of human experience must then be seen such that the specific humanness of his/her acting is brought forth. The specifically human character of his/her forms of experience force a didactic pedagogue to assume the specific human ways of being, by which he/she then fundamentally considers the form of his/her teaching practice.

In building a didactical theory, a thinker can only assume this specific way of being, if he/she also understands that these original acts or experiences must be verbalized as life forms. In other words, a person’s original act and, thus, experience, has an essential say with respect to the life form which, thus, is verbalized. For a didactician, these insights into the coherence of the life form and original experiencing is the foundation of his/her categorical view of teaching, but this remains merely theory unless he/she also realizes that this form of life serves precisely the purpose of a presentation or the possibility of creating a teaching structure in the experiential world. It must be clear, however, that the life form of a person is visible only because it also involves life content.

It is with respect to this coherence of life form and content which the didactical categories, in a descriptive and functional way, can reveal and make known the structure of the experiential whole we



know as “teaching”. “Know” and “make known” raise the issue of knowledge. This knowledge is relevant in theory building and is discussed in several ways. This includes knowledge of a person’s origin, being, and destiny, as well as manipulation of reality. In short: the entire question of the relationship created between person and reality is relevant.

At this stage, we summarize so that our thinking is concentrated on the essence of the contribution which a categorical view must make to constructing a didactical theory, the following matters are important:

1. In a categorical view, the meaning of original experiencing must be revealed as it is realized in the lifeworld, by verbalizing the phenomenon itself. The meaning of original experiencing implies the essence, the significance of the experience, as it appears fundamentally in a person’s world. A person does not put meaning into the lifeworld as such. Things have an implicit meaning, but this implicit meaning is brought to speech in the way in which people give meaning to or interpret them such that there is a world, in so far as we, as human beings, are aware of [these implicit meanings which are made explicit]. To become aware of an experience of educating, which is realized in teaching, is the task of a didactical theory. This meaning inevitably directs an appeal for action. This activity-aspect, in which a didactician primarily is interested, is known as teaching. Therefore, categorical viewing must bring into relief what essentially constitutes “teaching” so that he/she can understand the practice with which he/she is involved.

2. Thus, if that original experiencing *is* not established by a person, but in the fact that he/she is and lives as a human being and brings original experiencing to the surface, it is possible for a thinker to do this scientifically and learn to know it in its ordered coherence. He/she can capture this in his/her theory by holding it still for a moment to put its relief into words. He/she can solidify this relief in his/her descriptions so his/her insight into and understanding of the matters with which he/she is involved are able to be indicated according to both its form and content.

These indications also can be unreal. When they are not real, this means he/she has overlooked the essences of original experiencing

or has shown such a skewed perspective on it that the coherence of the essences, by which the experience itself is constituted, are not verbalized. In this way, the categories, which serve him/her in constructing his/her theory, must make the essences of a practice visible and knowable. Should he/she get mired in purely theoretical concepts, he/she will sketch a practice which is alien to the experience itself.

3. Educating (and teaching) is a dynamic matter. Given this dynamic, it is required of an adult that he/she consciously create situations to try, in this way, to guarantee that the image of a person which holds true in his/her time and cultural situation is consummated. Thus, educating is a matter of repetition, and, in this repetition, an adult seeks to guarantee that the change which has already occurred will emerge. By repetition, one proclaims his/her control of a situation, a life task, a technique, etc. In educating, it is no different. Even in the most primary, simplest intervention of adults with children, the fact of repetition is not to be omitted. This repetition does not presume the essence of educating but works to make these essences more visible. The adult, therefore, is faced with the task of restoring and repeating the situation by which he/she strives to guarantee, as far as is humanly possible, that his/her aims are being achieved.

How would he/she repeat a practice he/she didn't know? And for what logical reasons would he/she entrust his/her children to someone (a teacher) who, in the reality of educating, strives, next to him/her, if the latter cannot show that he/she really knows the practice he/she dares to do?

