

## CHAPTER I

### THE CONCEPT “CATEGORY”

#### 1.1 INTRODUCTION

It no longer is doubted that the practice of contemporary pedagogics is a particular form of an **autonomous** science. The battle over the autonomy of pedagogics is in its victory phase. Thus, the emphasis in fundamental pedagogics has shifted to a more radical explication of a **way of thinking** that has validity for an autonomous pedagogics. The essence and meaning of pedagogical thinking clearly is in the scientific spotlight.

When there is mention of thinking, there is reflection on the means that can be used in this scientific activity. Thinking requires means of thinking, and pedagogical thinking requires pedagogical means.

There is a close connection between the autonomy of pedagogics and the means used in pedagogical thinking. An autonomous pedagogics must decide about means of thinking, thus about means of thinking that will allow the pedagogic to appear in its **real-essentiality**. **In order to preserve its autonomy pedagogics must compel itself to be accountable for its means of thinking, thus its categories.**

Educating is a fundamental activity of persons in their lifeworld. The “a” indicates that there are other fundamental activities that can be distinguished. For example, there are religious activities that are studied by theology, social activities by sociology, the psychic life by psychology, etc. All of these and many more are lifeworld activities and the sciences that study (reflect on) them are sciences of the lifeworld. This means that they have their origin in the lifeworld. They reflect on the lifeworld and do this in terms of means of thinking that are found in the lifeworld. Sciences of the lifeworld thus implement lifeworld categories. This last statement means that it is possible that the various sciences of the lifeworld are able to particularize and implement the same categories in their scientific thinking.

What has been barely described also implies the following:

- (1) Although the various sciences of the lifeworld implement the same categories, because of their autonomy, each questions the lifeworld by explicating and applying each category **in its own way**. Thus, pedagogics applies certain lifeworld categories **as pedagogical categories**, sociology **as sociological categories**, psychology **as psychological categories**, axiology **as axiological categories**, etc.
- (2) When there is mention of the lifeworld this means the world in which persons live. Thus, lifeworld categories are human categories, hence anthropological categories, and this is in contrast to animal kingdom categories and other forms of non-anthropological categories.

Now it is possible to distinguish between those areas of science that describe and elucidate being-human-in-general, namely philosophical anthropology, and other areas of science that describe and elucidate being-human-in-particular. The latter anthropological sciences are pedagogy, psychology, sociology, axiology, etc. Thus, there are:

- (1) general anthropological categories and
- (2) particular anthropological categories.

From a study of the works of Landman<sup>1)</sup>, for example, the former are known as anthropological categories and the latter are named in such a way that they refer to the science that implements them, thus pedagogical, psychological, sociological, theological categories, etc.

The following categories, among others, are called [general] anthropological categories:<sup>2)</sup>

1. being-in-the-world
2. being-with
3. temporality
4. being-someone-oneself.

This means that what is mentioned here are fundamental human ways of being, thus human ways of existing. The terms “being-in-the-world”, “being-with”, “temporality” and “being-someone-oneself” **verbally express** fundamental ways human beings are situated in the world. These expressions (particular words) then can be applied by philosophical anthropology as anthropological categories, thus as means of thinking in order to illuminate the real-essentiality of being-human-as-such.

- (3) The particularity (autonomy, distinctness) of each science of the lifeworld (human sciences) is characterized by the fact that each, from its autonomous question asking and **perspective**, can reflectively examine the verbally expressed ways-of-being-human-in-general. The result of such reflective examination then can be the particularization of specific categories, thus particular categories as pedagogical-, as axiological-, as psychological-, etc.- categories. The following twelve possible categories emerge as particular anthropological categories:<sup>3)</sup>

[Being-in-the-world]

1. Giving-meaning-on-one’s-own-responsibility.
2. Breaking-away-from-homeostasis.
3. Norm embodiment.

[Being-with]

4. Venturing-with-another.
5. Gratitude-for-security.
6. Responsible-for-relationships.

[Temporality]

7. Hope-for-the-future.
8. Designing-possibilities.
9. Fulfilling-destination.

[Being-someone-oneself]

10. Respect-for-own-dignity.
11. Task-of-understanding-self.
12. Freedom-to-responsibility.

The following modifications in the names of the above particular anthropological categories now are proposed for their interpretation

as **purely pedagogical categories** where their pedagogical significance is emphasized:<sup>4)</sup>

1. Giving-meaning-with-**increasing**-responsibility.
2. **Gradually**-breaking-away-from-a-lack-of-exertion.
3. **Exemplifying**-and-emulating-norms.
4. Venturing (risking)-with-each-other-**pedagogically**.
5. Being-grateful-for-**pedagogical**-security.
6. Being-responsible-for-**educative**-relationships.
7. Wanting-(hoping)-to-attain-future-**adulthood**.
8. Designing-possibilities-for-**adulthood**.
9. **Gradually**-fulfilling-destination (adulthood).
10. **Increasing**-respect-for-human-dignity.
11. Achieving-**adulthood**-through-**increasing**-self-understanding.
12. **Conquering**-responsible-freedom.

(4) The particularization of the means of thinking (categories), as is evident from the above, has taken the following course:

anthropological categories —→ pedagogical categories.

