CHAPTER 1

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM, AIM AND METHOD

A. INTRODUCTION

Many studies have been published on the retarded child and what is striking about most of them is that they focus on **symptoms**. Characteristics are postulated as if they capture the essence of the child. Burt[1], e.g., lists the following qualities: low intelligence, physical, sensory and motor defects, left-handedness, speech defects, and deficiencies of character and temperament.

Typical of current views is the definition of the American Association on Mental Deficiency[2] that states that intelligence is the ability to "effectively adapt oneself" to one's environment and that the retarded child does not have this ability.

An additional matter is the **stereotyped list of causes** compiled with respect to these intellectually less endowed children. For example, Burt[3] lists as causal conditions: inheritance, school (including irregular attendance and ineffective teaching), home and neighborhood, and a variety of physical conditions.

One of the most important issues is the **measurement** and **classification** of children. This is closely related to the **conceptual confusion** prevailing about the child who is poorly endowed intellectually. This confusion is reflected in the following classifications by persons such as Vedder[4], Tredgold[5], Robinson and Robinson[6], Trapp and Himelstein[7], Baker[8] (whose classification generally has been accepted in England for the past few decades) and Busemann[9]:



The retarded child discussed later is classified as falling within an IQ range of 65 to 80 and also is classified in the sub-normal group[10]. From the above classification scheme, it is clear that not only are there different opinions regarding the boundaries of classification but also there is conceptual confusion. On the Continent, the term "mentally deficient" is preferred while Anglo-American researchers prefer "moron", and still other writers use more comprehensive descriptions. Writers such as Herdenschee[11] and Van Liefland[12] use the term "retarded" that, however, is used by them in a broader sense than what is meant in the present study in that they refer to **all** children with poor intellectual endowment. In this connection, a variety of labels are used, e.g., "feeble-minded", or "oligophrenic"[13], "mentally deficient"[14, 15], "backward"[16] and "mentally retarded"[17,18]. The latter concept, however, is used by some writers[19] only with respect to the scholastic. The concept "poorly talented"[20] is an unfortunate choice in this connection because it refers to the talented in general. "Poorly talented intellectually" is more precise and acceptable.

In the present study, when reference is made to the retarded or intellectually less well-endowed child, this means a child who is limited in his intelligence as a **potentiality**. Currently, a child often is labeled retarded merely on the basis of his IQ, his

intelligence as a level of achievement, that may not correspond with his intelligence as a potentiality.

Also, it should be noted that these various classifications, in practice, are used for the sake of more effective **formal instruction**.

The critical reader might ask what has been grasped to this point? Do we understand this child? Do we understand what being a retarded child really means? In the current literature, the retarded child is described as an isolated monad, and this does not lead to an understanding of his world relationships as they are embodied in his experiential world. Also, the child's **pedagogic situation** is not entered in these studies. This means that the ontological-anthropological fact of being a child who necessarily is committed to education is not taken into account!

B. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM, AIM AND METHOD

1. Contemporary views of intelligence with particular reference to the retarded child

(a) A variety of attempts have been made to define intelligence, and without going into these current definitions in any detail, according to Sonnekus[21], the following remarks can be made about them: intelligence is connected with learning, thinking, adaptation, actions and goal-directed activities. As briefly mentioned above, intelligence is an ability or capacity that allows a person to better adjust to his environment, where environment is interpreted in the broadest sense possible. From this it follows that the retarded child is not in a position "to effectively adapt to his environment".

(b) The initial attempts to investigate intelligence (see Binet, Terman, etc.), as well as the continued work by factor analysts, are based on its **measurement** in order to find one or another dimension (factor) for comparing the test performance of a child with other children of the same chronological age so that their "cleaverness" or "dullness" can be quantified. As a consequence, a child often is labeled retarded.