First and foremost, this knowledge of the practice is rooted in the categorical view of the matter "teaching", as it is realized in the reality of educating. If a teacher does not pay attention to this structure, this simply means he/she dares to practice without being able to give an account of its essences.

4. Practice does not occur with respect to nothing; also, practice itself is something. It is a matter of equilibrium of form and content, and both take their origin from the lifeworld, and turn to it

again. In this return to the lifeworld, a person shows his/her own relation to this reality, and everything which arises before him/her while in its midst.

Therefore, the categorical view, insofar as persons are trained as teachers, must introduce them to the essences of the practice to which they are on their way. Just practically and logically, this matter is a condition for the question: *How* must teaching be. And further: With respect to *what* must teaching be given.

With a view to answering these two questions, a categorical view of the didactic event leads to a very clear distinction. In this respect, the reality of educating shows that a categorical view essentially involves the *form* in which original experiencing is manifested, and which should be described and interpreted accurately for establishing a second order structure by which a formal pathway to a school situation must be adapted to the original sense of the forms of living. It is only in this way that a didactic pedagogue can arrive at the practice to which he/she is moving. His/her categorical view is the first step in trying to describe this practice in its form, and [practically interpret it] also in terms of his/her life and worldview.

Here it should be made clear that the contents, including one's life and worldview, do not essentially determine the form of a person's original involvement with reality. The contents are specific, they change from time to time, from community to community, even provisionally for the time being, so as to bring the following to attention.

It also is true that if there is teaching, as original experiencing, and if one also sees that this original experiencing appears for no reason on the life horizon as such, it cannot be reduced further, a thinker must also realize that the forms of teaching that one gets to know in the lifeworld are forms of living. Therefore, the categorical structure of teaching will bring this original form of living to the surface. With this, now it also is stated that, if the experience related to an educative event (thus, also an event of teaching) is original, the form in which it is given also is original. In other words, for constructing a categorical structure and implementing it in designing a didactical theory, which can fruitfully be transferred

to practice, it follows that teaching is original as a form of living for “human being in the world”.

The scientific sense of a categorical view of teaching must be seen as disclosing to us the sense of original experiencing “person in the world”, also with the aim of understanding what results from this for a construction of a second-order construction of what generally is known as “school”.

Should the didactical pedagogue, in his/her viewing and analyzing original experiencing, assume didactical categories, this means that, with these categories, he/she discloses and describes, in systematic and orderly ways, the original experiencing to reestablish an equally meaningful practice which originally appears in the lifeworld of a person as a meaningful matter. This has the following consequences for didactical theory building: no thinker can arrive at a categorical structure of teaching if he/she refuses to think about teaching as an original life experience in his/her formal thinking about the event. This original experiencing (the first, most primary way in which one deals with things educatively) is the ground from which a categorical structure of teaching arises so that, in his/her practice, this ground again can be returned to.

### **C. ORIGINAL EXPERIENCING AND DIDACTICAL THEORY BUILDING**

The significance of original experiencing in building a didactical theory is highlighted so often and so prominently in the problem posed, an explanation of its significance for constructing a didactical theory is no longer avoided. After all, teaching is a matter of acquiring knowledge which has a constituting function regarding a person’s relationship to reality and, therefore, it is incomplete without an explication such as is provided above regarding the categorical structure of teaching.

Theoretical statements about the coherence of knowledge acquisition and experience are found formally in Aristotle’s philosophy of science, which has described experience as the basis of all knowledge. He claims that the beginning of all learning is rooted in experience because the details made available in

perceiving are generalized in experience and, thus, are declared to be valid knowledge.

For didactics, experiencing is a matter of extreme importance because teaching, as described thus far, in its essence, is established on new, wider flourishing experiential possibilities. This contention presupposes and, thus, is focused on allowing the act of learning, without which teaching cannot be conceived, to manifest itself.

