

CHAPTER 5

UNLOCKING REALITY: A DIDACTICAL ANALYSIS

A. DIDACTICAL ANALYSIS

In the preceding paragraphs, it is repeatedly noted that, any didactical theory building should result in a lesson structure. This lesson structure must be shaped in accordance with the essences of original experiencing as it is present in the reality of educating. Also, it is pointed out that it is possible to move progressively from the reality of educating to a lesson structure, by which the latter should then disclose the essences of the original experiencing.

On the other hand, second order practice [e.g., schooling] is itself a field of thought and research for didactical theory building, and a regressive view of “*didaskhein*” from a lesson structure can highlight important controlling (criterial) aspects which no longer can be left out of consideration. The first way then represents the primary didactical inquiry, while the last way is attending to a second order established practice with a view to thoroughly verifying insights which emerged from the primary view.

This last way, i.e., regressively looking at teaching activity in a general sense from a teaching situation constitutes what, in the didactic literature of today is generally known as “didactic analysis”. On the European continent, this matter has already received attention from various angles such that, no doubt, this theme has been elevated to an area of study for those intensively engaged in didactical theory. Taken together, and considering this literature, didactic analysis points to a regressive view in theory construction about teaching to make generally valid statements about the act of teaching and teaching constructions from formal teaching by analytically sorting out the *fundamentalia* [essences] of the course of a lesson.¹

Any didactic analysis, therefore, very definitely is a theoretical construction. Understandably, in such a construction, there are approaches such as didactical presuppositions, methodological variations, different points of fixation on the course of a lesson, which serve as bases for thinking, etc. Thus, it makes sense to ask questions beforehand regarding the meaning of a didactic analysis, without which criteria for constructing, as well as for judging a lesson structure in terms of original experiencing is not possible.

What then does didactical theory building have to do with a didactic analysis? If one were to work from the conceptual meaning of formulating “didaskhein analysis”, it is important to note that, here the emphasis is on analyses, conspicuously on the analytical aspect of “didaskhein”, i.e., to analyze what teaching as a practice essentially is, especially because any theoretical analysis must presume an ultimate synthesis.

On the other hand, I point out that, in such a formulation (didactic analysis), many definitive methodological considerations are implied, which does not necessarily claim that a concept’s composition is the most felicitous choice for verbalizing the purpose or idea of concern. By implication, this formulation is clearly a move away from a phenomenological view, precisely because original reality, in the first place, is not addressed here such that dialectics and hermeneutics, as methods in structuring theoretical results, can play a very important role. Therefore, here it is emphasized that any didactic analysis only makes sense for didactical theory building if such theory has already explored the reality of educating, described its essences, and has pointed out coherent structures for establishing a second order practice.

A school practice on which a didactic analysis concentrates can be conceptualized as being absent from the reality of educating, even though such a practice can be seen as essential in the modern lifeworld. The concept “didactic analysis” also assumes that, in theory building, one already has set something apart for analysis, i.e., that a certain structure is already available for analysis, that there is already knowledge, even verbalized science, with respect to which such an analysis can occur. Thus, in didactic analysis, one assumes that a didactic construction is available in both theoretical

and practical terms – otherwise, the concept would be meaningless, since then there would be nothing to analyze. From this, the currently available literature on this theme should be read and questioned.

Hence, the first problem which comes to mind is a relatively concrete one, i.e., to what extent is a practice present for analysis, in the sense that the conclusions will have universal value?

Considering that the ways didactic analysis is done agrees, in a sense, with the results of a didactically valid theory, this question becomes far more complicated than first seems to be the case.

For example, if one arrives at specific conclusions from a programmed teaching structure, or from cybernetic teaching models, or from the question of teaching content based on revealed didactical constructions, the results (value) of a didactic analysis will vary significantly. These variations are largely the consequence of different emphases and are not primarily a question of value. Therefore, it is of significance for didactical theory building, above all, to determine, by a didactical analysis, what is theoretically fundamental for trying to determine *why* it is going to be essential in the analysis.

It is shown that the significance of the fundamental, original reality of educating, as it is realized in teaching, necessarily is the basis of any didactical theory. That this original (essentials of) teaching, is already described in detail, and summarized in a structure, are a precondition for the possibility of a didactical analysis. This fundamental-theoretical exposition must, after all, provide the criteria on which an analysis of a second order practice must be carried out.

Let us illustrate this with an example: Would it be possible to didactically evaluate the course structure of teaching in the well-known school systems of Montessori, Dalton, etc. without insight into a ground structure, i.e., without an answer to the question: What is teaching? However, none of these systems provide their own criteria for the evaluation to which any didactical analysis necessarily is directed. It is only possible to place such systems in the spotlight of didactical analysis insofar as they bring forward the

essences of teaching, by which the teaching moments contained therein are expressed.

In this line of argument, the concept “analysis” immediately implies an evaluation, as the ultimate or final trend of an analysis and, what is more, any evaluation immediately raises the question of criteria in terms of which [something] can be analyzed. Therefore, a good question to consider is if a person can measure [assess] an evaluation in the case of a didactical analysis with criteria other than generally valid didactical criteria, also considering the character of a situation to be evaluated didactically.

For a didactician who is looking for the scientific aspects (as opposed to the application aspects) of the matter of a didactical analysis, this situation is relatively fluid. From existing insights, there is a definite point of focus which can serve as a point of departure for relatively sound theoretical reasoning. In this point of departure, at this stage of writing a didactical theory, it is advanced that one can speak of a lesson structure in a generally valid sense. By this, it is meant that didacticians have unfolded a lesson structure as an eventuality of practice (i.e., theory which proceeds to practice; a theory which can and should become practice). From the insights into the original reality of educating, currently it is possible to describe a lesson structure from its experiential side and test its theoretical structure in practical situations. This structure is outlined in broad strokes in the next to last paragraph of this chapter and, by implication, a lesson structure is also partly the result of a responsible didactical analysis.

To return to the original statement of the problem: What does a didactician want from a didactical analysis in his/her fundamental theory building?

First and foremost, this has to do with the question of concretizing the functional-didactic course, which assumes that teaching is a practical, everyday human experience and, more particularly, an educative one. As an experiential structure, a didactician is involved with a functional matter, i.e., a matter which is functionalized, brought into motion and, thus, however one looks at it, it does not exist in a purely theoretical respect. Any didactical

theory construction, or structure (and, thus, a lesson structure) is not conceptual in nature, but represents the empirical totality of details which manifest themselves in such a theory construction or structure.

The implication is that practice must make the structural aspect of thinking visible. As such, it must be made functional. It must be *structurally* repeatable. This is not to claim that a didactical structure has a pragmatic nature. Not all educative and teaching aims are necessarily useful. In this respect, a theorist must carefully distinguish between the concepts “useful” and “functional”. The meaning of a didactical design is not primarily in its usefulness, but in the fact that, in practice, it comes to life or is made functional. After all, there is a wealth of teaching content which has no pragmatic value at all.

If then one uses the concept “functional-didactical” in theory construction, firstly, it is intended to verbalize from practice (here, a second order practice) the situation’s course, in its actualization tendency. In practice, if there is a nonfunctional aspect, this means that such an aspect is sterile, that it cannot be fulfilled in some way, that it is a theoretical-didactical concept which is unrelated to the original dynamic character of teaching. In such a case, one simply is not involved with didactical theory.

The concretization of a functional-didactic exposition is a didactic course. The functional-didactic can be seen only as something progressing, occurring as a progressive dynamic which eventually is fulfilled in accordance with the teaching aims. A didactical analysis is possible insofar as something *happens* during a situation.

In the first and second chapters, it is pointed out that these didactic events cannot be thought of and understood independently of the pedagogical course (sequence/progression) structures. From within an educative point of view, the implication is that the structural course of teaching necessarily corresponds with the general course of educating. However, in this case, the correspondence noted by a didactician in his/her analysis is not complete because a second order [e.g., school] didactical practice, after all, is a reestablished, refined, and combined coherence of structural aspects which, in this

respect, is not always manifested as being *the same* as in original experiencing.

Based on these refinements, combinations, and the general diversity of teaching which a school situation shows, a didactical analysis of its course will make more details available than is the case with an original, naively constituted educative situation. This does not violate the proposition that the structure of educating is realized in teaching and that the structure of teaching agrees with a pedagogical course structure. The meaning of a formalized act of teaching is found in these original givens, by which the original [situation] necessarily retains its co-partnership in the meaning of a second order situation.

In the first place, the functional aspect of a second order teaching situation does not always strive for realizing educative aims. It is obvious that a didactical analysis implies greater detail of a refined and compiled practice. A self-initiated didactic course is chosen to thereby expose the didactical designs. Here the central issue is to expose, via didactical analysis, the unique nature of a didactical course, one now considers the didactical modalities.²

The concept “didactical modality” is created to illuminate and verbalize the harmony between forms and ways of presenting and ways/modes of learning, as this arises in a lesson structure. To the extent that didactical modalities come into play in a didactical analysis, the assumption is that planning for and realizing the modes of learning will become clear in the analyses. Thus, here it is asserted that the issue of didactical modalities is fundamental to why it involves the course aspect of the didactical analysis; precisely, it is because there can be no course if one does not realize that it is the equilibrium created in the presentation and the learning activities which makes the course possible.

Therefore, the concretization of a functional-didactical course is enabled by the analytic possibilities offered for consideration by the didactical modalities. In summary: In a didactical analysis, a didactician systematically tries to make visible the functional-dynamic aspect of the original structure of teaching (from the reality of [family] educating) in accordance with the combinations

and refinements which consciously, and in a performance sense, must be fulfilled in a second order, reconstituted situation. Without such a view, there is no concretization.

In concretizing, a didactical analysis must indicate the extent to which a structure used in a classroom situation is a matter of mastery, demarcation, and a teaching effect. This indicates the first task for, or meaning of a didactical analysis, but without answering how or in which way analysis can be concretized. Nevertheless, the experience of teaching indicates, beyond any doubt, that there is a wealth of detail regarding the functional sequences which must be brought together and tied somewhere to be able to talk about a structure resulting from such an analysis. To concretize means to make [something] visible, manipulable, and implementable such that, in the end, a didactical analysis also must have functional value for designing and realizing new teaching situations.

