

THE RISE OF A 20TH CENTURY PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY*

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1. Introduction

It is risky to try to give an image of the streams of thought of any period because it involves the views of a variety of individual thinkers. The organization of their views is difficult because they are personal and unique. Still, when systematic thought is involved, such a construction can be relatively accurate and complete. It is an extremely difficult task to try to construct an image of contemporary views. Not only is one so intimately involved in contemporary views that distancing is difficult but also the views of various persons have not yet arisen because some thinkers have not yet spoken the last word about their thinking because they are still involved in acquiring an evolving grasp of reality. 20th century philosophers increasingly desire not to follow thinking in terms of systems. They participate in an open conversation and do not claim that their answers are final.

Now when there is mention of a 20th century philosophical anthropology this refers to the ideas of 20th century thinkers about being human. Philosophical anthropology is the radical and total penetration of the humanness of being human. It is a search for what makes a human being human. It is a question with which thinkers have involved themselves through the centuries. 20th century philosophical anthropology is not a detached direction of thought. It is connected with the tradition and is even a reaction to a continuation of it as a search for and interpretation of the essence of being human viewed within a closed human image. The new view first announced itself as a matter of methodology and then later as a reaction against the traditional way of investigating the essence of being human.

2. The tradition

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Traditional Western thought about being human refers to the dualistic image of being human of Plato who emphasized the spiritual. He designated the body as the temporary, transitory home of the immortal soul in the same sense that he viewed the entire concrete world of things as a temporary reflection of the eternal world of ideas. With a shift in emphasis to the sensory perceivable and experiential life as the true reality, Aristotle opened the way for a materialistic view of being human. The answers that have been given through the centuries about the essence of being human are extremely diverse but can be categorized under two main directions corresponding to the methods used to arrive at knowing. The idealistic (rationalistic) view is an extension of the Platonic view of being human and the realistic (empiricistic, positivistic or scientific) is a further expansion of Aristotle's theory.

Platonism and Christianity easily found a connection to each other. Plato affirmed the human relationship with an eternal reality and Christianity affirmed it with God. Human being bears the image of God and through Christ the prospect is laid down for a new way of being for him in eternity. For Plato as well as Christianity the way of existing in the world is viewed as temporary. The dualistic thinking of Plato has permeated the Christian view of being human. The sharp distinction between a worldly and trans-worldly dimension in being human, i.e., between body and soul, is maintained. Thomism affirms a closer connection between body and soul. The soul is a form of existence of the body and thoroughly permeates the body. Although the soul can exist without the body, this is not a natural way of existing for a human soul. However, this view does not eliminate the dualism.

This dualistic view of being human today also is questionable from a teleological angle. A deeper penetration into Old Testament ways of thinking that were worked into the New Testament, and in comparing Christian thinking as it developed through the centuries with scriptural thinking leads to the conclusion that Platonism really is foreign to Christian thinking. The question is whether Christian doctrine was not interpreted too quickly in the spirit of Plato's dualistic view of being human.⁽¹⁾

In the first half of the 17th century Rene Descartes firmly placed the dualistic, substantialistic view of being human in the foreground. He exercised a strong influence on modern anthropology and on modern scientific theory although this is not necessarily an influence of unaltered acceptance and execution. Descartes distinguishes two realities into which being splits, namely, extended being (*res extensa*) and thinking being (*res cogitans*). Here there is mention of an absolute separation between two estranged substances that exist independently of each other: body and soul. The human body is material and, as such, is extended and divisible. It is part of the world of things and is subject to the laws of the natural world. The soul as conscious, as subject, contrasts substantially with the body as object. Ryle speaks of this human image as “the ghost in a machine”.⁽²⁾ The body can be known as a thing with characteristics. The soul is unknowable. The “impossible reality” of an interaction between these two irreconcilable substances that Descartes finds united in one way or another in humans, is attributed by him to God.