A didactician must not view experiencing as a blending of a variety of tiny realities of daily life. In explaining the essence of experiencing, Husserl<sup>1</sup> points out that insight into a matter like experience is only possible if one takes intentionality directly into consideration. Intentionality is interpreted by Husserl as the attitude of turning to and living reality, and to provide proof in the performances of consciousness, i.e., in learning to know this reality. Therefore, he also talks of a performing consciousness, as a matter of human intentionality.

Then, in this regard, he describes the coherence of learning to know and experience as follows: To learn to know reality, i.e., intentionally going out to reality, belongs to the most original whole of human actions. To be human means to understand reality. Thus, going out to reality implies achievement in mastering such reality. This achievement of learning to know reality, above all, includes perception, but this leads to an experience of active association by which scientific knowledge becomes possible. The act of a person's going out to reality is the original lifestyle of a person and is a precondition for the possibility of scientific knowledge.

He argues further that it is impossible to come to an understanding of reality in a general sense without experience. This statement by Husserl is not new, as Kant espoused this in his *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, referred to above.

However, for a didactician, this is an extremely important statement because, implicitly, it assumes that experiencing enables a person to question an unknown reality meaningfully. Therefore, experiencing enables a person who is outside him/herself (by virtue of being in the world) to master reality, in the sense that, as an activity, he/she

can get to the things he/she is turning to and disclosing the essence of the things themselves. As such, experiencing raises the origins of a person's interest regarding reality which, in its turn, exercises a decisive influence on the relationships a person establishes with reality. In these relations to reality, human intentionality is revealed in its essences, especially regarding the scope of these relations. In the life of a child, gaining experience means revealing the first and most fundamental understanding of things and, therefore, the primary relationships to reality and their possibilities. Thus, this matter is not merely the scope of experience but pushes through to the quality of experience in the light of the repetitive aspect of teaching referred to earlier.

Experiencing is the original possibility which can influence the quality of mastery of a child's relationship to reality. Didactically, this fact means that, based on his/her experiencing, a person can meaningfully question reality, especially because, in the performance of his/her consciousness, he/she proceeds to extend this line to anticipate situations occurring in surrounding reality. Indeed, it is logical that the experiencing of reality also makes available information about it, even if one worked so simplistically, the observation category of Dasein, and its coherence with thought would make a statement such as this possible.

The order or coherence of a reality structure, as a matter of fact, is the dividend gained from human experiences. It also is important to note that the experiences of everyone are, with respect to reality, original, a first experiencing which continually appeals to one's performing consciousness to which a person simply cannot say no. It is equally important to note that, however meaningful original experiencing can be for the relationships one establishes with reality, a complete view of and insight into a slice of reality, merely on the basis, e.g., of perceiving (even one's actual participation in it) is impossible because, as Husserl rightly points out, aspects or moments which cannot be perceived or undergone, nonetheless are *assumed*.

Husserl calls those aspects of reality which cannot be perceived, but which are assumed, anticipations. This already has been said for one or another reason. What we must understand well at this stage, is

that anticipations essentially are part of an experiencing and, especially in the sense that they grasp, in advance, the meaning of a concrete experiencing is such that the anticipations provide additional possibilities for experiencing.

The anticipations in experiencing proclaim possibilities of experience in both scope and quality: experiencing can broaden and deepen, but certainly also thrive in quality and intensity. Thus, anticipations, unlike insights which flow from experiencing, are not dividends of experience, but essentially are unique to experience because experiencing often finds its origin in the anticipations. Anticipations do not predispose experiencing in a deterministic sense, but provide the source, origin of many of the modes of experiencing which figure so prominently in a didactic situation.

Also, there are additional connections a didactician must recognize if he/she wants to contribute meaningfully to theory. From these remarks made so far, the function of experiencing is far superior to perceiving. Put another way: Experiencing is exceeded by experiencing as anticipation such that a learning person can turn in anticipation to reality, even if aspects of this reality and not perceptually available.