On the other hand, different aspects included in a didactical analysis do not allow themselves to be concretized easily if they can be isolated, e.g., the affective and thinking. Also, because the meaning of a didactical analysis is that a better account of the structure of teaching can be given, then the only logical result of a didactical analysis is in a lesson structure. Considering this statement, perhaps, at this stage, the problem for a didactical analysis can be reformulated: In the context of an accountable lesson structure, a didactical analysis must indicate the extent to which a functional-didactical course can be concretized. In turn, a lesson structure must summarize the didactical aspects identified in an analysis as *fundamentalia* [essences] for a course of teaching in a firm, functional teaching design.

Creating the coherences which disclose a lesson structure as identifiable, i.e., describable matters of action, which then can be indicated as the second aspect the aim of a didactical analysis. From the previous chapters, teaching and, thus, a lesson structure, matter only to the extent that an equilibrium can be established between the form and content. Because of this equilibrium of form and content, a “lesson structure” becomes possible. This cannot be described other than as “structure” because essentially it is

experienced as moving because of its rootedness in [original] experiencing and in the lifeworld.

Therefore, a balanced lesson structure indicates a balanced insight into form and content, which has fundamental significance as soon as teaching is to function. Didactically, a balanced relationship between form and content, as a problem, begins with the fact that, as far as a second order situation is concerned, contents mostly are prescribed in curricula to which didactical designs then must give vivid form. Thus, it seems that a balanced relationship must be assumed such that a didactician is involved with a relatively fixed point which weighs heavily on educators and must be balanced by a didactical design.

Such a view is true to some extent, but the content remains a matter of thematic announcements and indications because no curriculum can prescribe a meaningful integration of content for a teaching situation, precisely because it cannot guarantee it. The reduction of content, in accordance with announced themes in a curriculum, makes demands of the design, but it also provides freedom in implementing in terms of a great impetus for the didactic modalities.

During the situation, a teacher makes no contribution to the original insights into the coherence of realities (contents) he/she must teach. On the other hand, the essences of the realities (physics, linguistics, history, art, etc.) do not always speak for themselves. In addition, these aspects are not self-evident matters of life problems for children, although the aim of teaching is life orienting.

Whatever a curriculum might prescribe in this regard, a teacher always must bring it to its essence and, in accordance with the life involvement of his/her pupils in a lesson structure, to claim that he/she is teaching meaningfully. Teachers do not write an original subject matter science. They implement available and existing insights as a lesson problem, learning aim, and lesson sequence for the sake of the children entrusted to them becoming stronger. The initiating acumen, in a didactical sense, is inconceivable if the skillful and justifiable handling of content does not precede a free teaching design, as a possible precondition. This free and justifiable

involvement with the content, therefore, is a primary aspect of an identifiable lesson structure. Without a good insight in this regard, equilibrium of form and content is not possible.

As far as form is concerned, usually it is referred to as a field of play for the free, initiating acumen of a didactician. In fact, it is not the case that content provides for this in terms of didactically formulated stipulations which can serve as clues for anyone who initiates a teaching situation. In a didactical sense, form is a matter of thinking about design. Here a designer is unbound because, in different ways and based on various principles, he/she can work through to the form in accountable ways (modes). To the extent that there are didactic modalities, the equilibrium of form and content is non-determinative. At this point, a designer acts in accordance with his/her judgments -- judgments he/she incorporates into a design to provide for certain modes of learning in terms of learning content. After all, these provisions for learning activities, in accordance with a teacher's knowledge of the content and of a child, contribute to the equilibrium of form and content in a lesson structure.

The balanced coherence of content and modes of presentation for the sake of actualizing the modes of learning is considered in previous pages as a matter of didactic modality. The didactic modalities guarantee, as far as possible, the achievement nature of teaching previously described as a teaching effect. If a didactical analysis cannot systematically describe the identifiable matters (presenting and learning) as a lesson structure matter, there is no didactical analysis. Indeed, this *course* takes a clearly identifiable order. There is no course without order, which also indicates other important aspects such as teaching and learning models [regarding this order] for a more refined analysis which a didactical analysis must arrive at, as well as to indicate important areas of research.

A third aspect of the aim of a didactical analysis is to succeed in disclosing the didactic modalities, especially since the modalities and techniques clearly show that structurally, teaching takes a definite course. As far as a conceptual analysis is concerned, in this respect, the word "modality" is derived from "modus," meaning "way". Theoretically, "modus" means that, a *way of experiencing*

becomes visible in a modality. The way in which *experiencing* is realized is knowable and describable in the modalities. When there is a consideration of technique, the emphasis is not to be separated from a way of doing but especially on the meaning of an implemented facilitation or letting [something] occur in accordance with a precalculated program. Technique has to do with actualizing skills rather than with a fundamental skill itself.

Thus, modalities of a lesson structure should come into play as teaching models which require technically proficient dexterity in a teaching situation before there can be any teaching effect. Hence, in a didactical sense, modalities point more to a judgment, an appraisal in a constructive sense, while one is involved with technique rather than with realizing, applying, or actualizing an already existing judgment.

In a didactical analysis, this coherence is of importance if it also has the task of disclosing and indicating their relationship to didactic technique. Considering the progressive nature of a didactical situation, a structural explication of a lesson structure is not possible without insight into this coherence. The modalities are always actualized during a lesson with one or another technique. On the other hand, a structural result also is not possible if these two concepts are leveled. A didactical analysis is aimed at describing for the sake of realizing [practice?].

The first aspect of the disclosure of modalities³ in theory building is the following: Any didactical analysis has fundamental significance only insofar as it accounts for and verifies its statements within a broader framework of didactical theory. Thus, it also is fair to ask if a didactical analysis with a simple focus in theory forming (i.e., regarding its origins and possible preconditions), can still be described essentially as a didactical analysis. Would an analysis based on one-sided behavioral learning or fixates on content (Bildungsinhalt) be described as didactical analysis?

A fundamental matter to which answers must be given is if such above-mentioned approaches have any points of intersection in didactical reality. If not, this means that a didactical analysis, from such a background, completely misses a lesson situation. In this

case, the good judgment of a didactician also must ensure that a child is not thrown out with the bath water. The fact that one way of teaching is hypothesized in a didactical theory or that one aspect of a lesson structure is assumed as the alpha and omega of a teaching situation does not mean that such views have meaning for a more comprehensive view from the reality of educating.

A second aspect which must be pointed out here is that the didactic modalities cannot be understood well unless one realizes that, as far as a lesson structure is concerned, one is at the crown of one's structure. In disclosing didactic modalities, one moves from fundamental theory (thinking) to the realization tendencies (practice), which will test the final verification of one's views of a lesson situation itself.

The coherence of the modalities with already worked out ground forms, methodological principles, forms of ordering content, etc. must be clear because the modes of didactic movement which speak from a lesson structure, originate here. In this case, if the coherence of mode and technique can be described, a transition from planning (designing) to executing (lesson structure) is achieved. The disclosure of the modalities has a direct influence on a future practical situation. This implies that the modalities anticipate the possibility of didactic achievement (effective teaching). The reason for the importance of didactic modalities can hardly be stated more strongly.

This brings us to a fourth question which is focused on the aims of a didactical analysis, i.e., the consideration of the possible impact of different types of lessons and the assessment of their possible connection with what today is generally known as teaching models. Understandably, the question of lesson types is as old as didactical theory writing, as well as not being discussed systematically by didacticians. or not being interpreted with respect to the course of a teaching situation. Their sporadic appearance in the literature begins at least with Comenius and continues to the present time. After all, the issue of lesson types can be understood as a matter of didactical analysis because, as types, and in accordance with the ground forms, is a matter of experiential accounting. Also, they are

undefined aspects of original experiencing, referred to as the only primary source of knowledge for didactical theory building.

Thus: The distinctions regarding types of lesson⁴ simply involve describing the manifestations (modes) of original experiencing. As such, the recognition of lesson types is also evidence of the meaningful realization of didactical modes. The coherence of mode and technique, discussed above to some extent, now reveals itself here in the sense that the relationship between the two is a matter whose visibility does not emerge from technique itself, but from the lesson types which become possible as types of *forms* based on the relationship as a construction. As constructions, these lesson types are not bound or determined but are free, and this freedom is *possible* based on general guidelines indicated by the *designation* of the lesson types. If one were to arrange the lesson types side-by-side, it becomes clear that under their designations, free construction possibilities are offered whereby the judgments which arise from the didactic modalities are fulfilled in a technical sense. For didactical methodology, this is of utmost importance because it is methodological planning which makes the designation of lesson types possible. As types, this always involves ways of execution (*Methodos*).

A type of lesson is not a teaching model, in the sense of a recipe, but simply announces a way of doing. Thus, it is apparent that there is a distinction in effectiveness of the two concepts. In fact, how else is it possible to talk about the impact of the concept “lesson type”? Nevertheless, a type of lesson is announced in a general sense: lesson types are (considering the relevance of original experiencing) a matter of general didactical knowledge. It is even so general that daily it is realized in practice without this relationship being considered. Lesson types are self-evident during *a* [teaching] *situation*. However, its impact is in the structure of action which is announced in designating lesson types.

In a telling lesson, narrative is a methodological program. But there also can be narrative *without* didactic impact, e.g., as in communicating. Didactically, there is a big difference between narrating and communicating. In this respect, designating a lesson type is a relatively exact matter and it is assumed that what is

announced in the designation will be realized in a lesson situation, e.g., in a telling lesson, communicating (also as a technique) will be realized.

But: To what criteria must narrative answer to function effectively in a teaching situation? This question is valid for each of the lesson types, and it involves a myriad of issues about which didactics cannot provide answers which hold water. Certainly, in formal teaching, the designation of lesson types proclaims the matter of the course of a lesson, but such a proclamation does not provide criteria for assessing effective teaching. A telling lesson does include judgment, technique, and dividend (effect). However, an effect only follows if the judgment is fulfilled *in* the technique. Ultimately, a didactical analysis cannot have full value unless the criteria for the lesson types eventually are included.

General didactical criteria certainly must function in these lesson situations, but their relevance is too general to interpret the essential meaning of the designations of the lesson types in detail. This presents a didactical analysis with a comprehensive and urgent task, also and especially, regarding a search for empirical approaches to such research. A lesson structure, and its realization in a type of lesson, in its whole assessment, is a matter of practicing the total didactical spectrum presented in previous chapters; in fact, all the insights which exist on the broad line of theory building, because a teacher in a lesson situation cannot work outside a lesson structure and its associated lesson types.