Thus, the pedagogical categories are grounded (based, founded) in the general lifeworld categories that are known as anthropological categories. The question that now arises is if there possibly is a **FUNDAMENTAL (GROUND) CATEGORY** that grounds the anthropological categories. Landman<sup>5)</sup> already has indicated that indeed this is the case and thus it also is the author's aim in this study to investigate more closely the significance for pedagogical thinking of such a fundamental category that Landman has called **the ontological category**. There is mention of **the ontological category** (note: singular) that is named **being-in-the-world**.

Before proceeding to additional explications it is meaningful to verify if contemporary pedagogicians implement the terms "category" and "being-in-the-world" as well as their variants.

## 1.2 CONTEMPORARY PEDAGOGICIANS AND THE TERM "CATEGORY"

In reading the title of this study the first noun in it, “category” is immediately conspicuous and it can be asked directly whether contemporary pedagogicians use this concept and in what ways. In this connection one thinks in the first place of **M. J. Langeveld** of the Pedagogical Institute, Utrecht, Netherlands. In his discussion of “Prolegomena van ‘n Prinsipiele Pedagogiek” by C. K. Oberholzer, he says, “With Oberholzer, the anthropological moment assumes a fundamental place, but **deserving particular attention** is his attempt to develop the question of ‘what categories genuinely can disclose the pedagogic’, a design of pedagogic categories and criteria.... Herein lies a series of important questions by which category and criterion **must deliberately become** differentiated and **must be kept track of phenomenologically** with a view of establishing the structural relation at their root.”<sup>6)</sup>

In a letter to Prof. Landman, Faculty of Education, University of Pretoria, Prof. Langeveld provides the following commentary, among others, on his “Op soek na Pedagogiese Kriteria” (Van Schaik, 1969):

“I have read this with great interest and **agreement**. It pleases me that the pedagogic continues to develop so elegantly in your country.”<sup>7)</sup>

The following quotation is sufficient evidence that Langeveld deals with the concept “category” in his own work and how “The category of creating or bringing forth (Schopferischen oder Schaffenden) is a fundamental anthropological category”. This is recognized as the (ordinary) creativity of a child supported by a pre-given, psychological and not further reducible anthropological category.”<sup>8)</sup> “Then ‘Man’ includes adult and child and every deduction required regarding the specific difference in the category ‘child’ and this being is directly what we lack”. “ ... that the category ‘child’ always assumes the educative relation and thus the educative situation as a basic condition of being human.” “...i.e., the category ‘becoming’ is doubly representative of child being: ... here arises the future-directedness of the category of becoming and with this the category is given as constructing and expanding in nature.”<sup>9)</sup> “It is a wonder that the category ‘development’, as fundamental form of human life construction in human self reflection, has received so little attention.”<sup>10)</sup> “For a long time the very tedious process has been

carried out of a person thinking in categories applied to the child as a person,”<sup>11)</sup> “...he assumes bodily self experience as an intuitively available category for each reader.”<sup>12)</sup> In connection with the sequence structure, Langeveld says of “association”: “...association is the phenomenological category of human behavior in which we primarily find educating and it is its precondition.”<sup>13)</sup>

H. J. van der Linden (Pedagogische Studien, no. 10, 1969, 484) mentions that Langeveld often and explicitly uses anthropological categories. He lists the following:

|              |                |                   |
|--------------|----------------|-------------------|
| adulthood    | independence   | suffering         |
| authority    | love           | sympathy          |
| conscience   | morality       | trust             |
| freedom      | person         | value             |
| guilt        | punishment     | worthy of a child |
| humanization | responsibility | worthy of a human |
| image of man | sociality      |                   |

The Netherlander **S. Strasser** attempted to find an answer to the question of the scientific nature of pedagogics. His aim was to think radically about [reflect on] the educative act. His approach was to give a phenomenological description of the educative event and he remarks in this connection “Much depends on which language is used in the description, which concepts, are applied and which categories are considered to be fundamental.”<sup>14)</sup>

Then Strasser discussed further the two categories that **Theodor Litt** described in his “Führen oder Wachsenlassen” [Guiding or growing up] and that are included in the title of the work. Then he remarks: “We think that the third, most elemental category of pedagogical thinking deserves to be sought in the direction of human fertility.” ...”There is a need to introduce a pre-pedagogical category into the pedagogical discourse. We wish to propose a discussion of the procreating of life. Indeed, all forms of educating are made possible through this procreating”... “The primacy of this ‘third category’ ... is ... ontological in nature.” If we accept the concept of procreation as the point of departure for our categorical pedagogical theory....” “It is a constitutive characteristic of human Dasein; it must be labeled an ‘existential’ in the sense of Martin

Heidegger”. “... that our third category has relevance for the foundation of all educating...” Strasser begins the third chapter of his work by showing the connections among the unity, autonomy and unique nature of the pedagogical and its fundamental categories and further on he explains that there can be specific pedagogical understanding if a pedagogician knows “where he obtains his categories and concepts that change his judgments into pedagogical ones. Thus, this involves an epistemological problem that, in its turn, can only be solved on the basis of ontological insights”... “In the following we will label these typical ontological relationships as foundational rules”.<sup>15)</sup>

We can now proceed to the German world of pedagogical thought and here one initially thinks of **Otto Friedrich Bollnow**. He maintains that the pedagogical must design criteria by critically analyzing the educative reality. These criteria have to be used to judge what [activities] are false or correct. The pedagogic hermeneutic occurs through an analysis of language usage from which develops a phenomenological description of reality itself.<sup>16)</sup> As far as a pedagogical encounter is concerned, he explains that it is an “existential category”.<sup>17)</sup>