In the constitution of reality, as we find it daily in a classroom, these statements are of exceptional importance. This preunderstanding by a person from experience, and his/her exceeding the direct perception in experience has its ultimate didactic meaning in that it illuminates the highest form of achievement in a learning situation. Here one moves to the symbolic, the verbalization of the invisible, the consequences of thought and the emotional life, and, therefore, on one of the highest plateaus of becoming which lies within one's reach.

The fact that important data for didactical theory building are made available from the fields of psychopedagogics and the psychology of learning also is a well-known fact. As far as experiencing is concerned, it is striking that all currently recognized learning psychological views are acknowledged, and each works out, in its own way and by means of its own methods, the connections between the performance of consciousness (as learning) and experiencing.

The usual approach is that learning activity is understandable *from* achievement, and that learning is available for evaluation in the achievement. This is a logical point of view and, as such, is generally acceptable in constructing a didactical theory.

In the light of our argument so far, probably it would be equally fair, from a didactical perspective, to ask whether achievement from a learning act could be understood from the preunderstanding performance of consciousness by which the preceding statement is reversed. Then, learning is not only the dividend of acquiring experiences but, more intensive as well as extensive experiences also are dividends of the act of learning.

The important thing for a didactician is that learning *necessarily* follows from multiple experiences. Stated differently: Learning, as a performance of consciousness, necessarily follows the broadening of experience and is seen in *modified* acts of learning by which a person's grasp of reality, in its origins, is of extraordinary importance for teaching. Therefore, original experiencing cannot show an unusual, static character. A didactic situation must provide for this.

Hence, the formal consequence for constructing a didactical theory is as follows: Learning is an immanent consequence of experiencing. Therefore, experiencing necessarily has learning consequences. These learning consequences do not imply only learning to know, acquiring a grasp of reality, but moving on to something *new*. In the light of this matter, by referring to Buck<sup>2</sup> and Merleau-Ponty<sup>3</sup>, one can indicate the dual meaning of experiencing as the original means of human participation in the world:

- (i) A simple, first acquaintance with a matter which arises from reality.
- (ii) A thriving, increasing involvement forcing the learning activity continually returning to itself because of accumulating experience. Understandably, this second consequence is impossible without the first.



In summary, the significance of experiencing, as the original way of being in the world, for didactic tasks which flow from it, is the following:

1. The performing character of consciousness cannot be conceived and provided for, in a didactic sense, unless experiencing is considered.
2. One's attribution of meaning to reality is rooted in the fact that, in experience, one undergoes reality, as it were. In experiencing, a person moves to reality, to something new. Ordering the multitude and chaotic appearances of reality occurs mostly in experience.
3. Reducing reality to its essences for anticipated mobility in new situations is impossible without previous experiencing.

#### **D. ORIGINAL EXPERIENCING AND DIDACTIC FORM**

The possibility of disclosing "didaskhein" in both its essence and manifestation, as already is seen, speaks from original experiencing, i.e., a person's original involvement with reality. That is, there is no primordial phenomenon as far as the pedagogical is concerned. Original experiencing is manifested in his/her spontaneous, nonformal, natural involvement in the things surrounding him/her or in his/her participation in the reality which looms up and passes him/her in everyday life. This does not mean a person has this original experiencing he/she inevitably enters and orders, and which, pathically [affectively], as well as gnostically [cognitively], flows unimpeded with the stream of reality.

Original experiencing, however, is brought under control pathically [affectively] and rationally ordered gnostically [cognitively] by which the relief of a human landscape takes its form. Therefore, it is understandable that a myriad of outcomes or trajectories of original experiencing can be indicated in the human world. But, in any theory building, it is the case that this original reality, from which one's actions speak, cannot be redirected, or reduced to something else. The being-there [Dasein] of a person proclaims original experiencing as the first, primary or primordial way of being involved with reality. His/her *original ways* of being in the

world constitute original experiencing. Hence, in this light, it also is stated original experiencing will show a great variety, which enables a thinker to explain and describe human involvement across the board.

For original experiencing, there are no dominant tendencies or manifestations. If one or another tendency prevails, this would imply that original experiencing varies from its origins – which, after all, is ontologically and logically unacceptable. The variants of original experiencing are actualized over the full, broad line of a person's involvement with reality, including the religious-moral, the social-political, etc.