Didactic insights are only present where a teacher works. The impact of a lesson type is found in the compiled didactic insights of which, as a lesson structure, must be able to speak. Otherwise, all theory is in vain. And now: As far as a lesson structure is concerned, does a connection exist (as it must be sketched in a didactical analysis) with so-called didactical or teaching models? In our understanding of the matter of “teaching models”, there are three aspects which are of fundamental importance if the stated problem is to be judged, i.e.:

- a) Teaching models are models constructed from specific teaching content representing teaching units.

- b) Therefore, as a teaching model, it must indicate ideal types (lessons) as far as the didactical ground forms are concerned.
- c) A teaching model must consider the overall balanced insights of the didactical methodology.

Hence, a teaching model assumes giving form to teaching which is offered as a model (thus, a grounded, valid example). The model, thus, must involve an exemplary constitution which gives a teacher the opportunity to detach him/herself from a judgment, his/her own didactic design as such, to focus on the implementing, presenting, or technical aspect of a lesson situation. Thus, a model provides him/her with a completed, didactic construction which he/she then can bring into motion, can actualize it by considering his/her situation.

Would this matter now belong to a didactical analysis? Would one be able to take the structure of a lesson type as a model in a theoretical explication such as this? In other words: Could we incorporate the realization of a general lesson structure into a model as an ideal type? And could such a model carry effective teaching as arises in a specific situation? With reservations, the answers certainly are affirmative – provided a generally valid lesson structure, as a fundamental construct, is found behind the model, so if a valid structure projects the model as a matter of fact, and provided a teacher knows the origin of, and interprets the model accordingly, and anticipates the variants which practice always provides.

Hence, the presumption of lesson types is something other than a teaching model. The latter is only a first image of a lesson type, even as an ideal image for which variation in a specific situation must be envisioned according to its differentness. A completed construction by which a teacher can work is imaginary if one considers the demands which changing situations continually raise. For example, if the lesson types are worked out in the finest detail (also in terms of their criteria) can they be used as teaching models?

The answer must be denied because a lesson type is established in accordance with a lesson structure in a general sense and not on content. Only when many model lessons are created in consecutive

sequences, in accordance with a curriculum, will teaching models be considered *as* ideal types in this regard. And even then, these models cannot guarantee the teaching but can only have a guiding effect for a teacher who is able to account for his/her interpretation and implementation in accordance with a valid lesson structure. Therefore, any didactical construction, thus also a teaching model, is dead until it is brought to lived experience (life) by a teacher's actions. No recipe guarantees a practice; it can only direct practical actions. A recipe doesn't act on its own. A teaching model runs the risk of being a nonsensical recipe unless a teacher interprets it against the background of the total concept of the didactical, as outlined in a lesson structure.

A last aspect which must be attended to in a didactical analysis, and which is mentioned repeatedly in other chapters, is the matter of teaching effect. Considering everything, two main issues enter the foreground because they constitute a teaching effect: The teaching to which a teacher progresses, and the action expected of a child. Without intensive collaboration, especially with a psychopedagogue, this cannot be the case. This situation required a great deal of flexibility from both participants about which we know little in a didactical sense, but which must be of decisive significance when we want to unlock [present] reality effectively. Since this matter includes a comprehensive, parallel structure in general didactics, particularly in practical and psychopedagogical fields, for the time being, this issue is left open, and a comprehensive investigation eventually must be undertaken.

In summary, a didactical analysis seeks to verbalize the activity-possibilities in a lesson situation, in so far as it reveals its impact in a lesson structure and particularly a type of lesson. Formal teaching is necessarily rooted in a reality with a view to unlocking new reality. In the first place, teaching is designed and is not a mere imitation of designs. The only thing which is essentially imitated is structural forms in which original experiencing is manifested. A decisive factor in effective teaching is a didactician's initiative, and not the availability of many models which lie ready for use.

B. INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS ON A LESSON STRUCTURE

1. *The origin of lesson structure.* From the foregoing, it is correctly concluded that a didactical analysis, in its theoretical expositions, is an obvious matter. There are clear indications of functional criteria which must be established to disclose and describe the structures (origins) with a didactical analysis. First and foremost, these origins amount to the ways, or forms in which one participates in the world, or gives form to one's being in the world, by which teaching then takes a definite course.

From the existing literature, didacticians do not always deal with the same issues. Neither the meaning of an analysis nor its course is described in general or shared terms. To summarize the problem categorically: A didactical analysis has *significance* for the original act "didaskhein" (to teach) in so far as teaching can be made visible in its form (course), as well as its directedness to reality (contents) in such an analysis. As expressed in the details beforehand, an important indication for the issue of a lesson structure is found here:

A lesson structure is not didactic pedagogically obvious. The structure of a lesson must be disclosed from one's original experiencing or involvement with reality.

Therefore, the first question which must be investigated is that of the origin of a lesson structure. How is it possible to determine the structure (origin) of a lesson in general? If one considers the totality of the theoretical didactic exposition currently available to a student in books, it seems that the origins of a lesson in the descriptions of it announces two aspects for investigation, i.e., (i) the form and (ii) the content.

In all attempts to account for a lesson structure, these two aspects are emphasized in one way or another; content especially gives rise to an urgent analysis in that the meaning of teaching becomes visible in it. As far as such an analysis is concerned, form is often limited to a matter of the methodological or to lesson methodology because presenting a lesson makes its form visible and available for description and evaluation. This does not mean that such descriptions of a lesson structure are meaningless, even though they do not present an image of "structure" in the original meaning of

the word and, therefore, appears in the construction of a didactical theory as incorrect or incomplete.

When a didactician has arrived at a lesson structure, he/she works with a relatively final synthesis of didactical insights. Proceeding from the fact that a design with its form and content balanced, is the most important component of a lesson, a theoretician must realize that the syntheses he/she builds on must be realized in a classroom. They must function in a formal, businesslike situation, otherwise his/her theoretical expositions are not valid.⁵ If we consider that the concept “lesson” (coming from “read”), it suggests that something, i.e., content, must be learned and recited from outside. Here a didactician must reduce it drastically to arrive at the origins of a lesson structure, than what is found thus far in didactical theory building.

2. *The form aspect of a lesson structure:* The origin of the form aspect of a lesson structure is of fundamental importance for constructing a didactical theory. If “reading”, or then “giving a lesson” assumes a conscious intervention by a teacher (be it a parent or some other adult), it points to an original situation in which an adult, as an accompanier, moves forward and initiates an action which is attuned to effective learning. The vernacular speaks of someone who “reads a lesson” or “to teach someone to read, which clearly reach to a relationship of accounting, in which there are norms (contents) which, in an activity, are insufficiently given form or must still acquire form.

The important thing to note is that the lifeworld (as expressed in verbalizing lifeworld experiences) includes a type of situation which takes a teaching course with respect to “something” (content). This *course* of this situation announces the *fact* of content, but not its *nature*. The course is a matter of the *form* of a situation, as is the case with every type of situation which occurs in the lifeworld. For someone to “read a lesson” implies intervening in someone else’s course of life to bring about a change, reorientation, or modification of attitude etc. This can occur in a comprehensive series of circumstances but, especially it appears in the being together of adults (parents) and children (non-adults). Here, we are talking

about a pedagogical intervention which aims to change structures of action in a child's life.

To read a lesson undoubtedly is the formal realization of the course structure in the reality of educating. The "lesson" refers to contents (especially normatively determined) which are presented and assumed to be included in a lifestyle. To the extent that a series of situations became formalized, the concept of a lesson underwent a change in meaning, acquired a more businesslike, scientific connotation, and was seen as an important task of the reader (expert) who had to make available content of varied meaning for the mastery of reality. A reader repeats such a piece of the original reality of educating in its course to realize specific aims of pedagogic intervention.

Thus, the form of a lesson structure lies in a person's lifeworld. The form is disclosed in a person's form of living; it is part of a person's most original experiencing. Hence, if one considers that educating (referred to above) belongs to the most original experiencing of a person, that an act of educating in the life of persons is not to be avoided in its structure (in its aims, relationships, and course), that where there are persons, necessarily they are dependent on educating, that this educating (pedagogic intervention) reveals a definite structure, that it cannot occur in terms of nothing and, thus, is attuned to content (life and worldviews), and this means that a lesson form appears in an important source of knowledge for the study of educating, i.e., the reality of educating.

The contents of concern primarily appear from another source of knowledge, i.e., life and world views. Clearly, form without content is meaningless and, therefore, cannot be incorporated *as such* in a didactical theory. The reverse also is true. With respect to these two matters, [original] experiencing appears in the lifeworld and becomes knowable. The coherence of form and content is a matter of *lived reality*. Thus, the forms of educating speak from the course of educating (the structural), while the life and worldviews will indicate the contents in terms of which the forms come into motion. The convergence of these two lines in an event (i.e., what a person allows to happen) proclaims the *sense*, the explanatory moments of human life.

The didactical presumption then rings so: Educating is realized in teaching, while the sense of teaching becomes visible in educating. Thus, educating takes place in teaching and (hypothetically) where this does not occur, educating does not appear in the human world. “Didaskein” is an inherent matter of human[ized] life, since life (humanly speaking) is a matter of lived, original participation of a person in the world, as it is assumed that a person’s being in the world is to take up the educative imperative. Therefore, the form of “didaskein” must appear in accordance with his/her being in the world.

One cannot deal formally with educating differently, give it formal structure, and he/she does not actualize his/her educating differently in teaching. To make the form of teaching visible, didactical theory turns to the original forms of living at one’s disposal in terms of his/her spontaneous, intuitive participation within reality as an experiential totality which he/she will have to implement anew in a teaching situation. One has no other ways of teaching at his/her disposal than those which become visible in his/her participation and life.

The essences of his/her forms of living, therefore, are refined, combined, differentiated, etc. to establish his/her teaching style *in accordance with his/her lifestyle* to realize his/her educative aims. Otherwise, his/her teaching would be completely alien to life which, after all, is impossible. One has no lifestyle at his/her disposal to realize in teaching other than what is specifically human. All forms of teaching can be traced directly to the forms of living, otherwise they cannot be teaching forms. Also, this holds for the most sophisticated techniques applied in modern times when trying to move a teaching effect to the most optimal level.

