

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF A CATEGORICAL STRUCTURE FOR DIDACTIC PEDAGOGICS*

F. Van der Stoep
University of Pretoria

To reflect on the activity known as “Didaskein” (teaching) in the original experiences of all persons is to reflect on a practice that is carried out daily by everybody. It thus is an essential part of the course of life as people encounter it in the life world. Such reflection, contemplation or reasoning, therefore, is not primarily the result of a particular theory, premise, conception or ideal but grounds itself as a direct description of the practical, everyday life experiences that all persons go through each day and that, as a matter of course, eventually become integrated into the totality of the experiences they amass during the course of time.¹ The usual relation between person and reality that is necessary and is built up with increasing intensity makes possible the reflection on the sense or original meaning of this particular aspect of their experiences. Indeed, it is a compelling experience that some teaching is done so inconspicuously that one is inclined to accept it as self-evident without seeking information about its nature or essence, i.e., about its real structure. The consequence is that for many centuries, especially in Western-European thought², didactic science seldom if ever considered seeking information about the original meaning of this primordial experience that we describe as “Didaskein” (teaching) and in what ways and with what aims it is implicated in the course of educating all children during the years they are allocated to being educated. Reflection from this point of view also clearly puts in relief the possibility of a didactic perspective on the phenomenon of educating so that this connection [between educating and teaching] can be unavoidably implicated in the course of the argument. In concluding this matter, teaching that

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is not attuned to the child's becoming and change is meaningless. At the same time, educating without teaching is impossible because then educating would be stripped of all content. As far as teaching (Didaskein) is the obverse side of educating, this means that this original experience or primordial form of living (educating) necessarily includes teaching that, ipso facto, compels the pedagogue from the beginning to take teaching into account when constructing a pedagogical theory. Thus, fundamental reflection on educating also includes didactic pronouncements by which there is mention of a didactic perspective on a scientific-pedagogical level.

If one reflects fundamentally on the activity we know as "Didaskein" this implies that the reflection reaches back to the original experience already mentioned. On close examination, this "original experience" actually means a person's primordial involvement with reality. The first and most obvious insight to which this approach leads one is the realization that a person's original involvement with reality is for him a matter of meaning. The first ontological category of "being-in-the-world" (Heidegger) implies an activity of giving meaning that arises from the relationships he has established with such a reality. From this it follows that when the didactic pedagogue reflects on a person's involvement with reality, he must accept that this being-in-the-world just referred to is for a person a matter of meaning. In other words, the life world would be a meaningless structure for a person if his involvement in it were not an issue of meaning. Reflecting on and systematically ordering his experiences (original involvement with reality) would consequently be impossible. As a first ontological category, a person's "being-in-the-world", therefore, implies a meaning-giving activity that expresses the relationship he has established with reality.³

This first indication of a fundamental reflection on the original experience that we know as "Didaskein" necessarily leads, however, to a greater particularization. The activities mentioned above can be nothing more than human activities because only persons educate and are committed to it. When the didactician wants to construct a fundamental theory from this he must also see that he continually is involved with and has anthropological categories, i.e., categories concerning the ways a person is involved with reality by which he also is aware of it. The simple motivation for this

standpoint lies in the fact that these anthropological categories must clarify for the didactician a person's original involvement with reality. After all, these educative actions of a person in his original involvement with reality are a matter of giving form to the first ontological category "person-in-the-world". In other words, person-in-the-world is a dynamic concept indicating that the integrated relationship person-world acquires form in the original experience and is available for description and judgment in this way [categorically]. Thus, there is mention that a person's involvement with reality takes on a particular form as original, simple activities that separately and together delimit a person's form of living. Stated differently, the form of a person's involvement with reality is made evident in original, simple activities. So viewed, the form of the original experience then must reveal the specific humanness of his ways of acting. The specific human character of his forms of experiencing force the didactic pedagogue to postulate the specific human ways of being by which he rejects each naturalistic-evolutionistic anthropology.⁴ They simply do not agree with the fact of the specific human being as is seen in the original experience. However, one can only postulate this specific way of being if one also realizes that these original actions (experiences) must reveal forms of living as such. In other words, one's original action and, therefore, one's original experience has an essential authority with respect to the form of living that is hereby revealed. This insight regarding the relation of life form and original experience is interesting to the didactic pedagogue but it remains merely theory unless he also realizes that this form of living has the possibility of creating a structure in the experiential world that can be actualized for presenting or making known the life contents in which the specifically human manifests itself in a teaching situation. Still one's form of living is observable on the basis of the fact that he involves himself with life content. The meaningful structure of his original experience exists in the fact that in the ways he is involved with reality, he continually proceeds to give meaning, i.e., content to his existence.⁵ An absolutely essential aspect of his involvement with reality turns on the matter of knowledge: knowledge regarding his origin, being and destination, his command to watch over and work at what is unique to his existence. In summary: the entire constituting of a unique life world has to do with the fact that it is what is meaningful for a person in his continuous experiencing and