Attempts to eliminate this dualism have resulted in a one-sided spiritualism, on the one hand, and in a one-sided materialism, on the other. The attempt at a spiritualistic monism led to making the idea of the soul absolute and resulted in Hegel’s absolute idealism which views the Absolute Spirit as the origin of everything. What gives rise to the human spirit is the realization of certainties that have their origin in the Absolute. A human being is determined by the lawfulness of a non-material order.

Materialistic monism makes the body absolute. It reduces a person to part of the material whole, a thing among things, the result of natural processes that determine him from the outside and here so-called psychic abilities are a mere extension of the physical. Ultimately, both spiritualism and materialism are unacceptable. Both are attempts to reduce one irreconcilable substance to another.

The flourishing of the natural sciences and the enthusiasm for their possibilities of application in the 19th century largely was responsible for the shift in emphasis by which a person was measured, evaluated and quantified in the finest details as an object of nature. The practitioners of the human sciences were impressed

by the so-called objective methods of the natural sciences and, as a result, the human sciences were reduced to natural sciences. Carnap argued for a universal language for the sake of uniting the sciences and since physics is the most fundamental empirical science, its language is the only scientific one. Guillaume pled for an analogous approach on the basis of methodological considerations and not on the basis of logical and scientific theoretical grounds. In his study of the human psyche Tolman chose animal experiments instead of inter-human communication because he regarded the latter to be too subjective. The slogan was “We want rats, not men”. A person differs only slightly from an animal in the sense that he has at his disposal a greater variety of functional possibilities for adapting.

The problem of objectivity places the question of method in the foreground. A striving to achieve objectivity through purely empirical and experimental methods that, in the natural sciences, provide verifiable results that can be expressed in exact, formal language and mathematical symbols, in the human sciences lead to [the ideologies of] empiricism, objectivism and scientism. In the subject sciences this results in reducing some dimensions of being human to a variety of “isms [doctrines]: energism, materialism, biologism, evolutionism, psychologism and sociologism, each of which results in the nihilistic doctrine of “nothing-more-than”

For the 20th century seeker of the humanness of being human these approaches are unacceptable. “One cannot think about human scientific relations in terms of natural scientific categories Whoever applies methods that essentially are the same as those of physics will remain in the area of physics and the humanness of being human never enters there.”⁽³⁾

It was especially Scheler, and Heidegger after him, who gave philosophical anthropology a new flavor by indicating the needed method of research. The method that, in particular, is accepted in modern philosophical anthropology is the phenomenological method according to Husserl, although not always followed slavishly by these thinkers.

3. The phenomenological approach

As did Kant, Husserl tried to find a way in which knowledge and science are possible for a person. The main difference between these two great thinkers is that Kant regarded knowledge of the thing-in-itself to be impossible while Husserl's slogan was return to the thing itself. He proceeds from the conviction that "there is one sphere of absolute data and this sphere provides us with the possibility of constructing a completely accountable epistemology".

(4) He specifies this method as a method of giving meaning that is the foundation of all sciences. It is giving meaning as a matter of knowing. The eidos (essence) of the phenomenon can be grasped through reduction.⁽⁵⁾ Scheler, Heidegger and actually all existential philosophers use the phenomenological focus to understand human existence; it is the method for analyzing the question of [the essences of] human beings and their ways of existing. Scheler was interested in the meaning of human existence and with Heidegger it was the question of Being: it had to do with the sense of Being. His *Daseinsanalyse* is an attempt to disclose *Da-sein* (the there of its being-there) and its existence. The relativism and skepticism of the empirical, by which the speculative thinking of idealism was also revealed, deprive a person of his foothold on reality. Phenomenology is an attempt to regain this foothold through giving meaning as a matter of knowing and giving sense as an existential matter.

The claim that phenomenology is atheistic is decisively refuted by Luijpen in well-thought-out ways: The god denied by atheistically oriented phenomenologists such as Sartre is another god than the God of Christianity.⁽⁶⁾ Of course, whether God exists cannot be ascertained by the phenomenological method. However, this method can be used to learn to know persons in all sorts of situations in their life world, thus also when they serve their Creator. Thus, Bollnow made use of this method by analyzing a variety of phenomena on the level of human life to arrive at a more meaningful interpretation of being human and its task. He indicates that being human is a being who not only knows but also believes; he not only thinks but thanks.