An inquiry into the form of teaching is rooted in one’s being in the world. In accordance with the relief a didactician discloses here, he/she can indicate its *didactic possibilities*. *This speaks clearly of a coherence of life form, educative form (teaching form), and learning form*. A didactical design, the ultimate result of which is a lesson structure, reaches to this coherence and makes possible the actualization of the course of teaching. A didactician can describe

and justify a lesson structure in accordance with these original ways in which a person transforms the world into a lifeworld for him/herself. For these reasons, a didactical theory does not go to schooling, a theory of learning, or anything else to illuminate his/her lesson structure (the possibility of a design for practical implementation) because neither schooling nor a learning theory, nor anything else can make the origin of the practical forms visible.

For the sake of clarity, let us repeat the first essence: A form of teaching (lesson form, lesson structure) is grounded in a human way of living because a person, as a human being, is here in the world. Consequently, a teaching form and teaching style cannot surpass or exceed the form and style of living. For “*didaskein*”, there is no first source of knowledge in which form is disclosed. Understandably, from insight into form, a didactician directs him/herself to his/her aim (learning as change) so that eventually the latter constitutes a third point of a lesson structure which must be provided for in a design. This is not only what makes the presumption of didactic ground forms possible, but also meaningful. These didactical ground forms represent the first profile of the relief which a lesson structure shows as it becomes visible from the forms of living.⁶

Even though the form aspect of teaching has not yet been worked out systematically and in a definite coherence in detail, nevertheless, there is a wealth of insights spread over a large area of didactical history which, when studying it, didactical form must be interpreted. Form is a first insightful aspect which makes possible a matter such as a lesson structure possible. A teacher who cannot account for this, also cannot provide an account of the essences of the practice in which he/she is involved.

3. ***The content aspect of a lesson structure:*** Above it is indicated that a person’s lifeworld also is determined in terms of content. Forms of living are only significant and meaningful because they give rise to contents according to which one moves through the world. [For a Christian, these contents especially are defined normatively by Scriptural revelation and, thus, the latter is the first, acceptable source of knowledge about both the origin and meaning of reality]. In this regard, if one also considers the discussions of an achieving consciousness currently available in the literature, and as

discussed in previous chapters, the statement “lifeworld” next to “world” also has to do with living (moving), which has its fullest appearance as a lifestyle determined by content.

Indeed, lifestyle itself makes the attribution of meaning visible which, in its turn, is inconceivable without life content because then the directedness of the moving cannot be made conscious. That is, without contents, a person would not have been aware of “world” so that teaching would never have appeared on the horizon. The alternative of “something,” as content, then would be “nothing” – a matter in which a person cannot imagine at all, let alone let alone immerse him/herself in. The life forms become visible as a person participates with reality or gives content to his/her existence: The lifeworld *is* because life without content is not possible.

The things of the world are given meaning, they are ranked in order of importance, while the emphasis of this meaning varies according to the ways a person participates in them. As a person participates in the world, the contents differentiate themselves categorically because he/she becomes *aware* of different issues and in different ways.

A person’s consciousness (being aware) speaks of self-consciousness in educating, as shown, e.g., in moral consciousness by which educating (teaching) has either a moral-normative meaning or does not exist at all. Thus, with respect to life contents, one finds a categorical unfolding which accords with the meaning one attributes to reality. The coherence (structure) of these categories of the lifeworld (life contents) makes it possible to ascertain how reality manifests itself essentially. The interpretation of a categorical structure, in its turn, assumes a person’s life and worldview, and such views represent a dimensional matter of a person’s outlook on reality. Therefore, all human beings have a view of life and world, and everyone’s involvement with the contents to some extent is determined normatively.

Apart from moral norms, e.g., also there are material norms, and if the latter is a dominant factor in a dimensional perspective on reality, and, as materialism, it is still normatively determined: Based on related norms, any variation of materialism is knowable and

describable in a specific way. Thus, contents of the lifeworld are visible categorically, and lend themselves to an emphasis in the knowing consciousness of a person where it becomes visible as life content. In this relief, educating is a meaningful matter, and one also decides on his/her educative aims, whether explicitly or implicitly. Hence, he/she also states *what* he/she wants to realize in his/her teaching. With this, by implication, also he/she chooses his/her educative content – primarily according to his/her perspective on what *is*.

This choice of content is a lived experiential arrangement of reality, in the sense of an emphasis by which there is already a *particular* (chosen) relief. That there is ordering does not imply that reality as such, is seen as chaotic, but that one experiences it as being without a dimension of depth until it acquires relief through meaning and emphasis. Reality is close to a child, but he/she is removed from its *meaning*. Formally, he/she does not participate thoroughly in it because he/she is an experienced being. But experience accumulates over time, and he/she must attribute meaning to reality to eventually understand the multiplicity of his/her existence and be able to reduce his/her participation in the world to its essences.

Otherwise, he/she does not arrive at a personal lifestyle in his/her own world. Here, an adult intervenes through educating. The course of everyday experiencing is *determined* and channelized with a view to attributing meaning. An adult is aware that a child will learn whether one is directing these learning activities in accordance with justifiable preferences. However, he/she does not leave this matter to chance; he/she formalizes [this learning] through teaching to be able to realize pre-established aims. As far as contents are concerned, he/she includes certain aspects of the lifeworld at a time when he/she concludes that such aspects no longer are dangerous to a child, or that at a certain age, they inevitably appear on the horizon of his/her childlike life.

Thus, a father's calling used to be one aspect of the heritage of his son – they grew up and got to know their heritage by participating in it from infancy. That this no longer is the case today does not mean that implementing a teaching practice is *not possible*.

However, in our time, it has become unnecessary and/or undesirable. Preferences have changed such that contents are emphasized differently. Hence, the excitement of reality looks different, and a child goes a different way (to a life vocation) than his father. Simply, this is a remnant of technological developments over the past several centuries. In this way, formal training has become the last aspect of formal teaching.

In other words: Over the past three centuries, increasingly more formal teaching has become important. In our modern world, adults have increasingly eliminated life contents from a primary [home] educative situation. Earlier, a child's sense of responsibility was acquired by direct work assignments which *immediately* involved their daily bread. Currently, responsibility acquires structure through study assignments by which another day's bread appears in the realm of *possibility*.

Thus, as far as formal teaching is concerned, contents of the lifeworld reveal a categorical coherence. The task of those involved in educating is that the relief [of the contents] must be shaped according to the emphasis of modern times because a child must be guided and accompanied in it. In this respect, one must understand that the spontaneous experiencing always and today still represents the first content of the course of educating.

As soon as a more businesslike teaching of the lifeworld becomes necessary, a parent shares his/her assignment with a teacher. Hence, a school appears where this more matter-of-fact involvement with life content becomes desirable or inevitable. Today, in so-called "primitive" communities, where this matter is irrelevant, there are no schools. Then it sounds strange that the didactical calling has been around in the Western world for centuries: Return to the lifeworld of a child? How many school and teaching systems were anchored in this calling, and how much will be left of the so-called educational renewal of the past few decades, if one were to remove this call [to return to the lifeworld of a child] from it?

This original experiencing asserts itself today as a lost world which must be brought back into educating. The meaning of the above callings is in a search for a harmonious synthesis between original

experiencing and a first ordering of life contents. Thus, the concept of “now” acquires meaning again in modern didactical theory building. One realizes that those contents in terms of which a child must participate in the world and life are changing in such a way as to obscure that a radically changed image of reality threatens to oust a child from the original lifeworld.

This matter of contents is another aspect of a lesson structure which, to some degree, must be brought to a solid insight in a didactical theory. One cannot express him/herself structurally about the content of a lesson if, indeed, a didactician does not recognize and involve it in theory building such that original experiencing represents the most original ordering of the lifeworld to which one comes, and from which, and as a result of which any other ordering becomes possible -- also, in the more businesslike approach of a teacher in a classroom. This also provides the meaning of the didactical ground-forms, as a primary matter of a giving form to a lesson situation. Then, when form and content are in a balanced relation in a didactical investigation, and eventually show expertise, there can be a lesson structure, i.e., the implementation of theoretical insights into the origin and course of a businesslike teaching situation. An adult can only account for a teaching aspect of schooling if he/she has incorporated the essences of this practice into his/her theory building.

C. THE EDUCATIVE TASK

A brief exposition in response to the question of a school’s educative task is important and meaningful considering the preceding explications. As a matter of postulation, one can argue: The educative task of a school is to help a child find him/herself, to discover him/herself in the lifeworld. In searching for the didactical aspects of didactic pedagogics, a theoretician might find it difficult to overlook two criteria which are particularly applicable to the notion of “didactical” as a slice of human experiencing. One criterion is seen as a demand or expectation that educating must be near-to-life. Teaching (*didaskhein*) must not be foreign. The other criterion is the expectation that teaching must essentially be educative. A teacher must not be upset about or averse to educating.

When educating fulfills these two criteria, one can say the first step has been taken toward a justifiable didactic pedagogical theory. They are the first to be implemented, also in the spontaneous course of an educative situation, with respect to the matter of educative form and of content. It is when educating can be described as near to life that it is justifiable substantively, that it is not foreign to realizing living as an adult sees and interprets it.

One's life environment increasingly shows the characteristics of a changed world, in the sense that the original [world] is covered by adjustments. In this, the origins not only threaten to become obscured, but also to disappear such that necessarily the educative contents reflect the adjusted world, also in terms of life and worldviews. As far as educating is concerned, this points to the disappearance of those forms which originally appeared in the lifeworld. Thus, the forms of educating must not appear as being totally foreign to a person, as entirely a-human or anti-human. The primary forms of living must be an inherent part of the forms of educating in a classroom event to try to help a child in his/her original being-there, to make something of the appeal of a life situation.

In theory building, a synthesis of nearness to life and educative intervention gives rise to the postulate of the didactical imperative. The didactical imperative emerges in relief as *the* call to which a responsible adult cannot or must not say no. It represents an unavoidable call to teach. Thus, when there is a relationship between form and content in a lesson structure, a person is involved in reaching to the abovementioned criteria which now, in a lesson structure, exposes categorically the failure of experiencing as teaching which makes possible the reduction of experiencing to didactical categories.

This same failure forces didactical theory building to expound on the concept of lesson. In original narrating, and later by reading to [someone], and a lesson, available knowledge is passed on to the next generation. To the extent that someone has become more matter of fact, and scientific has its origin there, is a progression to reading to instead of telling. This change to a "lesson" speaks of an

equilibrium between the form (reading, reading to) and content (what is read). This balance is the basis for any structure for presenting content with an expectation that the act of learning will be actualized.