increasingly he must realize the meaning content that such experiencing has for him. A searcher for fundamental structure in the didactic pedagogic must recognize that here we have to do with the relationship between person and reality. This relationship only can come about on the basis of the fact that, insofar as a person is involved in reality, this involvement manifest itself in particular forms of living. These forms of living have their ground or sense in the original ways in which he as a person is involved with the total reality in religious, moral, social, juridical, economic and every other respect. This original involvement with reality then understandably proclaims the forms of his involvement in reality or better his original forms of living. These original forms of living express an unprejudiced view of nothing less than the ways a person originally experiences reality. But, here a person does not experience nothing. In his original experiencing he is involved with something—he does something, thinks about something, talks about something, etc. And this something is not the experience itself but the content by which this experiencing of reality takes its course. Therefore, if one talks of “person in world” one really talks about a harmony, a synthesis and relation with respect to life form and life content that is visible in a person’s original involvement with reality. The form as well as the content with which one is busy in the everyday practice of living must be carefully analyzed and thought about to be able to decide if these things are primary or secondary structures. Finally, a person’s experiencing shows that he continually has to do with practices that are not primary experiences, e.g., the manufactured aspects of his occupational life, the transportation systems he creates, etc. Fundamental thinking thus must carefully distinguish if the experiencing (in this sense now the relation of form and content) really is a primary matter, i.e., if it is something that has to do with his original experiencing, his “being in the world” as such [e.g., educating—G.Y.], and if it is something that he brought about himself in the course of time as a synthesis of different aspects of his involvement with this reality [e.g., schooling—G.Y.]. For the didactic pedagogue this means that he has to be prepared to reach back further than the school since, in light of the above, the school’s reality cannot be characterized as an original experiencing of the forms of living. In searching for the possibility of a categorical structure for the didactic pedagogic, going back to the school’s situation means to ground it on a

secondary, contrived matter that in its form of appearing does not implicate, in the first place, the original involvement of a person in reality.

With this, however, it also is acknowledged that the original experiencing actualizes itself somewhere in reality. As far as the didactic pedagogic is concerned if this is not in the school the course and connected series of situations must be found elsewhere. Here the didactician-pedagogue is confronted with the question of where, i.e., in what space does the original experience actualize itself. It certainly is implied in the foregoing that the dynamic, acceleration, course, movement of a consecutive series of situations as observed in the educative event that has to bring to the surface a connecting factor by which the relation of form and content can appear in a particular harmony precisely because there is mention of giving meaning to one's own existence in the original experiencing. It took many years and even centuries for pedagogues to clearly see that the meaning of the original experience of "Didaskein" (Teaching) is found not in the secondary situation of the schools but in the primary family situation. And a discussion of this point is considered unnecessary for the progress of this exposition.⁶ The relation of form and content actualized in a spatial being-there, however, is important because in this the accomplished factual connection of life form and life content is observable and, therefore, describable. It is precisely in this space or place (the family) where the coherence of the fundamental reflection on "Didaskein" regarding the form and the principle insights regarding content are placed in pedagogic harmony. Finally, this has to do especially with the form of how there can be teaching and the content (including principles) regarding what teaching ought to be. While the form aspect is a universal matter the content principles very clearly are particular matters. The universal form of the original experience that is in force for all people and all times is brought to life, to dynamic movement, to exercising pedagogic intervention by means of particulars, the life- and world-views, and, in particular, for us it is the Christian Protestant—more specifically the Calvinist view.