A second German thinker who is important to consider by pedagogical thinkers is **Josef Derbolav**. In his article, “Vom Wesen geschichtlicher Begegnung”<sup>18)</sup>, he explains that “encounter” was first a theological category and then became a philosophical-human scientific and eventually a pedagogical-historical one. He also talks about a “category of experience”.<sup>19)</sup>

**Werner Loch** contends that educating cannot be understood in itself but rather from the reality of being human because “human reality and nothing else can fill the category of educating. Without this, the category of educating remains empty”.<sup>20)</sup> (The significance of this statement for the theme of this study is obvious and will gradually become clearer in the following chapters). Loch distinguishes between anthropological pedagogy (a tautology—author) and pedagogical anthropology and explains that the latter has as a presupposition that “educating is a category of human Dasein without which it cannot be considered”.<sup>21)</sup> Elsewhere Loch talks of “human categories” (i.e., anthropological categories),

“moralistic categories” (i.e., axiological-ethical categories) and explains that a pedagogical understanding of being human is a decisively important category”.<sup>22)</sup>

The pedagogician **Wolfgang Klafki** finds that “the decisive, constitutive criterion of the pedagogical” must be sought in a field of tension and then in this regard he refers to Romano Guardini.<sup>23)</sup> Educating gives rise to a field of tension.

These few German pedagogical thinkers must suffice and now we proceed to consider the South African scene where it is well known that the matter of category was initiated by **C. K. Oberholzer** in his “Prolegomena van ‘n Prinsipiele Pedagogiek”. Among other things, he says that categories are a scientific necessity for expressing the pedagogical in its primordial phenomenality.<sup>24)</sup> Pedagogical criteria in terms of which an educative event is evaluated are pedagogical-ontological for Oberholzer and thus make a claim of necessity and universal validity.<sup>25)</sup>

For **Landman** categories are illuminative means of thinking<sup>26)</sup> and pedagogical criteria are value-structures that are brought to light by a pedagogician’s unbiased evaluative-consciousness.<sup>27)</sup>

**Gunter** describes pedagogical categories as fundamental pronouncements about being a child and the educative phenomenon and pedagogical criteria are norms for evaluating educative activities.<sup>28)</sup>

For **Van der Stoep** pedagogical categories are truisms that make the educative phenomenon accessible for investigation and for valid description, while with the help of didactic criteria it can be determined how a situation can be constituted in a didactic sense, how such a situation can be evaluated and how such a desired situation can be repeated.<sup>29)</sup>

**Sonnekus** gives a phenomenological-pedagogical essence analysis of the learning world of a child and writes that there are anthropological categories at the foundation of childlike modes of learning. In this regard he explains “that since the various modes of learning to be distinguished are viewed as modes of Dasein or

indeed ways of being, it is necessary to first look at the anthropological categories that lie at the foundation of such differentiated modes of being". And in addition, "it is necessary that the above-mentioned categories must not be viewed as separate from each other but as unitary categories that may not be thought of as apart from each other". Yet more, "These anthropological categories disclose child openness as a primordial way of being as this emerges in a child's going out to reality".<sup>30)</sup>

The historical-pedagogue **F. J. Potgieter** writes "If the historical situation is also a pedagogical one, in essence it is a pedagogical situation that has situation-exceeding significance and therefore historical categories, as auxiliary categories of the pedagogical, must be applied". He explains further that a historical study must be done in terms of particular categories that allow themselves to be seen in the historical situation.<sup>31)</sup>

From the above it now seems clear that a number of contemporary pedagogic thinkers have involved themselves in the problematic of pedagogical categories-criteria. Hence, this study must also be viewed as an attempt to make a contribution in this respect.

In linking up with what has been written so far, it can now be verified which pedagogicians have implemented the second term in the title of this study in their pedagogical thinking. Hence it will be verified if and to what extent there is scientific involvement with the category "being-in-the-world" or some variant of it such as for example "child-world-relationship".

### **1.3 CONTEMPORARY PEDAGOGICIANS AND THE TERM "BEING-IN-THE WORLD"**

For the sake of conciseness attention will only be given to the pedagogical work of the following Afrikaners:

**C. K. Oberholzer** employs this concept "being-in-the-world" as follows:

"Whoever refers to human being simultaneously means world involvement".

“As intentionality being human is the affirmation of the world; as existentiality he is world encountering”.

“From the beginning he is worldly: he is involved in an unbreakable dialogue with the world”.<sup>32)</sup>

Thus, being-**in**-the-world is a precondition for being human, and hence also for all of the activities and actions that are characteristic of being human, among which scientific activity and thus particular acts of thinking are of particular significance.

“His being human is a being-in-the world, a being-by-and-with-others-and-things, and a being-in-time”.<sup>33)</sup> No person lives in an opposite world as a world of objects next to each other”. “His being-in-the-world has as a direct other side, namely, a world for him”.<sup>34)</sup> Thus, it is being-**in**-the world and not being **opposite** the world or **above** it that is a precondition for being authentically human. “The fundamental structure of human existence finds expression in the statement that being human means being-in-the-world”. “By virtue of this being-in-the-world, a human being is already and always bound to (a partner of) but also concerned with (a participant in) at least a concrete situation of the here-and-now”.<sup>35)</sup> This also means that a person’s thinking participation in what is given in reality presumes his being-in-the-world.