Understandably, guided- and self-actualization, referred to in a previous chapter, are relevant in that the meaning of a lesson structure is also visible in them. A lesson implies a call to someone who can and will help, and a response from one who needs to be, and must be helped. Equally, it is understandable that an educative aim should reveal the results of the equilibrium of form and content because it makes a final synthesis, as structure, possible.

D. THE EDUCATIVE AIM

Considering the foregoing, an educative aim is explained by the equilibrium or harmony of form and content. After all, this involves the formativeness or change which must be seen in a child. However, the problem is much more difficult than it seems. Forming has been pointed to as an event and as a condition or state. The events called forming are not obvious (at least in a didactic situation) because the driving force, the intentional act, is not in the situation itself but in the plan of an adult (teacher). Forming, as a condition to which a pupil must arrive, is a learning effect in the sense of mastering, conquering, and even manipulating reality.

Hence, we must deal with three aspects peculiar to the course of a didactic act: A purposeful presentation, according to the formative value of the content, an expected effective act of learning, and an event, respectively, the state of the change, which shows the degree to which the aim has been attained. Would these three matters, in their identifiable coherence, reveal the origins of “*didaskhein*”?

Here, it is appropriate to indicate that the validity of the judgments set forth in the above statement hereby are not questioned or disputed to any extent. Even so, one should note that, while the concept “*Bildung*” presupposes an extensive, attuned participation in life and world, the word itself does not obviously imply, in a didactical sense, the presentation or learning. It is about forming, changing, deepening, flourishing human participation with reality.

That this forming occurs, is brought about, or accomplished is not doubted by anyone. However, it is equally certain that it is not taken for granted or assumed to be automatic in acquiring form in a person's life in either of its two-fold meanings. For example, and merely hypothetically, if nothing would happen to a person, forming also would not occur.

From another point of view, one also must point out that forming does not occur in a person's life only as an effect or dividend of an act of teaching, i.e., an act of learning. By this last statement, I mean that it is commonplace during a didactic situation. Forming cannot be limited to a continuous course of didactic situations. A person also learns not only in a sequence of organized didactic courses. A person learns a great deal beyond any teaching intervention by acquiring experiences, making observations, interpreting feelings, etc.

The change mentioned in a theory of forming, and which undeniably is visible in some way in the life of every person, cannot be limited to being a dividend of didactic intervention. Teaching is but one, although extremely important factor, which contributes to the eventual state of being formed.

In looking for the *fundamentalia*, here one is concerned with two obvious gaps: In the first place, the change involved in forming does not presuppose *necessary teaching*, or *necessary learning*. In the second place, forming, in its meaning as an event, as well as a state, cannot be limited to a didactic situation and, thus, teaching and forming are even closer to didactical theory and formative theory, and cannot be explained as identical concepts of equal meaning.

The concept of forming strikes a notably broader field than "forming by teaching". As a teaching dividend, the word forming presupposes that the change (forming) brought about by a didactic situation is preceded by an action. This action is shown by both adult and child, i.e., by presenting and by learning. Teaching is something other than the change. Teaching can predispose a change – but the change also can occur apart from it, depending on whether teaching takes place or not in a person's life.

Our problem is one of relief or perspective. When an essential aspect of teaching, such as an expected change, is taken out of its proper perspective and so overwhelmingly placed in the foreground that it completely or partly hides the rest of the course of teaching in its essences, the only possible result of a search for the grounding of “*didaskhein*” is a one-sided perspective. After all, the relief which a theory is supposed to state exactly of a point of view, shows a lack of a dimensional relationship in accordance with the totality of the experiencing of it, which is available in the lifeworld.

Categorical hypostasizing is a tempting and seductive detour for a theoretical didactician because it looks so true, so realistic, and even so practical in its everyday appearance. It is impossible to redirect “*didaskhein*” as such to one, fundamental category which can make the totality of the structure visible. What is previously expressed about forming as a didactical category, applies to each of the other categories involved in designing such a theory. A student of didactics must know that proceeding to hypostasizing in theoretical designs is a dangerous practice which puts the ultimate validity of pure theory forming into serious consideration.

An important matter which arises from the foregoing is that the equilibrium of a lesson form and lesson content is the most important matter for consideration, if one wants to speak, with good reason, of a lesson structure. The ground of these views is shown to be the reality of educating – a matter given with being human. The reality of educating *is* because a person *is* in the world. One must follow this line of argument well from the first search for the possibility of a didactical theory to where, currently, we are seeking a harmony of form and content in a classroom, as revealed in a *teaching aim*. The reason for this statement is that teaching would be a meaningless activity if one did not work purposefully with form and content. After all, to have a place in one’s lifeworld, a teaching situation is a conscious, decisive, intentional act which is not haphazard.

Thus, when one speaks of a teaching aim, it is acknowledged that this teaching aim seeks an equilibrium between *form* and *content*, whether consciously, in a second order, formal situation, or

spontaneously, in an educative [family] situation, which raises the possibility of a reasonably explainable lesson structure.

If one accepts that, considering the previously discussed aspects, an essence of a lesson structure is found in the equilibrium which can be created between form and content, then one must make the following deductions:

1. The meaning of a lesson structure resulting from any theoretical didactic reflection, is in the functional planning of effective teaching with a view to effective learning. This statement summarizes the meaning of a lesson structure. Thus, a lesson structure shows an initiating or a starting for a learning effect. Teaching without learning dividends for those receiving it is a meaningless matter. Thus, a lesson structure reveals effective learning as an imperative and demands change, both in the form as well as content.

The sense of the initiative we know as teaching (and, with this, the initiating and teaching have been brought to the level of explanation) is in creating a beginning, providing the opportunity, making the climate favorable so a learning person can favorably participate in the situation. This does not involve a teaching effect for the sake of teaching, but a teaching effect with a view to a learning effect. This is supported by the theory of didactical modalities (principles of actualization), modes of learning, teaching, and learning aids.

2. If there is an educative aim, two successive, coherent aspects must be distinguished, i.e., a *teaching aim* and a *learning aim*. A teaching aim implies effective teaching and a learning aim effectively actualizing the act of learning. In the relationship between these two matters, a teaching aim is a narrower concept than a learning aim. A teaching aim need not have an accumulative effect because it can be effective as such. In contrast, a learning aim is assumed to have an accumulative, thriving effect.

A learning effect must reproduce itself to be described as effective. Less effective teaching can and should be corrected, but a corrected teaching structure itself is never a teaching aim, except in preparing teachers. When improving teaching itself is addressed, e.g., because

of an error analysis which leads to more effective teaching, this was not the aim of the lesson. Better, teaching is an additional matter which does not fundamentally address a theory of the lesson structure. After all, a lesson is not originally intended to have an effect other than one of learning, i.e., an optimal effect.

One cannot claim that a teacher teaches to be able to teach better the next time. But this is not the primary, defining sense of teaching. If this were the case in a [teacher] preparation situation, it still is a matter of learning effect, i.e., learning to teach more effectively.

On the one hand, a didactician knows this side-effect of teaching as a matter of experiencing and, on the other hand, in the analysis of what a teacher ought to make of his/her practice. However, in the first place, usually an analysis of teaching does not deal with the issue of effective teaching for the purpose of improving it, i.e., if the criterion of effective teaching is not applied in the analysis. When a learning effect is not focused on in a teaching situation, a teacher proceeds to investigate his/her practice to try to remove impediments which may exist, and which block effective learning. Thus, there is a narrower and broader aspect of a teaching aim.

On the other hand, a learning aim represents the eventuality of a didactic situation. It is in realizing a learning aim that the outcome of a didactic situation shows or manifests itself. A person who has didactically initiated [teaching] must have brought about something which has had a profound effect. One could argue that it is impossible to determine with certainty the learning effect of effective teaching. After all, it is impossible to determine the transfer effect or maneuverability effect of an act of learning resulting from a thorough and justified teaching situation. In fact, viewed schematically, a learning effect has an inverted pyramidal structure whose base cannot be calculated. A teacher does begin with a small aspect of insight, intention, lived experience, etc., but in the maneuverability of insight and the implementation of knowledge, increasing skills, and confident thinking a learner him/herself never determines the basis of the learning effect. Also, it remains functional throughout his/her life. And it is in this respect that the notion of the formative value of the learning

content is rooted. Thus, a learning effect is not only a matter of the immediate, but it is only completed for a person over time.

In accordance with the problem originally posed, here a didactician is involved with an undeniable coherence, both in a logical and ontological sense, of lesson form and lesson content by which a person can arrive at the concept “lesson structure”. A didactician must remember that here he/she is dealing with origins, i.e., he/she reaches to a beginning or start, also the start of a lesson. On what basis can a didactic lesson be started? The answer is that a designer of a didactic situation must bring about a definite equilibrium of form and content with respect to an aspect of a person’s lifeworld which is manifested as a relationship between life form and life content.

In a classroom situation, this is a matter of a relationship between a teaching aim and a learning aim. Collectively, they are an educative aim. Therefore, one speaks of an initiating an act of learning through teaching, which should result in a continuous or thriving broadening, or effective learning event. The target of teaching is narrower than is the effect of an act of learning which should follow. Thus, in this case, the concepts “narrower” and “broader” indicate that teaching must not be stuck in the narrower meaning of the aim. In doing so, a didactician is forced to see this narrower aspect of his/her target area as an immediate or intermediate horizon which must be extended to the broader horizon of a learning effect.

The meaning of teaching is not in the teaching but in a learning effect because it proclaims the change which an educator seeks. Thus, a lesson, any lesson, implies giving a businesslike form to teaching with a view to effective learning. Here, could such a person derive this logic by saying that, ultimately, a lesson is focused on the activity of a teacher, while the learning activity is considered nowhere or haphazardly? Such a view would be the most irresponsible didactical statement imaginable.

If it is stated that a lesson implies *giving form* to teaching with a view to effective learning, this is to acknowledge that the aim of teaching is in giving form to a learning aim by which the equilibrium of form and content crystallizes into the next important

lesson criterion (in addition to a learning effect). When there is a lesson form, one is mainly looking for the initiating contributions of a teacher to the course of a situation. Earlier, this is referred to as a matter of educative engagement. When there is a learning aim, one shifts the emphasis to the activity expected of the pupils. Is it not the great void of all known didactical constructions which do not focus on the equilibrium of these two matters, and eventually show that the form itself does not but focus on the effect which this form will be appealing regarding the *tasks* which they set for a learning person?