(c) On the basis of an obtained IQ, children are classified (see "Introduction"), general or typical ways of behaving are attributed

to them and predictions are made regarding their scholastic progress. Inversely, these typical behaviors also are important means for classifying children. For example, if a child is classified as mentally retarded, he might be transferred to a special school to receive special instruction that usually is more practically directed. Thus, these classifications are only made for the sake of formal instruction. But attributing stereotyped characteristics to the retarded child has the danger of establishing a **homogeneity** that is unacceptable.

(d) Regarding the **stability** (not reliability in the psychometric sense--G.Y.) of intelligence, the current view is that it primarily is inherited, that it gradually grows and develops until 16 or even 20 years of age, but that after that no important changes occur. Also, it is recognized that the milieu can have an effect but that hereditary factors are decisive. For these reasons, intelligence is considered to be relatively stable or constant, although small fluctuations can occur. In order to obtain a "reliable score" for school children, normally the child's intelligence is "tested" twice in his school career by means of group tests. If there is a difference, the higher score is counted in the child's favor.

With respect to mental deficiency (and thus of relevance in considering the retarded child), Goddard[22], with his study of the Kallikak family, indicates the role of heredity, while various other researchers point to the role of environmental factors. Fedder[23], who classifies the retarded as mentally deficient, describes it as a condition where the prominent phenomenon is a serious defect in intellectual development existing since birth or acquired in the first year of life. Later the question of the stability of intelligence will be considered again.

(e) The child, and especially the retarded child, is approached in the current literature as having an intellectuality that is viewed as a **purely** cognitive matter. This perspective stems from the psychology of consciousness with its atomistic view that consciousness is a number of functions. This also is a matter that will be treated later.

Related to the above is the notion that a child who is poorly endowed intellectually should be capable of **practical training.** However, according to research done in this connection, Landman[24] rightly concludes that a child with a low level of general intelligence

does not necessarily display a high degree of dexterity. For educative and vocational orientation purposes, according to Landman, dull-normals should be divided into two groups:

> **(i)** those with a relatively high degree of practical ability; and
> **(ii)** those who not only have a low intelligence but also a retarded practical ability.

To summarily deliver a retarded child to practical training is unaccountable because he might also be limited in this regard.

2. The question of intelligence as the point of departure for exploring the retarded child

(a) In 1905, after researching intellectual differences in children, a French psychologist, Binet, with the assistance of a physician, Simon, published the first intelligence test. The original Binet-Simon scale was expanded, modified and re-standardized by various researchers in several countries and published in 1908 and 1911. Binet's first effort was an **individual test** meant to test or **measure** an individual child's intelligence. The aim of this test is to try to ascertain how intelligent or dull a particular child is; i.e., the test is designed to indicate a **level of achievement**. Thus, Sonnekus[25] rightly point out that the aim of such tests is not to determine the nature of intelligence. They involve establishing a level of achievement and the ways this achievement is attained but not the **nature** or **essence** of intelligence as such.

(b) Among the (revisions and) **re-standardizations** of the Binet-Simon test is that of Terman in 1916 and an expansion of the same test with Merrill (1937) known as the Stanford-Binet or Terman-Merrill intelligence test. In South Africa, in the field of individual intelligence tests there now is the "Individual intelligence Scale of the National Bureau of Educational and Social Research", a revision of a test by Dr. M. L. Frick published in 1927, which is a revision of the Binet-Simon test as re-standardized by Terman in 1916 (and known as the Frick Scale). The above bureau (now known as the Human Science Research Council) also recently released the **New South African Individual Scale (NSAIS).**

(c) The first large-scale standardization of a **group** intelligence test occurred during World War I with the aim of

classifying and selecting recruits for the United States Army. This research by Yerkes resulted in the Army Alpha and Army Beta tests. Thus, group tests originated from research on adults and did not arise from the child's situation. Since World War I, group intelligence tests have been applied on a large scale in different countries. In South Africa, the **South African Group Intelligence Test** for pupils from 10-16 was compiled and standardized under the direction of Professor R.W. Wilcocks. It has been replaced by the **New South African Group Intelligence Test**, standardized by the National Bureau of Educational and Social Research (now the Human Science Research Council).