4. The announcers of the new image

The new image that had announced itself in the previous century primarily was a matter of methodological-scientific nature and, indeed, was a search for a way that included the possibility for a more complete scientific investigation.⁽⁷⁾ The confluence of the existential thoughts of Soren Kirkegaard and the phenomenology of Husserl is conspicuous. This confluence speaks clearly in Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit* [Being and Time].⁽⁸⁾ This also is true of the contributions of Scheler and Merleau-Ponty. It can be said of the announcers of the "new" thinking about being human that they are existential thinkers. That there is mention here of existential phenomenology in no way is surprising.

It is especially the natural science oriented who themselves brought to light the one-sidedness and inadequateness of a complete absolutizing of the natural scientific way of thinking and that still contributes to modern philosophical anthropology, e.g., Binswanger, Buytendijk, Christian, Frankl, Portmann, Van den Berg, Von Gebattel and Von Weizsacher. From medicine and psychiatry there was a necessary awareness to learn to know a person in his life world if it is remembered that these persons are confronted with crisis situations of fellow persons. A person in distress calls for assistance from someone who is ready to help and who asks for what ought to be. Siegmund indicates the knowledge of a *Nicht-in-Ordnung-Seins* [not-being-in-order], the awareness of unfulfilled *Sein-Sollen* [should be].

A person is addressed to do what ought to be done. Questions about the way a person must organize his life to be true to his own essence always lead back to the meta-question "After all, who am I in the world?"⁽⁹⁾ Scheler asks directly if, with a biological-evolutionistic vision, there still is mention of an exceptional position of human beings. If human beings, because of a higher intelligence, can arrive at a deeper insight and, consequently, can make more advantageous choices to satisfy their needs, then there only is a gradual difference between a human being and an animal. According to him, human being is not a mere extension of nature. There is a radical difference. A human being occupies an exceptional position. He is a unique being and this is because of his rationality and humanness as spirituality by which it is acknowledged that he is a person. Essentially, the new image in 20th century philosophical

anthropology is characterized by the fact that it discloses a personologically oriented, anti-substantialistic image of being human in contrast to the predominant naturalistically oriented, substantialistic and atomistic model that was constructed in the previous century.

The practitioners of a phenomenologically oriented anthropology, psychology, sociology, ethics, pedagogics and therapy plead not only for a return to the life world. They stress the fact of existence. The subject scientist who wants to understand human beings in existential situations does not lapse into making a few dimensions of that being absolute. He does not construct a particular model of being human as a psychological or sociological or moral being in order to then acquire an image of the "whole" human being through a summation of these models. Each subject scientist views being human from a particular perspective and is aware that what he sees from that perspective refers to the existing human being in his indivisibility. Therefore, the subject scientist can contribute to a more complete understanding of the humanness of being human who as an existing participant in a multi-formed world design pointing to a future guided by norms and also to a more complete understanding of the humanness of the human being who has become ill at ease and unfaithful to what he ought to be. The phenomenologically oriented subject scientist in the human sciences who wants to see the human being as a person contributes to the area of philosophical anthropology because he does not make his area of knowledge absolute but is aware of its limitations and also is aware that disclosing the essence of being human exceeds his own limited awareness.

Therefore, contributions can be made from a biological, physiological, medical, psychological, sociological, historical, pedagogical and theoretical perspective that are meaningful for philosophical anthropology and, consequently, the subject scientists, in their turn, can better understand being human from their particular perspective if they take into account modern philosophical anthropology which is no model following a rational construction.⁽¹⁰⁾

5. Some aspects of a personological image of being human

It is not possible to give a complete explication of what is meant by a personologically oriented image of being human. The core aspects ought to indicate that being human, as being a person, is different from viewing being human as in the grasp of nature and driven by needs and drives. The need for categories that manifest, raise, bring into existence the humanness of being human is readily stated. Such categories are still eagerly sought because, in thinking about being human, philosophers are still firmly held by naturalistically oriented concepts. Just as there can be mention of phenomenology and of existential philosophy, there also can be mention of a personological anthropology. It is difficult to schematize this new direction of thinking since different authors provide a variety of images. What is more, this direction of thinking is, in principle, anti-schematic. Even so, there are certain fundamental concepts about which more clarity is desired to be able to see the essence of the new in the 20th century philosophical anthropology. The following are given further attention below: (a) intentionality, (b) existence, (c) being-in-the-world, (d) being-in-the-world-with-others and (e) person.