There can be no question that a lesson form holds no appeal for a learning person. To claim that a teacher's initiative does not push through to a child's initiative is to deny the reality of educating in its entirety. A teacher's call, as evidence of his/her initiative, compels an answer from a child who is with him/her. This answer is evidence of child's initiative grounded on the fact that he/she is in the world and must become someone. If the didactical imperative, under which a teacher stands, does not eventually also speak of a learning imperative under which a pupil stands, the intervention made is meaningless.

Strikingly, the correlate is that the imperative is always the unmistakable realization that a person is someone who "cannot" *say no* to it. The question is if those involved in a didactic situation *must not say no*, above all, considering his/her task, a teacher (adult) might indicate a "no" with nonaccountable teaching. Clearly, here there is a complete or rounded out educative intervention, and to think of a lesson structure outside this connotation is inconceivable. Should there then be a lesson form (meaning the initiating share which a teacher takes so that, as a lesson takes its course as a type of lesson, it becomes manifest or visible) indicates an intention which is accountably attuned to definite modes of learning. A last account which a teacher should be able to give of his/her structure, also includes an account of the modes of learning which are relevant to the lesson.

If, in explicating a lesson structure, one should start with the generally accepted statement that a lesson form indicates a way in which lesson content can be considered, one is involved with a half-

truth. This statement is unfinished or incomplete because its final consequence has not been drawn. To be able to argue this opinion further, first a didactician must account for an additional problem addressed here, i.e., what is the linking factor between teaching aim and learning aim, if one accepts them as the two components of an educative aim? How is it possible that the one (teaching) pushes through to the other (learning), and the opposite, in the sense that it is a matter of educative initiative?

Teaching is meaningless if there is no learning. But [without teaching], learning still is possible, but it is without direction if there is no teaching. A child learns in the lifeworld apart from being taught. If one sees the origin of the form and the content of learning in its coherence, one will notice that the reality of educating reveals this matter in such a way that an adult, who accepts responsibility for a child, does not leave the act of leaning entirely to a child's free initiative, or to chance. On the contrary, he/she directs it in the simplest situation by guiding a child in actualizing learning. After all, this is where the word "teaching" came from.

In German, "unterricht" comes from "recht", i.e., to indicate a course, to show a direction, to recommend a path. If "unter" also means "between", i.e., it implies the interpersonal, then in teaching this has to do with indicating the direction and course of the interpersonal activity. Directing a learning intention is a matter of teaching, i.e., the meaning and task of teaching. The coherence of life form and life content which culminates in a human lifestyle, is the evocative force behind the events which, in their turn, are guided by a life and worldview. In what then does a didactician find the unifying factor for a teaching aim and a learning aim of a lesson situation? There can be only one such factor, i.e., the content.

In teaching and learning, content is important. It must be acquired, mastered, integrated, and implemented in a child's becoming. After all, content indicates the direction for the dynamic of a learning person. Also, content proclaims the meaning of teaching and offers meaningful beacons for actualizing the act of learning. Mastering contents also eventually discloses the state of [a child's] formedness. The way in which one deals with the content makes possible the

description of a matter such as what is “generally human”. The contents state the essence of human existence. In the simplest verbalizations of a child who learns to speak, in the perception of another person or an object, there is a recognizable changing, becoming relationship to the *matters* with which reality is filled.

Therefore, one must understand that whenever and wherever a lesson structure comes into play, there are two major lines to be indicated. Schematically, this would show the image of a ladder. One of its legs would represent a teaching aim, the other a learning aim, while the rungs would indicate the content by which the two legs are connected. This coherence of teaching and learning aims, as linked by the contents, not only makes an educative aim (i.e., a teaching aim) meaningful, but also practically possible.

Everyone who has experienced educating in one or another form in its practice must include these two aspects; i.e., teaching and learning, cannot work without definitive statements about contents. This experiencing of teaching practice is unique to all adults dealing with children and as such, it is important for constructing a didactical theory which *must* result in pronouncements about a lesson structure, because the totality of experiencing is the first, primary ordering of the lifeworld, also available in its educative context. Whether these contents arise as a spontaneous narrative or as a formal, matter-of-fact explanation, fundamentally makes no difference to the insight which can be gained from them. Without content, no teaching. Without content, no educating.

Therefore, the starting point in a lesson structure is the lesson content. It is when an adult decides, spontaneously or formally, about *what* to teach (i.e., point(s) of fixation for a learning person’s attending) that he/she decides to describe more extensively according to his/her teaching and learning aims, and (in school) as a lesson. If the content is not securely delimited, an adult essentially does not know where he/she is going with a child. After all, the form he/she creates varies according to the content in which he/she is involved. It is because of the nature of the content that an adult gives form to his/her teaching. It is in terms of the unique nature of the content which a learning child proceeds to master as content. No one masters content in the same way, otherwise the

issue of the modes of learning would have had a much smaller scope in planning the course of teaching.

Considering the foregoing, in planning a lesson, the first task of a teacher is to reduce the content to its real essences. If an adult has decided that a content agrees with his/her lifestyle as well as his/her life and worldview, his/her own mastery of reality (e.g., agriculturally, or industrially) is important for a child's becoming, he/she also can proceed to formulate a teaching and a learning aim.

Of course, in an everyday educative situation, teaching and learning aims acquire form, irrespective of the quality. This form also is fluid because it depicts a design for a situation which does not have a businesslike character. In a school situation, where progressions have largely been formalized, these relationships involving content are very important because so many matters of content have been *dealt with* there. Parents do not talk about matters which have been completed, teachers do. The progress of a teacher and his/her pupils largely depends on the contents completed. A teacher measures his/her progress by having content completed, in terms of a student's knowledge of it.

The fact that all pupils have not mastered everything which has been dealt with, offers one of the most important tasks of orthodidactics: In this respect, the educative situation at home is much simpler than in school, and the scope of the contents are not necessarily prescribed. The lifestyle in the primary (i.e., home) situation allows for greater variation, it is much more fluid and pliable.

The first task for a teacher in preparing the content to be dealt with, is to reduce it to its real essences. In any theme, all content is not equally essential. The most important criterion for deciding what is or is not essential is the learning aim a teacher has set. When it is decided *what* the pupils in *this* lesson should know, master, and use, the essence of the content is determined accordingly.

For example, in treating a sonnet, immediately two possible learning aims arise: an appreciation and an analysis aim. One is lived experienced more pathically [affectively] and, thus, more

esthetically directed (appreciative), while the other is lived experienced more gnostically [cognitively] and, therefore, is more intellectually attuned. With one, there is an emotional, spiritual involvement in a piece of cultural goods, with the other, an involvement with understanding a poetic form.

Obviously, there will be differentiation in the modes of learning while reducing the content and designing a teaching form will show corresponding differences. A learning aim differs in these two variations, forcing varied teaching forms. The coherence of a teaching and a learning aim, in terms of the relevant content, is not unreasonable. The form of teaching and the modes of learning take their start in the content which must be offered and mastered. Teaching and learning find each other in the relevant content. Reducing the content should bring the perspective of the content into line with the learning aim. Preparing a learning aim implies that a learning effect is noticeable. At the same time, attaining a learning aim is achieving a teaching aim.

What is the outcome of this way of dealing with statements about the lesson structure? On the other hand, a teacher *must* reduce content to its essences while considering his/her learning aim. By this, it is understandable to include understandable statements about the ways in which the content must be reduced. On the other hand, this involves formulating a learning aim which also includes verbalizing the content as a lesson problem. This lesson problem must verbalize the essence of a teacher's reductions in accordance with the learning aim in such a way that it falls within the possible grasp of a pupil and makes sense to him/her. The lesson problem is verbalized such that the origins of the content are interpreted to be in harmony with the learning aim.

This simplifies the problem of a lesson structure. If content is reduced to essences in harmony with a learning aim, and if a learning aim is meaningfully formulated as a problem which figures somewhere in a child's lifeworld, properly verbalized so that the problem also stands out for a child, a teacher has a starting point for his/her formal design. Announcing a theme does not constitute a lesson problem. Somewhere in a theme, there is a life context actualizing value for a *becoming* modern era. The identity of a

lesson problem is not recognized or described in isolation. Any lesson problem has identity because a teacher also is aware of related or opposing problems, no matter how different their nature might be for a becoming child.

This does not mean that curricula which serve schools all over the world make this principle visible. If this is not the case, it will fill a gap in a curriculum, and those responsible for the teaching will pay attention to this matter to eventually explain the meaning of a curriculum as a starting point for the act of teaching. It cannot but help that, in terms of a specific theme, a problem or problems must be highlighted with an eye to a child mastering them to be more maneuverable in their own lifestyle. Only then is there a didactically justified curriculum. In a lesson problem, the learning intent must be awakened so that learning can be actualized.

In addition, now a teacher plans his/her ways of unlocking. It is clear that his/her presentation also can lock up, instead of unlock the reduced essences. His/her planning for unlocking or revealing reality is a matter of form. Clearly, here there is an emphasis on the act of teaching as a matter of *ways* of presenting contents.

However, the question is: To what is this way of unlocking attuned? The significance of anticipating the modes of learning is shown repeatedly. In this case, it is about matters such as remembering, thinking, sensing, lived experiencing, experiencing, attending, perceiving, etc. On these issues, pedagogics needs a wealth of research, especially in psychopedagogical terms. However, there are also other issues which must be considered in this regard: The experiences, and prior knowledge available to the pupils, their level of becoming, whether they are sons or daughters, what age group is represented and much more.

In this way, a teacher's unlocking reality implicates mastering it. This mastery involves both content and form. As for a teacher's share, reality is in relief. This is not the case with a pupil. In his/her case, this relief is still approaching. As the accents shift, there is a change in profile of the reality presented. As a teacher moves in unlocking reality from science to lifeworld, of learning, a child moves from lifeworld to science.

The content binds together the activity of *unlocking* or *disclosing* into a unity which is describable didactically as a lesson structure. In this context, ground-forms, teaching methods, and forms of ordering content, didactical principles, and forms of practice are meaningful and are integrated in accordance with the fundamental matters discussed so far.

E. SUMMARY: DIACTICAL THEORY AND TEACHING PRACTICE⁷

The relationship, coherence, and so-called distance between didactical theory and teaching practice are some of the most inexplicable contradictions of didactics. In the history of both science (didactics) and schooling (teaching practice), the ongoing theme of the problems are indicated. Practice, as the area where teaching *is dealt with*, the reproach is tossed to theory, i.e., the area in which there is *thought* about teaching, that reflecting on practice has nothing to say to practice, that it does not consider the dynamic, active nature of practice that, therefore, the theory does not incisively illuminate practice. In addition, it has little to prescribe practice. And certainly, any theory is expected to offer some prescription.