(d) It should now be clear that the research on intelligence initially was concerned with constructing and standardizing intelligence tests. With this "test approach" to intelligence, by using **factor analysis**, a number of investigators attempted to study intelligence in terms of its constitutive factors. In this way, an attempt was made to determine **what** was being measured by intelligence tests. In this context, Spearman is mentioned with his general and specific factors of intelligence, that later were expanded by other researchers[26].

Sonnekus[27] indicates that as far as the **essence** of intelligence is concerned, a factor analytic approach has contributed little. The aim of factor analysis is to try to ascertain the degree of relationship among different psychic functions or dispositions and to determine the number of distinguishable factors defining the relationships. The question of the nature or essence of intelligence is neither asked nor answered. Further, under the influence of factor analysis, intelligence, as such, is approached as an isolated quantity or magnitude, as an autonomous ability or factor(s) without viewing it in relation to the person as a totality-in-communication with his world. Even today, this view is found in the current practice of labeling a retarded child as having a low intelligence with the consequence that such a child, often on the basis of low intelligence as measured and possibly taking other information into account, is doomed to spend the rest of his school career in a special school as a retarded child where the opportunity is limited for actualizing his potentialities. The child as a totality-in-communication with his world is misunderstood, and there is no mention of a phenomenological fathoming of his **experiential world** (see below).

(e) The question of the **stability** of intelligence deserves to be examined again. This issue is seriously criticized especially by Kohnstamm[28] from the perspective of the measurement of intelligence. A purely quantitative judgment of intelligence is responsible for ignoring the complex structural interconnections of intelligence and for not considering important qualitative matters. The view that intelligence is stable points to a danger of and a deficiency in its current measurement.

In contrast to the current view of intelligence as a constant, stable quantity that cannot be markedly changed by schooling, forming or educating, Selz (psychology of thought) and his co-workers[29] revealed that thought processes and also intelligence test performances can be elevated to a higher level provided the right methods of solution are acquired and provided there is the necessary intellectual "maturity". Building on these findings, Kohnstamm[30] concluded that the character of intelligence is not so much **stable** as **meta-stable**; i.e., not only is it subject to gradual change but it also can change by leaps-and-bounds.

By discovering and using appropriate methods of solution, a break-through of insight can occur that suddenly elevates the meta-stable intellectual level to a higher one if there is enough intellectual "maturity" to implement the necessary methods of solution. These findings have important implications for the measurement of intelligence:

> First, his means that an intelligence test result, as such, need not be valid. Naturally it is possible that the result corresponds to the maximum level of which a person is capable, but it also is possible that the test result lies below this level, i.e., that his level of intelligence still is in a meta-stable state. Second, the creation of a secure and favorable space can elevate the intelligence test performance still higher.

The implications of the above for the retarded child are obvious. Often children are divided into groups according to their intellectual level, particularly the "border-line" cases, where, on the basis of an IQ, it is determined whether a child should be placed in a special class or school.

Intelligence test results should not be interpreted as exact and should be handled with extreme caution. Consequently, an important supplement to this quantitative measurement is a **qualitative** analysis of the intelligence test performance.

(f) A **qualitative analysis** of the structure of intelligence means a descriptive analysis of the **ways** a child achieves his intelligence test performance. Today many voices are calling for a qualitative evaluation of intelligence test performance since the limitations of a purely quantitative approach are becoming evident. Thus, Chorus[31] states that a qualitative analysis of performances on the old Individual Scale (Stanford-Binet type) is done in four ways, viewed as a totality:

(i) Level analysis: this refers to the scattering of a child's responses over items at different chronological age levels. In other words, it is ascertained which of the child's responses spread above and below his chronological age. In particular, whether the correct responses lie concentrated at or near the child's chronological age is taken into account. It can be that a child who gives relatively difficult correct answers shows a qualitatively better structure even though quantitatively he does not give as many correct answers as another child.