(a) Intentionality:

The term intentionality was used by Franz Brentano to indicate that an act of consciousness is always directed to something. It is directed to representations of the world of things. There is not yet mention of overcoming the separation between the subject who perceives and the object perceived. Husserl was struck by the idea that consciousness is always consciousness of something and, stimulated by Brentano's thinking, he eventually used the term intentionality in a different sense than his teacher did. For Husserl consciousness is essentially intention, reaching the perceived. Consciousness no longer is something or even an interiority and the intention is not a function of something. With this the anti-substantialism so characteristic of modern philosophical anthropology is announced. Consciousness is not something that, in its substantial differentness, stands against an on hand world of things. Intentionality is the way in which consciousness is; it is the way of being conscious. This directedness (the act) itself is constitutive of consciousness. Thus the subject-object separation

disappears. It seems that “consciousness itself can be nothing other than openness, directedness to others and does not rests in and on itself. Thus, consciousness does not appear to be a pure interiority but it serves to promote understanding as one moves in the light, as one steps outside of oneself, thus as existence. The explicit act of knowing then merely is one of our ways of being-in-the-world as our human existence”.⁽¹¹⁾ Just as Brentano had not understood the full consequences of his insight into consciousness, as consciousness, Husserl also did not grasp the full implications of his view of intentionality. This is illuminated further by Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty.

(b) Existence:

It was Husserl’s aim to acquire valid knowledge through accountable research. Thus he sought a method to disclose, reveal, show the origins (ultimate grounds) of a phenomenon. The philosopher asks the question about being (the fundamental reality, the ultimate reality). Closely related is the question about being human as the core question of philosophical anthropology. The question of being is closely related to the question of how a being can be disclosed. The idea of being is not evident. It must be systematically investigated. The appropriate way to investigate being is the phenomenological way. Heidegger indicates that from the diversity of beings there is only one being that can serve as the point of departure for the investigation, namely that being who can question himself. Only by analyzing human existence (Da-sein, being-in-the-world) can authentic philosophy be practiced.⁽¹²⁾

In existential phenomenology the concept existence refers to the primordial fact, the original reality, the fait primitif. With this the distinctive way of being human is indicated. Existence is what constitutes being human as human.

The concept existence in the sense of “to be” or “to exist” is an old concept in Western thought. However, it is an entirely new use of the concept “existence” that brings together in one camp thinkers with diverse ideas such as are found with phenomenologists, existentialists and philosophers of existence.⁽¹³⁾ When in recent philosophical anthropology it is said that only a human being exists

this does not mean that nothing exists outside of being human but only that being human is a way of being that is radically different from other beings. He not only exists but follows a way of existing. Existence is what remains of being human after everything in the world that he can possess has been lost. It is not something that he has. Essentially it is what makes him a human being.

Jaspers as well as Heidegger assert that it is not possible to give existence a particular form or content. It is not possible to make a final pronouncement about human existence. Existence is the particular way of existing of a human being and thus also of being-in-the-world by which he transcends himself. He is becoming. His essence is “to be” (Zu sein), futurity. He always is in a situation, in a particular relationship with himself that presumes a relationship with the world and others. He is always outside of himself and is continually ahead of himself. Being human calls to human becoming and this is unthinkable without being-there (Da-sein) as being-in-the-world. Heidegger emphasizes strongly that “The essence of Dasein lies in its existence”.⁽¹⁴⁾

(c) Being-in-the-world:

By describing Dasein as being-in-the-world Heidegger emphasizes the primordial relation, as original relation, and unitary phenomenon of human being and world. This unity cannot be demonstrated but can only be pointed out. Human being exists in the world and this cannot be done in any way except as being bodily present in the world. Being born is entering a world of meanings, a particular field of sense. The entire way of human existence implies inhabiting the world. The only way in which humanness can be expressed is through a bodily being bound to the world. A human being finds himself in a world that he has not chosen in a way and time that he also has not chosen. He is thrown into the world. With a person’s being thrown in the world everything is included regarding his existence, even what he had no part in, including the past as a particular meaning interpretation because the human world is a world of meaning. For his inhabiting the world he needs a grasp of reality. He acquires this grasp by giving meaning. He gives meaning by the way he enters a dialogue with the world. His

actions refer to his questions and his responses as his attempt to create a meaningful field of existence for himself.

The above already acknowledges that being human is not causally determined. As intentionality a person is directed to a goal, to a future in accordance with norms as matters of propriety. Giving meaning, constituting a world is a creative activity of humans. The world is permeated with humanness. A world that is not a world-for-human-being is unthinkable and equally meaningless is the idea of person-without-world. There is a dialectic relationship between being human and world. A person's questions and responses refer to a relationship of being-safe or being-threatened, of world-acceptance or world-estrangement, but he always is in a relationship with the world in which he finds himself. "Existence 'is' being-related and not being-apart".⁽¹⁵⁾ It belongs to the essence of being human to establish relationships with the reality that surrounds him. Therefore, Buytendijk calls him "an initiative of relationships to a world" and whoever wants to understand him has to do so from his world, i.e., "from the meaningful ground structure of that whole of situations, circumstances, cultural values, where he directs himself, what he is aware of, what his behaviors, thoughts and feelings are concerned with – the world in which he exists, that he, in the course of his personal history, encounters and forms by giving meaning to everything".⁽¹⁶⁾

A person is always in a situation but is not delivered to it because he gives sense and meaning to the situation by establishing a new situation in terms of what ought to be according to the norms he accepts as valid. These norms can be beneficial to the thriving of his humanness but they also can be impeding. A person always finds himself in a situation. His being bound to a situation is always a matter of becoming different by giving meaning. A person cannot escape giving meaning. As world inhabitant, he must choose how he is going to carry out his task. Even the absence of a choice and positive conduct are evidence of the particular way he participates in designing his world. A person cannot escape his creative share without being untrue to his own nature. This does not elevate a human being to the creator of all that is because being human implies an inseparable being bound to time and space, to a

particular meaningful world in which he finds himself, to his own bodily-being-in-the-world.

Whoever does not accept one's own deficiencies, limitations and the inevitabilities of temporality and spatiality, of suffering and death, cannot meet the demands of being human. The situation is not limited in the sense of not-able-to-be-different. It simply is the sphere within which a person offers his creative contributions as a response to what ought-to-be-different, always considering particular factualities as fixed givens.

(d) Being-in-the-world-with-others:

The first supportive reality that one gets help from in grasping the world "is another living person, a thou, who approaches one as a brotherly thou".⁽¹⁷⁾ At his birth a small child finds himself in a field of existence as this has acquired a particular sense through others and in which acknowledged human norms hold. There is a particular past, a history that forms part of his thrownness. Human historicity refers to a world-with-others. Existence is co-existence: the other simply cannot be thought away from our field of existence. Inhabiting is inhabiting-with. Human co-inhabiting the world requires accepting one's own thrownness, accepting the other and being accepted by others. This presents a pedagogic task. Without a fellow person's appeal to the educand the child cannot accept his own becoming a person as a personal task. The pedagogic shows being human as that being who is dependent on his fellow persons and who is willing to be assisted by them in order to give expression to the idea of humanity. Kwant indicates that childlike life reveals that "the extent to which one becomes and proceeds to live in our world in human ways is through human beings. We become acquainted with life and world through our acquaintance with persons. Things speak to us because others already have spoken to us about them. We are feeling before the world because we are feeling before other persons".⁽¹⁸⁾