**C. F. G. Gunter** strongly agrees with Oberholzer and he writes as follows:

“On the contrary, the world is imbued with humanness; the world is world-for-persons”. “On the contrary, he is essentially a being-in-the-world”. “Person and world thus form a unity of mutual implication.<sup>36)</sup> ... [a person] dwells in the world, acts in and with the world, changes and transforms it, and in this sense is essentially a being-in-the-world, and, as such, is essentially a being-in-a-situation”.<sup>37)</sup> As far as being authentically human is concerned, being-in-the-world is undeniable, cannot be thought away and is obvious.

**W. A. Landman** often uses this category “being-in-the-world” and from his work it is clear that person and world presume a unity, what is more ... “Being-in-the-world” or Dasein is the general

precondition for being-a-person-in-life-reality and consequently each description that does not take this into account qualifies as **unauthentic** or **untrue**". "Dasein-in-general with its meaning-giving directedness and openness to the world (intentionality—existence) is therefore the first category of reality, or fundamental category or ontological category".<sup>38)</sup> "As being-in-the-world a person, and thus also a child as a specific form of living, becomes-in-and-with-the-world".<sup>39)</sup> "A person is present to himself because he is-in-the-world". "The world is always there as the horizon of his dialogues and engagements". "The world is entirely within me and entirely outside of me".<sup>40)</sup> (Merleau-Ponty).<sup>1)</sup>

**F. van der Stoep** implements this concept in his didactic thinking as follows:

"The moment when especially language is acquired a person shows himself as in the world, i.e., in conversation with the things there". "Being directed to the world, exploring really means being directed to the world of adults".<sup>41)</sup> "However, the human world is only an aspect of 'Dasein' while human experiencing, as an empirical matter, is also only directed to this single facet".<sup>42)</sup> "... in his act of stepping-into-the-world he simultaneously enters **into** the world of language".<sup>43)</sup> "Being a person is a matter of being-in-the-world". "With this it is not suggested that the world is the last destination of a person". "However, for the time being, the world is our dwelling place".<sup>44)</sup>

**B. F. Nel** writes as follows:

"The I-self relationship is thus already an I-world relationship because the self cannot be formed except as in the world". "Being a person is finally being-in-the-world". "I is meant as 'I-being-in-the-world' and not that there is an I as an object that stands opposite the world as an object". "The quality of being-in-the-world acquires expression in the 'I am'".<sup>45)</sup> "There is not first an I and then a world but I and world but for my consciousness I and world are in one and the same act".<sup>46)</sup> Thus, there then is also no mention of first "thinking" and then "Thinking of the world". Thinking is only possible as thinking-about-something (the world). Thus, a person's

being-in-the-world is a precondition for his thinking about the world (reality).

**M. C. H. Sonnekus** states this as follows:

“Because of his child-being, he is Dasein, i.e., directed to conquering his world but at the same time he is also open to the world”.<sup>47)</sup>

“Human Dasein (Heidegger) then means a basic open possibility or indeed a being open to, that also means intentionality or being-directed-to”.<sup>48)</sup> “Further this means that a person, as consciousness, is directed to the world and others with the underlying idea of being-directed-against”.<sup>49)</sup> “Therefore, he is present-there in his actions, he dwells in the world by means of and in his actions, as acting child he creates a world and constitutes a meaningful new world for himself”.<sup>50)</sup> “A child is thus existentially present in the world in an affective (pathic) as well as normative way and in the same ways is present with things and others in the world”.<sup>51)</sup>

“Through seeing he lived experiences himself as being-in-the-world and indeed by and with things”. “He does not yet lived experience the meaning of his being-there but is in his pathic visual experiencing mode of Dasein”.<sup>52)</sup> “Learning as a primordial phenomenon manifests itself from the beginning in his primordial situatedness and relatedness with the world in which he finds himself”.<sup>53)</sup>

**C. J. G. Kilian** expresses himself as follows:

“As being-in-the-world, a person comes into contact with all of the embracing reality in which he is a participant”.<sup>54)</sup> “The person-world relationship manifest itself in person-person and person-thing relations”.<sup>55)</sup> “A person, as being-there, is permeated with the world and the world is saturated with humanness”.<sup>56)</sup> “Being-in-the-world, as existential, is thus a fundamental structural moment of being human”.<sup>57)</sup> “A precondition for any scientific reflection regarding person-child thus is their being-in-the-world because being human is being-in-the-world or Dasein (Heidegger)”.<sup>58)</sup>

**T. A. Viljoen** writes as follows:

“A person-in-his-world also thinks about his being-in-the-world...”  
“It will thus seem as if the human way of existing in the world can be qualified as one of wanting-to-know”. “The bridge between ‘knowing’ and ‘being-in-the-world’ is built in the lifeworld with the expression ‘being-at-home’.”<sup>59)</sup> “In the first place, human existence is a being-present-in-the-world as a task”.<sup>60)</sup>

**S. J. Gous** says the following:

“Without human being there is no world”. “As existence a human being is always already in the world and from the beginning is concerned with what reality is”.<sup>61)</sup> To be concerned with reality, thus also thinking about the reality of educating, necessarily presumes the thinker’s (pedagogician’s) being-in-the-world. “An essence of being human is that he is openness, i.e., aware-of-being-in-the-world, a being who is aware of himself and of the other that he is not”.<sup>62)</sup> “The only world that exists is a human world—this existing world that a person has designed himself as a world-for-him”.<sup>63)</sup>