A multitude of works by great pedagogical (respectively, didactical) reformers have been raised regarding this rare objection. At the same time, in the history of didactical thinking, this objection is shown to be fruitful and justified: Comenius, Pestalozzi, Froebel, Petersen, and Kurt Hahn, in the very recent past, all base their life's work on this objection, and from this, new, far-reaching practices are called to life by which we possess only their theoretical remains in books.

Thus, if we follow the trail of the problem in the history of didactics, it seems beyond any doubt that the objection that theorizing has little to say to practice can be consistently maintained. On the other hand, it is striking that the changes which have been made in practice, and proclaimed to be desirable today, are only descriptions, i.e., available as theory. Also, it is interesting that the

purest theorist in the history of didactics, i.e., Herbart, in the history of schooling, and to this day, has had the greatest residual effect.

A comprehensive and intensive historical unraveling of this problem surely would bring many insights to the surface, which today remain hidden. For this summary, one conclusion is sufficient for an introduction to this argument. From the history of this issue, one can assert an undeniably real coherence and mutual relationship between theory and practice. That this historical coherence is incomplete, narrow, wrong, one-sided, or is insufficient, when viewed as a whole, but this has nothing to do with the principle of the matter. Rousseau and his *Emile* provide the clearest proof of this. In our time, to talk about or describe didactical theory and teaching practice means to postulate a coherence, a connection with theory and practice.

If statements about the coherence of theory and practice regarding teaching are permissible, one could reduce the matter to two aspects and end up with their essentials:

1. What demands could a practice rightly make of a theory? and
2. Presently, in its analyses and descriptions, what does a theory offer for practical implementation?

In answering both questions, as pedagogicians, we must remember that thinking about a practice always presupposes a view, a fundamental, and thorough view of the situation itself, to know it. This is his/her first, fundamental task. In its turn, practice must take note of this view or fundamental pervasiveness of the situation, but then, for the purpose of acting, doing, bringing into motion, executing, completing.

1. The first demand which could be placed on a didactical theory is that it must be directed to reality and true to it. For a theory to be true to reality assumes that it must consider reality itself; that a thinker must refuse to allow him/herself to be displaced from this reality; that this reality must be verbalized in theoretical constructions, and that nothing, absolutely nothing, should be attributed to reality which is not substantive and essential to and part of it.

It is the task of a theory to disclose and not to impose. As soon as a theoretical didactician proceeds to impose, he/she delivers him/herself to other subject sciences [e.g., psychology] whose statements acquire application status in a didactical course. But, above all, he/she surrenders to his/her own fantasy. Then, his/her theoretical constructions become mere thought constructions which cannot consider practice at all.

Psychology, sociology, biology, etc. are not focused on teaching itself, and therefore, in a didactical sense, they establish a gap between theory and practice; their application endeavors have nothing to do with teaching. Their results are about zero for didactic practice and, rightly, didactic practice finds them to be mere babble.

On the other hand, when a theorist exchanges reality for fantasy by thinking about a situation which does not exist, this means his/her explanation has no origins because it is not real. His/her expressions are merely imposed with little more than rhetorical value. Essentially, this does not differ from the above-mentioned presumed contributions [of psychology, etc.] to didactical theory.

The common position of both is that they have nothing to do with didactical science. We find this problem in every other discipline of pedagogics in its scientific context, but especially it affects the didactic because a school's teaching situation can and must show these didactical views to be true. Also, this does not mean that other disciplines do not have the same problems: Theology has struggled for many centuries with disclosing and imposing because, ultimately, the pulpit must be ascended.

In contrast, a didactical theory which holds fast to reality ensures a continuity of thought and action because reality *is* and becomes manifest in what occurs, i.e., in what is *done*. With this, the rightly raised objection to the isolation of theory and practice is eliminated fundamentally because reality, i.e., the totalities of experiencing themselves form the basis on which a discussion of theory and practice can be built: After all, this is the only basis for such a discussion if the conversational partners do not talk together

fundamentally. A willingness to hold onto reality guarantees the discussion between theory and practice. In this connection, I think the tasks of theory are extensive, three of which are brought up here:

- a) To disclose reality through practice in both its essences and multiplicities. The concepts “essences” and “multiplicities” indicate the depth and breadth of the theoretical expositions on which a theorist tries to avoid one-sidedness and superficiality. Thus, his/her descriptions will be fundamentally didactical in this regard, while considering the historical-didactical, psycho-didactical, socio-didactical, and especially fundamental-didactical statements about the *origin* or the structures of the original experiencing of the practice he/she is reflecting on.

a The experiencing in question is one of the most original which person possesses. Its essence or essentials are summarized in didactical theory today in a categorical structure which describes the practical act of “*didaskhein*” (to teach). Any didactical theory which has not yet advanced far enough to claim that it has broken through the crust of the surface.

- b) Experiencing also shows that educating is continually realized in teaching. No one can educate with respect to nothing. Educating is always realized about “something”, i.e., contents of a rich and varied nature which, after all, give the final *sense* to the pedagogically identifiable becoming of a child and, thus, to the educative interventions of an adult.

This does not claim that all educating is teaching, but only that educating outside teaching is impossible – in the same way that [educative] teaching is meaningless without considering educative ideals. Today didacticians are aware that this actualization of educating in the act of teaching involves a very strong pre-scientific, subjective, and a post-scientific aspect which should be carefully considered when describing the course of teaching in its universal validity.

To preserve the continuity of thought and action, didactical theory, in its explications, must be able to clearly indicate the coherence and relationship of the universal form and the varying content, but also make it available for scientific judgment. If a categorical structure, as briefly described above, discloses the essence or essentials of [original] experiencing, a criterial system which serves a scientist, makes possible the assessment of a practice (i.e., as didactic), but then under the condition that he/she can justify his/her criteria and show the equilibrium of form and content and, thus, establish a scientific perspective and view of life as revealed in the original experiencing [of educative teaching].

The spontaneity and naivety which is implicit in this account of [original] practice, in didactical theory must be made explicit for those who are supposed to understand the structure of teaching, also with a view to re-implementing it in situations which are not original, and do not figure in a person's experiential totality, e.g., the school.

- c) The motivation for the two preceding matters regarding the boundness to reality of thinking and acting in teaching is summarized in the two concepts: to *know*, and to *evaluate*.

The reality boundness of an accountable didactical theory also poses a third motivating matter for his/her departure from original reality or experiencing. Insofar as a didactical theory is not only written, but must be studied, insight into teaching also must result in a teaching initiative. This means that insight into and evaluation of the act of teaching should lead to the initiation of a practical situation which includes the essentials or essences of this form of experiencing (teaching). Only then will *thinking about* and the *activity of teaching* find each other in a practical situation.

That content is bound by [and varies with] time, place, culture, and life view is evident. The continuity in thinking and acting, thus, can manifest itself with respect to content expressions about, and for teaching – but it does not have to. Today, divergent religious, social, political, and other views are evidence that content, and with what we rightly are concerned,

acquires an emphasis without which our educative ideals cannot be realized in our teaching. However, form remains universal.

Form is a matter of general human experiencing and, if a didactical theory is to be real, this means that, in his/her investigation and explication of form must give an account of his/her being anchored in a lifeworld, the contemporary ways in which this can be expressed in our present time, and the expectations which are cherished for the future.

Of course, there are other matters which also help maintain the continuity of thought and action, of theory and practice in didactics. However, for this summary, this three-fold motivation for the reality-bound character of a didactical theory suffices.

2. A second aspect in which practice can legitimately expect something from a theory is that of terminological ambiguity. Discussion about teaching, whether theoretically or practically directed is only possible in terms of concepts. These concepts must precisely express both thinking and experiencing according to their meaning, and, thus, an exchange of thought becomes possible. A first matter to be accounted for by any theory or science is the commonly accepted terminology by which both the terrain he/she covers and the activity he/she describes are indicated. When the same concepts are used for different matters or phenomena, terminological ambiguity clearly is not part of a practice of science or theory by which a discussion with and about practice is going to be lost.

Regarding this aspect of the relationship between theory and practice, one must note that experiencing as such, is not aimed at being verbalized but at being realized. When a practice becomes verbalized, there is already an objective, distanced attitude which accumulates in thinking, and is no longer practice as such. Thus, a theory fulfills the task of verbalizing, precisely because it describes practice. I summarize the recognition owed in the following three aspects:

- a) A theory will have to engage in etymological research of conceptual lineage to disclose the true meanings of its verbalizations, and to interpret and evaluate them in relation

to prevailing theoretical views. For didactical theory, it has become time to distinguish between thoughts and opinions or points of view. Didactical thinking focuses on formal-logical pronouncements in terms of its subject matter language, recognized scientific methods, research, etc. However, a theoretical view cannot detach itself completely from the matter of opinions or points of view because opinions mainly are grounded on or accumulate because of experiential totalities and dynamic courses of situations in which people participate without necessarily expressing themselves in formal-logical ways. Both thinking (i.e., science) and opinion (i.e., experiencing, original reality as a common point of departure), must finally find each other in terminological unambiguity because they formulate about the same piece of reality.

Finally, here a theory must ensure that the conceptual which serves him/her brings him/her to talk about practice as such. Even more closely: Care must be taken that the concepts verbalize the essences of practice. On the other hand, it also is a fair task for a practitioner to familiarize him/herself with scientific terms and participate in a discussion about practice, and to bring forth sound criticisms of theoretical statements. Also, the time of chattering and general knowledge finally has passed in didactics.

- b) In doing this, a didactical theorist is presented with the task of exploring the correctness of the use of such terminology in his/her writings. Words also have specific meanings in science. Sometimes there is mention of broadening, sometimes of restricting recognized word meanings. Sometimes new words are coined to express new insights or changed forms of living. The entrenchment will show itself in an unambiguous subject matter language which, since it is about a practice, will have or ought to have the same relevance, and which cannot be used loosely or rigidly in support of his/her preferences or opinions.
- c) As a result, didactical theory must increasingly change from its formal-logical descriptions to more precise and

comprehensive defining. In Latin, the verb “definire” means delimiting, precisely determine, to narrow, to limit. The form “definition,” especially in relation to logic and rhetoric, refers to a definition, while the adverb, “definitus,” means clear or concrete. Hence, to define implies that a matter, object, or view is bounded, determined, and verbalized exactly. Accordingly, the concept “teaching practice” then would imply a unique situation oriented to *responsible* action: An act preceded by a decision regarding in what way, and for what, in this situation for these children, a teaching intention must take its *real* course.