Where Sartre interprets the look of the other as threatening one's subjectivity, Binswanger, Luijpen and Bollnow stress the significance of love as creative of the subjectivity of the other. The hateful look that degrades the other to an object is a reality. However, it is not

in harmony with true humanness. It is the we-ness (we-ness in love) as an interpretation of the mutual affection of person to person that puts him in a position to create his home by shaping and residing in the world.⁽¹⁹⁾

A human being must live in a particular field of existence. The situation that he needs is not given as finished. He has to design his world. However, he does not begin with a meaningless world. He creates within a particular field of existence that is prepared by others and he creates with others. The world is a world-for-me-through-others-and-a-world-for-others-through-me. Giving meaning is an inter-subjective giving of meaning. Meaning-for-me is meaning-for-us.

If it is asserted that existence at the same time is co-existence because giving meaning is inter-subjective, this does not imply making alike, no “massified” person. Jaspers talks of the *Massa-dasein* without responsibility as “*Dasein* without existence”. Existence implies being a person and being responsible. Inter-subjectivity is only possible where there is respect for the person of the other.

(e) Person:

The term “person” refers to the uniqueness, the individuality and the indivisibility of a human being. This emphasizes the radical difference of being human from any other organism. This difference is indicated by the word SPIRIT. Spirit is not a substance; it is also not the product of the evolution of physical, vital and psychic substrata. Scheler asserts: “The center of action in which spirit appears within a finite mode of being we call person” and then he elucidates further: “A ‘spiritual’ being, then, is no longer subject to its drives and its environment. Instead, it is ‘free from the environment’, or as we shall say, ‘open to the world’: such a being has a ‘world’.”⁽²⁰⁾ A person is in an open world with many possibilities who is addressed by and accountable to another PERSON who appeals to him to choose and act in accordance with what ought to be. He is questioned and must answer; and his answer is evidence of attributing values that his actions makes meaningful. As meaning giving existence a human being manifests

himself as freedom, but not freedom as licentiousness. A person can and wants to be someone himself. He can intervene in the existing order. Thus, he not only exists but follows a way of existing. Through his intervening he shows that he has a sense of values. He creates culture and accepts responsibility for the changes he brings about. He is not determined merely by drives; he is possibility and, as such, he is openness and must even acquire his freedom by progressively responding in obedience to the moral imperative. He can say yes and he can say no. He is personally involved in his becoming a person. He is self-designing and, as such, he always is on the path to what ought to be. He knows that he cannot properly satisfy the demands that address him. He is continually confronted with a new task and participates in multi-formed ways in his conversation with the world and fellow persons. He often experiences the world as a threat. The existentialists and the early philosophers of existence had, after the second destructive world war, even labeled a human being's being-in-the-world as a way of anxiety leading to the destination of death as the annihilation of his existence. In their later works Heidegger and Jaspers allowed a more optimistic sound to be heard. Linking up with Binswanger and others, Bollnow indicates that the fundamental relationship of being human is one of thankfulness, trust and hope. It is the task of a person, in the midst of threats, to confidently venture when he is confronted by new possibilities in order to design a human world. A person can only proceed to devote himself to a task with love and effort if he believes that the future is meaningful. Accepting the past and future as tasks of the present asks for faith in the meaning of a human's being-in-the-world, and indeed a meaning that transcends time and space. A person cannot accept his task of becoming human without education. He must be educated to venture confidently, to continually recapture his security and to believe in the meaning of being human.

6. Conclusion

From the above there cannot be mention of a closed image of being human from phenomenologically oriented existential thinkers. Instead, there are always new possibilities and therefore these thinkers provide searching rather than completed answers. Thus, they keep open the question about the nature of being human.

Interesting in this connection is Kwant's conclusion that man's answers to his own being reveal the gift of being human as a wonder.⁽²¹⁾ This is in sharp contrast to the closed models resulting from system thinkers, and this is meaningful for educators because it also rejects constructing closed educative systems. Educating is no recipe-like, mechanistic or spontaneous biological lawfulness because being a child, as becoming adult, as a way of being human, is not a being causally determined but is open possibility that to become human is dependent on fellow human beings.