The implication of the above pronouncement is summarized as follows: That the form of the experience as it manifests itself in the

original life world is a universal, generally valid matter and that this original experience is known after its form has manifested itself in the everyday act (what we call giving instruction or “Didaskein”). At the same time this form is a lifeless theoretical structure unless it is brought into motion in terms of content, i.e., a particular world view with the aim of the child’s eventual adulthood. In his fundamental reflection on the nature and essence of the experience of “Didaskein” the didactic pedagogue, therefore, expresses himself regarding the question of form and content as they ought to harmonize in the original space (the family home) and thence be carried over to the secondarily functioning school situation that, really, only is an extension of the event that had already occurred long before and is occurring in the home.

When, on the basis of the above pronouncement, there is a search for a “categorical structure” for the didactic pedagogic, ostensibly this has to do with the form in which this original experience manifests itself and that obviously ought to be carefully described and interpreted for the sake of establishing a secondary structure by which, in a formal way, the original sense of this form of living is integrated into the school situation. And it is only in this way that the didactic pedagogue really can justify himself regarding the practice that he tries to describe in its form, and also in light of the perspective of his life- and world-view. With this it also must be clear that the didactic pedagogue cannot disclose a categorical structure for didactic pedagogics from any other subject science such as biology, sociology or psychology.

The two important insights to crystallize from the above and to constantly keep in mind in the search for a categorical structure for didactic pedagogics are the following: First, the thinker must note that if he really wants to know with what he is involved he can do nothing else than to candidly concentrate his thinking on the form of “Didaskein” as an original way of giving meaning regarding a person’s involvement in reality. The content with which this form is filled is chosen from and on the basis of other deliberations in order to set the didactic event in motion in the family home as well as in school. Second, it holds that if there is mention of “Didaskein” as an original experience (i.e., as an experience without a cause that cannot be reduced further) the thinker also must realize that the

forms of “Didaskein” that one learns to know in the life world really are original life forms. And with this it is now stated that if the experience that is paired with the educative and, hence, with the teaching event is original the form in which it is cast also is life-original, that is, original as a form of living for a “person-in-the-world”. The scientific sense of a categorical look at Didaskein must then be seen as disclosing to us the sense of the original experience, also with an eye to the insight that flows from this for the secondarily constituted event that we know as schooling. Should the didactic pedagogue come to postulate didactic categories in his viewing and analyzing of the original experience this means that in these categories he has in systematic and orderly ways disclosed and described the sense of the original experience with the aim of re-establishing a particular practice that originally figures as a meaningful matter in the life world. Thus, with the didactic categories the sense of the original experience of or ways of being involved in the reality known as “Didaskein” is interpreted essentially. The simple implication, therefore, is that one will never arrive at a categorical structure for didactic pedagogics as long as one refuses to think about “Didaskein” in its form. When the thinker does not take his point of departure as the didactic event itself, thus from the original experience of “to teach”, this means that he allows himself to be pushed out of the original piece of reality about which and in terms of which he ought to reflect. Therefore, the didactic pedagogue has no other choice than to characterize the original experience about which he expresses himself as that of “Didaskein”. From this “Didaskein” he has to reflect on this aspect of the original experience [of reality]; also insofar as this shows a harmony with respect to form and content, meaning thereby is given to his own existence. All other possibilities, such as reflecting on didactic pedagogics from the phenomenon of learning, necessarily lead to an applied instead of an original science. One reflects on the didactic from “Didaskein” in its educative connection or one does not. This is a logical as well as ontological deduction.⁷

The last consequence that is of particular importance in the foregoing to some extent was already broached in the very first paragraph, namely, that the meaning of teaching is closely related to the meaning of educating for the simple reason that educating