(ii) Structure analysis: is a further analysis of the types of items a child answers correctly which lie above his chronological age. In other words, the strong points in the structure of intelligence are taken into account; and so are the weak points by analyzing the types of erroneous responses to items below the child's chronological age.

(iii) Individual analysis: is a descriptive analysis of all answered items with a view to how these answers are arrived at. Thus, while the test is administered, **what** the child says and does as well as **how** are noted.

(iv) Observation or character analysis: is acquiring data about the "personal temperament" (being a person) of the child and thus is not directly involved with the test items but with the child's behaviors or expressions in the broadest sense during the investigation as a whole.

A further contribution to the qualitative analysis of intelligence is provided by Swart[32]. She engaged in work that supplements that of Chorus and, briefly, she differentiates the following additional analyses:

(i) Language analysis in the investigation of intelligence. This aspect is especially important since language is the means of actualizing intelligence. Here, she particularly emphasizes the quantitative as well as qualitative analysis of the child's vocabulary, sentence structure, reading, typical linguistic errors or deviations and the level (visual or abstract) on which the child's language usage moves.

(ii) Analysis of thinking, in terms of all thought and language items attempted. The criteria here are those of the psychology of thought where thinking is viewed as occurring on various levels, e.g., the concrete-visual, the schematic, the abstract. The question is does the thinking of this particular child function on a level of thought appropriate for his age?

(iii) Arithmetic analysis, which especially is included because of the relationships and interactions among language, arithmetic and thinking.

(iv) Analysis of intentionality (directedness) which, according to Swart, is of interest because it is important to know **in what way** the child constitutes the situation. A child who is not intentionally directed to his world will not constitute it and thus actualize his intelligence adequately. It is important to determine the quality of intentionality given the incompleteness of a purely numerical result. For example, a child can have a high IQ but the question is whether he is able to exercise this intelligence and whether he can direct himself to his task.

(v) Memory analysis. Swart indicates that memory and intelligence run a very parallel course but are not identical. Memory analysis is important since each intellectual achievement includes use of particular knowledge by the child remembering that acquired and retained knowledge. According to Swart[33], Chorus says that intelligence manifests itself in the ways a person is able to use the acquired knowledge at his disposal in new situations and in new combinations.

(vi) Affectivity analysis. Swart[34] draws on Sonnekus who states that affective guidance or education based on the principles of safety and security leads to a strengthening of the affective relationships between a child and his world which also means a strengthening of the development of his language as a means of exploring and of breaking through the environment to insight.

(vii) Analysis of perceiving. A child's attitude toward the situation he is in will be influenced by his perception of it. Of special importance here is his directedness to the situation.

(viii) Analysis of attending/concentrating. The ways in which intelligence is implemented depend greatly on the intensity of a child's concentrating or attending.

(ix) Analysis of intellectual tempo. According to Swart[35], Busemann especially stresses tempo as representative of the fundamental layer of intelligence and its analysis is necessary.

(x) Analysis of projections. Swart states that when intelligence is approached phenomenologically it cannot be separated from the person. When, during the administration of the test, projections occur, they must not be overlooked.

Without going into it, it also is appropriate to mention the research by Steenkamp[36] who did a qualitative analysis of intelligence test performance on the **NSAIS** as a psychological-**pedagogical** evaluation. He points to the necessity of a pedagogic evaluation of intellectual achievements in the pedoclinical situation.

Also, Anglo-American voices speak out these days for a more qualitative analysis of intelligence. In this connection, Swart[37] refers to Rapaport whose contribution is of value in that he supplements the numerical achievement with an analysis of the responses to the test. Although the increasing support for qualitative analyses is highly commended, still there is no guarantee that the child is going to achieve an adequate actualization and good performance. In this respect, what is needed is a **pedagogic evaluation** in order to determine if the child actualizes his intelligence as a potentiality in **responsible** ways.