The fact that young people come together to get to know each other is just as original an experience as educating children born outside the resulting relationships which might arise. In the same way, one or another gathering or ritual with respect to religion is as original as some form of administering justice. Each of them is a specific way in which a person announces him/herself as a participant with reality: each one presumes an order of reality, and an integration of things and events into his/her living through the world. The tendencies of original experiencing, thus, do not concern its origin. "Original experience", seen in this way, includes each variant manifested in a person's original involvement with reality. The variants or tendencies, therefore, are modes of actualizing original experiencing.

Understandably, as a unique experience, each separate tendency will be actualized identically, either as a form of original experiencing within its own field of play, or in an area of reality. The contents which matter for such an actualization are specific and are of utmost importance during experiencing and, hence, also for the actualization of the experiencing itself. One can hardly find better examples than in the ancient Israelite religious ritual, and in the distinctions shown in the educative practices of Athens and Rome.

The important thing for theory forming, which one must see here, is that the variants of original experience have been cast in unmistakable *forms*. These forms are *actual* because experience

takes its form in terms of them and, thus, accordingly, reveals itself as a person's dynamic course through the world. Also, it is important to point out that these forms are *unique* in each tendency or variation of original experience. That is, the forms of manifestation of each variant of original experience proclaim the identity of the variant. These forms, as a manifestation of the identity of the variants themselves, understandably are linked closely to the contents to which form is given. However refined, modified, combined, the contents also can be revealed in the forms; this makes no difference to the assumption that the forms, bring universal human tendencies or lifestyles to the surface which may appear otherwise, in a second order area, by a change in emphasis because certain aspects of the contents receive more or less emphasis, which adds to the fundamental structure of forming, while not detracting or interfering with anything. A comparative study of the role, structure, and implementation of schools in educating in ancient Sparta and Athens, can serve as a good illustration.

In his/her theory building, the conclusion to which a didactician comes, insofar as form is concerned, is that the actualization of a specific tendency of original experiencing in a certain time, culture, or community will not differ *essentially* from that in other times, cultures, or communities. The second order practice which results from these forms of actualization will differ to the extent that there is varied emphasis in the contents to bring a specific life and worldview to the fore. Didactic forms must meet these specific aims, insights, etc. by providing a functional structure to allow for the fulfillment of the impact of the contents in a specific community.

In a Christian community, the form of original experiencing is no different than in another community but, in practice, the particulars require a modified emphasis of contents which, from a superficial view, often looks like a modified practice. Neither the sense nor origin of this practice can deny or overlook original experiencing of a person, as the ground for the forms of teaching. It is in the meaning of experiencing, its transcendence of reality, the way life imperatives are interpreted, the demands of propriety imposed for unconditional obedience which a Christian lifestyle is based on contents.

These contents are actualized continually in the forms of original experiencing such that a didactic form has a universal character which lends itself to fulfillment. The forms of original experiencing then must serve to realize contents, attitudes, actions, etc. as a matter of being human. For didactical theory building, this means that the forms of original experiencing are as original as the experiencing itself, and a constituted practice can strive for or negate these forms as much as it can deny the meaning of original experiencing.

Repeatedly, it is assumed and argued that educating and, thus, teaching is a matter of a person's first, primary or primordial involvement with reality. "Being in the world" implies educating, i.e., teaching. As far as "didaskēin" is concerned, a didactic pedagogician is continually confronted with the task of *formally* re-establishing original experiencing as a *specific* practice. This practice presupposes certain aims, contents (values, norms, forms of cultural systems, etc.), and a life and worldview. The form in which these specific views can be cast is not capable of exceeding the form of original experiencing. If a didactic pedagogician, in his/her pronouncements about his/her theory building, systematizes and justifies contents which have validity in his/her own life situation and accountably brings it to the fore, does not yet mean he/she can account for the form of his/her practice. Therefore, his/her account of the form of his/her practice also includes an account of the form of original experiencing which, although based on his/her insights and refined skills, are noticed, described fundamentally, and implemented in formal ways in [school] practice. His/her account of the original form of experiencing, thus, is the basis for his/her account of the basic forms of his/her practice, i.e., of the didactic ground forms.