without teaching is unthinkable and that teaching without educating is void of content and therefore must be fruitless. However, at this stage, further explication is required because now this converges directly with the line of thinking about the possibility of a categorical view of the didactic pedagogic. The meaning of the one has a complementary relation with the meaning of the other. The meaning of teaching remains hidden if the meaning of educating is not disclosed, but educating is a matter of the original involvement with reality for the reason that it cannot be reduced to a particular origin or something else. Educating is an event that is given with being human. However, it does not occur outside of a framework of reality and thus is understood as continually directed to reality. Educating outside of a context of reality in its aspects of form and content is unthinkable. In this lies the mandate by which the meaning of didactic-pedagogic work comes to the fore most clearly. This reality to which educating (teaching) directs itself is not necessarily obviously available for the one who is being educated (child). The reality can be absent; it also can be vague; or it can be prospective. The knowledge and meaning of the reality thus lies within the framework of meaning of the one who educates rather than in the life perspective of the one who is being educated. This implies that a person's original experience manifests itself as a mandate—in this case an educative mandate that reality must be made available to the not yet adult person. One can formulate this much more strongly: The educative mandate takes the form of an educative imperative because without the help of an adult the child will not by himself become a grownup. The educand's going out to reality without dynamically taking up the educative imperative by means of didactic intervention is unthinkable. Now when the adult will make available the content of reality to which he directs the child, he cannot avoid the original activity of "Didaskein". He makes reality available precisely through the activity of "Didaskein". He makes reality known. The organization of the practice that he aims for has a twofold character, namely, its form aspect that describes the nature of his activity and the content aspect that as far as possible has to guarantee the orientation of the child in reality. To be able to work with content he must be able to justify to himself the form otherwise he runs the danger of being unaccountable. With this a very particular connotation regarding the relation between "Didaskein" and "Dasein" is postulated. Interrelatedness

that necessarily expresses “Mit-Dasein” (being with) as an ontological postulate equally expresses the activity “Didaskein”. Hereby “Dasein” acquires an imperative character of “being-there” that immediately refers to the mandate “Didaskein” in the sense that: If you will be there you must give instruction. So viewed, the meaning of our being-there as adults and the intersubjective relation with our children’s being-there is a matter that “Didaskein” spontaneously elicits as an original way of giving help with respect to the task of “being there”. For the Christian educator this pronouncement simply means that he has come to stand before the paradise mandate and can do nothing other than be unconditionally obedient to it but at the same time in his scientific intervention to show his readiness to take responsibility for the nature or form that the execution of this mandate ought to assume. And in order to attend to and give an account of the meaning of this activity (Didaskein), the didactic pedagogic arrives at a categorical structure that describes and systematizes the essence of the original experience for one who in formal, secondary ways is involved in teaching to bring up children.

It was previously stated as a task that a categorical structure for describing and systematizing practice, then, really must disclose the meaning of “Didaskein”. By implication, in the above pronouncement there are various categories that certainly cannot be dealt with here⁸ but yet briefly are systematized and, indeed, that disclose the meaning of this original experience in the life world of persons.

- a) Unlocking reality: This means that it is an essential of the activity of teaching that a particular aspect or aspects of reality is thrown open by one who knows for someone who doesn’t know.
- b) Entering reality (learning): Unlocking reality would be a meaningless activity if there were not also mention of an entering reality. Understandably, this entering can assume a large variation of forms, although the most general and best known is found in the activity of learning itself. In the course of the educative (teaching) event the child’s eventual becoming adult is unthinkable if he doesn’t show a continued readiness to enter the reality that was unlocked by the adult.

- c) **Forming:** Each teaching activity in logical ways is attuned to change in the sense of an improvement; an amplification of participating in the course of life; the broadening and deepening of a unique lifestyle; the attainment of one's own destiny. This new, comprehensive interiority is essentially unique to a greater or lesser extent depending on the successful course of each teaching event and therefore is formative in nature.
- d) **Orientation:** The fact that a child is born into a world that for him really is a totally strange landscape implies that at some time or another and in diverse ways he must become oriented in this life reality. When a child does not eventually discover his own place and position in reality and is ready to account for himself in this regard, certainly he runs the danger of eventually becoming a grown up that doesn't necessarily mean that he has become an adult. In this course of orienting activities teaching not only plays a far-reach but also a decisive role.
- e) **Accompaniment:** The reality in which a child as a person must orient himself is not harmless. In addition, no child can become an adult without the help, protection and care of adults. This help, protection and care is characterized as an accompanied participation of the adult in the life of a child on his way through the world. To teach without providing protection, care and help would mean to pursue something that cannot occur. At its best this something certainly should be described as brutalizing.
- f) **Objectification (Distantiation):** In order to satisfy the demands of adulthood, also interpreted in light of the above categories, the child must acquire an image of reality. The expression "acquire an image of reality" refers to the fact that each child must obtain a distance between himself and reality that places in particular relief judging, critiquing, designing, relating and similar factors within the course of reality. This relief certainly refers to an objective attitude by the child and, as such, essentially is peculiar to the intervention taken in particular by the teacher with the child.
- g) **Imperativity:** It is peculiar to teaching that it has a strong character of progression. Particular demands are continually placed on a child that he must satisfy to a greater or lesser

degree and without which the character of achievement of the didactic event will be lost. When this does not occur, i.e., when the adult does not impose demands, teaching as such fails because by this the conversation between adult and child draws to a close.