(g) It has already been noted that several persons have tried to **define** intelligence and what the general outcome of this was. Because most researchers have not penetrated to the nature or essence of intelligence but merely have **defined** it, these definitions are taken as the point of departure and not the phenomenon itself. In this way, pre-established opinions are forced onto the aspect of reality investigated (e.g., intelligence) and consequently this reality withdraws from and confuses the researcher such that he is unable to describe the matter clearly and distinctly. Various people have tried to define intelligence as though the definition were its essence. This necessarily is a false track because its nature or essence can only be grasped through a phenomenological approach to it.

(h) As a primordial phenomenon, as an ontic given, as an anthropological fact of being, intelligence only is accessible phenomenologically because phenomenology is a method of knowing without which ontology or the study of reality (being) is not possible. It is not surprising that many retarded children have been victimized by conceptions founded on a confused understanding of reality because in current practice there still is a lack of clarity about what intelligence essentially is. Regarding a phenomenological fathoming of intelligence, both Langeveld[38] and Sonnekus[39] have made excellent contributions:

> There is an unbreakable bond between person and world: a person is Dasein (Heidegger) which also implies that a person is existence; he goes out of himself to meet his world as initiator of relationships (Buytendijk) and constitutes the world as a world-for-himself, as an intentionalized world by giving meaning to it. This is possible because of a person's fundamental openness by which this world constitution, as the constitution of an experiential world (see below) is accomplished as an event of becoming. Joining and participating in this world is an occurrence of giving meaning as an existential way of being; i.e., as a totality-in-communication, a child designs his world. Thus, he is present **in** the world affectively as well as normatively-existentially as modes of lived-experiencing in both affective and cognitive ways.
>
> Thus, as far as intelligence is concerned, in his situational relations, a child has to go out to his world in and through his intelligence and this is because he actualizes his intelligence as a potentiality to **break through** (Langeveld) and transform the world into a world-for-himself. Thus, intelligence can be described[40] as a cognitive mode of being, as a power available to the child for breaking through situations to insight.
>
> The actualization of this power to break through (especially by means of language), as a cognitive mode of being, is only a distinction within existential ways of being as an event of giving meaning and which is subject to the child's intentional directness on a cognitive level but backed up by the affective.

> The child's **actualizing** his intelligence as potentiality is related to the adequacy of his **moral** guidance or education to **responsibly** actualize it as well as the adequacy of his **affective** education to achieve a **readiness** to actualize it.

Since, in the current literature, there still is not an accountable fathoming and description of intelligence and its actualization, it is not surprising that the retarded child is surrendered to these errors. Intelligence still is often approached as an isolated quantity, as a detached, independent function, ability or factor that can be "measured" without understanding it in relation to the person as a totality in his situation. The current views amount to objectifying a person with the aim of quantification. Only a facet of being a person is taken into account and omitted is the existential-ethical-subjective(41). Fortunately, there now are voices in favor of a more qualitative analysis of intelligence test achievements, but not evident in the current literature and practices is a pedagogic evaluation of a retarded child's responsible actualization of his intelligence as a potentiality. This pedagogic evaluation requires a phenomenological fathoming of a child's experiential world (to be shown later) that will allow one to do justice to the retarded child as a person.

3. The life world and experiential world as points of departure for exploring the retarded child

As already noted, the close connection between person and world is primordial. Who says person says world and who say world says person or he falls into an objectivism or subjectivism and the person, as Dasein, the most basic category of reality, is negated, which is not possible. Who postulates that there is a world without persons is postulating something that does not hold because "is" refers to being, and this term has no other meaning than being-for-a-person(42).