**P. van Zyl** states the following:

“A world that is not a world-for-a-human being is incomprehensible and equally meaningless is the idea of a human being-without-a-world”. The world is a world-for-me-through-others and a world-for-others-through-me”. “Meaning-for-me is meaning-for-us”.<sup>64)</sup> Also thinking about the world is incomprehensible without the being-in-the-world of the thinker. “A person must have an abode in order to really be a person-in-the-world:.”<sup>65)</sup> “A person is in a world where things occur and these things are not blind events of fate”.<sup>66)</sup>

**F. J. Potgieter** attests to the following:

“Being human is being-in-the-world or ‘Dasein’.” “A person as subject cannot exist or be comprehended without his involvement with the world, and whoever says ‘person’ also says ‘world’.”  
“Being-in-the-world emphasizes especially carrying out a dialogue, constituting a world and dwelling in the world that, in their turn would not be able to exist or be comprehended without the ontic givenness of openness as an existential of Dasein”.<sup>67)</sup>

J. M. A. Kotze writes the following:

“The form in which a child appears as child-in-the-world, as a particular way of being, can be equated with no one and nothing else except with itself”.<sup>68)</sup> “Consequently, we must continually keep in mind the one fundamental anthropological fact that a person’s being-in-the-world, as a relatedness to being with its aspect of world-for-him, continually refers to an assimilating and appropriating of that normed world that he must constitute anew”.<sup>69)</sup>

From the above examples it is evident that many Afrikaner pedagogical thinkers use the category **being-in-the-world** in their ways of thinking, even in the various part-disciplines of pedagogics. In summary, the following is ascertained from their thinking:

- (i) “Dasein” is a primary category of reality or an ontological category.
- (ii) “Person” and “world” illuminate and presume each other. This implies a being-by-and-with-others-and-things. As openness a person **dwells** in his world and through **task** and **assignment** he is continually **in-the-world-designing**.

#### 1.4 THE CONCEPT “CATEGORY”

It is clear that in contemporary pedagogical thought the terms “category” and “being-in-the-world” are prominently in the foreground. In implementing the concept category, it is viewed as meaningful for constructing an autonomous pedagogics. However, with the pedagogicians mentioned above, this involves not only using the term “category” but also a scientific accountability regarding its essence and significance.

The word “category” originally comes from the Greek word “**Kategoria**” that means “**fundamental pronouncement**”. The Greek verb “**agoreuein**” means “to say [something public], to speak [openly]”. Gunter indicates that this **pronouncement** is not arbitrary but refers to something **fundamental**. This means that a

category brings to light or shows an essential characteristic of a matter.<sup>70)</sup>

Thus, it seems that the only way in which a grip on or grasp of the essences of phenomena can be acquired is through **designing** categories. This designing places high demands on the scientist and thus the pedagogician and, therefore, Oberholzer postulates, “The investigator designs his truisms or predicative categories in terms of his creative thinking, but then at the same time, thinking as reflecting on the phenomena not as he wants but as he must”.<sup>71)</sup>

Categories immediately bring one to the matter itself that is present. In other words, they open real-essences for a thinker and this can be seen where there is real thinking and talking. For example, this means that pedagogical categories allow fundamental pedagogics to talk about what it ought to, namely real pedagogical essences (fundamental pedagogic as well as pedagogic structures).<sup>72)</sup>

To disclose the essences and what is meaningful of a matter demands scientific description and explication. These require means of description, communicative words and means of explication that are critical-accountable expressions or verbalizations. These are known as categories.<sup>73)</sup>

**Landman** writes the following: “Categories are illuminative means of thinking; a category is a distinctive name in the sense that it expresses or verbalizes the real-essence of a being”.<sup>74)</sup> This means that this distinctive name (category) is an essence-concept and therefore it shows the real-essence of a being, e.g., a pedagogical category is a particular **word** that allows a being to appear as it **is**. This unity between word (category) and being is formulated by Landman (in reference to Heidegger) as follows: “No being **is** when the word is lacking because the available word gives a being its being (presence)”.<sup>75)</sup>

**F. J. Potgieter** indicates that by category is meant “Those **fundamental interpretations** of a matter or object in terms of which it can be clearly known and described in its **essences**”.<sup>76)</sup>

For **F. van der Stoep** a category is “a characteristic of a matter that is so unique to it that it can be fathomed, investigated and described in terms of such a characteristic”.<sup>77)</sup>

From what has already been said, a category has to do with disclosing and describing fundamental structures and their real-essences. The question is, how is such a disclosure possible? Landman indicates that only one answer to this question is possible, namely the “being-in-the-world” or “Dasein” of the investigator. Therefore, he postulates this “being-in-the-world” as the **primary category of reality** or **fundamental category** or **ontological category**. This implies that categories are real-essences and because they are illuminative means of thinking by which other real-essences can be known. **Whoever knows essences understands.**<sup>78)</sup>

In summary it is stated:

Categories are expressing-, showing-, announcing-, allowing to hear-, allowing to appear and illuminating-means for understanding. Realities are used to disclose reality (the essentials in their clarity, obviousness and essentiality). Thus, categories are decidedly not purely word-meanings (definitions) but **essence-describing** concepts and therefore these concepts (categories) must be **lucid** and **clear**.<sup>79)</sup>

## 1.5 BEING UNSCIENTIFIC AND CATEGORIES

### 1.5.1 General

Each science has its own particular field of study, its own methods of investigation and categories that it designs as its own. “Every science and every principal form of man’s reflective activity has its guiding categories”.<sup>80)</sup> As soon as the boundary between science (i.e., thinking that strives to explicate everything—De Vleeschauer) and non-science (i.e., everything that lies outside of the area of science) is overstepped, one falls into **being unscientific**. This overstepping of boundaries occurs because so often:

- a) Particular dogmatic or worldview categories and criteria, politics, ideas, etc. have a say in and are viewed as binding for a science. By prescribing extra-scientific (those external to a particular science, i.e., here extra-pedagogical) categories as means of thinking pedagogically, one falls into being unscientific.
- b) A science oversteps its own boundary by [allowing] another science to dictate and prescribe [to it].<sup>81)</sup>

Thus, often categories from one order of being are and become implemented. Nicolai Hartman distinguishes among four orders of being in his work “Das problem des geistige, seins” [The problem of spiritual beings]. Before looking more closely at these orders of being, the essential characteristics shown by each is explicated

- (1) Each order of being or level has its own principles, laws or categories.
- (2) There is a reciprocal relatedness among the orders of being and indeed from the lowest to the highest.
- (3) In spite of this close connectedness, the autonomy and independence of the different orders of being are not eliminated.<sup>82)</sup>

With a closer view of the orders of being one sees that Hartman<sup>83)</sup> makes the following classification:

Spiritual order of being  
 Psychic order of being  
 Organic order of being  
 Physical-material order of being.

Another way of classifying the orders of being on the basis of implementing categories is:

- a) A non-anthropological order of being (including Hartman’s physical-material-organic orders),
- b) An anthropological order of being (including Hartman’s psychic- and spiritual-orders).

Now if a scientist describes and explicates a **human being's** being-in-the-world by making use of natural-scientific categories (non-anthropological categories) he is involved in overstepping the boundary of autonomy of each area of being. For example: **adapting** instead of **orienting**, educative **process** instead of educative **event**, **development** of a child instead of **thriving**, **unfolding**, **becoming**; etc.

Thus, the *metabasis eis allo genos*<sup>84)</sup> exists in the overstepping from an order or area of opinions to another, i.e., the “application” of one order of being to another, mostly from the logical to the ontological, from the order of being to the order of values, from the non-anthropological to the anthropological.

Because of this *metabasis eis allo genos*, pedagogics has long been viewed as an applied science and its own autonomy has been lost to one or another view of life or subject science. This reduction of one order of being to another, by the “application” of its categories for reflecting on the real-essences of another order of being, has contributed to a total overlooking of the real-essentiality of person and world as a unity of mutual implication, of a person-as-totality-in-communication-with-the-world and thus also of a person in his exceptional position and as being radically different from the non-human. By implementing non-anthropological categories to reflect on and explicate the anthropological (thus also the pedagogical, psychological, sociological, etc.), the real-essences, the fundamentals of the anthropological become concealed and thus cannot be clearly illuminated.<sup>85)</sup>

### 1.5.2 Non-anthropological categories

A non-anthropological attunement is when there is thinking from a non-human order of being to a human order. This occurs, e.g., when categories from the animal order of being are applied to try to illuminate the real-essences of being human. Thus, this does not involve a fathoming from being human to being human as the disclosure of the real-essences of the reality of being human. Such an application of non-anthropological categories is naturalistic

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· Moving from one area or order of being with its truisms and applying them to another.

anthropology and is unscientific simply because the wrong categories are applied. The necessary recognition of the differences between human being and animals falls away. The following non-anthropological categories are often implemented to describe the being-in-the-world of persons: **Adaptation, development, growth, reaction, instincts, maturation**, etc.

For a pedagogician, who is a phenomenologist, these non-anthropological categories are unacceptable because:

- (i) when these categories are evaluated against the universal reality of life as background, it seems that in this reality it cannot be confirmed that they express what is peculiar to being human;
- (ii) these categories are peculiar to the natural scientific- and biological-world. A human being must not and cannot be explained in terms of categories that cannot say something authentic of him because such an “explanation” can never be an authentic understanding;
- (iii) what these categories express are not identifiable in a pedagogic event because:
  - a) a person is put forth by them as an object among other objects;
  - b) a person is put forth by them as a world-less subject isolated from his world;
  - c) a person is viewed by them as passively involved in his becoming a person on-the-way-to-adulthood (see the concepts: growth, development, adaptation);
  - d) a person is forced by them into stimulus-response schemes;
  - e) they only give evidence of biological inevitabilities (maturing, mating), while the **normative** never arises as an essence of being human;
  - f) by them a person can never be viewed as accountable for his own actions.<sup>86)</sup>