- h) Anticipation: Each form teaching, at home or in school, is and always was directed to intercepting the future in the sense that the adults along with the child contribute to the future. Teaching always is characterized by anticipating the future otherwise it is not teaching.
- i) Formalizing: It is further peculiar to the teaching event that essentially it is attuned to creating a particular mobility in the child regarding particular aspects of reality. This mobility guarantees his security in later adulthood, also in material as well as spiritual ways because he unconditionally acknowledges and obeys the norms and values and their interconnections. When formalized the adult creates particular and planned situations (teaching situations) to try to guarantee this mobility.
- j) Socializing: A person's involvement with reality always is an involvement by and with other persons. In religious, societal, juridical, economic and every other respect, a child must learn to live with other persons in a proprietary way—or be ostracized by them. Teaching that in one way or another is not socializing in nature really cannot be described as teaching because without socialization a child cannot find his way through the world.

These are a few categories that are examples but they must be fully explicated and interpreted. This applies to the clarification as well as to the scope or number of categories mentioned: there are more. However, what must be emphasized is that the meaning or essence of the activity that in everyday experience we know as “Didaskein” cannot be made visible without actualizing these categories separately and together.

References

¹ The significance of such a description in which the original experience of persons is sought as a point of departure is in the fact that the reality is stripped

of its idea-garb that was drawn over it for so many years in order to disclose its essentials or fundamentals with the aim of systematically describing and evaluating it. In all of his publications, but especially in his *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie*, Edmund Husserl indicated that science often obscures rather than clarifies reality. In the didactic publications of the past pedagogues were compelled to turn their thinking back to the original experience of educating because without teaching educating is unthinkable. In this connection, see the following:

J. Bijl: *Inleiding tot de algemene didactiek van het basisonderwijs* (Wolters, Groningen, 1960); W. Klafki: *Das pädagogische Problem des Elementaren und die Theorie der kategorialen Bildung* (Beltz, Weinheim, 1959); G. Buck: *Lernen und Erfahrung* (Kohlhammer, Stuttgart, 1967); F. van der Stoep: *Didaktiese Grondvorme* (Akademika, Pretoria, 1969); S. J. Gous: *Verantwoording van die didakties-pedagogiese* (Unpublished D. Ed. dissertation, University of Pretoria, 1969).

² The contributions made by Pestalozzi in this regard scarcely can be overestimated. His writings and formal pronouncements throughout had a practical aim and concepts such as “elemental” and “categorical” flow mainly from his views. It should catch the reader’s attention that in the first place Pestalozzi had not aimed at a systematic thinking through from “*Didaskein*” but indeed from meaningful activity structures that would make “new” practice possible, i.e., a practice that in the sense of a child’s participation would bring into the foreground for him the strange and characteristic value of life reality. See W. Klafki, *op cit.*, pp. 13-82.

³ With this the didactic pedagogue very clearly is faced with far-reaching epistemological as well as ontological problems. This has to do with the question a present focus on a broader reality that Martin Heidegger treats in a fundamental ontological connection (*Sein und Zeit* p. 190 et seq. and 315 et seq.) and by which anticipating the future acquires pedagogic significance. The meaningful connections of reality imply the possibility that they can be penetrated and clarified and that, finally, they constitute the ground conditions for any educative (teaching) activity. On the other hand, this has to do directly with the question of intentionality by which the pedagogue is compelled not only to search for the life dynamic of the child but also to inspire it with respect to the world relationships he has established. The problem of constitution, therefore, is entwined with this. Understandably, with this the didactic pedagogue proceeds to penetrate such relations as space and time (see Langeveld, M. J.: *Die Schule als Weg des Kindes*) but also the relation of form and content by which one’s life- and world-view come prominently into the foreground. With this there are for the reader a few implications of anticipated results that still must follow. In connection with the problem mentioned first see: A. Kockelmans: *Martin Heidegger* p. 76 et seq. (Lanoo, The Hague, 1962); K. Kanthack: *Das Denken Martin Heideggers* (De Gruyter, Berlin, 1959).