Author's English Summary
(Edited slightly)

1. Introduction:

It is difficult to give an account of contemporary thought since the philosophers concerned have not yet spoken the last word. In addition, 20th century philosophers do not want to think according to a scheme.

Philosophical anthropology is a radical attempt to penetrate the humanness of being human. The new line of thought announced itself as a reaction against the traditional.

2. Tradition:

Traditional Western philosophy is in line with the dualistic Platonic image of man. Plato over-emphasized the spiritual aspect while Aristotle founded reality on experience. These lines of thought developed into rationalism and empiricism. Christianity subscribed to Platonism. At present the question arises whether the Christian doctrine has not been interpreted too easily according to Greek dualism. Descarte's dualistic, substantialistic image of being human distinguishing between two substances, body and soul, is called "the ghost in a machine" by Gilbert Ryle. Descarte's myth led to spiritual monism which absolutized the soul, ending in idealism, and materialism which reduced the functions of the soul to physical processes and ended in scientism.

The success of the natural sciences during the 19th century led to an attempt to give an objective image of being human according to the methods used in the natural sciences. The objective was to describe being human in the language of physics or to ascertain his true nature by means of experiments. “We want rats, not men” was the slogan of psychologists. The result was a number of closed images of being human or -isms, each absolutizing one aspect of being human, ending in nihilism: the doctrine of “man is nothing but ...”

The modern 20th century philosophical anthropologists cannot accept this approach. Scheler and Heidegger started looking for a method to study being human. The phenomenological approach of Husserl impressed them and they followed this, though not slavishly.

3. The phenomenological approach:

Husserl tried to find a method for gaining knowledge and practicing science. His slogan was: “Return to the things themselves”. He wanted to grasp the eidos (the essence) of the phenomenon by means of phenomenological reductions. Scheler, Heidegger and other existential philosophers used this approach to answer the question of a person’s being-in-the-world. Scheler intended discovering the meaning of human existence. Heidegger was interested in the question of Being. He wanted to dis-cover (to open), to reveal Da-sein (being-there) in its existence. Scepticism questioned the dogmatic speculations of idealism. The phenomenologists attempted to penetrate the meaning of knowledge as well as existential meaning.

Luijpen refutes the statement that phenomenology is atheistic. He indicates that the god whom Sartre and others repudiate is not the Christian God. Of course phenomenology cannot prove that God is. Religion as a phenomenon in human life cannot be denied. The philosopher can approach religious faith phenomenologically.

4. The announcers of the new image:

The new announced itself as a running together of phenomenology and existential philosophy. The names of Husserl, Scheler,

Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty are mentioned as the leaders. Scientists from the fields of medicine and psychiatry felt the need to understand human being in his own world, the world as he sees it. They revolted against the scientific image of being human. Scheler points out that a biological-evolutionistic image implies merely a gradual difference between being human and being animal, while there is a difference in the essence. The difference lies in a human being's spirituality. He is a person. This fact is emphasized by philosophers of the 20th century. They emphasize the importance of the world as the original habitation and of existence. The scientists studying psychology, sociology or pedagogics each see being human from one perspective. Each perspective points to other perspectives, i.e., to being human in his indivisibility. Therefore the psychologist, sociologist, etc., can contribute to a more complete image of being human as being a person.

5. Some aspects of an image of being human as a person:

Only the crux will be stated to point out that being human as a person is quite different from an image of a human being as a mere product of nature, driven by needs and drives which he cannot control. This emphasizes the need for categories to show being human in his exceptional position as a person. The following concepts need attention: (a) intentionality, (b) existence, (c) being-in-the-world, (d) being-in-the-world-with-others and (e) person.

(a) Intentionality: Franz Brentano indicated that consciousness is always consciousness-of-something. Husserl was struck by this and he eventually concluded that intentionality is actually consciousness, i.e., reaching the observed. Consciousness is not something. Thereby substantialism is done away with. Intentionality (the act of being intended on) itself constitutes consciousness. There is no longer a division between subject and object.