### 1.5.3 Categories of an anthropological conception

Such an investigator holds and makes absolute a particular idea of being human. A human being’s entire way of thinking and acting

are now reflected on and investigated in categories of this conception. The categories of such a particular biased and presupposed conception are not guilty of a reduction of one order of being to another because it is a perspective from being human to being human and, therefore, the categories of this conception indeed can be given anthropological status. However, since the thinking from such a particular conception with its categories can never (in all likelihood) attain **general validity, thus universal certainty**, it is thus an anthropology that is rooted in an **unreal** conception of being human. Such perspectives are “-isms” such as **humanism, behaviorism, existentialism, communism**, etc. Through these categories, these “-isms” do not express what is **universal** about being human. Consequently, they cannot be implemented in scientific reflection. **Further**, these categories are absolutized and whoever absolutizes categories does violence to life reality and cannot give authentic descriptions and interpretations of its real-essences.<sup>87)</sup>

From the above it appears that the way of any particular “-ism” is a non-phenomenological way and when the criterion “**against the universal reality of life as a background**” is applied to them, these categories express a particular validity and even non-reality. The categories of anthropological conceptions have limitations and therefore must lead to a particular vision of the educative event. The result of applying such categories cannot be fundamental pedagogical but indeed can lead to the origin of a particular doctrine of educating.<sup>88)</sup>

## 1.6 DESIGNING CATEGORIES AS A SCIENTIFIC MATTER

### 1.6.1 The concept “designing”

#### a) Designing categories as making [something] unconcealed

This sub-title already indicates that here there is mention of something concealed, apparently obscure, inconspicuous but then in the sense of something that initially conceals itself and at the same time belongs to something that usually shows itself in such a way that it constitutes its real-essence [meaning and ground]. Now the

question is from where does this obscurity or withholding of light come? To this Heidegger answers: “the everydayness of each day that flows from the obvious acceptance of things and events around a person bring about an **obscuring of** or a **withholding of light** on the matter itself”.<sup>89)</sup>

If there now is a thinking penetration to the thing itself (Husserl’s return to the things themselves), thus to real-essences, this means opening the matter up and freeing it from the enveloping cover of the everydayness that conceals its essences. How does light now break through to this obscurity? Through creatively “designing categories” because “nothing is disclosed or appears if the thinking does not allow it to occur”.<sup>90)</sup>

Through designing, as **throwing light on** something, clarity can be acquired and this implies that the **thinker** must bring clarity and this is possible because he is **openness**. Since he is openness he is able to **illuminate** because “it is the light of thinking that illuminates the **openness** and the openness brings to light the matter itself (Heidegger).<sup>91)</sup>

Designing thus means making something unconcealed and thus also brings categories into the light. They are **disclosed** and this means they announce themselves to a thinker: “They open themselves by which something becomes bared”.<sup>92)</sup> Thus categories make something **present**. Heidegger says **being** is equivalent to **presence**: “Das Sein des Seindes, die Anwesenheit des Anwesenden ist erst dann offenkundig und damit vollständig Anwesenheit, wenn sie als solche für sich selbst gegenwärtig wird....”<sup>93)</sup> This placing in the present leads to clarity and a better **understanding** of the real-essentials of that reality. It shows a breakthrough from a “passive accepting to an active experiencing”.<sup>94)</sup>

It is especially in the thinker’s **naming of** the categories that they are shown, that elevates them to categorical reality (Landman). Through naming, the real-essentialities of the categories **appear** more clearly, “and in their **light** reality itself is **illuminated**”. “The quality of the naming, i.e., the quality of the name a thinker **designs** for a category determines the quality of its **appearance** to him”.<sup>95)</sup> It also determines the quality of the appearance of the real-

essences that he wants to bring to light through implementing the categories.

It is clear that “making something unconcealed” places high demands on the thinker such as radically thinking through, intuitive viewing, further reflecting and interpreting because it is he who reaches reality itself (Husserl) and what reality allows him to see as it really, essentially is. All of this is only possible for a thinker on the basis of his **being-in-the-world**.

### b) Designing categories as receiving meaning

The “meaning” considered here is not acquired from a personal value judgment but is a verbalization of the real-essentials of reality itself. This meaning can only be acquired by **receiving** what is essentially real of reality as it shows itself: [In Dutch] “If life has a **meaning** then this meaning can only be found in **life itself**”.<sup>96)</sup>

Thus, reality is a **carrier of meaning**, it **displays meaning** and this implies that the scientist must search accordingly to **disclose** it, to **receive** it as it indeed is **disclosed**: [In English] “Meaning is something to be found rather than to be given, discovered rather than invented”.<sup>97)</sup>

By this **receiving of meaning** the researcher brings things to this **meaning** and reality now becomes for him a reality of **lived experienced meaning**. Lived experiencing means a concerned involvement in reality without which understanding is not possible. Thus, there is a close **connection** between **being** and **meaning** and to ask about the being of a being is already to ask about its meaning.<sup>98)</sup>

### c) Designing categories as giving meaning

The essence of being human, as meaning giving existence, refers to the fact that his task is to allow **meanings** to arise. **Giving meaning** refers to the **attribution** of **meanings** and this is preceded by a **lived experience of meaning**. Each investigator must **name** his categories. This naming as designing is not a purely rational construction but an **activity of giving meaning** by which

reality becomes meaningful for him (Binswanger). Thus, this **naming** is a **thoughtful designing** of a particular name for a particular reality because the reality **normalizes the discourse about it** (Strasser).<sup>99)</sup>

Naming is thus giving meaning; giving meaning is making something understandable and understandable verbalizing is a discernible indication that an **intentional contact** with **reality** is realized (Landman). Kilian names this act: giving-meaning-as-ordering-reality.<sup>100)</sup> This means that what was initially concealed before the naming now is observable and is ready for further illuminating, reflecting, interpreting and implementing in the phenomenological description and interpretation.