⁴ Each naturalistic-evolutionistic anthropology has an inherent defect in postulates of necessity, the most important of which is that a person is delivered defenseless to the world and is doomed to patterns of behavior unless he can

“adapt” himself to this reality. These “adaptations” then constitute his forms of living and understandably constitute the aims of his education. The educating (intervening) then results in the conditioning of reflexes (stimulus-response) that understandably cannot pass the test of reality. In this connection see: J. Dewey: *Democracy and Education* p 28 et seq. (Macmillan, New York, 1935) and *The School and Society* p 877 et seq. (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, no date); E. L. Thorndike: *Educational Psychology* p 14 et seq. (Kegan Paul, London, 1927). Nel, B. F.: *Fundamentele orienteering in die psigologiese pedagogiek* (University Publishers and Booksellers, Stellenbosch, 1968); Sonnekus, M. C. H.: *Die leerwereld van die kind as beleweniswereld* (University Publishers and Booksellers, Stellenbosch, 1969) p 51 et seq.

⁵ For a more comprehensive explication of how forms of living in the original experience influence the practice of “Didaskein”, the reader is referred to F. van der Stoep: *Didaktiese Grondvorme* p 13 et seq. As an example, the question of play can be used here merely for orientation. To play is fundamentally peculiar to the form and style of living of people. A person implements this form in a variety of educative activities, but especially in his beginning teaching where playing to and imitating in play is the basic form of the practice of teaching that especially is brought about with a young child. See, e.g., H. Scheuerl: *Das Spiel* (Beltz, Weinheim, 1968) p 124 et seq.; p 138 et seq.

⁶ Reference already has been made to the pronouncements of Bijl. However, in this regard also see: W. Brezinka: *Erziehung als Lebenshilfe* (Klett, Stuttgart, 4th edition, 1965) p 165 et seq.; H. Roth: *Paedagogische Anthropologie* (Schroedel, Hannover, 1966) p 71 et seq.; Dahmer and Klafki: *Geisteswissenschaftliche Paedagogik am Ausgang ihrer Epoch—Erich Weniger* (Beltz, Weinheim, 1968) p 35 et seq.; Oberholzer, C. K.: *Prolegomena van ‘n prinsipiele pedagogiek* (HAUM, Cape Town, 1968) p 62 et seq.; Landman and Gous: *Inleiding tot die fundamentele pedagogiek* (Afrikaans Press, Johannesburg, 1969) p 51 et seq.

⁷ In its history didactic theory forming shows a variety of points of departure in this respect that, although all contribute to insights and understanding, create confusion regarding the essential and non-essential in terms of what the original experience indicates in this connection. Examples are points of departure from formative theory, the psychology of learning, schooling, the learning content as such and more by which the fundamentals of “Didaskein” are illuminated and reasoned about only partially or one-sidedly. In this connection see: H. Nohl: *Paedagogik aus dreizig Jahren* (Schulte-Buhnke, Frankfurt, 1949); H. Rohrs: *Die Schule und ihre Reform in der gegenwartigen Gesellschaft* (Quelle & Meyer, Heidelberg, 1967); W. Guyer: *Wie wir lernen* (Rentsch, Stuttgart, 1960).

⁸ See F. van der Stoep: *Didaktiese Grondvorme* p 24 et seq. and S. J. Gous: *Verantwoording van die didakties-pedagogiese pp 24-77.*

APPENDIX

This appendix was added by George Yonge and did not appear in the original work. The following descriptions of some of the didactic categories are taken from F. van der Stoep and W. J. Louw, *Didactics*, pp 47-52 (Pretoria: Academica,

1984) and they are edited slightly. They represent a more detailed and further developed description of these particular didactic categories. The additional categories of “demarcation”, “reduction”, “achievement” and “progression” are described in this book.

1. Unlocking reality

Unlocking reality implies that a person who knows and commands certain contents of the life world unlocks or unfolds them for the benefit of one who does not know and does not yet command them. This activity underlies the teaching involvement between adults and children. The aid is to help the child acquire a sure grasp of reality and thus provide him with the necessary security to explore reality on his own.

Unfolding reality is an essential characteristic of the original relationship between adults and children. The fact that an adult unlocks and unfolds reality for the educative benefit of the child cannot be explained on other grounds or reduced to other reasons than that adults involve themselves educatively with children.