3. The continuity of thought and practice, as well as terminological unambiguity compel an accountable didactical theory to be situation-bound, meaning to expect that it will be based on practice. Flights of fantasy which are claimed to be science, in some didactical writings become an impassible path for a practitioner of science. As in the previous cases regarding the expectation that practice can ask of a theory which can foster the argument, is limited to three aspects which together might guarantee a situation-based didactical theory.

- a) A theory must be situation related. Coming out of a practice, as a scientific exposition, it must have relevance for practice, literally it must refer to practice, it must be implementable in practice, can be visibly indicated, and can be repeated fruitfully with refinement if it wants to qualify as a theory. The situational involvement of a theory will highlight the pre-scientific, scientific, and post-scientific aspects of a practice in a didactically clear, balanced coherence. By implication, a science of teaching can push through to a teaching theory.

But even more, it will show and interpret the relationship structures which *ipso facto* are in a didactical situation with respect to teaching and its progress: relationships of trust, authority, and understanding cannot be removed from the experiencing we commonly call teaching (“didaskhein”). In addition, the course or sequence structures of association, encounter, engagement, and teaching intervention, *e.g., by accompanying the learning activity, it must be brought to fruition with respect to the situation-related

theory (Landman). The same holds for psychopedagogical statements, the modes of learning (Sonnekus), and so many more aspects of related pedagogical disciplines which must be considered in creating a situation-related didactical theory which does not immediately collapse on itself when tested in practice.

- b) That a didactical theory also must be situation-ordering means that its insights can be summarized in a structure which, as far as it is scientific, eventually must result in a lesson structure whose origin, essence, and implementation must be scientifically accountable in accordance with the experiential totalities which lay its foundation.
- c) Thirdly, a situation-based theory also must be situation-anticipating. Certainly, it can be expected of didactical theory that, in its view of the course of teaching, it will be able to advance the situations he/she brings about, especially in the sense that it is a practice which considers its turnaround potential. Didactical anticipation is one of the greatest tasks given to a person who is practicing daily. Essentially, this is unique to practice. When a didactical theory has not taken up a scientific planning tendency in this regard, this means it has overlooked an aspect of practice and the entirety of expositions will show a somewhat skewed structure. On the other hand, a practitioner must be able to think ahead about his/her daily actions and decisions to have both meaning and form in a lesson structure or, more broadly, to cast a learning plan which illuminates his/her manner and, especially his/her teaching style.

That a theory of this and many other matters still falls too short in the present time does not relieve a practice of its obligation to take an honest and unfettered scope of what a theory presently has to say for practice.

With this, we have arrived at the second question which was initially asked, i.e., what does currently known theory have for practical implementation?

The theoretical-didactical explications of the past two decades give very clear evidence that didacticians, i.e., those who claim the title

of “scientist”, were and still are prepared to address didactical problems radically and with originality. The encyclopedia of knowledge and insights available today in books and writings do not agree at all. But, from different standpoints, ways of viewing, points of departure, and even prejudgments, tangents have been disclosed which, to a greater extent than ever, delimit a common problem regarding large-scale research undertaken in both theoretical and practical terms. The most important of these is that didacticians have a common understanding that teaching is an imperative of life. Among other things, being human means teaching. Teaching is life practice, life fulfilling. In teaching a future is made, history is written, and the destiny of people and nations is strongly influenced.

In the preceding chapters, the coherence of form and content is repeatedly indicated in the description of a piece of original experiencing known as “teaching”. Also, it is pointed out that, while content is and should be specific and variable, form is a universal matter which always and under all people and cultures, has revealed an identifiable, autonomous identity, and still is disclosed and by which it is designated as “form”.

In experiencing, what we know as “didaskēin” is described in contemporary didactics in both the categorical and the criterial aspects of its structure. This does not indicate that the descriptions of the structures are all adequate, complete, or above doubt in all respects. The fact is that now there are structures, i.e., there are honest efforts to describe the event of teaching in its essentials, and to evaluate what they are, also in line with the educative expectations of what they should be.

Also, it is emphasized that these fundamental views of “didaskēin” are not available outside particulars, but also within life views, since his/her expositions are available, because reality furnishes its contents with specifics. [The particulars continually realize themselves in the structure of contents and enable a responsible didactician, especially one who calls him/herself a Christian, to account before God and humans of the practice he/she exercises for created beings in its origin and real essences]. Today, a practitioner

no longer can excuse him/herself by claiming that the theory did not explain to him/her the origin of his/her daily action.

In addition, it has been pointed out that the ultimate result of a didactical theory is that it must provide a lesson structure. Rightly, it can be asked whether present day practitioners of a theory have advanced to a lesson structure. If it is considered that a lesson structure must verbalize and portray the coherence of didactical insights, an analysis of it probably provides the best point of linkage for understanding the contributions of research to practice.

There can only be a lesson structure where the form and content of a lesson exhibit a balanced coherence by which the teaching intention can be fulfilled in formally constituted situations by repetition. One must recognize that the constant factor here is a lesson form, while the content varies according to curricula, type of school, formative and preparation aims, pedagogical presuppositions, post-scientific views, etc.

Yet it is necessary to say something about certain didactical principles regarding lesson content. In this regard, there especially are two factors which must be emphasized for practice.

1. Where there is a lesson structure, there is a *problem* of lesson content which must be addressed formally. Stating a lesson problem is directly related to a teacher's learning aim. Therefore, a lesson problem is also the verbalization of the learning aim as content, and it must consider every aspect related to the learning aim to guarantee the success of the act of learning during a lesson. For a pupil, the lesson content is not an obvious problem, i.e., content itself does not guarantee the learning intention.

Here, we must distinguish between problematic and difficult. To the extent that content makes sense and is meaningfully placed in a lesson problem, there is a learning intention and eventual learning problems are intercepted.

2. In the second place, a lesson structure makes room for reducing content to its essentials. This reduction implies that a teacher, based on his/her exploration and knowledge of a child, clearly

formulates his/her learning aim, and with insight into the modes of learning, he/she strips the lesson content of everything which is superfluous and, with the solution of the problem in mind, guides the learner securely to the acquisition, mastery, and integration of new knowledge. That he/she is required to simplify, reformulate in a child's language, and in accordance with the child's experiential totality, to schematize, to build models, to observe, etc. need not be argued further.

The fact these two aspects emphasize that contemporary didactics gave up the obvious didactical nature of contents, and that a lesson structure might vary from situation to situation with the same class and/or with the didactic form. The fact that this content is also ordered in a lesson structure is no didactic novelty, except that this ordering is closely linked to form, and the way of ordering co-determines a lesson form.

With respect to lesson form, there are four matters which need didactical attention. The ground-form, method, modalities, and modes of learning planned for, together build a didactical design which casts the mold for the lesson content. From experience, these four aspects are not radically new because, for centuries they have been the basis for any formalized teaching practice.

A practitioner who does not provide for each of these matters of a lesson structure for which he/she is responsible, does not know what he/she is doing. To talk about didactical theory and teaching practice involves a contradiction. A didactical theory which qualifies as such, describes practice. A didactic practitioner who can explain why a situation is constructed so and not otherwise, necessarily practices, and implements a theory. When "didaskhein", as original experiencing, is the basis of both theory and practice, on the one hand, one has a thinking, researching, looking back to and forward to practice. On the other hand, we are dealing with an empirical test of insights, anticipations, and expectations. A theory which cannot find its fulfillment in practice is no theory. The explanatory sense of practice in terms of form and content, reveals a theory because the entirety of experiencing teaching is verbalized. To verbalize this most original of human experiencing means practicing didactics as a science.

F. CONCLUSION

The search for a point of departure for constructing or designing a didactical theory based on the preceding explications presents a large and varied problem. The answer to questions of essential significance for such a design do not lie on the surface of everyday experiencing for collection. It also seems as if an eclectic approach to designing such a theory, though not without value, may not penetrate to the origins sought. If this were to be the case, one should have arrived at a structural whole which would provide fundamental questions or answers, considering the preceding six possibilities or approaches to designing a didactical theory.

In each of the analyses we noted separately that, insofar as a structure is involved, it could not incorporate the entirety of interpretations of “*didaskhein*”. To think that a deliberately chosen synthesis of *fundamentalia* which had come to light, nevertheless, would reveal the origins of such a theory forming would be dangerous scientifically. Everyone who today works scientifically is aware that a whole is more than the sum of its parts.

Therefore, it seems that a more accurate explanation of didactical origins, in a general sense and as far as they are knowable, must be researched before there is a search for the origin of “*didaskhein*” and, therefore, the point of departure for designing a didactical theory must be brought to life. The problem is so varied and some aspects in modern times are so topical that didacticians can be forgiven for often taking a part for the whole, exchanging theory for practice, techniques for principles, ends for origins.

Without delineating the didactical problem further, one necessarily tends to make categorical statements about matters, to describe them in an unintelligible way, and to announce practice without knowing how such practice essentially actualizes the didactical problem “*didaskhein*” (seen in its experiential context), which, after all, is the only way in which original practice can be described.

1. Compare, e.g., Van Gelder, L.: *Didaktisch analyse*; Klafki,

W.: “Die didaktische Anayse” (in Dohmen & Maurer: *Unterricht*).
Schulz, W.: “Grundzuge der Unterrichtsanalyse” (in Dohmen & Maurer: *Unterricht*).

2. This formulation is from my colleague and co-worker, Dr. C. J. van Dyk.

3. Look at the explanation of the lesson structure.

4. The following types of lessons distinguished are obvious (only the most notable ones are indicated):

- i) Appreciation lesson
- ii) Tell lesson
- iii) Exposition or explication lesson
- iv) Free activity lesson
- v) Exercise (drill) lesson
- vi) Discussion lesson
- vii) Demonstration lesson
- viii) Experiment lesson
- ix) Analysis lesson

5. In this regard, also compare the remark made in the Concluding word (section E).

6. For a complete breakdown see Van der Stoep, F.: *Didaktiese Grondvorme*.

7. This part was presented in a modified form by the author during the national S.A.V.B.O. congress, 31 Jan. 1971, Port Elizabeth.