In summary it is declared that **giving** and **receiving meaning assume each other** and that when there is talk of “designing”, giving and receiving meaning are meant.

### **1.6.2 The phenomenological method as the only authentic method for designing categories**

A penetration to the essences of reality, e.g., the reality of educating, implies a radical deepening of a purposeful being-directed to disclosing universalities, thus real-essences. The only scientific way of approaching a real-essential being and its meaning, viewed against the universal reality of life itself as background, is the phenomenological method. Because this method is free of any obscuring biases, takes its point of departure in the person-world relationship, discloses real-essentials themselves and because all further thinking and interpretation remain grounded in the reality of life itself, the phenomenological method is the only authentic method for designing categories.<sup>101)</sup>

### **1.6.3 Phenomenology is only meaningful as ontology**

#### **a) Explication**

As a cornerstone of scientific thinking, Heidegger says: Ontology is only possible as phenomenology. This means that only the phenomenological method can lead to and disclose the real-

essentials of being human and their meaning viewed against the background of the universal reality of life itself. Landman says that phenomenology is only meaningful as ontology.<sup>102)</sup> This means that a thinker who calls himself a phenomenologist and denies the **ontological** cannot be an authentic phenomenologist. Ontology, as a reflection on being, asks the question of **the meaning of being** (Heidegger) and this means to interrogate being with respect to its meaning. The question of the meaning of being refers to receiving and giving meaning and thus designing [categories] as making a being understandable and making understandable verbalizations about it. Thus, to design [categories] means to apply the phenomenological method and indeed a phenomenological method that meets the demands:

- (i) Phenomenology is only meaningful as ontology,
- (ii) Ontology is only possible as phenomenology.<sup>103)</sup>

#### **b) Phenomenological describing and interpreting**

A human being is a phenomenological being and this means that he **will** and **can disclose** the real-essentials of reality. This disclosing, uncovering, illuminating is only possible on the basis of his own **being-in-the-world** because now he can distinguish different beings from each other, describe and deal with them (Heidegger). Landman calls this being-in-the-world the first category of reality (ontological category) and says, with reference to Heidegger, “being-in-the-world is the original [primordial] precondition for being-human and therefore scientific thinking connected with human-being always must begin with his being-in-the-world”.<sup>104)</sup>

Meyer views the free or original activities of persons and human activities in a situation, thus also his designs, as fundamental for all human sciences. Phenomenological description has once again allowed these fundamentals to be done justice. A phenomenological attunement rests on the acceptance of a person’s meaning-giving activities and attempts to disclose this meaning.<sup>105)</sup>

In agreement with this, Landman describes phenomenological description as essence-disclosing, meaning-structure unveiling and fundamental-structure uncovering reflections.<sup>106)</sup>

In phenomenological description there is an appeal to the matters themselves and this **appearing** of things is nothing more than their **real existence** for a person. Therefore, Gous postulates: “Phenomenological description means the thinking, intuitive viewing and describing of the essential characteristics, the uncovering of what for a particular phenomenon remains the same, unchanging and always valid”.<sup>107)</sup> Thus, this involves a genuine describing of a reality in its **essential characteristics** as it shows itself in the lifeworld.

In closing, the phenomenological describing is an **interpreting** of the real-essentials. “Thus, the work of phenomenological thinking is essentially hermeneutic because whoever works phenomenologically has the aim of understanding [something] and making it understandable”.<sup>108)</sup> This means that bringing-to-light structures of being are *hermeneutika* but then an **interpretation** of their **meaning** [is necessary] so that they become **understandable**. The search for real-essences eventuates in an ontological understanding as the interpretation or description of the meaning of the real-essences. Without this hermeneutic understanding and describing, the practice of any science is incomplete.<sup>109)</sup>

Thus: A first precondition for an authentic phenomenological describing and interpreting is the describer’s and interpreter’s **being-in-the-world**. **In other words:** a thinker posits as his first precondition (note well: not prejudgment) the ontological category of **being-in-the-world**.

## 1.7 STATEMENT OF PROBLEM

Now the problem is the significance of the stated ontological category (being-in-the-world) for pedagogical thought, i.e., an autonomous pedagogical perspective on the reality of life [lifeworld]. **In other words:** what the significance is of this ontological category for a pedagogician whose thinking is directed to the reality of educating itself in uncovering, penetrating, illuminating fundamental pedagogical structures, naming and verbalizing them; briefly to call into existence pedagogical categories and criteria.

## 1.8 FURTHER PROGRAM

Following the preceding motivational, orienting conceptual clarifications, reflections and statement of the problem in chapter I, the main moments in the further program of research are the following:

In chapter II a closer essence analysis of the category “being-in-the-world” is pursued.

Chapter III offers a further exploration, ordering and extension of the category “being-in-the-world”.

Finally, in chapter IV a retrospect is offered.

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102. See Landman, W. A.: op. cit., 134.
103. See Ibid. 134.  
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104. Landman, W. A. and Gous, S. J.: op. cit., 49.
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107. Landman, W. A. amd Gous, S. J.: op. cit., 25.
108. Kilian, C. J. G.: op. cit., 304.
109. See Ibid. 304-306.