According to Heidegger(43), as a source of potentialities, Dasein creates a network of relations among beings by which they become comprehensible. This constituted network of relations gives these beings their meaning and places them within a horizon of intelligibility: "We call this horizon of intelligibility the world" or also the **life world**. The life world or world, thus, is a correlate of a person's directed, intentional consciousness. Thus, we must not wonder if we correctly perceive the world but rather we must say

the world is what we perceive (Merleau-Ponty). This world or life world is described by Sonnekus[45] as the world that is intentionally established and constituted by each subject in all of his relations to the beings to which he directs himself, e.g., to things, plants, animals, persons. The life world is the primordial ground for one's own life and is presupposed by all perceiving, knowing, reflecting, i.e., all sciences (knowledge). Gous[46] summarizes the above line of thought and states concisely: "The life world is the field of presence of a person based on his being anchored in being."

In his **intentional** going out to and participating in the beings in his world, as the primordial ground for experiencing, a child **lived-experiences** these beings as beings-for-himself. Through this intentional going out to his life world, as a meaning-giving activity, the child's life world becomes his experiential world (the life world as he lived-experiences it). The question now arises regarding the **essence** of the **lived-experiences** of the retarded child as meaning-giving activities by which he establishes his experiential world as a meaningful world-for-himself.

The following is a brief focus on Sonnekus'[47] exposition of lived-experience: First and foremost, it has to be kept in mind that lived-experience is a mode of being; it is one of the categories of human openness and, more specifically, of an existential way of being as a meaning-giving activity. Thus, lived-experiencing is a way of **giving meaning** to the world, and it is the original basis for the normative. But second, lived-experience is actualized by the child (and thus also the retarded child) in his progressively becoming adult on **different levels** that change from a predominantly pathic (affective) lived-experiencing to a distanced gnostic (cognitive) way of giving meaning. Third, human bodiliness, viewed as lived-bodiliness or corporeality, always is the **center** of the **totality of lived-experiencing**.

Regarding **lived-experience**, Husserl[48] indicates that on the one hand it has an **intentional character** and on the other an **act or activity character**. With reference to Husserl's act intentionality, lived-experience means a lived-experiencing-of-something, thus a lived-experienced relationship directed at something (world), and this relationship indicates that this act has been **actualized**. On the other hand, a person also is **functioning intentionality** (Husserl) and therefore a way of being. Lived-experience then

simultaneously and primarily is a **relationship to being** and is **meaning giving**.

In light of the above, Sonnekus[49] offers the following description of lived-experience: "Lived-experience is the intentionally determined, subjective, personal (affective-normative) taking a position by a person as a totality-in-function, in his communication with reality."

Provisionally, the questions of **becoming** and **actualizing** are worth mentioning with respect to lived-experience and the experiential world. In contrast to current developmental psychology, based on a naturalistic-oriented anthropology[50], becoming is an ontological-anthropological fact of being that is given with being human and that expresses something essential, fundamental and meaningful about being human. On the basis of his fundamental openness, the child goes out to his world but also answers the appeal that continually is directed to him and in doing so he **actualizes** his potentialities for new possibilities, and thus he always is a **child-in-becoming**. This amounts to the fact that a child becomes to the degree that he responsibly constitutes his experiential world. On the basis of the appeal directed to the child, his self-becoming occurs through others and things. A child becomes in and through a change (elevation) in the dialogue he conducts with his world[51]. Essentially, this elevation is a change in the meanings he gives to his world relationships.

Thus far becoming has been described as an anthropological category of being, but it has to be added that as far as a child is concerned, in his wanting-to-be-someone (Langeveld) on the basis of wanting-to-be-what-he-ought-to-be (Oberholzer), he cannot become a proper adult by himself. He is dependent on the help and support of an adult (i.e., on education) who through pedagogic intervention gives a different and proper course to his becoming adult in order to prevent it from degenerating. In other words, becoming involves a child who has to be brought up (educated) in order to increasingly display the image of proper adulthood. However, as openness, a child always participates in his becoming because he actively and lived-experiencingly goes out to his world and while doing this he is given support and assistance to become in the direction of moral independence and to responsibly actualize his potentialities. Thus, A child cannot adequately and responsibly actualize his intelligence as potentiality without being humanized and educated; otherwise, his potentialities may remain stuck on the vital level[52].