To speak of didactic ground forms implies a theory about the practice of original experiencing, and an evaluation of its possibilities for implementation in second order (thus, also school) situations. To attend to the essence of the practice, he/she wants to reestablish and eventually account for its form, a didactician returns to the original experiencing of an adult who, in the act of educating, seeks to realize his/her aims in teaching.

It is stated very pertinently that the theoretical view of form, from the perspective of teaching, as an aspect of original experiencing, is undertaken, and not from one or another perspective of the act of learning, which also is characterized as original experiencing.

The form of teaching certainly is directed to the form of learning; i.e., to the ways or modes by which an act of learning is manifested in educative events. But, letting learn, and learning are different categories of human Dasein, and cannot be used as synonyms. In the original situation, the didactic act is directed to but does not originate from learning. Seen in this way, a didactic ground form is a form of actualizing “let learn”, and other categories closely related to the original sense of experience. The letting learn to which an adult proceeds while educating, is a way in which he/she tries to achieve his/her aims. A categorical structure which must be brought to the surface in theory building, therefore, has the following important consequences for the didactic form:

1. Since, in its meaning, original experiencing is unambiguously attuned to providing help to a learning person to reach his/her own destination (adulthood) and, separately and collectively, the categories acquire validity in describing form.
2. A category must emerge from experiencing itself, not only to show the original sense of this experiencing, but to illuminate its original manifestation in a practical situation.
3. Individually and collectively, categories do not yet establish a practice, but make its description possible and, therefore, repeatable.
4. A categorical structure serves as a criterial coherence for evaluating a form according to its appearance in the original experiencing.

## **E. CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT TEACHING CONTENTS**

Finally, and in completing the above discussion of the problems posed by constructing a didactical theory, some remarks about the meaning of contents in teaching are considered in preparing a structure such as this.

Although the problem is not always a simple one, nonetheless, it is a common, everyday one. To eventually display the image of a person as an adult means, above all, that a becoming person must acquire an image of the world (worldview, view of life) for him/herself. This acquisition of a life and worldview implies that certain information or details about this world and everything which can and should be counted on, must be available to those who eventually must live in nature, community, and culture. <sup>(4)</sup>

In its didactic pedagogical connotation, educating as a practice speaks very clearly here. It is about a life practice: involvement in realities of life, participation in life contents. The world, or reality, or practice in question is *there*, i.e., it is present in terms of contents which come into play in this lifeworld. Therefore, this has an imperative character in human becoming (educating as a matter of providing help).

The implication for constructing a theory is relatively obvious. In a didactic pedagogic situation, an adult must proceed to provide help to a child in different ways and in terms of various forms, in which he/she has mastery and insight, to help a child construct a world for him/herself. This image must unlock the totality of reality which forces itself on a person so it can be known in its essentials, so a child can master the ways in which a person comes to know things. Although teaching about a specific reality is important, its function is that the total reality must be unlocked for a child categorically, not only to try to guarantee his/her orientation, but his/her mobility in this reality. It is in this sense that teaching contents are meaningful and deserve consideration in constructing a didactical theory.