The theory of categorical forming also states that a child must open himself to the reality the adult unfolds. This means the child must be receptive to the formative possibilities the adult unlocks or unfolds. To be able to do this the didactician must know the child thoroughly; he must know how the child learns as well as the influence the child’s prior knowledge will have on creating his personal relationship to the world. This means the teacher must be able to account for the content, form and aim of his teaching. He also must be able to account for how he will lead the child to expose himself to reality. The teacher’s accountability extends even further: he must also account for the nature and quality of the child’s access to reality as well as for the interpretation of the content to insure that he will experience the content as meaningful and in doing so transform it so it becomes an authentic part of himself.

2. Learning

The teacher’s major role in the teaching situation is unlocking or unfolding reality for the child. However, if the child does not learn, the adult’s contribution to the child’s change of his relationship to reality will be meaningless. When the original didactic situation is examined, it is striking that the parent only confronts the child with content that he can understand and for which he is receptive.

As a didactic category “learning” primarily is not focused on how a child learns but on the fact that he does learn. The learning activity is of primary importance in the teaching situation and, as such, it is a category of the teaching structure.

The child learns because he is a human being and because the learning activity is one of his spontaneous ways of being. This is why it is meaningful for the adult to direct the child’s spontaneous learning activities by guiding and directing them with the aim that the child eventually will realize independence and adulthood.

The involvement of the parent and the teacher, therefore, is not an attempt to create a circumstance that does not exist. The fact is the child also learns outside of situations of teaching and educating and, therefore, they are not conditions for the child to learn. (But learning is a condition for them to occur). The learning

intention is given as an original aspect of human existence. The adult uses the child's learning as an opportunity for the child to achieve greater independence and adulthood.

To realize this category systematically, the teacher must unlock reality in such a way that it will evoke the child's spontaneous learning intention.

3. Forming

Unlocking or unfolding reality comprises the help and aid an adult offers a child with the eventual aim that the child will become an adult. By its nature, teaching is formative in its effect for the following reasons: the aid given by the adult to the child displaces the latter's irresolution and reserve concerning a given aspect of reality. The effect of forming — formedness — means that the child is emancipated concerning an aspect of reality and that he is capable of determining his own position in relation to it.

Furthermore, forming has the added effect of enriching the child's inner life as is evident in his wider and deeper experiencing. The didactic situation, therefore, offers the child the opportunity to extend his experiences qualitatively and quantitatively.

These two aspects of the category "forming" increase and progressively realize the child's potential to become intimately acquainted with a larger and more sophisticated reality. As the child is formed in the didactic situation, so his relationship to reality changes. This change is evident in a wider (more encompassing) and deeper relationship to reality. Therefore, one could also say that forming by means of teaching has the effect of creating a more adequate relationship between child and reality.

4. Orientation

It is realistic to expect the child to orient himself in relation to the unlocked reality. It is self-evident that the adult cannot expose aspects of the wide and encompassing reality if the child does not possess fixed points in terms of which he can determine his position in the new reality. Therefore, the didactic meaning of orientation is that a child must determine his own position with the help of the known and fixed points that teaching provides for this purpose. Normally, these fixed points are the learning content. In his unfolding of reality the didactician enables the child not only to understand the content but also to use the insights to extend and enlarge his relationship to reality. In this sense, contents are the means of orientation. Orientation provides the child with the opportunity to enhance and enlarge his mobility and familiarity with reality. Without this orientation, reality remains undifferentiated, chaotic and unattractive for the child.

5. Accompaniment

During the teaching and learning activity, the adult does not leave the child to his own devices. The adult is continually involved with the child; he indicates direction, controls mistakes, tests insight, repeats certain aspects of the lesson, lets the child exercise certain activities, etc. He does all of this to ensure that the

child is steadily improving. Accompaniment is central to the progress of didactic activities because it emphasizes the fact that the adult is continually trying to meet the child's situation. The teaching activity does not appear as such if the category of accompaniment is absent.

6. Objectification

Unfolding reality, learning, forming, orientation and accompaniment imply that there is a certain distance or objectivity between man and reality during the course of teaching. Without distance or objectivity one cannot adequately gain any perspective on reality. As an adult, the teacher has already established a certain standpoint or conception concerning reality. This means that he has to distance himself from reality to the extent that he can view it objectively. Objectification of reality is essential and a prerequisite before the child can adequately be taught about reality. The aim is that the child must attain the same level of objectivity in his relationship to reality as the teacher. Objectification of reality by the child is of cardinal importance for the teacher because it is a precondition for the child's eventual impartial judgment of reality.