A **phenomenological** fathoming of the **lived-experiences** of the retarded child as these are manifested in the **experiential world** of this **child-in-becoming** is now considered; special emphasis is placed on **actualizing intelligence as a mode of being.**

4. Actualizing intelligence as a task for the retarded child

(a) In the preceding sections, the meaning of actualization was indicated. In the following, the actualization of intelligence as a potentiality by the retarded child is discussed as an **ontological-anthropological problem.**

Stemming from the childness of a child as described by philosophical anthropology via phenomenology, there is no recourse but to postulate that a retarded child is openness, potentiality, child-in-becoming. The question is how does the retarded child, as being different, come forward to meet his world, experience it, give meaning to it, constitute an experiential world, actualize potentialities, all categories of an existential way of being?

According to Nel[53], a child can be restrained in bodily, psychic or spiritual ways of being and thus as a person (totality) he is restrained in his going out to his world. His dialogue with the world, as an act of giving meaning, thus is deficient and this restrains him in constituting his experiential world. A retarded child, as one who is restrained in his psychic dimension, constitutes an experiential world based on skewed relationships that are not conducive to his personal becoming on the way to adulthood[54], and as a result he does not adequately actualize his potentialities. He enters relationships with himself, others, things and his God, but these relationships are quantitatively and qualitatively poorer than those of the non-restrained child[55]. These skewed relationships give rise to his lived-experience of **being different** and the consequence is that he isolates himself to protect his intimacy[56]. As his precautionary withdrawal from situations of failure increase, his communication becomes more limited and his horizon shrinks along with his venturing attitude[57].

He experiences himself as an exceptional child[58] and as not being "able bodied." Possibly his way of being is different but decidedly it is not a lesser being; he is able-bodied within the limits of his given potentialities[59], and he is a moral being of equal value[60] to any

person and who must not be stripped of his human dignity or be judged for the sake of convenience.

How does a retarded child come forward to meet his world? On the basis of his fundamental openness, he also lived-experiences his world, which is an act of giving meaning that is **normative** in origin. This lived-experiencing of meaning occurs on different levels varying from a predominantly **pathic** (affective) way of giving meaning to a distanced **gnostic** (cognitive) lived-experience of meaning. Later it will be more clearly shown how this child gives meaning to his world in his pathic but also gnostic lived-experiences.

The **different modes of being**, as fundamental structures of Dasein, are only understood in and through each other[61] since they are indivisible, dynamically interacting and mutually interdependent. Thus, the retarded child who is **cognitively** restrained will look for other ways of being and of giving meaning, as well as other ways of actualizing his potentialities. This child's **affective** going out to his world especially will be restrained by his cognitive failures and his lived-experience of being different; all of this touches his emotional life which leads to an affective braking and an obscuring of his intentionality. As the concretization of one of the basic structures of Dasein[62], his **language** has to be considered further because it is clearly a means of actualizing intelligence and of giving meaning[63].

Language, which also is the carrier of the affective[64], will not be left unscathed. Since language is a means of actualizing intelligence, restrained language leads to a **further** underactualization of intelligence and the lived-experience of this underactualization leads once again to further affective restraint. Thus, there is a vicious circle.

On the basis of the conspicuous relation between language and **thought**[65], the latter has to be understood as a retarded child's mode of being. Thus, it is clear that intelligence, as a mode of being, is actualized by the child's going out to his world, which is an existential mode of being. Other modes of being are of fundamental importance for this actualization and have to be understood.