It is no wonder that even today didacticicians fixate strongly on content when building didactical theory in which the whole spectrum of the act of teaching is considered. It is an alluring and tempting way of describing practice precisely to identify content within the field of didactics because the dividends of educative intervention are made known in the content involved. However, I believe that the following issues, as points of orientation for reflecting on the meaning of the contents in constructing didactical views, are of specific importance:

1. All persons who are involved with children educatively are linked inextricably and undeniably to the reality indexes to which each day is devoted.
2. A human being, who often is described as openness, futurity, being-with, initiator of relationships, etc., can only be characterized as such by virtue of the reality indexes or *existentialia* which reveal the meaning of his/her moving, participating life tendencies.
3. The relief of the human life-landscape in general, but also as one's lifeworld (i.e., lifeworld for me), do not exist if there are no life contents.
4. A person's experiencing in life-reality and the sense he/she gives it in his/her activities is woven into and around the contents of the lifeworld. The form of his/her experiences only has meaning in so far as it gives form to the contents.
5. A person's world is not a constant, unchanging magnitude. This means that, in teaching, the matter "world" is not obvious. A person constantly is involved in the world to the extent that he/she gains mastery of reality, constitutes a new reality, and manipulate its details technically such that reality is only mentioned in constructing a didactical theory by virtue of the contents entering the foreground in this connection, i.e., in accordance with the specific situation.
6. Contents presume attitudes, dispositions, values, judgments, etc. It is with respect to these matters that the didactic-pedagogical task, in relation to educative contents, is indicative of co-considerations in building the theory.
7. Contents themselves do not always appear on a child's landscape in their meaningful coherence. However simple, often they must be disclosed, and this disclosure of contents occurs through unlocking reality to bring their meaning (whivh especially shows a meaningful relation to reality) to the surface.

8. Contents make dwelling in the world possible and implies a temporal-spatial meaning is given to the surrounding reality: Space is *filled* as and because time *elapses*, especially with respect to educating. However, it should be clear that the meaning of the acts “let learn” and “learn” is not bound to time and place.

Probably one still could quote many similar claims and/or statements. However, this is unnecessary since the above examples are sufficient to provide some main points about content.

The question a didactician now faces in his/her theory building is the following: What can one derive from “the didactic”? Even more closely: What educative imperatives stand out regarding the sense and meaning of the didactic act? However, it is very clear from the above eight statements that a didactic event is inconceivable without content. Possibly the following two questions will delineate the problem more clearly:

- a) Does the didactic practice present contents? In this respect, are contents a task for didactical theory?
- b) Are the contents *there* and lay the task for didactical theory to disclose, describe and, eventually reconstitute educationally, the *ways* or *forms* of a person’s original association, the ways he/she is being-there with things?

From the above, it follows logically that didactical theory [i.e., a didactician] must be acquainted with the nature and essence of contents before they can be described formally. A theorist must know what the contents are, why he/she deals with them as he/she does, before the nature of the association (its essential truisms) and the ways of associating (the life forms which have didactic relevance) can be disclosed. How these insights affect a person’s time-space dynamic will be reflected in the meaning of the didactic act. Therefore, as far as the contents are concerned, the field of didactical inquiry will need to include the nature of this dynamic, and its forms of actualization, as a field of orientation for reconstituting a practice. Thus, one can say categorically that the contents are there, but their acquisition is not self-evident. Hence, as for contents, a didactical theory pays special attention to the following:



1. A study of the contents in their broadest design, and regarding their final composition, arrangement, applications, and the like.
2. The actualization of forms and methods, by which the contents of the original experiencing can be available in new situations.
3. The organization of a practice which can guarantee to some extent the course of the teaching in an educative framework, and in accordance with the contents.

In view of this, regarding content, theorizing makes two particularly important demands:

- a) That the teaching will be near to life, and
- b) that teaching will strive for its ultimate effect.

If one accepts these two criteria, in its turn, this makes two important demands of the school:

- a) The school must be pedagogically accountable, and
- b) The school must concentrate on near to life contents.

Without going further into the task of the school, again we refer to the demands a school must meet, as set out in chapter two, and which are crucial for insights regarding the meaning of the content in bringing about responsible didactical thinking.

<sup>1</sup> *Erfahrung und Urteil*, p. 28.

<sup>2</sup> Buck, G.: *Lernen und Erfahrung*.

<sup>3</sup> Merleau-Ponty, M.: *Phenomenology of Perception*.

<sup>4</sup> Roth, H.: *Paedagogische Anthropologie*, pp. 19-20.