The aim here is not objectivism that, as an ideology, can never be a pedagogically accountable didactic aim. Objectification essentially means that the child is removed from the immediacy of the content in such a way that he is capable of identifying the essences of the content as well as their interrelationships. The aim is to enable the child to make sound judgments in terms of which he can evaluate the particular content, accept it or even discard it. In this sense objectification is not only confined to educating because it also imparts quality to one's life-style. If objectification does not appear in the didactic situation, the child is lost in reality in that he is not able to order the content in a comprehensive way or make decisions about it.

7. Imperativity

It is characteristic of teaching that it is always concerned with development or improvement. Certain demands are made of the child in the teaching situation that he cannot ignore or avoid. This does not mean that the child always adequately meets them, and if he doesn't, this cannot be ignored. If the child's achievements or performances are not at the desired level, the adult repeats the situation until he (the demand) is satisfied. The unlocking of reality is never diffuse or uncertain but rather it is specific and direct. In this respect, the teacher makes specific demands of the child and expects him to improve the way he accepts them.

All of the previous categories are meaningless if the imperative character of the situation is not fully realized. Even where the child is learning by himself (for example when doing homework) imperativity retains its authority as a didactic category. This is because auto-didactic situations cannot be authentically realized if the child does not attempt to meet the demands the content make on him.

8. Anticipation

The future is continually realized in the teaching situation. It is a human involvement always directed to the future. If the future has to be actualized in the present, anticipation always necessarily is present in the teaching situation. In this sense the relationship between the categories “anticipation” and “imperativity” is clear. The demands made of the child in the didactic situation have a strong bearing on the child’s future activities with respect to reality. Where the teacher anticipates the child’s future in the classroom the implication is that he has a concept of the child’s future that he (the teacher) considers to be important.

Where there is no anticipation, it means that the teacher teaches contents that have no consequences for the child’s future. The basic structure of the curriculum is that it clearly spells out what the child must do now to enable him eventually to master certain reality. Anticipation does not mean the teacher must be a futurologist. It means that the teacher must anticipate the child’s course of life in order to prepare him for the life reality he will encounter one day.

9. Formalizing

The didactic activity is aimed at the realization of certain skills and to aid the child to acquire a certain mobility regarding specific aspects of reality. Skills and mobility culminate in better understanding, greater efficiency and more independence. However, these qualities of the child’s learning are not necessarily achieved at the first teaching attempt. The teacher must therefore repeat the didactic situation in order to present the essences of the learning content again. This means he re-structures a certain didactic situation to enable the child to prove his ability, to exercise certain skills or to have another opportunity to master certain contents.

In order to repeat the teaching situation, the teacher will have to formalize it. It is important to differentiate between formalizing and formalism in this context. Formalism implies that the teacher constructs his lessons in only one form. This often leads to a rigid application of a teaching recipe and this is didactically totally unacceptable.

As a didactic category, formalizing stresses the immediate as well as the mediate character of teaching. The teacher must consciously construct a situation that can function in two ways: first, to offer an opportunity for a more effective orientation to reality; and, second, to offer an opportunity for a more authentic acceptance of reality as part of the child’s life world. Formalizing enables the teacher once again to present the child with contents previously exposed. Formalizing and accompaniment, as didactic categories, are closely associated in that formalizing provides the didactic structure within which accompaniment is achieved.

10. Socializing

The didactic situation is essentially a social situation. It is eminently a situation of interpersonal relationships of a social nature. There is always a social relationship between adults and children in the teaching situation. The learning activity of the child progresses in a social climate where certain norms and codes

of behavior are set, and this in turn determines the quality of the activities and behaviors.

The didactic category of socialization describes certain aims in the course of teaching by bringing the interpersonal structure of teaching to the fore. It is simply true that a child cannot find his own way through reality without the help and aid of the adult and still emerge without being hurt. That is, reality is only meaningful to the child insofar as it is a human reality. The child experiences reality as meaningful to the extent that he identifies himself with the person of the adult and that he is able to form a positive relationship with him. Identifying with and relating to the adult are the means by which the child experiences the surrounding world as meaningful. The involvement of teacher and child in reality has a clearly socializing tendency.