(b) The **proper** unfolding of Dasein, i.e., the **responsible** actualization of potentialities by the retarded child, is a **pedagogic**

problem. What is meant by "pedagogic"? It is clear from Landman's[66] description of the pedagogic situation that it is one in which a not-yet-adult is involved in real communication with a world in which people, as educators and educands, enter educative relationships out of which educative activities flow. These activities are aimed at promoting the child's constituting an experiential world, his giving meaning, his becoming, his actualization of potentialities. It is obvious that here one meets a particular way of educator and educand being involved in a relationship between two persons where the educator presents to the educand contents selected from the world as it is and as it ought to be. The educative activities of the educator involve his referring the educand to this (adult) world with its demands of propriety, demands for executing tasks, and demands for a willingness to assume responsibility. There is an appeal to the child in this **encounter**: The position in this world of the mature, responsible, morally independent and authoritative educator calls the not-yet-mature, not-yet-responsible, morally dependent, authority-seeking child to adulthood[67].

The above educative actions, which occur within an understanding-trusting-authority relationship, are a totality with a two-fold structure, i.e., educating a child on an **ethical-normative** level to **responsibly** actualize his potentialities, and educating the child on an **affective** level to a **readiness** to actualize his potentialities.

Can the retarded child, on the basis of his openness, continually give meanings to his world as meanings-for-himself, give appropriate meanings because norms are exemplified by the adult? What does the pedagogic imply for the retarded child's actualization of his intelligence? Can a child really be educated ethically and affectively to responsibly actualize his intelligence? Later an attempt will be made to answer these questions.

(c) The above line of thought can be extended to an **orthopedagogic problem**, particularly regarding a **retarded** child. Orthopedagogic intervention is mentioned here since the retarded child, as a restrained child, cannot always be educated in the usual ways. The appeal directed to the orthopedagogue is to educate the child to accept his being different as a no lesser being, and to educate him to meaningfully accept and assimilate his being-different, and to design a meaningful future and future perspective[68]. In other words, responsible acceptance and meaningful assimilation have to be awakened in the child regarding

his being-different as a problematic existential situation and regarding the particular problems brought about by his deficient education so that he can responsibly and optimally actualize his potentialities[69].

To illustrate the tremendous task the orthopedagogue has with regard to a retarded child, this child is contrasted with another restrained child, i.e., a blind or weak-sighted child, about which Van Weeldon[70] says the following: "The blind child is aware of his own blindness ... . Knowledge of his own situation allows him to distance himself from it, and this can protect him from suffering his blindness. Here, then, is also the point where educating is applied." Regarding the retarded child, because he is poorly endowed intellectually, is he aware of his deficiency, i.e., does he perceive (know) he is restrained, is different, and thus lived-experience his being-different? If so, as an intellectually deficient child, is he in a position to gain insight into, acceptance of and a distance from his problem? If he does not perceive that he is different and if, consequently, this is not lived-experienced intensely, is he confused about his different way of being? It seems clear that the "application" of education is somewhat problematic here; however, he must not be written off as uneducable merely for that reason.

The above problem culminates in one core question: Is it possible to educate or to re-educate a retarded child to actualize his intelligence? Before this question can be answered, there has to be a phenomenological study of the retarded child's experiential world in order to acquire an image of the ways he actualizes his intelligence. Such a study (and image) is the aim of this study that will be carried out by implementing pedodiagnostic media as media for actualizing intelligence (see Chapter 3).

By the nature of the matter, additional responses to the above question require a more comprehensive investigation than this introductory study. In such a future, more comprehensive study, there can be an involvement with the retarded child in a pedotherapeutic situation after which (i.e., after a series of pedotherapeutic sessions) it possibly can be determined if this child's intelligence as well as other potentialities can be actualized more responsibly as new possibilities; i.e., determine if the child can elevate the level of his forms of dialogue with his world.

Chapter 2 is an explication of the distinguishable, differentiated ways of actualizing intelligence by the retarded child viewed specifically as a problem of the psychology of becoming.

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