(b) Existence: Husserl wanted to find a method to penetrate to the origin (the ultimate grounds) of reality. Heidegger wanted to penetrate the primordial facts of being human by an analysis of Da-sein (the mode of being human). In existential phenomenology the concept existence is the *fait primitif*. With this the mode of

being human is indicated. Existence constitutes being human as human. This distinguishes him radically from all other beings. Existence has no fixed form or contents. It is the essence of a human being's being-in-the-world (Da-sein) and it implies that he transcends himself. His being is to be (Zu-sein), futurity. This is impossible without being-there as being-in-the-world. Heidegger says: "The essence of Dasein lies in its existence".

(c) Being-in-the-world: The term Dasein as being-in-the-world indicates that it stands for a unitary phenomenon. This primary datum must be seen as a whole. Human being exists in the world by being bodily present in a world of meanings. The human way of living implies inhabiting a world. A human being is thrownness. This means he finds himself in a world in a way and time that he has not chosen. It is his task to constitute his own world. Being human, as thrownness, does not mean causal determination. As intentionality he is directed at a goal. Giving meaning and, thus, constituting his world is a human's creative activity. World always implies world-to-a-human. The idea of world-without-a-human is absurd. Human being stands in a dialectic relation to world and as inhabitant of the world he must decide on how he intends fulfilling his task. Though bound to a situation he is not handed over to it. He designs his own world. The situation, though it restricts his freedom, is actually the sphere in which he delivers his creative contribution. He can and wants to change the situation in answer to the appeal that he ought to do so. He cannot create in a vacuum since he cannot exist in one.

(d) Being-in-the-world-with-others: Existence is co-existence. A human being cannot constitute his habitation without fellow persons. Awakening the consciousness of the child to what should be depends on pedagogical assistance. The pedagogic exposes being human as that being who is dependent on his fellow persons and is willing to be assisted by them in order to give expression to the idea of humanity.

Sartre interprets the look of the other as a shocking threat to one's own subjectivity. Binswanger, Luijpen and Bollnow emphasize the creative power of love. Mutual affection is a condition for the construction of a home for humans. World-to-me is prepared by others and I am co-designer of the world-to-others as world-to-us.

Giving meaning is inter-subjective. This does not mean crowd making. Existence implies being a person. Inter-subjectivity implies respect for the other who also is a person.

(e) Person: The radical difference of a human's uniqueness compared with any other organism is indicated by the word SPIRIT (GEIST): This means that a human being lives in an open world. He is the one who is being questioned and who has to answer by becoming human in a meaningful way. He can change the present order. He is not determined by drives but is endowed with the possibility and responsibility of creating values. He can assent and dissent. This implies that he has freedom to decide how he wants to live. This is not license. There are limitations, but all limitations are possibilities for giving meaning to his own life and to the lives of others. A human being cannot escape being responsible.

Originally existentialists regarded the primary attitude of being human to his world as a way-of-anxiety leading to the destination-of death as NOTHINGNESS. Binswanger and Bollnow emphasize the meaning of faith, hope and love. Human being cannot constitute a world in which he can live as he ought to without faith. The human child must be educated to believe in the task of giving meaning to his being-in-the-world.

6. Conclusion:

Being human is always incomplete and open. The essence of his being, his existence, cannot be caught in a fixed model. Kwant concludes that a human's answer to his own being reveals the gift of being human as wonder.

The personological image of being a person demands pedagogic assistance for the human child in order that he may respond to the appeal of being-in-the-world in a meaningful way.

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- (3) De Miranda, J.: Verkenning van de "Terra Incognita" tussen praktijk en theorie in Middelbaar (Scheikund-) Onderwijs, 51-52.

- (4) Kockelmans, A.: Edmund Husserl, 51.
- (5) In this article a complete discussion of phenomenology is not attempted. You are referred to the contributions of Spiegelberg and Oberholzer in this issue. Also see Meyer, A.T.M.T. et al.: Die Fenomenologie.
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- (21) Kwant, R.C.: De Fenomenologie van de Taal, 245.